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FOREWORD 
Hawthorne's oeuvre is decisively modern. It arrives out of the 
future and speaks to us today. It is audacious. 1 In so far as it speaks 
against the unquestioned perceptual and metaphysical bias of the age, a 
bias immediately contingent upon the scientific-technological world-view 
which had exhaustively informed the most basic posture of Western 
civilization since the Renaissance, Hawthorne's work affectively articu-
lates a counter-environment or "world" in opposition to the tradition 
from whence it obtains. Over and against the predominantly transparent 
"rationalism" of his day, and its divergent conspicuousness in both 
idealism and transcendentalism, Hawthorne's fiction discloses a 
revolutionary moment in its discovery of the world, a moment liberated 
from the scientific-technological objectification of Being in order to 
become apparent. Thus articulated, the world no longer constitutes the 
transparent reflection of a consciousness whose "content" is already 
determined ahead of itself, but rather becomes an indivisible part of the 
opaque and situated unitary structure, being-in-the-world. At the same 
time, Hawthorne's work performs an ontological reduction of Being, dis-
closing the bankruptcy of an intelligence which ignores its own affective 
basis or "ground" in pre-reflective understanding. In its most radical 
lcf. David Michael Levin, "The Novelhood of the Novel: The Limits 
of Representation and the Modernist Discovery of Presence," Chicago 
Review, 48 (Spring 1977) : 87--"The modernist novel is a scandal. Not 
even the boldest .of the old masters, excepting, perhaps Laurence Sterne 
(consider Tristram Shandy) and Nathaniel Hawthorne (consider 'Rappaccini's 
Daughter,' 'Dr. Heidegger's Experiment' and 'My Kinsman, Major Molineaux' 
[sic]), would have dared the audacities of our modernist writers." 
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manifestation, this reduction of Being in Hawthorne's oeuvre takes the 
form, "head" versus "heart." But how, specifically, does this articu-
lation come about, and to what does it point? 
Although it seems that Hawthorne never developed a systematic 
philosophy, his own comments in the notebooks, as well as the fiction 
itself, reveal a persistent concern with the complex tradition out of 
which the oeuvre arises. Like the present, Hawthorne's age was beseiged 
by rapid technological advances whereby it became increasingly more 
difficult to situate one's "self" in the world. Eminently, as a man of 
his time, Hawthorne felt the necessity to transact the perceptual and 
ontological issues raised by the cultural milieu in which he lived. 
Thus, Hawthorne's fiction displays, throughout, a marked fascination with 
two predominant media which attained to their fullest development at this 
time: daguerreotype and diorama. In the following work I am suggesting 
that Hawthorne discovered in the daguerreotype and diorama two 
descriptive models which would acconunodate the reciprocal postures "head" 
and "heart. 11 Similarly, both models reflect a set of perceptual and 
ontological assumptions about the world which they portray. "Daguerrean" 
time and space, for example, are fixed and frozen. Here the percipient 
is without, looking upon a static moment and "perspective" space. He 
sets himself apart from and against the world in order to objectify its 
11 content;" and to this extent, the world becomes a comprehensive picture 
or view. Hawthorne's villains, without exception, assume such an 
attitude. In effect, Hawthorne's scientists, reformers, and 
."intellectuals" in general seek not so much to dis-cover the world, but 
rather to verify their own presuppositions. 11Dioramic11 time and space, 
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on the other hand, are fluid, transpositional, metamorphic. Here the 
percipient is within or "situated," looking upon an unframed perception 
where both "subject" and "object" equiprimordially constitute the 
phenomenal structure, being-in-the-world. Thus, the dioramic point of 
view is always ambiguously incomplete, and constitutes an authentically 
open bearing toward the existent as a whole. Metaphysically speaking, 
Hawthorne's oeuvre implicitly translates both the daguerrean attitude of 
the "head" and the dioramic attitude of the "heart" into the realm of 
"subjectivity" as analogous models of logic. In Heideggerian terms, that 
mode of consciousness proper to the daguerrean model corresponds to the 
logic of calculating reason: Descartes' consciousness of the ego cogito. 
That mode of consciousne~s proper to the dioramic model corresponds to 
the world's inner space: Pascal's logic of the heart. In Hawthorne's 
work, an ontological conversion of consciousness ensues whenever the 
daguerrean manipulation and objectification of Being is turned toward the 
dioramic interior of the heart's inner space: such is the case with 
Roderick Elliston. For only when the "scientific" or self-assertive 
attitude (Hawthorne's "unpardonable sin") is turned toward the heart's 
interior does man appropriate the existent as a whole. The converted 
consciousness engages in "saying" without the self-imposing willing of 
desire--without calculating reason and its objectification of Being. It 
is to say Being; it is to be; it is to care. Thus, man accomplishes this 
conversion with language: witness Dimmesdale' s final "revelation." In 
speaking the truth of his heart, Dimmesdale returns to the fullness of 
Being, the very fullness of the existent itself wherein Being .is always 
situated--that is, Being-there (Da-sein). Conversely, the self-imposing 
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attitude characteristic of Hawthorne's villains never turns this 
conversion; it violates the human heart; it turns away from the heart; it 
makes of the heart an object; such is the case with Ethan Brand. To 
repose in this attitude is to stand apart from Being, to stand outside 
Being: witness Chillingworth, Hollingsworth, and Westervelt. 
Furthermore, located within the tradition from whence this 
dichotomy between head and heart originates, its ground is discernible in 
nothing less than the subject-object dichotomy itself, a dichotomy which 
had informed the most elemental presuppositions concerning the nature of 
"reality" throughout the history of Western civilization as a whole. 
Thus, the subject-object dichotomy, and its "artistic" delineation in 
Hawthorne as head versus heart, points to an historical context which 
Hawthorne's oeuvre disrupts. Because Hawthorne's work implicitly sets 
out to destruct or de-construct the referential surface of the metaphysi-
cal world-picture which had so unequivocally articulated the subject-
object dichotomy ever since the Renaissance, I have felt it necessary to 
explore the background of that tradition in some detail. Thus, the 
first two chapters of the present work investigate the uniquely Western 
and essentially philosophical tradition which Hawthorne's oeuvre 
affectively destroys. Similarly, the two complimentary chapters which 
conclude the present work specifically address the Hawthorne canon in 
terms of the aforementioned context. In other words, the dissertation 
generally takes the form of a structural "gestalt," wherein Chapters I 
and II constitute the "ground" or background, while Chapters III and IV 
constitute the "figure" itself, that is, Hawthorne's oeuvre. Hence, 
although Hawthorne rhetorically abhorred the lifeless abstractions of 
ix 
philosophy as such, it is my sincere hope that the following discussion 
will disclose Hawthorne's work in a way which will make it appear to us 
again, for Hawthorne's work is out of the future and speaks to us today. 
Finally, in so far as the present work essentially constitutes a 
phenomenological approach to Hawthorne's oeuvre, it assumes on the part 
of the reader at least a passing familiarity with certain contemporary 
thinkers--specifically, the basic writings of Martin Heidegger and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The obvious limitations of time and space 
prohibit a more detailed philosophical explication of the terms herein 
employed other than what is explicitly set forth in the first two 
chapters. Unavoidably, that explication will be inordinate for some, 
and insufficient for others. Throughout, however, I ask the reader to 
bear in mind that whenever the terms "subject" and "object" are utilized, 
they refer to the single, unitary structure "being-in-the-world," which 
is never divisible ontologically and which signifies the primordial 
structure from whence the possibility of the subject-object dichotomy 
misunderstandingly originates in the first place. Otherwise, it is hoped 
the following schema will clarify some of the basic distinctipps alte~4Y 
taken for granted in the present work. 2 Whenever an inquiry i$ 
"ontological," its object is Being (Sein); its terms are designated as 
"existentials;" the status of occurrence is designated as "factical;" and 
the type of self-awareness which accompanies the inquiry is "existential." 
Reciprocally, whenever an inquiry is "antic," its object is some Entity 
(Das Sciende); its terms are designated as "categories;" the status of 
2cf. Michael Gelven, A Commentary on Heidegger's "Being and Time," 
(New York: Harper and Row, A Harper Torchbook, 1970), pp. 19-24. 
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occurrence is designated as "factual;" and the type of self-awareness 
which accompanies the inquiry is "existentiell." In so far as the present 
investigation seeks to phenomenologically disclose the ontological ground 
of Hawthorne's oeuvre, it is always directed toward the "existential" 
self-awareness which the world of Hawthorne's work figures forth, the 
very self-awareness toward which the villains that populate Hawthorne's 
fictional world have already closed themselves off. To the extent that 
Hawthorne's villains treat Dasein as merely another object in objective 
space, they characteristically articulate the type of "ontical attitude" 
which Hawthorne's work brings to account. It is precisely this 
ontological bearing that grounds the world of Hawthorne's work and, at 
the same time, speaks to us today in its own significant voice, a voice 
which is both silent and alien because it is too near. The authentically 
reticent discourse of Hawthorne's oeuvre echoes the void between Being 
and nothingness, and re-soundingly calls us to care. 
xi 
CHAPTER I 
DAGUERREOTYPE AND WORLD-VIEW: THE FRAME 
The eighteenth century explicitly articulated an attitude consti-
tutive of the most elementary vector of Western civilization since the 
Renaissance. Cartesian metaphysics had already solidified this position 
when it defined the existent as objectivity of representation, and truth 
as certainty of representation;! as such, the existent is only in so far 
as it is set before us as an object, as something calculable. By 
defining the existent as that which is re-presented "objectively," man 
simultaneously sets himself up as the real and uniquely meaningful 
subject independent of a world in which he finds himself situated. He 
subsequently appropriates the meaning of the existent merely as a super-
fluous footnote to himself. He becomes, in fact, the center of the 
world, the center of the existent as a whole, the "measure" of all things. 
This process whereby man "sets up," "sets before," and "sets apart" at the 
same time discloses the most basic exercise of modern history: "the more 
completely and thoroughly the conquered world stands at our disposal,··. the 
more objective the object seems to be, the more subjectively--that is, 
the more prominently--does the subjectum rise up, and the more inevitably 
do contemplation and explanation of the world and doctrine about the 
world turn into a doctrine of man, into anthropology."2 Only when man 
!Martin Heidegger, "The Age of the World View," trans. 
Marjorie Grene, Boundary 2 4 (Winter 1976) : 349. 
2Ibid., pp. 352-53. 
1 
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sets himself apart from the existent do the resultant subjective and 
objective postures mutually condition one another so that "reality" 
becomes a problem. Hence, in an attempt to solve this pseudo-problem, 
the dichotomy between subject and object, man, metaphysically cut off and 
isolated from the world qua world, consequently adopts an attitude or 
view towards the world whereby it exists only to the extent that it is 
determinate. Moreover, this prospect of the world, as an object of 
transcendental inquiry about which absolute knowledge is possible, 
represents an attitude peculiarly and voluntarily maintained by man 
himself. This anthropological analysis of the world, which attained 
exclusive prominence at the end of the eighteenth century, persists 
today more vigorously than ever before and is essentially characterized, 
thus, by having a "world-view" (Weltanschauung). 
As the subject of a world-view--that is, as that existent who has 
an entirely determinate frame of reference and to whom no "objective" 
domain is inaccessible--man thereby constitutes the "norm" of truth, the 
absolute standard by which something is said to be certain or not. Man 
simultaneously gets himself "into the picture" as that cogitatio whose 
positing consciousness can re-present the whole picture to itself, a 
-third person process determining every modality of the res extensa.3 By 
being in the frame of his own view, as another object in an object-world, 
man acquires a specific view of the world which in its most radical 
significance means simply a completed view of man. This implies that 
he is able to deal with the existent; he is equipped to negotiate it 
and, similarly, to determine it. 
3Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. 
Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 80. 
But in so far as man thus puts himself into the picture, he 
puts himself into the setting, that is, into the open horizon of 
the universally and openly represented. Therefore man posits 
himself as the setting, in which the existent must from now on 
represent itself, present itself, that is, be a view or picture. 
Man becomes the representative of the existent in the sense of the 
objective. 
What is decisive is that man himself takes this viewpoint as 
produced by himself, maintains it voluntarily as that taken by 
himself, and as the basis of a possible development of humanity. 
Now, for the first time, there is such a thing as a viewpoint of 
man. Man takes on himself the manner in which he is to stand to 
the existent as the objective. That type of being-a-man begins 
which uses the sphere of human powers as the place for measuring 
and accomplishing the mastery of the existent as a whole. The 
age which is determined by this event is not only for retro-
spective reflection a new one as against the preceding one, but it 
asserts itself specifically as the new one. To be new is peculiar 
to the world which has become a view.4 
3 
Thus, by placing itself in the forefront of the frame as subjectum, 
second-order consciousness paradoxically encloses a world delinquently 
withheld from ambiguity, a world whose total space encompasses not only 
the view, but the viewer as well in so far as he transparently transfers 
himself back upon the very frame of reference itself. But to the extent 
that man maintains this over-view, he simultaneously over-looks the more 
primordial phenomenon of experience and focuses exclusively on the world 
as an "object" of experience. Indeed, "the existent holds as existent 
only in so far as and to the extent that it is drawn into and back to 
this life, that it is lived through or experienced and becomes experi-
ence."5 Because he thus entertains a view of life, man brings his own 
life into the picture as the norm, a posture universally susceptible to 
truth; he subsequently posits objectivity or "correctness" as the 
standard of truth itself. As a concept mutually agreed upon, the truth 
of the world becomes a representable fact. And as that existent which 
4Heidegger, "World View," pp. 351-52. 5rbid.,_ p. 353. 
goes about determining the content of this factuality, man "brings into 
play the unlimited power of calculation, planning, and cultivation of 
all things. Science as research is art indispensable form of this 
adjustment in the world, one of the paths on which the modern age races 
to the fulfillment of its nature with a velocity unknown to the partici-
pants."6 
4 
Like Descartes' meditating Ego, the impartial spectator 
(uninteressierter Zuschauer) of scientific observation makes no attempt 
to discover, or rediscover, an already given rationality, but establishes 
itself by an act of initiative which has no guarantee in Being, "its 
justification resting entirely on the effective power which it confers on 
us by taking our own history upon ourselves."? The scientific method 
unquestioningly accepts perception as a kind of window which opens onto 
things, an act directed towards a truth-in-itself "in which the reason 
underlying all appearances is to be found."8 Tacitly implied in this 
assumption is the belief that the perspective of individual conscious-
nesses can ultimately be co-ordinated, removing all contradiction in so 
far as "what is now indeterminate for me could become determinate for a 
more complete knowledge, which is as it were realized in advance in the 
thing, or rather which is the thing itself."9 The scientific attitude 
thus schizophrenically deserts its ontological ground and ceases to 
recognize its "place" in its determinate view of the world. Repressively 
isolated not only from itself but also the world it seeks to frame, 
scientific consciousness, like the world-view, thus levels down all 
6Ibid. 7Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. xx. 
Brbid., p. 54. 9rbid. 
experience: "in face of the constituting I, the empirical selves are 
objects."10 Moreover, because it frames a view of the world solely 
constituted by the res exte~, the history of science represents 
nothing less than a history of the thing perceived. 
5 
The ideality of the object, the objectification of the living body, 
the placing of spirit in an axiological dimension having no common 
measure with nature, such is the transparent philosophy arrived at 
by pushing further along the route of knowledge opened up by 
perception. It could be held that perception is an incipient 
science, science a methodical and complete perception, since 
science was merely following uncritically the ideal of knowledge 
set up by the perceived thing.ll 
It is in this sense that Heidegger speaks of the "battle" of world-views 
taking place today. Because the basic process of modern times has come 
to mean the conquest of the world as picture, the world view now means 
the product of representational building: "In it man fights for the 
position in which he can be that existent which sets the standard for 
all existence and forms the directive for it."12 Furthermore, this 
battle for supremacy rages "not between world views at random, but only 
between those which have already taken extreme basic positions of man 
with the last decisiveness."l3 Even today, this opposition is chiefly 
characterized by the kind of attitude Kepler displayed toward Fludd when 
he was attacked for his strict adherence to scientific measurement and 
objectivity: Kepler replied, "Caudam ego teneo sed manu, tu caput 
amplectaris mente, modo ne somnians"--"You may embrace the head (of the 
universe) but you do so only in your mind, nay, in your dreams; I have 
10Ibid., p. 56. 
llibid. 
12Heidegger, "World View," p. 353. 
I3Ibid. 
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merely the tail, but that I hold in my hand."14 Unfortunately, neither 
thinker sought the "whole" on the hither side of this ingeminated 
distinction. 
The traditional subject-object dichotomy continues to inform 
various contemporary world-views, although in physics the discovery of 
the quantum of action has initiated a general collapse of this 
foundation. The category "natural object" was, perhaps, the first to 
disappear; for its part, the organism no longer presents physico-chemical 
analysis "with the practical difficulties of a complex object, but with 
the theoretical difficulty of a meaningful being." 15 As the Nobel 
Prize-winning physicist, W. Pauli, has remarked: 
Though we now have natural sciences, we no longer have a total 
scientific picture of the world. Since the discovery of the 
quantum of action, physics has gradually been forced to relinquish 
its proud claim to be able to understand, in principle, the whole 
world. This very circumstance, however, as a correction of 
earlier one-sidedness, could contain the germ of progress toward 
a unified conception of the entire cosmos of which the natural 
sciences are only a part.16 
Whatever may be eventually resolved from such a recognition, it 
remains true, even today, that science for the most part tenaciously 
adheres to its traditional view of the world, whereby the scient.ific 
concept fixes phenomena objectively. It orders the world by virtue of a· 
rationalism which ignores the phenomenal experience of chaos, defining a 
theoretical state of bodies not subject to the action of any force, and 
14Apologia adversus demonstrationem analyticam Roberti de 
Fluctibus, quoted in Erwin Panofsky, "Artist, Scientist, Genius: Notes 
on the 'Renaissance-Dannnerung,'" in The Renaissance: Six Essays 
(New York: Harper and Row, Inc., Harper Torchbooks, 1962), pp. 181-82. 
15Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 56. 
16"The Influence of Archetypal Ideas on the Scientific Theories of 
Kepler," quoted in Panofsky, The Renaissance, p. 182. 
thus ipso facto defining force itself. 
The notion of geometrical space, indifferent to its contents, that 
of pure movement which does not by itself affect the properties of 
the object, provided phenomena with a setting of inert existence 
in which each event could be related to physical conditions 
responsible for the changes occurring, and therefore contributed 
to this freezing of being which appeared to be the task of 
physics. In thus developing the concept of the thing, scientific 
knowledge was not aware that it was working on a presupposition.l7 
And though a few may recognize today that nature "is not in itself 
geometrical, and it appears so only to a careful observer who contents 
himself with macrocosmic data,"l8 the scientific pre-supposition 
continues to structure the majority view which sees the world as the 
completed picture of its own conceptual frame. Yet, in order to explain 
the upsurge of reason "in a world not of its making and to prepare the 
substructure of living experience without which reason and liberty are 
emptied of their content and wither away," we must see rationalism 
itself"' in a historical perspective which it set itself on principle to 
avoid."l9 
I 
The Middle Ages had conceived of a picture as "a material, 
impenetrable surface on which figures and things are depicted.n20 
. Similarly, what it had called perspectiva was merely optics, that is, 
"an elaborate theory of vision which attempted to determine the 
structure of the natural visual image by mathematical means but did not 
attempt to teach the artist how to reproduce this image in a painting or 
17Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 54. 
18Ibid., p. 56. 19Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
20Panofsky, The Renaissanc~, p. 124. 
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drawing." 21 It was not until about 1420 that Filippo Brunelleschi 
defined the painting as "a plane cross section through the pencil of rays 
connecting the eye of the painter (and the beholder) with the object or 
. n22 obJects seen, so that by around 1435 Leone Battista Alberti was able 
to formulate the picture as a "pariete di vetro" or "an imaginary window-
pane through which we look out into a section of space."23 Because the 
Renaissance predicated its radically new approach to the visible world 
upon this neoteric definition of artistic construction ~nd represen-
tation,24 the world itself became uniformly spatial in so far as it could 
be geometrically articulated. Indeed, this revolutionary technique for 
graphic representation created the very possibility of an objective 
science; and it is fair to say that the subsequent development of all the 
sciences during the Renaissance was directly contingent upon it: 
perspective laid the foundation for advances in botany, palaeontology, 
physics, zoology, and both projective and analytical geometry.25 But 
above all, this new pictorial or "artificial" perspective enabled the 
science of anatomy to explore the interior space of the human body with 
an objective precision hitherto impossible. Leonardo's Situs drawings, 
for example, not only co-relate perspective images with vertical and 
horizontal sections, but also demonstrate the internal organs in 
transparency;26 and his "serial sections" represent "a concrete, 
surgical application of a method of geometrical projection developed by 
•• Piero della Francesa and later on adopted by Durer: the plotting of a 
21rbid., pp. 131-32. 22rbid. , p. 133. 23rbid., p. 124. 
24rbid. 25rbid., pp. 140 and 133, respectively. 
26rbid., p. 148. 
series of cross-sections through the human body preparatory to exact 
. . n27 I h 1 ' perspect1ve construct1on. n t is respect, Andreas Vesa ius 
De humani corporis fabrica (1543) marks the inception of a new era in 
anatomical investigation.28 Science had securely commenced its 
transparent mission of seeing through the world. 
At the same time that anatomy negotiated the transparency of the 
individual object, the human body and its parts, another science was 
breaking fresh ground on a reciprocal front. In the very same year that 
Vesalius published his Fabrica, Copernicus unequivocally formulated the 
new astronomy; by placing the earth in its "proper" perspective, he 
articulated the geometrically "correct" space of the world. And like 
anatomy, the external world demonstrated its own theory of proportions 
which would henceforth locate the res extensa within a transparent view 
uniformly ingressive to all by virtue of its mathematical constitution. 
To the degree that the world had become geometrically spatial, man had 
become an observer--the dis-interested spectator of his view. Once the 
Renaissance had introduced perspective into painting, the art work 
. necessarily engaged man as a spectator tll.rough the instrwnentality of 
its visual ~niform space. Having ceased to participate in the world, 
man henceforth negotiates the existent. in terms of its geometric 
continuity; for what, after all, constitutes scientific observation but 
an attitude which varies the point of view while keeping the object 
fixed?29 The object, as such, represents an invariable structure 
27Ibid., PP· 153-55. 
28George Sarton, "The Quest for Truth: Scientific Progress During 
the Renaissance," in The Renaissance, p. 70. 
29Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, pp. 90-92. 
9 
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existing in a theoretical space so that between the subjectum and the 
existent as a whole there abides a spatial continuum which, focused in 
the predetermined depth of an "objective" vanishing point, not only 
requires 20/20 vision for its epistemological certainty, but also 
constitutes a "psychological" inter-action. Indeed, once the existent 
becomes that upon which man "reflects" he has already separated himself 
from the existent as a whole. In this sense, the twentieth-century 
rhetoric of alienation is by no means indigenous to the century itself; 
its origin extends as far back as the Renaissance: witness Hamlet and 
Lear, or for that matter--Oedipus. Because our thinking is so 
irretrievably established in spatial perspective, we are always "subject" 
to being out of place; that is, alienated. Consequently, we even think 
of time as a function of perspective space, for who would care to 
qualify my previous statement that alienation extends as "far back" as 
the Renaissance? Pictorial perspective thus successfully transferred a 
transparent consciousness onto the world itself in so far as man now 
possessed the fiducial means of seeing through it. Confidently poised 
outside the world, the scientific vision macrographically guaranteed that 
man could, once and for all, get a view of the world, a picture of the 
whole thing. Even today, such an eminent scientific figure as the late 
George Sarton could say with a straight face: 
Many people misunderstand science, and hence one can hardly 
expect them to have a fair idea of its history. The history of 
science might be defined as the history of the discovery of 
objective truth, of the gradual conquest of matter by the human 
mind; it describes the age-long and endless struggle for the 
freedom of thought • 
The history of science is one of the essential parts of the 
spiritual history of mankind; the other main parts are the history 
of art and the history of religion. It differs from these other 
parts in that the development of knowledge is the only development 
which is truly cumulative and progressive. Hence, if we try to 
explain the progress of mankind, the history of science should be 
the very axis of our explanation.30 
Copernicus would have agreed; and it remained for Kepler to establish 
' the new world picture, vis-a-vis advancing technological developments, 
with finality. 
By virtue of its naive anopia, however, science simultaneously 
developed a tell-tale symptom characteristic of its historical 
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motivation up to, and including, the present. At the very time when man 
was beginning to "conquer" nature, Copernicus ironically shoved him out 
of the center of the picture. The repercussions from this infantile 
trauma have haunted the scientific vision ever since; for a lurking 
doubt astigmatically disrupts the superficial correctness of this view, 
the doubt, be it ever so small, that the world might just be slightly 
larger than itself. Beneath its bravado-exterior there persistently 
dwells a cancerous anxiety, an anarthric apprehension that someday the 
world will fool it, just as it manipulatively "fools" with the world. 
And as its April-fool mentality nonchalantly manipulates the world and 
steals the object from a setting, it reciprocally fears that at any 
moment its cleptobiotic joke may back-fire. By framing its view, . 
moreover, toward a transparent cross-section of theoretical space, 
science paradoxically negates the very over-view it claims to 
appropriate. Since science can only manipulate its objects within the 
conceptual frame of an ideal space, it de-limits its own capacity to see 
in terms of the very frame it requires in order to freeze being. Thus, 
to the extent that it sees through the opacity of things by virtue of 
30sarton, The Renaissance, p. 55. 
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its frame, science, in effect, peeps at the world. It peeps at the 
world in order to catch it by surprise in the same way that it "listens" 
to the world in order to "over-hear" the secrets of the universe, its 
transparent design. Wordsworth's indictment of "One that would peep and 
botanize/Upon his mother's grave"31 perhaps expresses it best. By 
divorcing its objects, as well as itself, from the situation, from 
incarnate being, science simultaneously severs the thing from matter 
itself, and its "ideas" from the form of its own "body" (of knowledge). 
This is why science is always in the act of cutting off its own head; 
but in the process it goes blind, of course. In order to avoid this 
discomfort, it subsequently enlisted the aid of technology which 
courteously obliged to become its handmaiden, though in outward posture 
only. For ever since, technology has led it by the hand. Together, 
these two make a charming but dangerous couple. 
Science manipulates things and gives up living in them. It makes 
its own limited models of things; operating upon these indices or 
variables to effect whatever transformations are permitted by 
their definition, it comes face to face with the real world only 
at rare intervals. Science is and always has been that admirably 
active, ingenious, and bold way of thinking whose fundamental bias 
is to treat everything as though it were an object-in-general--as 
though it meant nothing to us and yet was predestined for our own 
use.32 
In so far, then, as the new representational technique of perspective 
delineated the space of an "objective" world and created the basis for an 
"objective" science during the Renaissance, it subsequently fostered the 
metaphysical world-picture whereby the subjectum negotiates the world 
31Wordsworth: Poetical Works, ed. Thomas Hutchinson, rev. ed. 
Ernest de Selincourt (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 380. 
32Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception, ed. James M. Edie 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 159. 
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from an un-situated, theoretical point of view; that is, outside of it. 
Once the world became transparent, it ceased to be that space where man 
comes up "against" things, and became, instead, the luminous reflection 
of consciousness. Yet, the metaphysical picture itself required its own 
articulation; and Descartes filled the bill. 
Throughout the greater part of the sixteenth century, art and 
science had evolved together, but by the end of that century the "divine 
madness" of Neo-Platonism had inspired such art theorists as 
Raffaele Borghini, Gregorio Comanini, and Federico Zuccari to openly 
attack science, especially mathematics, as an enslavement of the 
spirit.33 The fact that the world of science was "increasingly 
dominated by telescopic and microscopic instrumentation served to 
estrange it from the world of the artist;"34 and via the Neo-Platonic 
gospel of supra-rationalism, art itself turned away from the imprison-
ment of all "rational" rules: "It was realized that the numerous planes 
which the Renaissance had projected onto one surface were, in fact, 
distinct and had to be separated again--according to principles which 
could become evident only once the projection had been performed."35 
Descartes' metaphysics unequivocally framed the completed picture of 
this separation between Nee-Platonic "subjectivity" and scientific 
"objectivity;" vis-'a-visthe "cogito" and "res extensa," Descartes 
fixed the world in its proper perspective; that is, he saw it as a view. 
Taking his lead from mathematics, Descartes defined the existent in 
terms of that continuous and uniform space constituted by a reflecting 
33Panofsky, The Renaissanc~, p. 175. 
34rbid., p. 178. 3Srbid., p. 175. 
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subject; and from this geometrically transparent consciousness he 
concluded to the existence of God and of the world itself. To negotiate 
the world in this fashion subsequently became "rational;" so that even 
today we speak of having a "rational" perspective on the thing in the 
sense that we see it "correctly," in its objectively proper place with 
respect to a complete continuum or whole picture, detached from our own 
"subjective" bias, that is, outside of our "self." And once the world is 
thought outside us, it has already become conceptual--an observation. 
From its disinterested vantage point, rationalism refuted the situation 
in favor of an all-encompassing view of the spectacle of the world; but 
to the extent that it constitutes a view at all, it is all-encompassing 
not in the sense that it sees "around" any thing, but rather in the sense 
that it sees from a certain perspective--the rational or theoretically 
ubiquitous point of view. Rationalism represents the only perspective 
from which one can correctly observe the truth, for it fixes the object 
before it varies the point of view. Grounded in the single horizon of 
the object itself, rationalism holds the whole world before a gaze 
simultaneously everywhere and nowhere. Paradoxically, however, this 
ubiquitous vision always remains invisibly de-limited by the limitations 
of its frame; because it necessarily envisions its world outside itself, 
it exclusively appropriates a single horizon, a vanishing point which 
unambiguously adheres to its objects without exception. -Like the 
Renaissance painting, it thereby sees through its invisible "windowpane" 
onto the world. It can only know the world, then, in so far as it sets 
itself apart from it by virtue of a theoretical frame; whatever cannot 
be framed cannot be known; that is, it does not really exist. To the 
degree that object and frame constitute center and margin, rationalism 
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merely comes into the possession of an equally determinate peripheral 
vision;36 but this is nothing more than the distinction between object and 
subject expressly delineated via the perspective of the world-view itself. 
In his effort to define certainty in terms of quantitative measure-
mentor "correctness," Descartes thus ascribed the "reality" of the world 
to "rational" space alone. In effect, then, re-presentation (Vor-stellen) 
bestows an intelligibility upon the epistemological distinction between 
subject and object, and the pseudo-problem of "reality," by accommodating 
both the external and internal world in such a way that they make "sense." 
The Lear landscape in Shakespeare offers a close counterpart to the 
Durer illustration showing a perspective drawing being made through 
a transparent screen. The artist fixes himself in position, 
allowing neither himself or his model to move. He then proceeds to 
match dots on the picture plane with corresponding dots on the 
visual image, a rather bizarre anticipation of the head clamps of 
Daguerre. This is the kind of "single vision" that William Blake 
later deprecated as "single vision and Newton's sleep." It 
consists basically in a process of matching outer and inner 
representation. That which was faithfully represented or repeated 
has ever since been held to be the very criterion of rationality 
and reality.37 
Similarly, Descartes' severation between subject and object set in 
motion a subsequent explanation of both "entities" along historical lines 
which further isolated the one from the other, 
We have become accustomed, through the influence of the Cartesian 
tradition, to jettison the subject: the reflective attitude 
simultaneously purifies the common notions of body and soul by 
defining the body as the sum of its parts with no interior, and the 
soul as a being wholly present to itself without distance. These 
definitions make matters perfectly clear both within and outside 
ourselves: we have the transparency of an object with no secret 
recesses, the transparency of a subject which is nothing but what 
it thinks it is. The object is an object through and through, and 
36Marshall McLuhan and Harley Parker, Through the Vanishing 
Point: Space in Poetry and Painting (New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 
1968), p. 20. 
37rbid., p. 16. 
l~ . . ; 
consciousness a consciousness through and through. There are two 
senses, and two only, of the word 'exist': one exists as a thing 
or else one exists as a consciousness.38 
For Newton the existent became known as correct or true to the extent 
that it was represented as a refractive condition of the eye; for Kant 
the existent became known as correct or true in so far as it was 
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represented either as a determinate concept, that is, through the instru-
mentality of the ~ priori forms of the categories of the understanding, 
or as an indeterminate concept of an "aesthetic" object. Thus, both the 
"scientific" and "intellectual" attitude came to be predicated on the 
analogous operation of re~presentation. With respect to Newton's eye and 
Kant's mind's eye, the subjectum knows, in fact "experiences," the 
existent according to the perspective-view precisely because he is 
already positioned outside the existent itself. 
Writing to Francis Bacon in 1620, Sir Henry Wotton told of a visit 
to Kepler, where he saw a "draft of a landscape on a piece of paper, 
methought masterly done;"39 and to Wotton's surprise, Kepler remarked 
that he had made the picture from, 
a little black tent .•• exactly close and dark, save at one hole, 
about an inch and a half in the diameter, to which he applies a 
long perspective trunk, with a convex glass fitted to the said 
hole, and the concave taken out at the other end ••• through 
which the visible radiations of all the objects without are intro-
mitted, falling upon a paper • . . and so he traceth them with his 
pen in their natural appearance.40 
Kepler's "little black tent" was, of course, a camera obscura; and it 
became his visible model for the human eye. Although Giambattista della 
38Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 198. 
39The Life and Letters of Sir Henry Wotton, ed. Logan Pearsall 
Smith, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1907), 2:205. 
40rbid., p. 206 . 
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Porta had popularized it in the sixteenth century, the first published 
account appeared in Vitruvius' Architecture (1521). While others before 
Kepler had remarked its analogies to the human eye,41 Kepler was the 
first to fully demonstrate its resemblance to vision; and it remained 
for Scheiner to prove the hypothesis at his exhibition in Rome, 1625, 
where he "cut away the coats of the back parts of eyes of sheep and oxen, 
and, holding objects before them, saw the images of the objects clearly 
and distinctly inverted upon the naked retina."42 Descartes' geometrical 
vision was thus substantiated by these "pictures" painted on the eye, or 
so it seemed. Many thinkers of the period entertained the notion that in 
the structure of the eye could be found that intermediary term or missing 
link between the cogito and res extensa. Of course, this represented 
nothing more than a sophisticated rendition of the Cartesian pineal 
gland, for positing an intermediary in any single part of the body still 
pre-supposes unsituated Being. In his Essay Concerning Human Understand-
ing (1690), Locke's dark-room analogy of the camera obscura extends this 
kind of thinking toward the epistemological problem, his famous "closet-
simile" expresses it thus: 
methinks, the Understanding is not much unlike a Closet wholly shut 
from light, with only some little opening left, to let in external 
visible Resemblances, or Ideas of things without; would the 
Pictures coming into such a dark Room but stay there, and lie so 
orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble 
the Understanding of a Man, in reference to all Objects of sight, 
and the Ideas of them.43 
41Marjorie Hope Nicolson, Newton Demands the Muse (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 78. 
42Ibid., p. 79. 
43John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. 
Nidditch (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 163. 
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As the link between subject and object, the camera obscura thoroughly 
conditioned both philsophical and scientific attitudes during the 
seventeenth century so that Plato's figure in the cave, vigilantly 
observing the shadows on the wall, became the dominant symbol of the age. 
Newton's Opticks (1704) solidified the theoretical implications of 
the previous century, confirming scientific corroboration that the 
pictures of external objects are, indeed, "propogated by Motion along the 
Fibres of the Optick Nerves into the Brain," and constitute the very 
"cause of vision."44 
Light which comes from the several _Points of the Object is so 
refracted by the transparent skins and humours of the Eye • • • as 
to converge and meet again in so many Points in the bottom of the 
Eye, and there to paint the Picture of the Object upon that 
skin • • . with which the bottom of the Eye is covered. For 
Anatomists, when they have taken off from the bottom of the Eye 
that outward and most thick Coat called the Dura Mater, can then 
see through the thinner Coats, the Pictures of Objects lively 
painted thereon.45 
Nevertheless, such questions as why we see in single vision, not double, 
and why we see color, shape, and magnitude remained ambiguous; for 
Newton's theory demonstrated how we "see," but failed to show us how we 
"perceive." This was a problem which had perplexed not only Newton, but 
also Descartes, Kepler, and Locke as well. Newton's answer was 
characteristically naive, and no more addressed the fundamental issue 
than Descartes' Dioptric. We perceive, said Newton, via the "Sensorium:" 
"Is not the Sensory of Animals that place to which the sensitive 
Substance is present, and into which the sensible Species of Things are 
carried through the Nerves and Brain, that there they may be perceived 
44sir Isaac Newton, Opticks, based on 4th ed. London, 1730 
(New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1952), p. 15. 
45rbid. 
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by their immediate presence to that Substance."46 Yet, try as he might, 
Newton's "eye" could discern neither the situation of perception in the 
subject, nor "Light and its Effects upon the Frame of Nature;" but then, 
it did not have to: there remained that incorporeal, omnipresent Being 
"who in infinite Space, as it were in his Sensory, sees the things them-
selves intimately, and thoroughly perceives them, and comprehends them 
wholly by their immediate presence to himself."47 It was not until the 
nineteenth century, however, that God's "sensorium" became the explicit 
vision of science: witness Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. At any rate, 
the great Newton's authority now stood behind that view of the world 
which envisioned roan as the dis-interested spectator of a vast and 
comprehensive mathematical system or "picture," as Edwin Arthur Burtt 
put it, 
whose regular motions according to mechanical principles consti-
tuted the world of nature. The gloriously romantic universe of 
Dante and Milton, that set no bounds to the imagination of man as 
it played over space and time, had now been swept away •••• 
The world that people had thought themselves living in--a world 
rich with colour and sound, redolent with fragrance, filled with 
gladness, love and beauty, speaking everywhere of purposive 
harmony and creative ideals--was crowded now into minute corners 
in the brains of scattered organic beings. The really important 
world outside was a world hard, cold, colourless, silent, and 
dead; a world of quantity, a world of mathematically computable 
motions in mechanical regularity.48 
Or as Alfred North Whitehead similarly remarked, speaking of the 
seventeenth-century scientific world-view, whatever theory you chose 
"there is no light or colour as a fact in external nature. There is 
46rbid., p. 370. 
47Ibid., pp. 405 and 370, respectively. 
48Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical_ Science, rev. ed. 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1932), pp. 236-37. 
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merely motion of material:" thus, "Nature is a dull affair, soundless, 
scentless, colourless; merely the hurrying of material, endlessly, 
meaninglessly."49 Such was the world of Descartes, Kepler, Locke, and 
Newton. 
At the other extreme, a certain mental disposition, ideologically 
similar, had been simultaneously negotiating a theoretical world "out 
there," but from the opposite point of view. Rather than interrogate the 
res extensa as such, this reciprocal attitude emphasized the problematic 
character of the cogito itself; yet, the basic pre-supposition of a 
theoretical space framed by the perspective view continued to inform the 
subject-object disjunction. In his Discourse on Metaphysics (1686), 
Leibniz argued against the possibility of conceiving an irregular event 
since the mind is always able to construct or formalize a "regular" 
design for it: 
let us suppose for example that some one jots down a quantity of 
points upon a sheet of paper helter skelter, as do those who 
exercise the ridiculous art of Geomancy; now I say that it is 
possible to find a geometrical line whose concept shall be uniform 
and constant, that is, in accordance with a central formula, and 
which line at the same time'shall pass through all of those 
points, and in the same order.in which the hand jotted them doWJ}. 
Moreover, if a continuous line be traced, which is now straight, 
now circular, and now of any other description, it is possible to 
find a mental equivalent, a formula or an equation common to all 
the points of this line by virtue of which formula the changes in 
the direction of the line must occur. There is no instance of a 
face whose contour does not form part of a geometric line and 
which can not be traced entire by a certain mathematical motion. 50 
Like Descartes, Leibni.z once again assigns a transparent consciousness 
49Science and the Modern World (New York: The Macmillan Co., 
1925), pp. 76 and 77~espectively. 
50Gottfried Wilhelm Von Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics,'' in 
The European Philosophers: from Descartes to Nietzsche, ed. Monroe C. 
Beardsley (New York: Random House, The Modern Library, 1960), pp. 254-55. 
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onto the world; by treating an event as though it were a geometrical 
form, Leibniz, in effect, conceives of temporality in terms of a 
perspective space whose uniform continuity accomodates the whole picture 
at once. Because the world is ultimately theoretical, we can always have 
a whole view of it via a lineal series of equations. In such a way, the 
mind is able to frame a regular or perspectived view, whereby everything 
assumes its proper place. Thus, time takes its place along-side the 
other objects in a world where everything is only in so far as it can be 
re-presented to us; and since it is essentially spatial, time becomes 
determined by the spatial perspective itself--that is, the succession of 
individual, isolated moments which regularly recede along a continuous 
line toward an objectively determinate "form." Again, Leibniz's account 
of the regularity contingent upon the fact of mathematical "motion" 
reminds us of the Durer illustration, whose contour can be traced 
entirely by virtue of its representational cor.rectness. 
Hume fell into the same trap. His distinction between Mentory and 
Imagination is literally "drawn" in terms of their respective 
representational ability to produce a lively "image" or picture (Hume 
sometimes uses the word "idea" for what we commonly mean by "image") to 
the mind's eye. 
We find by experience, that when any impression has been present 
with the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and 
this it may do after two different ways: either when in its new 
appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, 
and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea; or 
when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The 
faculty, by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, 
is called the MEMORY, and the other the IMAGINATION. 'Tis evident 
at first sight, that the ideas of the memory are much more lively 
and strong than those of the imagination, and that the former 
faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours, than any 
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which are employ'd by the latter.51 
The diction itself reveals the metaphorical frame of mind in which Hume 
conceives of these faculties; they are defined in terms of their respec-
tive ability to "paint" the object in more or less "distinct colours." 
But there is more to it than this: consistent with the painting metaphor, 
' Hume attributes to the imagination, vis-a-vis its ability to grasp the 
object, a certain facility for positioning our "self." This perspective 
on our self, in relation to the imagination's perspective on its object, 
is both contingent upon time and space. The imagination always relates 
its object to the present time and place. The more remote the object in 
time or space, the more difficult is the task for the imagination, and 
the greater the pleasure we derive from its use. And though Hume admits 
"the consequences of a removal in space are much inferior to those of a 
removal in time,"52 he nevertheless conceives of the function of imagina-
tion primarily in spatial terms, for the removal in time is thought of as 
a distance between individual successive moments. In effect, then, the 
imagination positions man with respect to its object as a relation of 
perspective, that is, outside the existent itself. 
'Tis obvious, that the imagination can never totally forget the 
points of space and time, in which we are existent; but receives 
such frequent advertisements of them from the passions and senses, 
that however it may turn its attention to foreign and remote 
objects, it is necessitated every moment to reflect on the present. 
'Tis also remarkable, that in the conception of those objects, 
which we regard as real and existent, we take them in their proper 
order and situation, and never leap from one object to another, 
which is distant from it, without running over, at least in a cur-
sory manner, all those objects, which are interpos'd betwixt them. 
51"A Treatise of Human Nature," in David Hume: 
Works, ed. Thomas Hill Green and Thomas Hodge Grose, 
Germany: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1964), 1:317-18. 
52rbid., 2:206. 
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When we reflect, therefore, on any object distant from ourselves, 
we are oblig'd not only to reach it at first by passing thro' all 
the intermediate space betwixt ourselves and the object, but also 
to renew our progress every moment; being every moment recall'd to 
the consideration of ourselves and our present situation.53 
The specific discussion of the effect of spatial distance further 
indicates that for Hume the imagination re-presents its objects as a 
function of perspective: 
'tis evident that the mere view and contemplation of any greatness, 
whether successive or extended, enlarges the soul, and gives it a 
sensible delight and pleasure. A wide plain, the ocean, eternity, 
a succession of several ages; all these are entertaining objects, 
and excel every thing, however beautiful, which accompanies not its 
beauty with a suitable greatness. Now when any very distant 
object is presented to the imagination, we naturally reflect on the 
interpos'd distance, and by that means, conceiving something great 
and magnificent, receive the usual satisfaction. But as the fancy 
passes easily from one idea to another related to it, and 
transports to the second all the passions excited by the first, the 
admiration, which is directed to the distance, naturally diffuses 
itself over the distant object.54 
Because Hume, like all the others, pre-supposes that the world is 
objectively spatial, he can never get around the subject-object dilemma; 
the world is known only to the extent that we can re-present it as a 
picture or view outside the "self" or cogito. 
Even Kant's "copernican revolution" was not sufficiently liberated 
from this kind of thinking to free the object from its theoretical 
manipulation, for Kant equally frames the world by making it immanent in 
the subject, as Husser! observed. His distinction between the empirical 
"reproductive" Imagination and the transcendental "productive" 
Imagination remains tied to the object as that concerning which we form 
or "frame" an image. By extending Hume's theory of imagination from the 
empirical realm to the transcendental, Kant defined the imagination as 
53Ibid., pp. 205-06. 54Ibid., pp. 209-210. 
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that faculty which not only makes "sense" of the object immediately in 
our presence and enables us to re-present an image of the object to our 
mind when the object itself is absent, but also determines the form of 
our sensations 3!_ priori. Imaginative activity is one of "apprehension," 
that is, it mediates between sensation and intellection. It consequently 
contributes to our awareness of the world via its representational power 
in so far as it forms images. Because of its aesthetic significance, 
however, we sometimes tend to forget the proposed function of the Third 
Critigue; yet, Kant's primary purpose in the Critique of Judgment (1790) 
was to link up Understanding to Reason by way of Judgment, specifically 
the "reflective judgment," which from a particular "given" appropriates a 
universal. In ordinary perception, the imagination informs our sense 
data and presents it to the understanding as a concept; and this 
conceptualization, as the form of an object, for example, provides the 
very possibility of representation in so far as it is constituted by 
"regularity." As Kant saw it, "The regularity which leads to the 
concept of an object is indeed the indispensable condition (conditio sine 
qua non) for grasping the object in a single representation and 
determining the manifold in its form."55 Thus, Kant's epistemological 
revolution continues to negotiate the object in spatial terms, for we 
come to know the object in so far as it always presents itself to us in 
the same conceptual "position." In seeking to find a universal pattern 
or "form" from a particular "given," the aesthetic judgment, as a spe-
cific kind of reflective judgment, employs the transcendental concept of 
the "purposiveness of nature." This, of course, does not mean that 
55critigue of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner 
Publishing Co., 1968), p. 79. 
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nature itself has a purpose or end, but rather that we assume some kind 
of universal pattern in things prior to our seeking such a pattern. 
"The purposiveness of nature is therefore a particular concept, ~priori, 
which has its origin solely in the reflective judgment."56 As such, it 
is entirely subjective, and attributes nothing to the object whatsoever. 
This transcendental concept of a purposiveness of nature is neither 
a natural concept nor a concept of freedom, because it ascribes 
nothing to the object (of nature), but only represents the peculiar 
way in which we must proceed in reflection upon the objects in 
nature in reference to a thoroughly connected experience, and is 
consequently a subjective principle (maxim) of the judgment.57 
When the aesthetic judgment perceives this form in an object, and does so 
with a contiguous pleasure derived from the harmonious inter-relation 
between the understanding and the imagination, the object is said to be 
"beautiful." The transcendental concept of the purposiveness of nature 
leads us then, as a subjective principle, to perceive the "purpose" in 
the object itself--its form as an end internal to that object, and not as 
a concept for the understanding. Yet, what is the specific relation 
between imagination and the aesthetic judgment? How does the role of 
the imagination as a function of aesthetic judgment differ from its role 
as that representational faculty which presents images of the objects of 
sensation to the understanding under a determinate concept? 
When the imagination frames an image for the understanding, in our 
ordinary perception of the world, it brings that object before the 
understanding precisely as a determinate concept; whereas, when the 
imagination frames an image for the understanding, in our perception of 
an object as "aesthetic," the understanding confirms its concept of the 
object as indeterminate. In the aesthetic judgment, the imagination is 
56rbid., p. 17. 57rbid., p. 20. 
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not contingent upon the laws of association; it is free to focus on the 
visible form itself, independent of a concept. Indeed, the imagination 
is liberated of any prior concept whatsoever, and subsequently able to 
create its own. Thus, between the imagination and the understanding 
there is a subjective agreement only, and not an "objective" agreement as 
there would be with a determinate concept. In its freedom, then, the 
imagination is productive and spontaneous; and this is what constitutes 
its role in the aesthetic judgment. It is the cause of the pleasure 
derived from an aesthetic judgment at all times, regardless of whether or 
not that judgment is of the beautiful or the sublime. "Now, if in the 
judgment of taste the imagination must be considered in its freedom, it 
is in the first place not regarded as reproductive, as it is subject to 
the laws of association, but as productive and spontaneous (as the author 
of arbitrary forms of possible intuition)."58 For Kant, then, the 
imagination is always distinguished as that faculty which "frames" 
images; and is fur~her distinguished in the aesthetic judgment as that 
faculty which freely frames its images, "the author of arbitrary forms of 
possible intuition," independent of the determinate concepts of under-
standing. Furthermore, Kant explains the distinction between the 
"beautiful" and the "sublime" specifically in terms of the imagination's 
ability to frame the image. The beautiful is constituted or determined 
by that freely framed image of the imagination brought to bear upon the 
understanding as an indeterminate concept, and yet harmonious with it; 
whereas, the sublime is determined by an object presented to reason as an 
indeterminate idea, and, as such, the imagination is incapable of 
ssibid., p. 77. 
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framing an image at all. The object suggests an idea of which no image 
can be formed; the image-making facility of imagination has before it the 
form of some object beyond which no further images are able to be 
produced; the object suggests certain indeterminate ideas for which no 
visible form can be created. In this respect, the sublime does not 
properly belong to nature at all, but constitutes a "pure" state of mind: 
the sublime in nature is improperly so called and that, properly 
speaking, the word should only be applied to a state of mind, or 
rather to its foundation in human nature. The apprehension of an 
otherwise formless and unpurposive object gives merely the 
occasion through which we become conscious of such a state; the 
object is thus employed as subjectively purposive, but is not 
judged as such in itself and on account of its form (it is, as it 
were, a species~inalis accepta, non data).59 
Generally speaking, then, the empirical imagination is determined by the 
"form" of sensation; on the other hand, the transcendental imagination 
creates or constructs its own forms, it determines the form of sense 
~priori. Yet, for Kant, the imagination always mediates between 
sensation and intellection according to its "formal" power; and to the 
extent that the imagination must always "frame" its images, it puts them 
in "perspective" in so far as it sets them before us within a single, 
uniform, and theoretical space.60 
Consciousness thus duplicates an absolute thought of the world;61 
by de-limiting its objects, the only obstacle it encounters is chaos, 
which is clearly nothing at all.62 Because consciousness constitutes 
59rbid., p. 121. 
60For a much more detailed discussion of how Imagination "frames" 
its objects, see Mary Warnock, Imagination (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1976), pp. 41-66, to whom I am greatly indebted for the 
above interpretation of Kant. 
61Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. xvii. 62Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
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everything, eternally possessing the intelligible structure of all its 
objects, it never changes its structure with respect to the various 
objects it appropriates;63 it merely de-lineates an entire pre-existing 
world--a single and constant exterior horizon. As with the scientific 
perception, idealism restricts the freedom of its vision through an 
artificial scope which, like the microscope and telescope, explains the 
world according to an analytic of "true" and "correct" data. "The 
precise and entirely determinate world is still posited in the first 
place, no longer perhaps as the cause of our perceptions, but as their 
immanent end. If the world is to be possible, it must be implied in the 
first adumbration of consciousness, as the transcendental deduction so 
forcibly brings out."64 If science maintained absolute faith in the 
"object," representing a total picture of the world in terms of its 
temporal-spatial constitution, it simultaneously treated consciousness as 
the absolute transparency of the world. Idealism, on the other hand, 
represents the co-relative view, whereby the "subjecJ:" constitutes the 
absolute "idea" of a determinate world in so far as he comes into the 
possession of a completed system of "true" thoughts, "capable of co-
ordinating all phenomena, a flat projection which clarifies all perspec-
tives, a pure object upon which all subjective views open."65 Because i~ 
is thus "familiar" with absolute being, consciousness snatches the one-
upmanship from science in so far as it no longer needs to "observe" the 
world at all; by challenging the "illusion" as the illusion of illusions, 
consciousness proclaims that it can only see what is.66 It is in this 
sense that Heidegger defines the world-view as a view of life, whereby 
63Ibid., p. 28. 64tbid., p. 31. 65tbid.' p. 40. . 66tbid.' p. 41. 
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the existent holds as existent only to the extent that it is lived 
through or experienced; for, once the structure of consciousness is 
considered absolute, the view itself can never be distinct from an 
"experience" of the world, although, paradoxically, the view is always of 
a world "out there" which can only be lived conceptually. 
Hence a philosophy with two guises, and observable in any doctrine 
of the understanding: a leap is taken from a naturalistic view, 
which expresses our de facto condition, to a transcendental sphere 
in which all bondage is theoretically removed, and we never have to 
wonder how the same subject comes to be a part of the world and at 
the same time its principle because the thing constituted exists 
only for the constituting agent. In fact, the image of a consti-
tuted world where, with my body, I should be only one object among 
others, and the idea of an absolute constituting consciousness are 
only apparently antithetical; they are a dual expression of a 
universe perfectly explicit in itself.67 
In principle, then, there is no essential difference between Newton's 
"eye" and Kant's "mind's eye:" in so far as the refractive condition of 
the eye enables the object to form an image or picture on the retina, it 
locates the object outside of us in a theoretical space; and in so far as 
the "formal" facility of the imagination always mediates between 
sensation and intellection, it too locates the object outside of us in 
the conceptual space of the subjective analytic. Kant's imagination 
could no more accommodate the subject-object dichotomy than Newton's eye; 
for once Descartes had severed subject from object, the world was "real" 
only to the extent that it could be set before us. And as the product of 
that separation, epistemology subsequently became grounded in 
"de-lineation" vis~-vis an abstract uni-form space. To the degree that 
man could frame an image of the world, that is, discern it as a view or 
picture, he could know it. And via this perspective on the world, the 
67rbid. 
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existent is thus determined by its re-presentation in the subject. 
World view, properly understood, therefore means, not a view of the 
world, but the world understood as a view. The existent as a whole 
is now so understood that it is existent when and only when and in 
the degree to which it is held at bay by the person who represents 
and establishes it. Where a world view arises, an essential 
decision takes place about the existent as a whole. The being of 
the existent is sought and found in the representational character 
of the existent.68 
II 
~or the eighteenth century, the world tarried as one anxious 
landscape, reticently waiting to be painted; indeed, the primary drift of 
eighteenth-century thought was "dedicated to the proposition that the 
outer world existed to end in a picture."69 Through such writers as 
de Chambray, de Piles, and du Fresnoy, the first half of the eighteenth 
century appropriated its basically Italianate aesthetic, specifically its 
theory of painting which stressed "design" in the sense that 
William Aglionby's Painting Illustrated in Three Diallogues (1686) 
defined it: "Design is the Expressing with a Pen, or Pencil, or other 
Instrument, the Likeness of any Object by its out Lines, or Contours."70 
In this context, du Fresnoy's De Arte Graphica (1668) had already taken 
Michelangelo to task for presuming "Liberties against the Rules of 
Perspective."71 And though Michelangelo's reputation steadily gained 
favor in the second half of the eighteenth century so that 
Sir Joshua Reynolds, in his Discourses on Art (1769-90), could say of 
68Heidegger, "World View," p. 350. 
69McLuhan, Vanishing Point, p. 121. 
70quoted in Samuel Monk, The Sublime (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1960), p. 172. 
71quoted in Monk, p. 173. 
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him that he was the "Founder and Father of modern Art," carrying it to 
the "highest point of possible perfection,"72 the posture of art 
criticism pertinaciously upheld representation as the most elemental 
criterion of truth. Only now, in conjunction with a parallel development 
in the concept of the "sublime,"73 the painter 'is apprised to represent 
the "general" truth of nature rather than its specific detail: "To dis-
tinguish between correctness of drawing, and that part which respects 
the imagination, we may say the one approaches to the mechanical (which 
in its way too may make just pretensions to genius) and the other to the 
poetical."74 Reynolds' distinction not only points backward to Newton 
(the "mechanical") and forward to Kant (the "poetical"), but also 
accomodates the successive gamut of eighteenth-century aesthetics. Yet, 
beneath this apparent theoretical opposition a radical pre-supposition 
informs the entire aesthetic continuum; whether the artist negotiates the 
"truth" of nature in terms of its specific or general detail, the art 
work always constitutes an imitation in so far as it is expected to 
represent the world. 
In Newton, painters and poets of the first half of the eighteenth 
century discovered a world more objectively certain than that offered by 
Descartes: 
Descartes thus, great Nature's wandering guide, 
Fallacious led philosophy aside, 
'Till Newton rose, in orient beauty bright, 
He rose, and brought the world's dark laws to light, 
72sir Joshua Reynolds, Discourses on Art (New York: Collier Books, 
1966), p. 239. 
73For an extensive treatment of the historical development of this 
concept, see Monk, The Sublime. 
74Reynolds, p. 239. 
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Then subtile matter saw, and vanished at his sight.75 
Newtonian light promised an absolute familiarity with the world in so far 
as the perfect symmetry of geometrical vision could guarantee "this out-
ward Frame of Things/ Is what it seems;"76 and it accomplished this to 
the extent that the optic nerve supplied the means of framing an image 
which resembles the object. In his Universal Beauty, Henry Brooke 
expressed the infallibility of this divine organ: 
So temper'd wondrous by mechanic scheme, 
The Sovereign Geometrician knits the frame; 
In mode of organizing texture wrought, 
And quick with spirited quintessence fraught: 
When objects on the exterior membrane press, 
The alarm runs inmost through each dark recess, 
Impulsive strikes the corresponding springs, 
And moves th' accord of sympathetic strings.77 
But if the geometry of vision, "Where truth's eternal measures mark the 
bound/ Of circle, cube or sphere."78 guaranteed the world, it simulta-
neously introduced metaphysical speculation concerning its origin: 
But can corporeal forms, with so much ease, 
Meet in their flight a thousand images, 
And yet no conflict, no collisive force, 
Break their thin texture, and disturb their course? 
What fix'd their parts, and made them so cohere, 
That they the picture of the object wear? 
What is the shape, that from a body flies? 
What moves, what propogates, what multiplies 
And paints one image in a thousand eyes? 
When to the eye the crowding figures pass, 
How in a point can all possess a place, 
75Richard Oakley, "Will with a Wisp," in The Works of the English 
Poets: From Chaucer to Cowper, ed. Samuel Johnson and Alexander 
. Chalmers, 21 vols. (London: J. Johnson et. al., 1810), 16:258. Chalmers 
mistakenly attributes this poem to Francis Fawkes. 
76Richard Jago, Edge-Hill (London: J. Dodsley, 1767), p. 83. 
77works of the English Poets, 17:351. 
78Mark Akenside, The Pleasures of Imagination (London: 
R. Dodsley, 1744), p. 34. 
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And lye distinguish'd in such narrow space?79 
Here, as throughout his entire poem the Creation, Blackmore, like Brooke, 
reasons for design in the universe as a final proof of the Great 
Anatomist, generally opposing Epicureanism and the modern atomists of his 
own century who argued for chance: "Not thus he gave our optic's vital 
glance,/ Amid omniscent art, to search for chance,/ Blind to the charms 
of Nature's beauteous frame."80 Similarly, Edward Young's Night Thoughts 
insisted on design, going so far as to attribute a certain "divinity" to 
man's senses as well as his reason: 
Our senses, as our reason, are divine. 
But for the magic organ's powerful charm, 
Earth were a rude, uncolour'd chaos, still. 
Objects are but th' occasion; ours th' exploit; 
Ours is the cloth, the pencil, and the paint, 
Which nature's admirable picture drawsi 
And beautifies creation's ample dome.8 
Newton had earlier made the same concession with his analogy bet~een the 
human and divine "sensorium;" and like Newton's optic world, the world of 
Young's Night Thoughts is void of color--there is nothing but light. 
"Into the camera obscura of perpetual night Young retired in order that 
Reason, the godlike faculty of man, might see light pure, not di~colored, 
refracted, and inflected."82 It was, indeed, the kind of world which the 
telescope had discovered on the moon.83 
Although Newton's "eye" apparently bridged the gap between internal 
and external worlds in so far as it "correctly" re-presented the object 
79Richard Blackmore, Creation, in Works of the English Poets, 
10:376. 
80Brooke, Universal Beauty, in Works of the English Poets, 17:357. 
81Works of the English Poets, 13:450. 
82Nicolson, p. 150. 83Ibid. 
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to us, it simultaneously failed to appropriate the "truth" of the world; 
for the truth of an objective world necessarily exists beyond the naked 
eye, just as the truths of science can never ultimately be "seen". By 
definition, the very concept of an objective world outside our "self" 
reciprocally carries with it the implicit assumption that its truths are 
"noumenal," that is, beyond phenomena. As with the conceptual space of 
p~ctorial perspective, the world of Descartes, Locke, and Newton is pri-
mordially invisible; Kant merely articulated the other side of the coin. 
Yet, science could not concede the impossibility of knowing the world 
absolutely, and stubbornly maintained that its superficial investigation 
of phenomena could and would lead it to a final noumenal vision. For the 
eighteenth century, technological advances in t~lescopic and microscopic 
instrumentation encouraged this fiction not only among scientific 
coteries but in the heart of the poets as well. Fanatically different 
from Arnold's narrator in "Dover Beach," Savage's "wanderer" turns his 
thoughts to telescopic lenses and similar Newtonian paraphernalia as he 
stands on the cliff over-looking the sea: 
There lies obscur'd the ripening diamond's ray, 
And thence red-branching coral's rent away. 
In conic form there gelid crystal grows; 
Thro' such the palace-lamp, gay lustre throws! 
Lustre, which, through dim night, as various plays, 
As play from yonder snows the changeful rays! 
For nobler use the crystal's worth may rise, 
If tubes perspective hem the spotless prize; 
Thro' these the beams of the far-lengthen'd eye 
Measure known stars, and new remoter spy.84 
But though this artificial "far-lengthen'd eye" may geom~trically fix 
the measurement of the universe, Savage's wanderer no more negotiates 
84Richard Savage, The Wanderer, in Works of the English Poets, 
11:302. 
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the visible ambiguity of perception than does the reverse perspective of 
microscopial analysis. Like the transparent "cogito" of Cartesian meta-
physics, both telescope and microscope factitiously accommodated the 
subjectum's bistouric desire to cleanly slice through a section of the 
world "naturally" hidden to the naked eye. If nature's secrets were to 
be unveiled, technology would assuredly have to come up with the artifi-
cial means of attaining a super-vision virtually capable of seeing 
through matter. Science had a considerable wait, however, before tech-
nology manufactured the X-ray; in the meantime, the microscopial 
discoveries of Leeuwenhoek, Swammerdam, and others encouraged meta-
physical speculation about the world of the minute, and why God had 
denied to man the kind of vision he had given to other animals.85 Though 
philosophers, especially Locke and Berkeley, had oxytocically delivered 
this question to theoretical supposition, Pope answered it handily and 
succinctly in a single sentence in his Essay on Man: "Why has not Man a 
microscopic eye?/ For this plain reason, Man is not a Fly."86 
Perhaps more than any other poet of his time, Pope opposed the 
growing tendency of the age to confer god-head upon the scientific 
mission; in The Dunciad he unequivocally indicted the arrogant posture of 
those who would make man the measure of all things, although his ultimate 
argument rested on theological ground. 
"O! would the Sons of Men once think their Eyes 
85Nicolson, p. 102. 
86The Poems of Alexander Pope, Twi.ckenham Edition, gen.ed. 
John But~11 vols-.-(London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1961-69), 3-i:38-39. 
For a penetrating analysis of the controversy surrounding Pope's manip-
ulation of ideas in the Essay on Man, see Douglas White, Pope and the 
Context of Controversy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970. 
And Reason giv'n them but to study Flies! 
See Nature in some partial narrow shape, 
And let the Author of the Whole escape: 
Learn but to trifle; or, who most observe, 
To wonder at the Maker, not to serve." 
"Be that my task • . • 
Let others creep by timid steps', and slow, 
On plain Experience lay foundations low, 
By common sense to common knowledge bred, 
And last, to Nature's Cause thro' Nature led. 
All-seeing in thy mists, we want no guide, 
Mother of Arrogance, and Source of Pride! 
We nobly take the high Priori Road, 
And reason downward, till we doubt of God: 
Make Nature still incroach upon his plan; 
And shove him off as far as e'er we can: 
Thrust some Mechanic Cause into his place; 
Or bind in Matter, or diffuse in Space. 
Or, at one bound o'er-leaping all his laws, 
Make God Man's Image, Man the final Cause • 87 
Of course, Swift's Tale of~ Tub had previously enunciated the 
Scriblerian protest, but nowhere do we find a more devastating reply to 
the philosophic and scientific world-view than in the final section of 
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The Dunciad, where universal darkness descends upon the pseudo-illumina-
tion proffered by the prevalent theoretical abstractions of philosophy, 
physics, metaphysics, and mathematics: 
See skulking Truth to her old Cavern fled, 
Mountains of Casuistry heap'd o'er her head! 
Philosophy, that lean'd on Heav'n before, 
Shrinks to her second cause, and is no more. 
Physic of Metaphysic begs defence, 
And Metaphysic calls for aid on Sense! 
See Mystery to Mathematics fly! 
In vain! they gaze, turn giddy, rave, and die.88 
Even Voltaire hastened to turn aside the scientific usurpation by 
declaring that the geometry of Newtonian philosophy was not a proper 
subject for poetry; but he weakened the force of his own rhetoric by 
writing verse on Newtonian principles himself.89 Pope too, despite his 
87rbid., 5:385-88. 88rbid., 5:407-09. 89Nicolson, p. 15. 
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frequent sorties against the securely entrenched certitude of scientific 
objectivity, fell prey to the intellectual climate responsible for the 
very attitudes he found so threatening; and the centrally implicit image 
behind the Essay on Man appropriates an equally total picture of the 
world, for the traditional idea of a great chain of being negotiates an 
abstract and theoretical space, no less "objective" than the linear 
perspective of a Renaissance drawing. 
If the first half of the eighteenth century stressed what Reynolds 
termed the "mechanical" aspect of representation, the second half of 
that century experienced a gradual shift toward the "poetical," although 
the imbrication of reality continued to evade its theoreticians. And if 
the poets began to analyze the construction of reality in terms of 
certain faculties in man, the respective capabilities of these faculties 
simultaneously contracted the consonant view of scientific "objectifica-
tion." Akenside's Pleasures of Imagination reflected the philosophic 
trend toward "subjectivity" which would culminate in Kant's Third 
Critique, although this subjectivity is no more situated than the 
Cartesian "cogito." "Mind," remarks Akenside in his poem, "Mind alone, 
bears witness, earth and heav'n!/ The living fountains in itself 
contains/ Of beauteous and sublime."90 But if the mind contains the 
beauty and sublimity of the world "out there," how much more carefully 
man is cautioned to proceed in his survey of the world; Richard Jago's 
Edge-Hill warned of the dangers implicit in the imagination, 
recommending to the reader the visual certainty of Newtonian 
objectivity: 
90p. 36. 
Shall we, 'cause Reason strives in vain to tell 
How Matter acts on incorporeal Mind, 
Or how (when Sleep has lock'd up ev'ry Sense, 
Or Fevers rage) Imagination paints 
Unreal Scenes, reject what sober Sense 
And calmest Thought attest? Shall we confound 
States wholly diff'rent? Sleep with wakeful Life? 
Disease with Health? This were to quit the Day, 
And seek our Path at Midnight. To renounce 
Man's surest Evidence, and idolize 
Imagination. Quit we rather then 
These Metaphysic Subtleties, and mark 
The curious Structure of these visual Orbs, 
The Windows of the Mind; substance how clear, 
Aqueous, or chrystalline! through which the Soul, 
As thro' a Glass, all outward Things surveys.91 
Because Fancy and Imagination receive "The whole magnificence of heaven 
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and earth,/ And every beauty, delicate or bold,/ Obvious or more remote, 
with livelier sense,/ Difussive painted on the rapid mind,"92 as 
Thomson's Seasons suggests, they may simultaneously distort the clear and 
perfectly transparent vision of Reason. To this effect, Akenside 
distinctly draws an analogy along the contemporary lines of Newtonian 
optics; because Fancy delineates a "form" which does not correspond to 
the actual object, it represents a false picture of the world, and thus 
constitutes an endogenous danger to man's ethical life: 
Another tribe succeeds; deluded long 
By fancy's dazzling optics, these behold 
The images of some peculiar things 
With brighter hues resplendent, and portray'd 
With features nobler far than e'er adorn'd 
Their genuine objects.93 
91pp. 84-85. 
92James Thomson, "Summer," The Seasons, in The Complete Poetical 
Works of James Thomson, ed. J. Logie Robertson (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1908), p. 118. 
93Pleasures of Imagination, p. 98. An annotation to these lines 
in the first edition reads: "Ridicule from a notion of excellence in 
particular objects disproportion'd to their intrinsic value, and 
inconsistent with the order of nature." 
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But, "where the pow'rs/ Of fancy neither lessen nor enlarge/ The images 
of things, but paint in all/ Their genuine hues, the features which they 
wore/ In nature; there opinion will be true,/ And action right."94 
Akenside introduces, here, an aesthetic supposition which became 
increasingly popular throughout the latter part of the eighteenth 
century, that the truth of nature resides in its general forms, and not 
its specific detail--thus the falsity of "images of some peculiar 
things." Johnson's Rasselas aesthetically terminated this attitude, what 
Reynolds termed the "poetical" in painting: "The business of a 
poet •.• is to examine not the individual, but the species; to remark 
general properties and large appearances. He does not number the 
streaks of the tulip, or describe the different shades in the verdure of 
the forest; he is to exhibit in his portraits of nature such prominent 
and striking features as recall the original to every mind."95 That 
Johnson defines the task of the poet in terms of visual representation 
is, of course, no accident, for Newtonian theory persistently intormed 
aesthetic pre-suppositions concerning imitation throughout the entire 
century even if that aesthetic shifted its vision toward the mental 
constitution of the world. The eighteenth century adopted the doctrine. 
of "Ut pictura poesis" flat across the board, whereby not only poetry, 
but all art aspired to the condition of painting; Uvedale Price went so 
far as to impute this condition to music. In this sense, the existent is 
only to the extent that it is "picturesque," that is, fit to be painted; 
indeed, this way of looking at the world corresponds to that attitude 
94Ibid., pp. 90-91. 
95samuel Johnson, Rasselas (Great Neek: Barron's Educational 
Series, Inc., 1962), p. 49. 
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determined by having a view to such an hyperbolic degree that the 
existent as a whole becomes one vast prospect, suitable for framing. 
Nevertheless, Johnson's aesthetic reflects the increasingly sophisti-
cated distinction between the "picturesque," the "beautiful," and the 
"sublime;" and like Kant's Third Critique, it historically represents an 
indefatigable attempt to unify the various aesthetic theories of the 
eighteenth century into a single coherent system or "picture." 
Yet, throughout the second half of the eighteenth century, and 
despite the popular trend toward "subjectivity," poets continued to 
dispute the respective merits of Fancy and Imagination regarding their 
ability to appropriate the "truth" of nature. Akenside, for example, 
airs the cob-webs from Memnon's Harp in order to sing the one-to-one 
correspondence between Nature and Mind which exists when Imagination is 
properly "tuned." As Titan's rays evoke the harmonious response of the 
harp, 
ev'n so did nature's hand 
To certain species of external things, 
Attune the finer organs of the mind: 
So the glad impulse of congenial pow'rs, 
Or of sweet sound, or fair-proportion'd form, 
The grace of motion, or the bloom of light, 
Thrills thro' imagination's tender frame, 
From nerve to nerve: all naked and alive 
They catch the spreading rays: till now the soul 
At length discloses every tuneful spring, 
To that harmonious movement from without, 
Responsive.96 
Like the eye, imagination frames its images within the proportioned 
space of a perspective which catches the "spreading raysn of its view 
from "nerve to nerve." Indeed, the implicit distinction between subject 
and object in the eighteenth-century view provoked the isoclinal framing 
96Pleasures of Imagination, pp. 15-16. 
of life to such an extent that the body itself was naturally thought of 
as a frame. Just as the mental image thrills through "imagination's 
tender frame," so does emotion insinuate the frame of the body. 
Thomson's Seasons expressed the effect imagination produces on the body 
in terms of the usual clichl: "Deep-roused, I feel/ A sacred terror, a 
severe delight,/ Creep through my mortal frame."97 Thus, the general 
framing of life indigenous to having a world-view continued to sustain 
the Cartesian severance despite the popular turn toward certain 
faculties of the mind; and though Fancy and Imagination entertain the 
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danger of distorting the truth inherent in the objective forms of nature, 
they simultaneously disclose its unequivocal correspondence with the mind 
when functioning properly. Yet, the augmented intussusception of mind in 
aesthetic theory signaled a growing rift between science and poetry, and 
ophthalmoscopically prefigured the uniquely subjective vision of the 
Romantic movement. At the beginning of the century, Addison had already 
declared that the poet was at liberty to transcend the laws of optical 
representation since language often "gives us more lively ideas than the 
sight of things themselves," and can subsequently improve nature: 
Words, when well chosen, have so great a force in them, that a 
description often gives us more lively ideas than the sight of 
things themselves. The reader finds a scene drawn in stronger 
colours, and painted more to the life in his imagination by the 
help of words, than by an actual survey of the scene which they 
describe. In this case the poet seems to get the better of 
nature; he takes, indeed, the landscape after her, but gives it 
more vigorous touches, heightens its beauty, and so enlivens the 
whole piece that the images which flow from the objects themselves 
appear weak and faint in comparison of those that come from the 
expressions. The reason probably may be, because in the survey of 
any object we have only so much of it painted on the imagination 
as comes in at the eye; but in its description the poet gives us 
as free a view of it as he pleases, and discovers to us several 
97"Summer," Complete Poetical Works, p. 73. 
parts that either we did not attend to, or that lay out of our 
sight when we first beheld it. As we look on any object our idea 
of it is, perhaps, made up of two or three simple ideas; but when 
the poet represents it, he may either give us a more complex idea 
of it, or only raise in us such ideas as are most apt to affect 
the imagination.98 
Although Addison seems to endorse the poet's freedom vis~-vis an 
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aesthetic expressiveness, the heart of his argument reads like a preface 
to Hume; and the painting metaphor itself reveals a typical Newtonian 
preoccupation with the representation of an optically framed view, 
perspectively located outside the "self." Thus, Addison's theory of 
imagination no more questions the picture-world of eighteenth-century 
aesthetics than its other theoreticians; in fact, it was Addison who not 
only acutely realized the significance of Locke and Newton, but also 
popularized their theories for the masses. If imagination fascinated 
Addison, it was only because it alone colored a world objectively dull, 
sterile, and colorless in itself. Cartesian metaphysics defined a world 
where color was merely accidental, and Newtonian physics manipulated a 
world similarly bleak where color is nowhere to be found in external 
nature itself. Addison merely painted the picture for all to see: 
Things would make but a poor appearance to the eye, if we saw them 
only in their proper figures and motions. And what reason can we 
assign for their exciting in us many of those ideas which are 
different from anything that exists in the objects themselves (for 
such are light and colours), were it not to add supernumerary 
ornaments to the universe, and make it more agreeable to the 
imagination? We are everywhere entertained with pleasing shows 
and apparitions, we discover imaginary glories in the heavens, and 
in the earth, and see some of this visionary beauty poured out 
upon the whole creation; but what a rough unsightly sketch of 
Nature should we be entertained with, did all her colouring dis-
appear, and the several distinctions of light and shade vanish?99 
98No. 416, The Spectator, ed. George A. Aitken, 8 vols. (London: 
John C. Nimmo, 1898), 6:100-01. 
99rbid., No. 413, 6:83-84. 
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Pope, too, had remarked the subjective quality of perception, 
especially how Fancy "colors" our vision; his Moral Essays juxtapose the 
clear and pure light of Reason with the "color" refracted by passion: 
. the diff'rence is as great between 
The optics seeing, as the objects seen. 
All Manners take a tincture from our own, 
Or come discolour'd thro' our Passions shown. 
Or Fancy's beam enlarges, multiplies, 
Contracts, inverts, and gives ten thousand dyes.lOO 
But Pope gave credit where Newtonian optics denied it; for in our 
perception of the world, he declared that "Darkness strikes the sense no 
less than Light."101 His "Epitaph, Intended for Sir Isaac Newton," 
"Nature, and Nature's Laws lay hid in Night./ God said, 'Let Newton be!' 
and All was Light,"102 not only locates Newton within the Augustan-
Cartesian-Galilean tradition of the "natural light" of reason, but 
ironically contrasts with the final lines of The Dunciad, where that 
tradition avariciously self-destructs: 
Lo! Thy dread Empire, CHAOS! is restor'd; 
Light dies before thy uncreating word: 
Thy hand, great Anarch! lets the curtain fall; 
And universal Darkness buries All.l03 
But if the eighteenth-century "school of night" found solace in this 
subfuscous interior, it simultaneously appropriated the achromatic 
shades of Newtonianism from whence the anti-logos might descend. Indeed, 
Young's Night Thoughts adopts a similar posture, and yet reads like a 
single and continuous annotation of the Opticks: 
Let Indians, and the gay, like Indians, fond 
Of feather'd fopperies, the Sun adore: 
Darkness has more divinity for me; 
It strikes -thought inward; it drives back the soul 
100"Epistle I," The Poems of Alexander Pope, 3-ii:17. 
IOlrbid., 3-ii:23. 102Ibid., 6:317. I03rbid., 5:409. 
To settle on herself, our point supreme! 
There lies our theatre! there sits our judge. 
Darkness the curtain drops o'er life's dull scene; 
'Tis the kind hand of Providence stretch'd out 
'Twixt man and vanity; 'tis reason's reign, 
And virtue's too •.•. 104 
For most of the poets, however, darkness was not singularly individual, 
but rather an association, as Burke expressed it, "of a more general 
nature, an association which takes in all mankind;"105 it was this 
general fear of darkness which prompted, for the most part, the 
"rational" mind of the Age of Enlightenment to seek the secure light of 
Reason. Walter Harte's "Essay on Reason" relates a somewhat modified 
version of the Lockean account of the development of this faculty: 
How stretch'd like Kneller's canvas first it lies, 
'Ere the soft tints awake, or outlines rise; 
How till the finishing of thrice sev'n years, 
The master figure Reason scarce appears . • • • 
Sensation first, the ground-work of the whole, 
Deals ray by ray each image to the soul; 
Perception true to every nerve, receives 
The various impulse, now exults, now grieves. 
Thought works and ends, and dares afresh begin. 
Experience slowly moving next appears, 
Wise but by habit, judging but from years; 
Till Knowledge comes, a wise and gen'rous heir, 
And opes the reservoir, averse to spare; 
And Reason rises, the Newtonian Sun, 
Moves all, guides all, and all sustains in one.106 
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And yet, beneath this certitude, there persistently remained the lurking 
fear that the light of reason was ultimately grounded in darkness itself; 
in his "Essay on the Weakness of Human Knowledge," Henry Jones, who 
changed his rhetorical posture to suit the popular attitudes of the age 
104works of the English Poets, 13:439. 
105Edmund Burke, ! Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our 
Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, facsimile reproduction, 2nd ed., 
1759 (Menston, England: The Scholar Press Ltd., 1970), pp. 273-74. 
106works of the English Poets, 16:354. 
-like a weather-vane, mimicked Pope in his attack on science and 
philosophy: 
Our prying Eyes would pierce all Nature's store, 
Unlock her Secrets, turn her Treasures o'er; 
Yet far within she shows the searching Ray; 
Her mighty Master keeps the Mystick Key; 
A nearer View's deny'd to mortal Sight; 
Newton's transcendent Day must bound in Night.107 
But Jones, like all the rest, whether looking at the world in terms of 
its "subjective" or "objective" constitution, assumes that Newtonian 
achromaticism correctly describes being-in-the-world, or more precisely 
the existent as such. The world of science is invariably black and 
white. Blake knew it only too well: "Art is the Tree of Life," he 
proclaimed, "Science is the Tree of Death."l08 
"Blake delighted in nothing more than in his ability to forge 
verbal thunderbolts to hurl against Bacon, Locke, and Newton."109 In 
his "Island in the Moon," he states the case in Hamletesque satire: 
To be, or not to be 
Of great capacity, 
Like Sir Isaac Newton, 
Or Locke, or Doctor South, 
Or Sherlock upon death? 
I'd rather be Sutton.llO 
Blake's disgust with the tradition of Locke and Newton represents a 
radical break with the eighteenth-century aesthetic, a break which 
45 
"adumbrated a complete revolutionary philosophy, including a psychology, 
a moral and social doctrine, and a metaphysic. In his transvaluation of 
107quoted in Nicolson, pp. 137-38. 
108"The Laocoon," in Blake: Complete Writings, ed. Geoffrey Keynes 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 777. 
109Nicolson, p. 168. 
110Blake: Complete Writings, p. 57. 
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values Blake in some respects anticipated Nietzche."lll Had the 
nineteenth century understood the existential significance of Blake's 
vision, it might have avoided the cultural transmission of a devastating 
world-picture which continues to dominate the scientific and 
technological visual field of our own age. He not only lived during the 
most violent age in English history, but witnessed the birth of the 
world as we know it today; 112 the imagery of the prophetic books reflect 
this process in so far as it increasingly darkens as we read on toward 
the true horror of a vision more vivid than the naked eye can 
glimpse.ll3 
I stood among my valleys of the south 
And saw a flame of fire, even as a Wheel 
Of fire surrounding all the heavens: it went 
From west to east, against the current of 
Creation, and devour'd all things in its loud 
Fury & thundering course round heaven & earth.114 
Blake inveighed against the scientific and technological objectification 
of the world, and its attendant divination of the five senses, which had, 
by his time, already initiated the destruction of the earth: "Man's 
perceptions are not bounded by organs of perception; he perceives more 
than sense (tho' ever so acute) can discover."115 .With respect to the 
technological manipulation of man, "Blake saw the machine growlarger 
111Louis I. Bredvold, The Literature of the Restoration and the 
Eighteenth Century, 1660-1798, vol. III, in A History of English 
Literature (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 191. 
112Jacob Bronowski, William Blake and the Age of Revolution 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 173-74. 
113Ibid., p. 176. 
114"Jerusalem," Blake: Complete Writings, p. 717. 
115"There is No Natural Religion," second series, Blake: Complete 
Writings, p. 97. 
than man, to make him stunted, ignorant, and beastly; 1'116 yet, no one 
seemed to want to hear the voice of the bard, 
Who Present, Past, & Future sees; 
Whose ears have heard 
The Holy Word 
That walk'd among the ancient trees, 
Calling the lapsed Soul, 
And weeping in the evening dew; 
That might controll 
The starry pole. 
And fallen, fallen light renew! 
'O Earth, 0 Earth, return!•117 
Against the representational theory of "aesthesia," and sensation in 
general, Blake's fairy in "Europe" proclaimed the opacity of a world 
wherein beauty was specifically embodied in the singularity of each 
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situation, rather than constituted by either the subjectum or an aQstract 
correspondence to the "truth" of nature--"So sang a Fairy, mocking, as he 
sat on a streak'd Tulip."l18 When asked, "what is the material world, 
and is it dead," 
He, laughing, answer'd: "I will write a book on leaves of flowers, 
If you will feed me on love-thoughts & give me now and then 
A cup of sparkling poetic fancies; so, when I am tipsie, 
I'll sing to you to this soft lute, and shew you all alive 
The world, when every particle of dust breathes forth its joy."ll9 
In Reynolds' Discourses, moreover, Blake discovered the aesthetic 
synthesis, via Burke, analogous to the scientific and metaphysical 
thought he so detested in Bacon, Locke, and Newton. His "Annotations to 
Sir Joshua Reynolds' Discourses" summarizes the connectedness of the 
eighteenth-century world-view in general, and discloses the termination 
116Bronowski, p. 176. 
117"Songs of Experience," Blake: Complete Writings, p. 210. 
118Blake: Complet~ Writings, p. 237. 119rbid. 
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of that picture in so far as it accommodates a framed prospect of the 
whole "world." 
Burke's Treatise on the Sublime & Beautiful is founded on the 
Opinions of Newton & Locke; on this Treatise Reynolds has grounded 
many of his assertions in all his Discourses. I read Burke's 
Treatise when very Young; at the same time I read Locke on Human 
Understanding & Bacon's Advancement of Learning; on Every one of 
these Books I wrote my Opinions, & on looking them over find that 
my Notes on Reynolds in this Book are exactly Similar.120 
Blake alone perceived the peculiar frame of mind which informed 
eighteenth-century aesthetic, philosophic, and scientific theory, as well 
as its universal indebtedness to Newton; and if initial over-emphasis on 
the "res extensa" of Newtonian objectivity prompted Kant to revive the 
Cartesian "cogito" at the end of the century, Blake knew only too well 
the single visage which prowled beneath this Janus-faced exterior. With 
his prism Newton had 
first separated light into colors in his darkened room; then he had 
fused the particolored divergent thought of the age into a single 
beam of pure light, the light of Reason, "the Newtonian Sun." 
Pope wrote the perfect epitaph for that Newton: "God said, 'Let 
Newton be!' and all was Light!" Blake's epitaph was equally 
succinct: "The Song of Los is ended. Urizen wept."121 
Blake was no more eccentric than John Bull himself; indeed, his thought 
"rested squarely on the world in which he lived.n122 Whenever the defin-
itive gesture of a single life is grounded in the situation, that life is 
inevitably public; we find it eccentric only when we miss the context: 
If we give our fancy to the privacy of a man who gave his mind to 
living in public, we shall needs find him eccentric; but the 
eccentricity is ours. The context of Blake's writings is the 
context of a man who gave his mind to speaking to a public world; 
and the man was of a piece. The public did not listen. But it 
stood about the speaker.123 
120rbid., pp. 476-77. 121Nicolson, p. 174. 
122Bronowski, p. 177. 123Ibid. 
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Blake knew: "A Last Judgment is Necessary because Fools flourish."124 
Eighteenth-century thought remained thoroughly conditioned to the 
theories of Locke and Newton, and the uncritical acceptance of Cartesian 
dualism; and as for its poets, 
The world "out there," the mind "in here," remained to many of them 
separate and distinct; try as they would, they could not bridge the 
gap. Even "Imagination," of which they made so much, was unable to 
go far, "cabin'd, cribb'd, confined, bound in" to one part of man's 
"soul"; passive rather than active, its place was predetermined, 
its functions limited. To the school of common sense, the way out 
of the dilemma seemed simple: let man leave his mental dark-room 
on the blank walls of which nature was shown only by reflection; 
let him go forth into the world outside and face reality for 
himself. 125 
Romanticism embraced the opposite extreme. Conditioned as it was by 
German idealism, especially the post-Kantianism of Schelling, the subject-
object dichotomy continued to inhere in any investigation of "reality;" 
the question of an external world merely became predicated on the 
subjectum and his natural tendency "to bury the 'external world' in 
nullity 'epistemologically' before going on to prove it."126 Romanticism 
merely transfers the transparency of an isolated "cogito" onto the 
external world itself, and henceforth negotiates the "truth" of that 
world in terms of a symbolic "insight" which sees "through it," just as 
its own reflection illuminates the ultimate reality of "mind." "After 
the primordial phenomenon of Being-in-the-world has been shattered, the 
isolated subject is all that remains, and this becomes the basis on which 
124"A Vision of the Last Judgment," Blake: Complete Writings, 
p. 612. 
125Nicolson, p. 164. 
126Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 250. 
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it gets joined together with a 'world' ." 12 7 Yet, to the extent that this 
"symbolic" insight is still envisioned in terms of an absolute "form," 
and that the inward glance toward a particular state of consciousness is 
still constituted by a theoretical and unsituated frame, the romantics 
unconsciously propounded the same kind of visual, spatial continuity of a 
perspective drawing even though that "form" now becomes "mind" or "self" 
as the mirror of nature. Although romantic poets rhetorically rejected 
"rationalism" in favor of "feeling," they continued to employ its 
perceptual bias in so far as they appropriated perspective in order to 
isolate single emotional states. 128 Newton is somehow still in the 
picture, and we can detect the influence of his Opticks on nineteenth-
century painting as well. "His revelation of the natural power of the 
eye to refract the visual world encouraged artists to select outer land-
scapes that isolated a particular mood or feeling from the emotional 
spectrum •. The external world was studied for its powers to select 
and to refract particular qualities of experience."129 In this regard it 
was especially the habit of American painters to delight in picturing the 
"mood" of a landscape, 
particularly when its moods were expressed in atmospheric effects 
of light, twilight, or morning haze. • • • Whatever the mood, 
however, these painters sought to engage the eye of the viewer 
deeply enough to lead his vision beyond the basic subject matter. 
They hoped keen observation of the mists over the hills would lead 
the viewer beyond the physical limits of the hills.130 
But it was chiefly the romantic poets who thoroughly exploited the 
127Ibid. 
128McLuhan, Vanishing Point, p. 21. 129Ibid., p. 22. 
130Richard Rudisill, Mirror Image: The Influence of the 
Daguerreotype on American Society (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1971), p. 16. 
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symbolic function of nature; Coleridge's expropriation of German 
idealism, following his flirtation with empiricism, convinced him of the 
transparency of the world, whereby a close observation of nature leads 
one to the vision of its general forms, its "significance." And we 
arrive at this symbolic insight directly in proportion to the transpar-
ency of our "gaze"--"as I have stood,/ Silent with swimming sense; yea, 
gazing round/ On the wide landscape, gaze till all doth seem/ Less gross 
than bodily."l31 Nature somehow points to a "reality" beyond itself; 
and though we can perceive this significance in a nebulous fashion, we 
can never explicitly express it. Similarly, Wordsworth disclosed the 
superordinate desire to see beyond the thing itself, to see with a 
"spiritual eye" the truth of ordinary objects of perception. 
By penetrating the specific form or "shell" of the object, we form-
ulate the general truth of nature; we see into the life of things. This 
post-Kantian attitude by which the eye informs its object finds its 
clearest expression, perhaps, in "Tintern Abbey." 
These beauteous forms, 
Through a long absence, have not been to me 
As is a landscape to a blind man's eye: 
But oft, in lonely rooms, and 'mid the din 
Of towns and cities, I have owed to them, 
In hours of weariness, sensations sweet, 
Felt in the blood, and felt along the heart; 
And passing even into my purer mind, 
With tranquil restoration . • • • 
Nor less, I trust, 
To them I may have owed another gift, 
Of Aspect more sublime . • . 
that serene and blessed mood, 
In which the affections gently lead us on,--
Until, the breath of this corporeal frame 
13l"This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison," in Selected Poetry and Prose 
~Coleridge, ed. Donald A. Stauffer (New York: Random House, Inc., 
The Modern Library, 1951), p. 61. 
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• ,. And even the motion of our human blood 
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep 
In body, and become a living soul: 
While with an eye made quiet by the power 
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy, 
We see into the life of things.132 
Obviously, the framing of life persists; only in so far as these 
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"beauteous forms" affect a mental eye do they lead us to the transparency 
of the world. Matter remains superfluous, just as the frame of the 
corporeal body hinders our perception of the world rather than grounding 
it; in order to see the world as it "really" is we must appropriate its 
mental transparency. The world is only to the extent that it is in 
thought; and in this sense, the romantic attitude adheres to the 
Cartesian projection whereby any resemblance between nature and mind 
belongs to thought alone. Like a Cartesian, the romantic poet does not 
see "himself" in the mirror; 
he sees a dummy, an "outside," which, he has every reason to 
believe, other people see in the very same way but which, no more 
for himself than for others, is not a body in the flesh. His 
"image" in the mirror is an effect of the mechanics of things. If 
he recognizes himself in it, if he thinks it "looks like him," it 
is his thought that weaves this connection. The mirror image is 
nothing that belongs to him.133 
So much for the insufficiency of "this corporeal frame" which must be 
shed if man is to perceive the truth of the world; thus, Wordsworth 
could say of the poetic mission, in the concluding lines of ~ Prelude, 
that it must nucleonically reveal 
• • • how the mind of man becomes 
A thousand times more beautiful than the earth 
On which he dwells, above this frame of things 
(Which, 'mid all revolution in the hopes 
And fears of men, doth still remain unchanged) 
132wordsworth: Poetical Works, p. 164. 
133Merleau-Ponty, Primacy, p. 170. 
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In beauty exalted, as it is itself 
Of quality and fabric more divine.134 
Yet, this "eye" which sees into the life of things is clearly not the 
"eye" of Kant, which can never ascertain the noumenal thing-in-itself. 
For Wordsworth, however, the possibility of knowing the noumenal world 
stipples the life-long task of the poet, whose mind, more than any other, 
-- possesses the power for seeing through the opaque materiality of things. 
And what is this power or faculty of X-ray vision? It is, again, the 
Imagination. 
For the romantics, imagination implied a mental facility consider-
ably different from the context in which Kant had defined it; but we can 
follow the development of this new meaning in so far as it primordially 
derived from the Kantian distinction between the beautiful and the sub-
lime. For Kant, the beautiful constituted that framed image presented to 
the understanding as an indeterminate concept; as such, the form of the 
object is represented to us in such a way that the imagination and the 
understanding mutually derive a specific pleasure from their harmonious 
inter-action. The sublime, on the other hand, was constituted by an 
object which the imagination presents to reason as an indeterminate 
idea, so that the object can not be represented as an image at all; the 
imagination is incapable of forming one, for an "idea" is the very 
opposite of an "image." Yet, we continue to obtain a certain pleasure 
from the anti-purposiveness of the object; the very formlessness of the 
image of the idea presented by the object provides a certain satisfaction. 
Though it is beyond representation, the mind somehow apprehends something 
in the object beyond its appearance. Precisely because we can in some 
134wordsworth: Poetical Works, p. 588. 
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way apprehend an object other than under the restricted categories of 
understanding, as an idea of reason, we thus approach, in our perception 
of the sublime, the very limit of thought--knowledge of the thing-in-
itself. In other words, by our recognition of the sublime we vaguely 
experience an idea of reason, although that experience is fated to 
remain indistinct and indeterminate. Moreover, in the sense which Kant 
defines it, the object itself can never be sublime; rather it is the 
mind which is sublime in recognizing it. And yet, to the extent that we 
may call an object sublime, we simultaneously attribute a subsequent 
quality to the object which "exists" beyond the object, and to which the 
object itself points. Nature thus becomes significant, that is, 
"symbolic." The imagination, then, can present us with an idea, though 
never directly; and that idea, which is "aesthetic" and not an idea of 
reason, is presented as such in its symbolic form. Apparently Kant was 
pushed to this position in light of his admittedly limited classification 
of those things which can be "actually" beautiful in terms of pure form. 
Because of this, the Third Critique seems to weaken the First wherein 
Kant explicitly denied the possibility of ever attaining to an idea of 
reason in any way since an idea, by definition, represented that limit of 
~· thought beyond which we can never go. Knowledge of an "ultimate" 
reality, the thing-in-itself, endured forever inaccessible. Strictly 
speaking, however, a Kantian "idea" is neither in the mind nor in 
nature, but rather that which mediates subject and object. Yet, the 
post-Kantian German idealists, especially Schelling, predicated the 
"idea" in nature itself so that all of nature became energized b.y a 
"Rational Idea;" Nature was Mind. For Schelling, Imagination became 
that faculty which virtually creates the world. As an idea, nature is 
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merely the unconscious expression of spirit; the "objective" world, as 
idea, like the eighteenth-century landscape, patiently awaits interpre-
tation in so far as it is symbolic, that is, the concrete form of an 
infinite idea. Obviously Schelling turned to Kant for his interpre-
tation of symbol (Sinnbild)--that which embodies a universal (idea) in a 
particular (image); but he went further, by making the Kantian impossi-
bility of knowing the idea a practical possibility. Imagination 
perceives the essence of a thing, an infinite idea, in the concrete 
articulation of the form as an "object;" in this regard, imagination 
appropriates symbols as an expression of the ultimate reality, the idea 
itself. Even for Schelling, imagination functions as a representational 
power; it delineates the ideas as a form, the form of a form as it were. 
And to the extent that imagination is formational; it "pictures" the 
existent in terms of a spatial perspective whereby man ~ow has a view of 
the world in so far as it constitutes an "idea." 
Coleridge adopted this position, and was largely responsible for 
its introduction to England. Because nature is mind, the imagination 
came to be that faculty which frames ideas rather than images; and it 
does so in such a way that the idea becomes significant with respect to 
its symbolic expression. "An IDEA, in the highest sense of that word, 
cannot be conveyed but by a symbol; and, except in geometry, all symbols 
of necessity involve an apparent contradiction." 135 Coleridge probably 
adopted the notion that the symbol contains a contradiction directly 
from Schelling; but even as that faculty which both perceives and 
creates the world, the imagination remains an abstract and format.ive 
135Biographia Literaria, in Selected Poetrx and Prose, p. 185. 
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power. It re-presents; it shapes; it reconciles; it combines. Coleridge 
called this power "esemplastic," although its essentially spatial conno-
tations apply more properly to a mental activity "in here" rather than 
the way in which it takes up an object world "out there." 
The primary IMAGINATION I hold to be the living Power and prime 
Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite 
mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. The 
secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, co-
existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the 
primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, 
and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, 
dissipates, in order to re-create; or where this process is 
rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to 
idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all 
objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead.l36 
Again we find a similarity to Newton's "sensorium;" because perception is 
judged to be primarily spiritual and mental, it naturally follows that 
the object itself lacks a life or a world of its own, that it is 
essentially "fixed and dead." Thus, the infinite repetition of imagina-
tive activity always looks back toward a theoretical and ideal corre-
spondence in order to formally unify its vision. Grounded in the 
infinite and eternal, it necessarily "struggles to idealize" because it 
sets itself apart from the world it negotiates in order to perceive the 
whole picture. The "in order to" of its activity already dictates an 
~ priori absolute standard divorced from what the activity itself dis-
closes and to which the activity must always address itself; and if the 
priority of its content is ever to be fully delineated, imagination must 
ultimately disregard the manner of its own expression in order to 
describe an ideal world, a non-personal space, where everything 
transparently "makes sense" according to its proper place. 
I36rbid., p. 263. 
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The. poet, described in ideal perfection, brings the whole soul of 
man into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each 
other, according to their relative worth and dignity. He diffuses 
a tone and spirit of unity, that blends, and (as it were) fuses, 
each into each, by that synthetic and magical power, to which we 
have exclusively appropriated the name of imagination. This 
power, first put in action by the will and understanding, and 
retained under their irremissive, though gentle and unnoticed, 
controul (laxis effertur habenis) reveals itself in the balance or 
reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities . • • and while 
it blends and harmonizes the natural and the artificial, still 
subordinates art to nature; the manner to the matter; and our 
admiration of the poet to our sympathy with the poetry.l37 
Despite its "transcendental" qualities, Coleridge's definition of imagi-
nation retains something indigenous to the Newtonian spirit; the notion 
that one idea attracts another pervades his thinking here, and we are led 
to suspect that perhaps Coleridge could never entirely relinquish the 
influence of Hartley and empiricism in general. Nonetheless, for 
Coleridge the imagination concretizes the ideas of reason by combining 
its "objects" in such a way that it presents us with a symbol of that 
which lies beyond the immediate forms of nature. But in so far as its 
symbols re-present "another" reality, imagination sets the existent 
before a theoretical gaze which not only subordinates "the manner to the 
matter," but also delegates the correspondence between external and 
internal worlds to the lineal perspective of a single rational Idea. 
Because the world is thus constituted by such a comprehensively 
transparent picture, knowledge of the world is tantamount to knowledge of 
the "self." Little wonder, then, that Wordsworth could only "reassure" 
himself of the materiality of nature by touching it. For how else can 
the blind see? 
For the romantics, following the direction of post-Kantian 
137Ibid., p. 269. 
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idealism, it was natural that the focus of imagination turned inward. 
But in effect, romanticism killed the very kind of Being it sought to 
emulate; by viewing the object as something "fixed and dead," romanticism 
could only come up to it by looking back in the same way that we treat a 
friend who has died as merely a "memory." The death of an object is the 
beginning of a subject. This change-over in Being, whereby the entity is 
able to be encountered only in the mind, signals the birth of an entirely 
new way of "living" the world, a way that both avoids the present, via a 
subliminal sentimentality, and the future, via its implicit failure to 
negotiate a genuine choice--it is "to remember." Romanticism visually 
delineated an inward gaze toward basic states of consciousness, a 
particular feeling or emotion, by employing the prevalent perceptual bias 
ever since the Renaissance. In looking back toward an historical 
subjectivity, romantic poetry frames a whole life in terms of isolated 
and sequential emotional states, little pictures placed in a theoretical 
perspective. It thus represents an ideal view, as much removed from the 
world as it is from its "self," for "The order of the sequence in which 
Experiences run their course does not give us the phenomenal structure of 
existing."l38 The creative function of imagination remained identical, 
in principle, to that representational organ which forms an image, 
whether or not that power historically derived from Newton's refractive 
condition of the eye or Kant's image-framing faculty of the mind. The 
truth of the existent is determined to the extent that it is either 
reproduced or constructed as an "objective" form occupying an ideal 
space. ·Romanticism temporarily "covered up" the subject-object 
138Heidegger, ~eing and Time, p. 337. 
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dichotomy in so far as it appropriated a psychological perspective in 
assessing its relation to nature; yet this repressive activity disclosed ¥ 
an even deeper duality. By thinking it could "create" nature, as a prod-
uct of mind, romanticism merely externalized the interiority of its 
poets. This self-deceptive attempt on the part of the poets to manipu-
late their own psychological abberations historically articulated the 
hyperbolic posture of scientific objectivity--but at the opposite 
extreme. In fact, it was inevitable: 
There is a type of mind, and not necessarily of an inferior order, 
which finds it impossible to accept the sum of parts as a substi-
tute for the whole, the quantitative as a substitute for the quali-
tative, a series of equations as a substitute for significance; and 
there is no denying that the reduction of nature to a system of 
numerical relations, so uncompromisingly demanded and put into 
practice by Galileo, was bound to leave a kind of psychological 
vacuum.l39 
In so far as it reflects the mind, romanticism ironically represents the 
ultimate "rational" posture--psychoanalytical self-analysis; carried to 
its logical extreme, it has become, in our own time, inextricably bound 
up with conducting the business of life in the most practical, inexpen-
sive, and least time-consuming fashion possible, that is, "You, too, can 
analyze yourself in one simple lesson." Indeed, today's advertizing has 
us so "psyched" that we uncritically accept the "mind-over-matter" sales 
pitch in order to avoid the "situation" at all costs. "Everydayness takes 
Dasein as something ready-to-hand to be concerned with--that is, something 
that gets managed and reckoned up. 'Life' is a 'business', whether or 
not it covers its costs."l40 Today we more or less accomodate this im-
plicit consequence of romanticism as something included in the rent, like 
139Panofsky, The Renaissance, p. 181. 
140Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 336. 
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the water bill; but for the nineteenth century the cost of romanticism was 
dear. The failure of the "objective" or "scientific" analysis of private 
interior states to find a "law" or general maxim was finally evidenced in 
the necessity of Freud. The romantics had isolated single emotional 
states without interrogating their relationship to a whole world. And 
without a world, man is unavoidably doomed to "insanity." 
Between Romanticism and Transcendentalism lies the straight and 
narrow path. We might add, that path is extremely short; so short, in 
fact, that if one closes his eyes he is there, for Emerson's transparent 
eyeball is irreparably blind as well. Like romanticism, transcendentalism 
is largely the product of post-Kantian idealism. Just as romanticism 
could talk about the truth of nature as a reflection or image of the 
"self" or mind, so too could transcendentalism speak of a spiritual "in-
sight" based on close observation of nature. For Emerson, each moment is 
uniquely transcendent in the perception of the object; and if we see it 
"correctly" we are led to the truth of nature itself. Yet Emerson was no 
more systematic in his thinking than Coleridge; and though it seems that 
he sincerely envisioned himself as a counter-gradient to the perceptual 
bias of his age, his thinking remained inextricably tied to the age's 
most fundamental prejudice. In his essay "Nature," Emerson invariably 
relies on the traditional epistemological metaphor of picture-thinking; 
his diction is saturated with the word "picture." Describing the corre-
spondence between "visible things and human thoughts," Emerson remarks, 
"Every natural fact is a symbol of some spiritual fact. Every appearance 
in nature corresponds to some state of the mind, and that state of the 
mind can only be described by presenting that natural appearance as its 
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picture."141 And elsewhere he says, "To the attentive eye, each moment 
of the year has its own beauty, and in the same field, it beholds, every 
hour, a picture which was never seen before, and which shall never be 
seen again."142 That Emerson uses the word "picture" to such an excess 
suggests that he recognizes the moment of vision as a fixed organized 
image, anticipating the daguerreotype by three years.143 In order to see 
l nature correctly, "I become a transparent eyeball; I am nothing; I see 
( 
all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me. 11 144 In 
seeing all, the perceiver becomes a transparent eyeball by escaping the 
frame of his body as well as the situation of perception itself; such a 
disembodied being must surely be "nothing," as Emerson would have it. Of 
course, this does not frighten Emerson any more than Homais in Flaubert's 
Madame Bovary; as he remarks to Madame Lefrancois: "Nothingness does not 
frighten a philosopher."145 Even so, before this transparent eyeball 
becomes a nothingness in order to discern the reciprocal transparency of 
nature and of the universe itself, it must condescendingly address the 
"forms" of nature. As an object of the intellect, "The beauty of nature 
re-forms itself in the mind, and not for barren contemplation, but for 
new creation."146 
Such is the constitution of all things, or such the plastic power 
141Nature, "Language," in The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, ed. Edward Waldo Emerson, Centenary Edition, 12 vols. (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1903-21), 1:29 and 26, respectively. 
142rbid., "Beauty," p. 18. 
143Rudisill, p. 17. 144Nature, "Nature," p. 10. 
145Gustave Flaubert, Madame Bovary, trans. Paul de Man (New York: 
W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., A Norton Critical Edition, 1965), p. 242. 
146Nature, "Beauty," p. 23. 
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of the human eye, that the primary forms, as the sky, the 
mountain, the tree, the animal, give us a delight in and for them-
selves; a pleasure arising from outline, color, motio~and group-
ing. This seems partly owing to the eye itself. The eye is the 
best of artists. By the mutual action of its structure and of the 
laws of light, perspective is produced, which integrates every 
mass of objects, of what character soever, into a well colored and 
shaded globe, so that where the particular objects are mean and 
unaffecting, the landscape which they compose is round and 
symmetrical.l47 
Nature is thus "the integrity of impression made by manifold natural 
objects. There is a property in the horizon which no man has but 
he whose eye can integrate all the parts."l48 Again, that specific 
property of the eye which is able to unify the manifold, to integrate 
the objects of nature into a uniformly continuous space, is characterized 
by perspective. Emerson envisions the existent as a picture. 
Spatial perspective so permeates Emerson's thinking that he 
defines Memory in similar terms: "Visible distance behind and before us, 
is respectively our image of memory and hope."l49 We are reminded of 
Hume. But Emerson rhetorically espouses an all-inclusive posture to the 
extent that he facilely accomodates all other systems in so far as they 
contain a partial truth, a kind of mental "aspect" of nature. Because 
idealism glibly negotiates all angles simultaneously, sees through the 
angular distinctness of matter in terms of a perspective somehow beyond 
perspective like Leibniz's perspectiveless posture, Emerson judiciously 
concedes all points of view: "The dawn is my Assyria; the sunset and 
moonrise my Paphos, and unimaginable realms of faerie; broad noon shall 
be my England of the senses and the understanding; the night shall be my 
Germany of mystic philosophy and dreams."l50 Although he appears to 
147rbid., "Beauty," p. 15. 148rbid., "Nature," p. 8. 
149Ibid., "Language," p. 26. 150rbid., "Beauty," p. 17. 
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oblige both empiricism and idealism in this remark, Emerson, like 
Coleridge, believed that truth reposed ultimately in the mind. The 
imagination mediates between reason and sensation in order to arrive at 
the transparency of the world: "The Imagination may be defined to be 
the use which the Reason makes of the material world."lSl In a passage 
somewhat reminiscent of Kant's definition of the sublime, Emerson 
describes this process; it is interesting, here, that he speaks of the 
"eye" of reason, although it seems that a pure "vision" of reason is 
beyond form--a transparency which approximates Kant's formlessness of 
the sublime: 
When the eye of Reason opens, to outline and surface are at once 
added grace and expression. These proceed from imagination and 
affection, and abate somewhat of the angular distinctness of 
objects. If the Reason be stimulated to more earnest vision, 
outlines and surfaces become transparent, and are no longer seen; 
causes and spirits are seen through them,l52 
In fact, Emerson specifically mentions the sublime several times in the 
essay; yet, regardless of whether or not he has Kant's concept of the 
sublime distinctly in mind here, it is obvious that Emerson's thinking is 
dominated by the desire to see through to the noumenal world. We can 
only arrive at the ultimately unframed vision of reason by cutting down 
the angular distinctness of matter in so far as it shapes and forms the 
object; but in order to do this, the imagination must somehow alter our 
point of view. By changing the point of view we get a new perspective on 
things; this, of course, means that we must catch nature in the act, 
amidst its fleeting variety of shapes and forms: 
Nature is made to conspire with spirit to emancipate us. Certain 
mechanical changes, a small alteration in our local position, 
apprises us of a dualism. We are strangely affected by seeing the 
151Ibid., "Idealism," p. 52. 152Ibid., "Idealism," pp. 49-50. 
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shore from a moving ship, from a balloon, or through the tints of 
an unusual sky. The least change in our point of view gives the 
whole world a pictorial air. A man who seldom rides, needs only 
to get into a coach and traverse his own town, to turn the street 
into a puppet-show. The men, the women,--talking, running, 
bartering, fighting,--the earnest mechanic, the lounger, the 
begger, the boys, the dogs, are unrealized at once, or, at least, 
wholly detached from all relation to the observer, and seen as 
transparent, not substantial beings. What new thoughts are 
suggested by seeing a face of country quite familiar, in the rapid 
movement of the railroad car! Nay, the most wonted objects, (make 
a very slight change in the point of vision,) please us most. In 
a camera obscura, the butcher's cart, and the figure of one of our 
own family amuse us. So a portrait of a well-known face gratifies 
us. Turn the eyes upside down, by looking at the landscape 
through your legs, and how agreeable is the picture, though you 
have seen it any time these twenty years!153 
For Emerson, changing the point of view "unrealizes" the world, it 
idealizes in so far as the vision is "wholly detached from all relation 
to the observer;" like the unsituated attitude of scientific "observa-
tion," Emerson's observer ideally perceives the object from everywhere at 
once. In theory, only when the imagination presents the object from 
every point of view is reason then disposed to see the transparency of 
nature. But does this, in fact, mean that the vanishing point ceases to 
inhere in the object? Does man finally abdicate his spectatorial 
throne? Does Emerson disown the theoretically ubiquitous perspective? ' · 
Not at all. Man still determines the existent in so far as his vision 
constitutes a perspective; but instead of being in the form of the 
object, as such, the vanishing point now nebulously inheres in the form-
lessness of the "truth" of nature as a whole. "Every universal truth 
which we express in words, implies or supposes every other truth. Omne 
verum vera consonat. It is like a great circle on a sphere, comprising 
all possible circles; which, however, may be drawn and comprise it in 
153Ibid., "Idealism," pp. 50-51. 
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like manner. Every such truth is the absolute Ens seen from one side. 
But it has innumerable sides."l54 In order to see the truth, then, man 
must be outside the existent, for it is only from the ubiquitous point 
of view that man can perceive an entirely determinate picture of the 
whole truth of being: "A Fact is the end or last issue of spirit. The 
-
visible creation is the terminus or the circumference of the invisible 
world." 155 
Like the scientific consciousness, Emerson's reason would define 
its scope in terms of the infinite; because it fails to recognize the 
very situatedness of being, it dis-locates itself from the world it seeks 
to see and, henceforth, ascribes to mind what was once the task of the 
body. But truth remains objective in the sense that it is "there" for 
all to see, it is the object of the mind; and man can know the truth 
only in so far as he sets it before himself. But to the extent that 
truth is mind, and not determined as an internal or external form, what 
man sets before himself is, in fact, himself. Only because mind 
terminates the mirror of truth can nature, in turn, become a "disci-
pline"--again, mind over matter. At times, Emerson's essay reads like a 
,, gloss on Addison: when man's thoughts are the equal of nature so that 
he can get the better of her, beat her at her own game, "the frame will 
suit the picture. A virtuous man is in unison with her works, and makes 
the central figure of the visible sphere."l56 Nature thus frames man, 
who in turn frames the truth of the world which is nothing more than the 
~ disembodied image of himself. Interestingly, this self-portrait is 
I' 
~ 
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never seen in profile, but always in full "view." In general, idealism 
does not do away with the distinction between subject and object, but 
rather makes the subject the object of his own observation. Like the 
seventeenth-century portrait, which gazes in_full view upon the 
observer, idealism establishes a psychological vanishing point in the 
viewer.l57 "Idealism acquaints us with the total disparity between the 
evidence of our own being and the evidence of the world's being. The 
one is perfect; the other, incapable of any assurance."158 Yet, the 
viewer is still divorced from the view precisely because it is a view, 
even if only a mirror-view or self-view; and as a view at all, the 
"visual" vanishing point remains outside the subject. 
We are taught by great actions that the universe is the property 
of every individual in it. Every rational creature has all nature 
for his dowry and estate. It is his, if he will. He may divest 
himself of it; he may creep into a corner, and abdicate his 
kingdom, as most men do, but he is entitled to the world by his 
constitution. In proportion to the energy of his thought and 
will, he takes up the world into himself.159 
Reason thus determines the world, constitutes the world, indeed creates 
the world; through it we learn that "man has access to the entiremind 
of the Creator, is himself the creator in the finite. This view .• 
carries upon its face the highest certificate of truth, because it 
animates me to create my own world through the purification of my 
soul."160 Indeed, the world belongs to those who think it best, and 
life becomes the thinking of a history, or better, the history of a 
thought, for only the rational perspective is correct: "In inquiries 
157McLuhan, Vanishing Point, p. 13. 158Nature, "Spirit," p. 62. 
159rbid., "Beauty," p. 20. 
160Ibid., "Spirit," p. 65. 
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respecting the laws of the world and the frame of things, the highest 
reason is always the truest."161 The manifold in unity, "il piu nell' 
uno," subsequently exists as something tacked on to reason whereby 
nature merely becomes "an appendix to the soul."l62 This attitude 
represents a logical extension of Cartesian metaphysics, wherein the 
existent as a whole is set before us in so far as it loses its opaque-
ness and becomes visibly transparent; in such a way man gets a view on 
it, a picture of the whole thing. He subsequently concentrates all his 
efforts into the solution of this picture-puzzle; he interrogates the 
world by demanding that it show itself. Discontent with the "appearance" 
of a world, man demands that things reveal themselves for what they 
"really" are beneath the surface of their form. Because he adds an 
"aspect" to the thing which he cannot "see," an invisible quale over and 
above the quantum, he spends the remainder of a life searching for a 
transparency in the thing which was never there to begin, never attested 
by the thing, but somehow posited as necessarily-there by himself. 
Man's quaquaversal vision seeks transparency as something payable on 
demand. George Santayana expressed the absurdity of such an attitude, 
and of idealism in general, in his satirical little poem which appeared 
in the Journal of Philosophy, 1952, but written around 1926: 
"I thought, before I learned to think, 
That bread was food and water drink, 
But now I know that drink and food 
Are simple phases of the good. 
My need of nourishment makes meat 
Out of such things as I can eat; 
Only that drink is drink in act 
Which irrigates my thirsty tract; 
And because I am slaked and fed 
Water is water and bread bread. 
161Ibid., "Prospects," p. 66. 162Ibid., "Idealism," p. 56. 
-Pips, bones, and grist]~ and the rest, 
Express my failure to digest. 
My mind, with all in thought comprised, 
Is just digestion realized; 
The whole world else, beyond all question, 
Is my projected indigestion. 
How came it that so bright a youth 
Ever could doubt this limpid truth? 
Because, concerning food and drink, 
I thought before I learned to think."l63 
In effect, Emerson no more wished to transact the truth of vision 
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than did Descartes; rather than investigate the phenomenon, Emerson would 
chase the specters of Reasons, which negotiates form-less, object-less 
perceptions "on the edge of a world that doesn't equivocate!"l64 Like 
Descartes' Dioptric, Emerson's "Nature" represents "the breviary of a 
thought that wants no longer to abide in the visible and so decides to 
construct the visible according to a model-in-thought."165 By handling 
the existent in this way, man secures a position free from doubt, 
Descartes' very starting point. By calculation and manipulation man 
imposes his will on nature as the very representation of its "truth", and 
thus determines the existent in so far as it becomes his servant. 
The exercise of the Will, or the lesson of power, is taught in 
every event. From the child's successive possession of his 
several senses up to the hour when he saith, "Thy will be done!" he 
is learning the secret that he can reduce under his will not only 
particular events but great classes, nay, the whole series of 
events, and so conform all facts to his character. Nature is 
thoroughly mediate. It is made to serve. It receives the 
dominion of man as meekly as the ass on which the Saviour rode. It 
offers all its kingdoms to man as the raw material which he may 
mould into what is useful. Man is never weary of working it 
up. One after another his victorious thought comes up with 
and reduces all things, until the world becomes at last only a 
163quoted in Dialogue on George Santay~na, ed. Corliss Lamont 
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realized will,--the double of the man.l66 
Such a willful im-position is irreparably doomed to failure; because he 
is naturally "out of position," man can only continue to make those 
costly errors which will finally cost him the ball game. As soon as he 
becomes the frame of reference by which the existent as a whole is 
judged, man de-limits his vision to that high-lighted area and its periph-
eral frame through which he stares at the reflection of himself. By 
seeing the world as that which stares back at him, the reflection of 
himself, he logically concludes that the existent as a whole does so 
also; but the syllogism is based on a false premise, and the results are 
devastating. "The greatest delight which the fields and woods minister 
is the suggestion of an occult relation between man and the vegetable. I 
am not alone and unacknowledged. They nod to me, and I to them •••• 
Nature always wears the colors of the spirit."167 The universe recog-
nizes man's presence; it reassures him he is there. Man needs this kind 
of formal acknowledgment once he locates himself outside the existent as 
an observer. 
III 
"It is no exaggeration to say that in the history of modern science 
the advent of perspective marked the beginning of a first period; the 
invention of the telescope and the microscope that of a second; and the 
discovery of photography that of a third."l68 And it is no accident that 
r 
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the history of these three inventions constitutes the history of the 
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solidification of the world-view. Today, that world-view bespeaks the 
' enormous value attached to "specialization" vis-a-vis research, a proced-
ure thoroughly different from seventeenth-century "experimentation." 
Yet, both experimentation and research presume that their projected area 
is able to become "objective" only in so far as they already possess a 
view of the world "ahead" of their activity. 
Every science is, as research, founded on the projection of a 
limited object area and is therefore necessarily specialized 
science. But, in the development of the projection, every special-
ized science must, through its procedure, separate itself into 
definite fields of investigation. But this separation or special-
ization is by no means only the unavoidable concomitant of the 
increasing vastness of the results of research. It is not a 
necessary evil, but the necessary essence of science as research. 
Specialization is not the consequence, but the cause of the 
progress of all research.169 
Characterized by its "busy-ness," modern science is able to incorporate 
the projection of its object area in the existent; but this is nothing 
less than to grant the procedure itself definitive precedence over Being, 
which research objectifies.170 "On the basis of this business 
character, the sciences provide themselves with the appropriate coherence 
and unity," which in turn forms men of an entirely different stamp: "The 
scholar disappears. He is replaced by the research man who is engaged in 
research projects. This, rather than the pursuit of scholarship, gives 
his work its keen atmosphere. The research man no longer needs a 
library at home. Besides he is always moving about. He does business 
at meetings and gets information at congresses."171 The total picture 
of the sciences today is grounded in this kind of motility; with respect 
to the objectification of Being, modern science has erected a "system" 
169Heidegger, "World View," pp. 346-47. 
170rbid., I=· 347. 171Ibid., pp. 347-48. 
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which offers the "greatest possible ability to switch its research--free-
dom of research, yet regulated mobility of transference and integration 
of activities with respect to whatever tasks happen to be of paramount 
importance."l72 In this way, research "holds the existent to account on 
the question of how and how far it can be put at the disposal of avail-
able 'representation.' Research has the existent at its disposal if it 
can either calculate it in advance, in its future course, or calculate 
it afterwards as past."173 Of course, this aspect of research, the 
transformation of truth into certainty of representation, had originated 
with Descartes, and had thoroughly serrated the perceptual field by the 
seventeenth century with the propagation of the "new science."174 But it 
takes a uniquely different course in our own century. It is in the most 
varied guises that science, 2;! research, specifically appears as "the 
gigantic;" and it is in this connection that the gigantic announces the 
infinitesimal.175 At the same time that technology produces such things 
as the skyscraper and the atomic bomb, it lays the ground for the 
emergence of that which makes such quantitatively gigantic phenomena 
possible: "Think of the numbers of atomic physics. The gigantic presses 
forward in a form which appears precisely to make .it vanish."176 Yet, 
beneath the superficially quantitative exterior of the gigantic there 
lurks, in our own time, a shadow darker than night; for the gigantic 
naturally tends to hide that through which the quantitative is trans-
172rbid., p. 348. 173rbid., p. 349. 
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formed into a peculiar ~uality, and subsequently becomes a distinctive 
type of greatness.l77 
Every historical period differs from others not only in its great-
ness; it has also in each case its own concept of greatness. But 
as soon as the gigantic in planning and calculation and organi-
zation and affirmation shifts from the quantitative to a peculiar 
quality, the gigantic and that which can apparently be completely 
and continually calculated becomes, precisely because of this, the 
incalculable. This remains the invisible shadow which is cast 
over all things everywhere when man has become subjectum and the 
world a view.l78 
Today, this menacing specter appears not only against the backdrop of an 
immanent nuclear catastrophe, but also hovers over the more threatening 
consequences of contemporary genetic research. When the International 
Council of Scientific Unions feels it necessary to form a watch-dog 
committee in order to regulate and monitor, as well as promote, recombi-
nant DNA research, the incalculable has unmistakably become, indeed, a 
distinctive type of greatness, that peculiar quality about which 
Heidegger speaks. Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe this new 
Committee on Genetic Experimentation will be able to do any more than 
what certain individual governments are already trying to do alone. 
Yet, on other fronts, contemporary scientific objectification 
touches our daily lives more poignantly; the electronic revolution in 
mass media such as the telephone and television evidences an apparently 
decreasing ability to situate ourselves, whereby modern technology 
pushes forward toward the "annihiliation" of time and space. We experi-
ence it in terms of transportation as well; witness the ever-decreasing 
time (and space) interval between any two points on the globe. Air 
flight, for example, makes its own unique demands on the passenger, 
177Ibid. 178rbid. 
demands which must be addressed both physically and psychologically in 
order to remain somehow "oriented" toward a whole world: 
Air flight involves an extension of the whole body. Once in the 
air a plane makes its own times and spaces, or perhaps one should 
say that it exists mainly in the dimension of time rather than 
space once it is off the ground. The passengers develop a 
"destination syndrome," as it were, as their contribution to the 
unique space created in the act of flight.l79 
73 
The new technological acceleration which we experience today in terms of 
fragmentation and isolation, however, is unique to the age only in so far 
as we approach the zero-limit of this interval as a lived experience. 
The nineteenth century was a time of enormous technological innovation as 
well. Such inventions as the steamboat, the railroad, and the telegraph 
appreciably diminished the time-space factor. Among the numerous techno-
logical innovations of the age, Emerson lists five miracles which 
appeared in his own lifetime: the steamboat, the railroad, the telegraph, 
the application of the spectroscope to astronomy, and the photograph; a 
little ditty from Elton's Songs and Melodies for the Multitude humorously 
expresses what must have been a common sentiment of the time: 
Oh, the world ain't now as it used to was, 
The past is like a dream, sirs. 
Every thing's on the railroad plan, 
Though they don't all go by steam, sirs. 
Expresses now are all the rage, 
By steamboat and balloon, sirs, 
In a year or two we'll get the news 
Directly from the moon, sirs. 
The electric telegraphs are now 
Both time and distance mocking, 
But then, the news which they convey 
Is really very shocking. 
Short hand is now quite out of use, 
For when the ministers preach, sirs, 
179McLuhan, Vanishing ~oint, p. 217. 
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Or politicians rise to spout, 
They "Daguerreotype" the speech, sirs.l80 
To the extent that the above attitude addresses a new technological 
attitude, it also tells us specifically how that age was on the way 
towards a world-view, and how the inventions of the age supported the 
stipulation that man, as ~ubjecturn, envisioned himself as the norm of the 
existent as a whole. Among Emerson's five technological miracles, can we 
find one which stands out above the rest and articulates the public, 
technological bias more than any other? 
More than any other invention of the age, the daguerreotype became 
the metaphor for technology in the public consciousness: 
Along with the railroad and the electric telegraph, it had taken 
hold of popular imagination as an example of technology. Distinct 
from the railroad and the telegraph, the daguerreotype had 
implications of symbolic insight which made it an ideal agency for 
such use. It seemed to epitomize new means of reaching truth in a 
form acceptable to everyone.l81 
In general, the daguerrean view supported the publicly biased attachment 
to technology and its concomitant perceptual prejudice in so far as it 
helped "locate" mari in the universe; it encouraged the fictive time and 
space which accompanies having a world-view. As that which is "real" 
only to the extent that it is set before us, the world became ultimately 
accessible when man could at last frame an image of it seemingly 
irrespective of his own position in that world, an image which appeared 
to co-incide with the object perfectly. Once man had captured the 
existent scientifically, and done so in a purely "objective" fashion 
divorced from the partial subjectivity inherent in microscopic and tele-
180"Rhymes and Chimes," quoted in Rudisill, pp. 74-75. 
181Rudisill, p. 73. 
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scopic instrumentation, the existent was assumed to be "there" before him 
once and for all; that is, in the sense we have previously defined as 
"rational." In 1849 Samuel Dwight Humphrey sent one of his plates of a 
multiple exposure of the moon to Jared Sparks, then president of Harvard 
University, who replied: "We here perceive the apparent motion of the 
Moon, or rather the actual motion of the Earth on its axis, distinctly 
measured for half a minute's time, within the space of one-tenth of an 
inch."l82 Once time and space have been set before us as an entirely 
measurable function, as that kind of thing on which we can formulate a 
perspective, both time and space are demonstrated to be calculable and 
manipulable; they are, in fact, proven to be exclusively objective, and 
to be so "really." The daguerreotype's ability to record a direct image 
of man's location with respect to the moon and stars asserted man's 
presence in the universe, and pushed him further into the forefront of 
that frame of reference by which the existent as a whole would henceforth 
be envisioned, manipulated, and constituted. The daguerreotype made 
explicit the central thought of the age; once man no longer considered 
himself as situated in the world, as that existent which looks upon the 
world in order to dis-cover it, but rather as the central figure of the 
world by which truth is solely determined and appropriated in so ·far as 
it coincides with his representation of it, he ceased to "see" the world 
at all. Now it is the world which perceives man as he goes about the 
business of manipulating and calculating it. If man continues to "see" 
~t all, it is to perceive that which is looking at him. As with 
Emerson's "Nature," everything bears witness to man's own actions, and 
182quoted in Rudisill, p. 85. 
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history becomes the record of man's presence in the universe • 
• Edward Hitchcock expressed the sentiment unreservedly: 
Men fancy that a wave of oblivion passes over the greater part of 
their actions. But physical science shows us that those actions 
have been transfused into the very texture of the universe, so 
that no waters can wash them out, and no erosions, comminution, or 
metamorphoses, can obliterate them. . • • Our words, our actions, 
and even our thoughts, make an indelible impression on the 
~v;t:Se.183 
Hitchcock further envisions the universe as one "vast picture gallery," 
and defines the universe, in essence, as pothing less than a huge 
daguerreotype of history which "encloses the pictures of the past, like 
an indestructible and incorruptible record, containing the purest and the 
clearest truth."184 Considering the implications that all nature is 
pervaded by this photographic influence, he proceeds: "We do not know 
but it may imprint upon the world around us our features, as they are 
modified by various passions, and thus fill nature with daguerreotype 
impressions of all our actions that are performed in daylight."185 
Analogous to the perspective articulated in Whitman's interior picture 
gallery,186 Hitchcock perceives history in essentially photographic 
terms; for all future generations the "truth" of history will be 
directly accessible. History, and truth in g~neral, subsequently become 
that which can be visually perceived and accurately recorded as a 
representation. Only the represented "fact" is true, and it is true to 
the extent that its objectivity coincides with the rational. 
183The Religion of Geology and its Related Sciences (Boston: 
Phillips, Sampson, and Co., 1851), p. 410. 
184rbid., pp. 410 and 418, respectively. 185Ibid., p. 426. 
186cf. Walt Whitman, Pictures: An Unpublished Poem. New York: 
The June House, 1927. 
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We have seen this collusion before in Emerson's "Nature," whereby 
nature coquettishly acknowledges man's presence in the universe. Man 
solicits this complicity whereby the universe reassures him he is 
"there;" he needs this kind of formal acknowledgment in so far as he 
locates himself outside the existent as an observer. Emerson's "Nature" 
had originally appeared in 1836, three years before the invention of the 
daguerreotype, and disclosed to what extent the stage had been set for 
its latest technological performance. Hitchcock's definition of the 
universe as a vast picture gallery, and history as the all-inclusive 
daguerreotype, merely constitute the daguerrean articulation, or 
"exposure" if you will, of Emerson's description of idealism, which 
"beholds the whole circle of persons and things, of actions and events, 
of country and religion, not as painfully accumulated, atom after atom, 
act after act, in an aged creeping Past, but as one vast picture which 
God paints on the instant eternity for the contemplation of the soul."l87 
The daguerreotype terminated the emphasis which the age placed on visual 
representation, and its correlative ability to arrive at the "truth" of 
nature and reality in general. Consciousness thus comes to be con~ti~ 
; 
titued by its visual "data," a collection of mental contents repr~sent~g-. 
a coincidence between subject and object; and rationality, in tu~, is 
shown to be grounded in the immediacy of fact, the unequivocal relation 
between sensation and impression--indeed, "a fortunate accident bringing 
together dispersed sensations."l88 The ontological implications of 
idealism are thus seen to be grounded in the very same epistemological 
187Nature, "Idealism," p. 60. 
188Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 60. 
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assumptions as rationalism. Idealism generally seeks to discover a 
"community in being" rather than a "community in meaning," as Cassirer 
denies to analytical reflection itself; yet, even an abstracted 
"community in meaning" destroys the significance of phenomena, for it 
places consciousness outside being.189 Like the rational perspective, 
- symbolic insight is fated to remain irreparably divorced from the 
phenomenon itself. Thus, the daguerreotype superficially articulated 
both the realistic and transcendental posture; for over and above its 
ability to accurately record the object as it "appears," the daguerre-
otype simultaneously accommodated the symbolic demand that we see "in" 
the object something "beyond" the object iself--that is, that we see 
"more." This seeing "more," however, contingently subsists in the 
accuracy by which we initially perceive the object as "objective;" we can 
appropriate the spiritual insight only in so far as it is grounded in 
accurate representation, that is, only to the extent that "what" we see 
before us (the visual data or content of consciousness) is "formal." 
Axiomatically, the daguerreotype was quick to seize the "content" 
of painting as most properly germane to its own purpose and potential; 
within a single year after its invention such a distinguished figure as 
Samuel Morse had already forseen the daguerreotype's enormous possibility 
as a determining factor in the art world. In 1840, as president of the 
National Academy of Design, Morse declared: "The daguerreotype is 
undoubtedly destined to produce a great revolution in art, and we, as 
artists, should be aware of it and rightly understand its influence. 
This influence, both on ourselves and the public generally, will, I 
189cf. Ibid., pp. 124-25. 
~·-. 
79 
think, be in the highest degree favorable to the character of art."190 
The thinking of Thomas Cole, at this time, reflects the "realistic" 
aspect of the American visual sense, and in it we may discern that aspect 
of representation which Reynolds termed "mechanical" as opposed to the 
"poetical." In his paintings, Cole seeks to present the object as a 
form of the "natural eye," rather than the "mind's eye;" in a letter to 
William Dunlap he remarks, "Although, in many respects, I was delighted 
with the English school of painting, yet, on the whole, I was 
disappointed: my natural eye was disgusted with its gaud and 
ostentation."191 He continues: 
Turner is the prince of the evil spirits. With imagination and a 
deep knowledge of the machinery of his art, he has produced some 
surprising specimens of effect. His earlier pictures are really 
beautiful and true, though rather misty; but in his late works you 
see the most splendid combinations of color and chiaroscuro--
gorgeous but altogether false--there is a visionary, unsubstantial 
look about them that, for some subjects, is admirably appropriate; 
but in pictures, representing scenes in this world, rocks should 
not look like sugar candy, nor the ground like jelly.192 
Yet, consummate painter that he was, Cole was cautious not to carry this 
position to the extreme; in a letter of 1844 he wrote that a painting 
"ought not to be a dead imitation of things without the power to impress 
a sentiment, or enforce a truth."193 Indeed, his "L'Allegro" and "Il 
190quoted in M. A. Root, The Camera and the Pencil (Philadelphia: 
J. B. Lippincott and Co., 1864), p. 391. 
191william Dunlap, ! History of the Rise and Progress of the Arts 
of Design in the United States, rev. ed., ed. Frank W. Bayley and 
Charles E. Goodspeed, 3 vols. (Boston: C. E. Goodspeed and Co., 1918), 
3:152. 
192Ibid., p. 153. 
193quoted in American Narrative Painting, Catalog notes by Nancy 
Wall Moure, Essay by Donelson F. Hoopes (Los Angeles: Los Angeles County 
Museum of Art, in association with Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1974), p. 54. 
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Penseroso" display a marked fascination with light although it could be 
argued that the themes dictate such an emphasis, while his "The Voyage of 
Life: Manhood" bears, in many respects, a genuine resemblance to Turner 
himself. Nonetheless, Cole's general attitude reveals how easily the 
daguerreotype was able to appropriate the realistic function of painting, 
a function not only sanctioned by many painters themselves, but also 
shared by a large portion of the general public. 
Working men and artisans over the country formed a keenly 
critical audience able to spot an inaccuracy or a distortion of 
what they knew from experience; in this kind of image recording 
even more than with landscapes, Americans believed that a picture 
was "good" if it was "true." Perhaps more than any other form of 
visual record, the genre paintings illustrated a climate of 
interest that was favorable for the introduction of photography. 
Like the panoramas, these pictures prefigured a need for the 
recording accuracy of the daguerreotype.194 
In Paris, however, when Daguerre produced his first "sun-paintings," 
audience response was somewhat qualified; Daguerre's early pictures 
reflected a magical aura specifically in terms of their acutely 
represented detail. Yet, the initial rejoinder to the daguerreotype 
evinced the feeling that something was "missing."195 The accuracy of 
194Rudisill, p. 12. 
195A passage from the Leipziger Anzeiger amusingly reflects an 
extreme reaction to the daguerreotype, as quoted in Rudisill, p. 50. The 
great generosity of the French government in pres~nting the process of 
the daguerreotype as a free gift to the world made the daguerreotype 
internationally known almost over night. Having failed to make a 
daguerreotype itself, the Anzeiger denounced Daguerre in .the following 
terms: 
"Wanting to hold fast to transitory mirror-pictures is not only an 
impossibility, as has been shown by basic German research, but even the 
wish to do so is blasphemy. Man is created in the image of God, and 
God's image cannot be captured by any man-made machine. • • • God has, 
to be sure, tolerantly forborne the mirror in His creation as a vain toy 
of the Devil. Most likely, however, He is regretting this tolerance, 
especially because many women are using mirrors to look at themselves in 
all of their vanity and pride. But no mirror, neither of glass nor of 
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these pictures intensified their magical mood, 
by their eerie representation of Paris as a city complete to every 
brick yet totally devoid of life. Since even the most carefully 
detailed paintings of the age--such as those of David or Ingres--
were still oriented to a central concern with humanity, people were 
used to thinking of pictures as centering on man. Since it was 
also the period of Romantic painting, pictures were expected to 
idealize the world by addition or suppression or interpretation. 
Now, suddenly, people in one of the most art-conscious cities of the 
world were confronted with pictures that were uncompromisingly 
acute in itemizing the details of the world but which simultaneously 
removed all trace of human life. The absence of color in such 
otherwise perfect representations further stressed this effect, as 
did the curious negative-positive character of the image on a 
perfect mirror surface that turned realistic scenes into ghostly 
negative images with the slightest change of viewing angle.l96 
Unsurprisingly, then, feeling somehow left out of the frame, it was in 
order to compensate for this apparent void in the photographic "still-
life" that man as subjectum re-positioned himself into the forefront once 
again by defining the daguerrean process as an art. Henceforth, the 
daguerreotypist becomes an "artist." This was especially necessary for an 
audience which could only think in terms of a visual conditioning 
centered around man, particularly so in painting itself; by comparison, 
the daguerreotype must have seemed peculiarly, if not frighteningly, 
devoid of the human '~touch." Ironically, the painters were among the 
quicksilver, has yet received permission from God to hold fast the image 
of the human face. • • • Now: Should this same God, who for thousands 
of years has never allowed that mirror-pictures of men should be fade-
less, should this same God suddenly become untrue to His eternal princi-
ples and allow that a Frenchman from Paris should set loose such a 
devilish invention into the World!!?? We must make clear, after all, how 
unChristian and Hellishly vain mankind would become if everyone could 
have his own mirror-picture made for filthy money and reproduced by the 
dozen. There would be such a mass epidemic of vanity that mankind would 
become godlessly superficial and godlessly vain. And·if this "Man-sewer" 
Daguerre in Paris maintains a hundred times that his human mirror-
pictures can be held fast on silver plates, this must a hundred times be 
called an infamous lie, and it is not worthwhile that German masters of 
optics concern themselves with this impertinent claim." 
196Rudisill, p. 39. 
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first to recognize the daguerreotype's artistic significance: Delacroix, 
for example, made elaborate use of the photographic medium for his own 
drawings; and Paul Delaroche, in a remark singularly pertinent to the 
over-worked comparison to Rembrandt's etchings, said of the daguerre-
otype, "Color is translated with so much truth that its absence is 
forgotten."l97 Whatever mysterious meaning Delaroche may have intended, 
comparison with Rembrandt immediately became a general touchstone "for 
discussing the monochromatic continuous-tone subtleties of light and dark 
which had never been seen before, and the medium's acuteness of rendering 
of atmospheric conditions was a constant marvel."l98 Already, in 1839, 
the year of its birth, N. P. Willis, the "sunshine and summer" columnist 
as S. G. Goodrich called him in contra-distinction to the "chill, dark, 
and wintry" Hawthorne,199 said of the daguerreotype: 
All nature shall paint herself--fields, rivers, trees, houses, 
plains, mountains, cities, shall all paint themselves at a bidding, 
and at a few moment's notice. Towns will no longer have any 
representative but themselves. Invention says it. It has found 
out the one thing new under the sun; that, by virtue of the sun's 
patent, all nature, animate and inanimate, shall be henceforth 
its own painter, engraver, printer, and publisher.200 
From such a passage as the above, one can justifiably understand how 
Willis would be counted among Hawthorne's bunch of "scribbling women;" 
nevertheless, Willis negotiates, here, the terms in which the daguerre-
otype generally came to be discussed. Rather than deny the daguerreo-
197quoted in Rudisill, p. 41. 
198Rudisill, p. 38. 
199Recollections of ~ Lifetime, quoted in Hawthorn~: The Critical 
Heritage, ed. J. Donald Crowley (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 
1970), p. 6. 
200quoted in Rudisill, p. 43. 
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typist his "art," Willis' conunent merely exhibits the difference between 
the European and American attitude toward painting at the time. Unlike 
the European reaction which focused on the creatively individual artist, 
the American attitude tended to emphasize the objects of nature as the 
"formal" constitutents of art. In this respect, American painting 
principally attended to nature rather than the artist himself. Behind 
the thoeretical divergence, however, one constant persistently emerged: 
the daguerreotype always tells the "truth" about nature, it cannot lie. 
In 1840, expressing a desire for this kind of absolute certainty, one of 
the great "rationalists" of the nineteenth century, Edgar Allan Poe, 
unequivocally stated the daguerreotype's superiority in this respect: 
In truth the daguerreotype plate is infinitely more accurate than 
any painting by human hands. If we examine a work of ordinary 
art, by means of a powerful microscope, all traces of resemblance 
to nature will disappear--but the closest scrutiny of the photo-
graphic drawing discloses only a more absolute truth, more perfect 
identity of aspect with the thing represented.201 
Poe's "more perfect identity of aspect with the thing represented" might 
be said to describe the nineteenth-century scientific-technological 
f attitude in general; but as we have seen, that perceptual bias was 
primordially grounded in the world-view itself, and more specifically, 
"rational" perspective. And whether or not that view focused outward 
upon the object or inward toward the subject, as an object of concern, it 
invariably employed representation as its criterion for "truth." The 
framed "prospectus" constructs a visually uniform space so that the view 
itself necessarily yields a formal resemblance between object and image. 
By taking over the "realistic11 function of painting, the daguerreotype 
201quoted in Van Deren Coke, "Camera and Canvas," Art in America 
49 (No. 3., 1961) : 68. 
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conferred a finality upon the existent in the sense that our certainty of 
the world was no longer confined, or forced to con-form, to a physical or 
mental "organ." Man's picture of the world was no longer contingent upon 
the subjectivity inherent in microscopic or telescopic instrumentation, 
much less the extreme inaccuracies inherent in a painting or a drawing; 
the mirror-image correctly reflected the existent in its absolute truth. 
"A painting may omit a blemish, or adapt a feature to the artist's fancy, 
but a reflected image must be faithful to its prototype."202 
Yet, this same kind of thinking simultaneously promoted the 
daguerreotype to a medium capable of symbolic insight precisely because 
of its essential ability to apprehend the object in the truth of its 
"form." In so far as the nineteenth-century perceptual bias demanded an 
absolute resemblance between external and internal worlds, phenomena 
merely represented the disclosure of an already pre-existent "reason;" 
formal identity thereby solved the problem of maximum coherence, the very 
condition for the possibility of the world.203 Whether or not this 
conformity represented the external world of Newtonian physics or the 
internal world of Kantian metaphysics, "form" itself invariably 
constituted the a priori model upon which the phenomena of structure are 
constructed. Rather than disclosing the very identity between external 
and internal world which it rhetorically sought, the world-view, because 
it assumes the ontological priority of space rather than time, "realizes" 
the world according to its norm to the extent that it projects the 
internal in the external, or vice versa. Both empiricism and idealism, 
202J. M. Whittemore, prospectus for The Daguerreotype: ! Magazine 
of Foreign Literature and Science, quoted in Rudisill, p. 73. 
203Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, pp. 60-61. 
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no matter what guise they may assume, are compelled to do this in order 
to get the whole "thing" before its gaze, just as a child, placing the 
final piece of a puzzle into place, comes up with the whole picture. 
With transcendentalism, too, consciousness exists solely for the forms, 
and stands outside Being in order to see it in a single glance; the 
transcendental ego equally belongs to others as well as myself. In this 
sense, knowing other people can never be a problem, for in determining 
the general conditions which make a world possible we have already 
discovered the "other" as well. Only as pure consciousnesses can we have 
the world and its completed "history" transparently before us.204 
Contemporary advertizing attests that this "view" largely persists to the 
present, and its inordinate success in creating a group consciousness 
tells us to what extent we think the world rather than live it. Similarly, 
the daguerreotype's symbolic function derived from its potential to 
define and perpetrate a national image which at once became "historical" 
and "true," a symbolic "reality." The possibility of publicly recording, 
for all times and places, an event or personality instigated a national 
or group consciousness: 
When bodies of people taking part in noteworthy events were so 
deliberately involved with pictorial situations, a form of group 
consciousness of communication with later generations was 
activated. • • • The commonality of public experience in the 
picture-making situation from one part of the United States to 
another tended to universalize the responses of the people into 
national behavior and attitudes held in general.205 
Public response to the daguerreotype consequently revealed a sense of 
historic iconology: "Merely by its presence, such a body of pictures 
204For a more detailed explanation of the above, see Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology, pp. 60-63. 
205Rudisill, p. 224. 
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conditioned the process of visual perception along particular lines of 
development so that people came to conceive of certain kinds of visual 
images as being true, or permanent, or typical."206 Functioning on this 
level, the daguerreotype became more meaningful in terms of its image 
rather than its "subject matter," so that "the value attached to the 
subject of a picture was often transferred to the picture itself in a way 
that allowed the picture not only to reflect attitudes or feelings but to 
affect them in terms of what people saw and how they saw it."207 In the 
same way, we have seen that American landscape painters often sought to 
portray the "mood" of the landscape, desiring to lead the eye of the 
viewer beyond the physical limitation of the subject matter itself. 
It was particularly in their attempt to represent light through an 
"atmosphere" that landscape painters imitated this "mood;" the 
eighteenth-century poet, Samuel Boyse, in his "Triumphs of Nature," 
expressed it thus: 
As darts the Sun oblique his varied rays, 
When through the fleecy cloud his lustre plays, 
Here deepens to a gloom the varied green, 
There beams a light--and shifts the shadowy scene: 
But when the obvious vapour melts away, 
The boundless prospect brightens into day.208 
Similarly, nothing contributed more to the symbolic function of the 
daguerreotype than its relation to light. In "Nature," Emerson had 
remarked on the efficacy of light in perception: "And as the eye is the 
best composer, so light is the first of painters. There is no object so 
foul that intense light will not make beautiful. And the stimulus it 
affords to the sense, and a sort of infinitude which it hath, like space 
206Ibid., p. 225. 207rbid., p. 32. 
208works of the English Poets, 14:536. 
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and time, make all matter gay."209 With the daguerreotype, however, 
nature could immediately paint herself; as the direct and absolute image 
of light, these "sun-paintings" represented a "shadow" cast across the 
instant of eternity. The daguerreotype was thus unique in so far as it 
scientifically exemplified the Newtonian "divinity" of light. Much was 
made of the truth of this direct image of light, and the daguerreotype 
machine itself became a kind of mystical medium capable of asserting its 
own agency in the production of this truth. Speaking of his daguerreo-
type machine, James F. Ryder expressed the sentiment ingenuously: "The 
box was the body, the lens was the soul, and an 'all-seeing eye,' and the 
gift of carrying the image to the plate."210 Indeed, this symbolic 
function has endured to the present. Edward Weston's photographic 
aesthetic merely reformulates the posture of Emerson's transcendental 
vision, whereby direct experience can lead to spiritual insight, and 
extends that kind of thinking into the twentieth century. Weston's 
repeated goal as a photographer, "To see the Thing Itself,"211 insists 
that the "thing itself" possess a significance beyond its explicit 
representation; and yet, the insight remains contingent upon accurate 
representation. "This then: to photograph a rock, have it look like a 
rock, but be more than a rock.--Significant presentation--not interpre-
tation."212 We are reminded of Cole's remark on Turner, and his own 
209Nature, "Beauty," p. 15. 
210voigtlander and ! (Cleveland: Cleveland Printing and 
Publishing Co., 1902), p. 16. 
211quoted in Edward Weston: Photographer, ed. Nancy Newhall 
(Rochester: Aperture, Inc., 1964), p. 39. 
212Ibid. 
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belief that imitation should enforce some truth. And in a recent 
commentary on Edward Weston, Willard Van Dyke reinforces this kind of 
confused thinking about perception as a cogent value for the present age. 
Concerning the presentation of Weston's subject, Van Dyke says, it "is 
deceptively simple; it challenges the viewer to make his own interpre-
tation. In his pictures the object is all there, complete within the 
confines of the frame; it is clearly what it is . Yet it is more. 
Whatever it may be, it also partakes of all other things because Weston 
saw its universal qualities."213 Again, as the translator and divine 
agent of light, the photograph appropriates the general truth of a thing. 
But surely, to perceive the "universal qualities" of a thing is to 
abstract it, to form-alize it. At any rate, it is clearly not to see 
the thing itself. In fact, it is nothing more than Emerson's transparent 
eyeball which, in its ability to capture the general effect as well as 
the specific detail, sees through the transparency of the world itself to 
its symbolic meaning. Weston defined his photographic aesthetic 
precisely in these terms: 
The photographer's power lies in his ability to re-create his 
subject in terms of its basic reality, and present this re-creation 
in such a form that the spectator feels that he is seeing not just 
a symbol for the object, but the thing itself revealed for the 
first time. Guided by the photographer's selective understanding, 
the penetrating power of the camera-eye can be used to produce a 
heightened sense of reality--a kind of super realism that reveals 
the vital essence of things.214 
Thus, the photographer, due to his superior "selective understanding" of 
the existent and in conspiracy with the "penetrating power of the 
213quoted in "Photo Exhibition a Testimony to Weston's Skills," 
The Denver Post, 1 February 1976, "Roundup Section," p. 22. 
214"What is Photographic Beauty?" quoted in Rudisill, p. 141. 
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camera-eye," unabashedly guarantees the truth of his presentation. In 
effect, then, the photograph no longer even represents the object, but 
becomes the representation of how well the photographer understands the 
object before he objectifies it. This kind of patting oneself on the 
back does nothing more than typify a modified version of Edward Hitch-
cock's initial response to the medium: henceforth, all nature attests 
to man's presence in the universe. Weston's attitude further "develops" 
that diorthotic objectification of the world, whereby the thing exists 
only in so far as it is set before us, or "brought to light." Yet, this 
is anything but the Heideggerian "clearing" of aletheia, for there is no 
room here for the "shadow" of concealment in truth. Its own historian, 
light reveals the world as some sort of mysterious agent in subtle and 
unexpressed complicity with man. Once man has placed himself "in the 
picture," he tenaciously holds onto this view whereby he constitutes the 
world as subjectum. The more man pursues the calculation, manipulation, 
and objectification of the existent, the more prominently he places 
himself in the forefront of the frame. Indeed, "That the world becomes 
a view is one and the same process with that by which man, within the 
existent, becomes a subjectum."215 
With the very inception of the daguerreotype, then, it was inevit-
able that man should become the subject for his own picture. The 
daguerrean portrait, by "objectively" placing man in the picture, 
literally terminated the anthropological tangent of nineteenth-century 
hero worship. Emerson's early thinking in the lectures on Biography 
(1835) reiterated Carlyle's On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the ijeroic in 
215Heidegger, "World View," p. 352. 
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History, and the nineteenth-century approach to history in general. And 
his Representative Men (1850), though somewhat tempered by a growing 
emphasis on dialectic so that society as well as the individual is given 
a positive role in the historical synthesis, denotes a contiguous 
attitude in so far as man abides as "representative."216 Man represents 
-._. the determination of historical events; he represents the age. And in 
the sense that he represents it at all, he does so in terms of a fixed 
and static vision of a moment in time. Even if that moment now resides 
in either the dialectical thesis or antithesis, which taken as a 
relation is always "moving on" toward a new synthesis, the vision itself 
remains permanently fixed in its truth. In other words, the "face" of 
man represents the existent as a whole in no less a dogmatic sense than 
Swedenborg's theory of correspondences. And though it seems fair to say 
with Charles Feidelson that Swedenborg "was Emerson's favorite whipping 
boy"217 regarding the stasis'of Swedenborg's doctrine of symbolism, 
Emerson's view in Representative Men is equally as retrospective or 
static in so far as we can discover the dynamics of an age by looking 
back at an individual as representative at all--and framing that 
perspective, moreover, as one which will be correct and true for all 
future generations who subsequently look back. In such a way the "mean-
ing" of history never belongs to the present, much less the future, but 
remains the counterfeit property of the past. The interpretation of 
history is in no way "subject" to change because the subject has become 
216For a detailed analysis of the role of dialectic in Emerson's 
historical thinking, see Gustaaf Van Cromphout, "Emerson and the 
Dialectics of History," PMLA 91 (January: 1976) : 54-64. 
217cf. Charles Feidelson, Jr., Symbolism and American Literature 
(Chicago: University of Ch~cago Press, Phoenix Books, 1959), p. 318. 
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an object for study, a "discipline." Whenever we look back, the subject 
is always "there," staring back at us from the exact same posture. 
Anchored in the past, these fixed lines of force secure man's position in 
the present--forever. In order to avoid this kind of historical 
attitude, we must keep in mind that these stereotypes in no way consti-
tute a "destiny," 
and just as clothing, jewellery and love transfigure the biological 
needs from which they arise, in the same way within the cultural 
world the historical ~ priori is constant only for a given phase 
and provided that the balance of forces allows the same forms to 
remain. So history is neither a perpetual novelty, nor a 
perpetual repetition, but the unique movement which creates stable 
forms and breaks them up.218 
Of course, by its very nature the portrait is retrospective; as a view 
into the past, the portrait frames or isolates a moment which represents 
the "subject" of history as a timeless object, an object ~ of time. 
It was only with the daguerreotype, however, that "everyman" could 
become a hero; though, to be sure, this is no return to medieval non-
perspectivism. Rather, the daguerreotype offered the opportunity for 
every man to have an "objectified" perspective on his private life, able 
to be exhibited at will to anyone else, thereby substantiating the Glaim 
that every life participates in the existent "significantly." 
In very little time, then, the portrait became the bread and butter 
of the daguerreotypist's trade, and portrait galleries sprung up in every 
f major city. While the European tradition of daguerreotype portraiture f 
emphasized aesthetic composition, the general or "formal" view, the 
American portrait stressed a central figure. The typical method 
presented the subject in direct light against a dark background. This, 
218Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 88. 
r ; 
i 
in effect, toned down the purely "realistic" or compositional aspect of 
the portrait while simultaneously playing up the "symbolic." Thus, 
European daguerreotypes, in general, seem "more timeless and self-
contained than is the immediate moment hacked out of the passing scene 
often shown in American pictures. This sort of jagged directness tends 
to emphasize the 'truth and reality' of the American picture in a way 
suggesting that the picture is less a distinct entity than a view into 
the world beyond it in an almost Emersonian sense."219 Once again, 
daguerrean portraiture, by presenting the high-lighted subject set off 
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against a dark background, reminds us of Rembrandt's own technique which, 
as we have seen, sustained innumerable comparisons with the daguerreotype 
throughout its develop~nt. Similarly, at the photographic exhibit for 
the London World's Fair, the jury reported: 
America stands alone for stern development of character, her 
works, with few exceptions, reject all accessories, present a 
faithful transcript of the subject and yield to none in excellence 
of execution • • • • The portraits stand forward in bold relief 
upon a plain background. The artist, having placed implicit 
reliance upon his knowledge of photographic science, has neglected 
to avail himself of the resources of art •••• 220 
Rather than paint-in a scene or background ("the resources of art"), 
American daguerreotypists preferred the more direct contrast between 
light and dark as a significant commentary on the subject. Concerning 
his own technique, Gabriel Harrison explained: "In daguerreotyping, as 
well as in painting, the artist should endeavor to secure three distinct 
and marked peculiarities that can hardly fail of making his production a 
superior work of art. These three points are the high lights, the middle 
219Rudisill, p. 161. 
220quoted in James D. Horan, Mathew Brady: Historian with a 
---Camera (New York: Bonanza Books, 1955), p. 18. 
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tints, and the shadow."221 He further remarked that when tonal 
gradations define the effect in this way, the daguerreotypist will insure 
himself of a picture "whose deep and Rembrandt-like shadow constrasts 
finely with the clear distinct tone of the high light, while the middle 
tints exhibit an elasticity of appearance so pure and lifelike, that the 
-- flesh seems imbued with motion, and the dull, frosty, death-like 
representation, that is so detestable in a work of art is studiously 
avoided."222 Thus, like the philosophical posture of idealism, the 
daguerrean portrait pictorially gets man "in the picture" objectively in 
so far as it treats the body as part of a single, continuous object-
space. Thus isolated from him-"self," the subject is henceforth able to 
perceive the truth of his subjectivity apart from its fictive opacity in 
the world. By placing his subjectivity in "front of" himself, out there, 
the subject simultaneously becomes the spectator of his own view; like 
the world, he becomes transparent. 
22l"Lights and Shadows of Daguerrean Life," Photographic and Fine 
Art Journal 7 (January 1854) : 8. 
222Ibid. Harrison deliberately emphasized this potentially 
"dramatic" aspect of the daguerreotype as a literary technique in his own 
writings. In fact, like science, the literary world at large was quick 
to adopt the daguerreotype to its own purposes. Nearly ten years prior 
to Hawthorne's use of the daguerreotype as one of his organizing 
metaphors in The House of the Seven Gables, as Rudisill remarks (pp. 221-
22), Francis Osgood had employed the daguerreotype as a kind of framing 
device for a series of character sketches in her short story, 
"Daguerreotype Pictures." And in 1847, a new literary magazine, The 
Daguerreotype, was established in order to create "verbal pictures," a 
new visual approach to literature which indicates to what extent the 
literary world was willing to appropriate the new technology to its own 
domain. Henceforth, the daguerreotype appeared in numerous short 
stories and novels either as some kind of plot device or metaphor for 
moral commentary. Such works as Fred Hunter's The Daguerreotype: or 
Love at First Sight, Dion Boucicault's The Octoroon, Augustine Duganne's 
The Daguerreotype Miniature or Life in the Empire City, and many others 
made extensive use of the daguerreotype as a literary technique, 
especially as a framing device for characterization or "portraiture." 
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In conclusion, then, because it uniformly frames the space of its 
image, the world-view positions the object in such a way that its form is 
always determined by the whatness of its "vision." But what we see is 
nothing more than the "content" isolated and set apart from its structure 
so that the vision never constitutes the phenomenon itself. This 
.-- priority of content can only be brought to account once we interrogate 
the possible relation of "meaning" to the visiop.. Although the structure 
of a phenomenon changes or alters its content, this can never be "true" 
of a world which is convinced of the unchangeability of its objects and 
their consequent absolute determinability in the mind as "concept." My 
idea of a geometrical space, for example, can never co-incide with the 
meaning of the space of my body as incarnate being-in-the-world. This 
space discloses a vanishing point in my "self" as a perceiver, and not 
in the object as a spectacle. Since I am always in the world as the 
articulation of a posture, perspective can never represent the space of 
that world, but only an ideal world whose space conforms to geometrical 
concepts incapable of framing anything other than a fixed and pre-
determined significance. The daguerreotype, moreover, not only objecti-
fied the thing, but the subjectum as well; the daguerrean portrait 
transformed people into things in so far as it extended and multiplied 
the human image to the proportions of mass-produced merchandise. 223 
Nevertheless, whatever "object" it captures, the photograph, like the 
world-view, sets its image before us as ~ view; the spectator simulta-
neously sets himself apart from the view in so far as it represents a 
1 privileged consciousness anterior to perception itself. To the extent 
~ 
223Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man 
(New York: The New American Library, A Signet Book, 1964), p. 170. 
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that the photograph objectified the world, it further evidenced the 
"correctness" of Cartesian metaphysics whereby the subjectum knows the 
object as extended and separate from him in a continuous and uniform 
space according to an ~ priori rationality or fixed perspective. 
Scientifically, of course, the photograph culminated the age of 
mechanical industrialism. "It was this all-important quality of 
uniformity and repeatability that had made the Gutenberg break between 
the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Photography was almost as decisive 
in making the break between mere mechanical industrialism and the graphic 
age of electronic man."224 Strictly speaking, however,. it was not until 
the "motion" picture that the electronic age could be said to have begun; 
yet, these photographic "dots" for the eye graphically terminated the 
thinking of an age, just as their corresponding "dots" for the ear 
implied the beginning of a new age: "Within a year of Daguerre's 
discovery, Samuel F. B. Morse was taking photographs of his wife and 
daughter in New York City. Dots for the eye (photograph) and dots for 
the ear (telegraph) thus met on top of a skyscraper."225 Perspective 
had created the very possibility of an "objective" science; Leonardo's 
Situs drawings and the subsequent science of anatomy were predicated on 
this new pictorial technique which could now describe the interior of the 
body as well as the external world itself. Telescope and microscope had 
further magnified the scientific objectification of the world. But with 
the photograph, the scientific mission had entered a new era which would 
extend the ubiquitous deceit of the camera-eye far into the twentieth 
224Ibid., p. 171. 
225rbid. 
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century itself. In so far as the photograph was able to capture the 
interior gestures of both matter and mind, it constituted the foundation 
not only for sub-atomic physics, but for the new worlds of endocrinology 
and psychopathology as well.226 
226Ibid., p. 181. 
r 
CHAPTER II 
EXPRESSIVE SPACE AND BEING SITUATED: THE FIELD 
Because perspective pays absolute homage to the object through the 
vanishing point, securing its place in a fixed uniform space in which the 
l 
I 
perceiver is situated objectively as well, it delineates an object-world 
already there, a world in which the perceiver passively identifies the 
truth of its content. Since it is an object itself, the world makes 
itself known to the extent that it is determinate and measurable, a space 
wherein every thing has its proper place via a calculus of objects--a 
calculus, moreover, which encourages the "delta" as the means of tran-
scending the purely geometrical in order to ground the world in an 
abstract infinity. As that ultimate object, entirely calculable, the 
world is to the extent that it is incremental, objectively representable. 
In short, the world becomes the "notion" that I have of it, an idea. 
Only in this way can we ever have it in our view .. Because perspective 
articulated the very frame for an objective scientific method, it 
simultaneously delimited the world of that frame, its content, as a 
view, and henceforth appropriated the world-view as its product. In 
order to insure its future, however, a world-view is necessarily 
compelled to repress the more primordial aspect of its epistemology, as a 
product of scientific and technological thinking wherein consciousness 
posits a priority of content in the sense that its view is significant 
only in so far as it is framed. For if it were to reflect on how it is 
that it "knows" its content, it would be forced to re-think the entire 
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~priori of its methodology, an aspect which at any rate it considers 
superfluous. For a world-view always orients itself toward a theoretical 
space in which it is unnecessary that it be perceived in order to be, 
since the ready-made world, as object, presents itself as the setting or 
frame for every possible event wherein perception is merely one of those 
events.! As long as "vision" merely negotiates the objective space of 
the thing perceived, either constituted or constituent, this kind of 
seeing stubbornly transforms its own activity into a perspicuous 
exchange between an epistemological subject and object. Because the 
perceptual "something" is never "in the middle of something else"2 it can 
never form part of a field, but rather gives me information or in-forms 
me of the content of its frame--a magic show which truly represents a 
performance "out of this world." It is in this sense that its perspec-
tive is always "framed." 
Indeed the natural world presents itself as existing in itself over 
and above its existence for me; the act of transcendence whereby 
the subject is thrown open to the world runs away with itself and 
we find ourselves in the presence of a nature which has no need to 
be perceived in order to exist.3 
Since, then, the object exists before we perceive it, there is no 
necessity that we take hold of it or "take it up" in order to know it. 
Because the object exists in a pre-determined conceptual space, all that 
remains is to reveal its geographical or geometrical location with 
respect to other objects, irrespective of the objectless subjectivity of 
our own body which makes the birth of Being possible. Thus, the "truth" 
of the world-view inheres in the assumption that our body is simply 
lMerleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 207. 
2rbid., p. 4. 3Ibid., p. 154. 
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another object in the world, a commodity with the ability to pay for 
itself. By framing its perspective, the world-view delineates an 
unequivocal correspondence between subject and object without any interme-
diary term. It judges the truth of its vision by an abstract impression: 
between perceiver and perceived there resides an absolute nothingness, as 
though the "something" perceived, its "whatness," constitutes a flat 
content which through the mystical agency of a fixed line of force 
projects the near-infinite number of points on its surface back onto a 
vision which receives them as impressions in the form of local stimuli 
and, in a durationless moment, reduplicates them--Presto!--into the 
completed form of a picture. Since perceiver and perceived exist as one 
object to another, this deliberate posture nullifies the object-horizon 
structure in the sense that the peripheral vision of its focus is as 
equally determinate as the central vision itself. 
Like pictorial perspective, the scientific-technological world-
view objectifies by making every object within the gaze of its frame 
centrally focused without any peripheral indeterminateness; it represents 
a gaze which has simultaneously come to rest on every thing, ther~by 
appropriating an absolute focal figure accompanied by a subsequent loss 
or negation of any background whatsoever--a flat projection without 
"depth." Within this gaze, objects rescind their ability to establish a 
horizon for other objects. What this amounts to, then, is not a gaze at 
all, but a framed representation, the mental picture of a whole world, a 
world constituted solely by objects as though the object were for-itself. 
In effect, this kind of perspective paradoxically represents an unlimited 
point of view, one which sees from every angle simultaneously because it 
ignores the subject of its perception by vanishing in the single horizon 
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of the object. Objectivity or representation is intransigently forgetful 
of the non-objective space necessary for there to be a representation or 
object-space at all; it disregards the bodily space of the perceiver; in 
short, it ignores Being.4 Because it presents a world of thoroughly 
focused objects through the fixed lines of force constituting, via the 
vanishing point, a continuous uniform space, it traces the outline of its 
gaze by a geometry in which the subject of the gaze plays no role other 
than already being there as another object in an objective space already 
made, a theoretical world of ready-made objects. In this kind of 
representation, an object is that which is seen from everrwhere at once; 
the object itself can be none of the individual points of view from 
which my body is able to perceive it at any given moment, but rather 
constitutes the flat projection of all possible perspectives, Leibniz's 
perspectiveless posture, the object seen from nowhere, or rather the 
object seen from everywhere. "The completed object is translucent, being 
shot through from all sides by an infinite number of present scrutinies 
which intersect in its depth leaving nothing hidden."5 Because the 
;;: . sufficient content, articulates a world of focal figures without a 
background or field, the world itself subsequently forfeits its opacity. 
It can thus no longer display itself, for there no longer exists the 
possibility of "relief." Where nothing is hidden, nothing can be seen. 
4cf. Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. 
Ralph Manheim. Garden City: Anchor Books, 1961. 
5Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 69. 
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We are left with the Cartesian-Newtonian world, an invisible universe, an 
abstraction. By going beyond the experience of perception, 
I regard my body, which is my point of view upon the world, as one 
of the objects of that world. My recent awareness of my gaze as a 
means of knowledge I now repress, and treat my eyes as bits of 
matter. They then take their place in the same objective space in 
which I am trying to situate the external object and I believe that 
I am producing the perceived perspective by the projection of the 
objects on my retina.6 
By positing an absolute object I negate my "own" experience and, like 
Melville's Ahab, monomaniacally attach myself to the idea which presumes 
itself "true," as does an absolute object, for all times, places, and 
Dasein. By expressing a universal validating power which forever closes 
off my ante-predicative knowledge of the world, I simultaneously "come up 
to" the world and every thing in it only in so far as it represents or 
refers me to an idea. As Descartes expressed it, perception is "solely 
an inspection by the mind;" and further on in the "Second Meditation" he 
continues, "I comprehend, solely by the faculty of judgment which resides 
in my mind, that which I believed I saw with my eyes."7 
Yet, phenomenally speaking, we do not come up to the thing in 
perception, but rather we live it by taking "hold of it," by making it 
our own. Hence, the non-objective situated space of my body makes it 
possible to define perception and Being analogously; for each, in its 
own way, constitutes the "disclosure of appropriation,"8 or as Hofstadter 
6Ibid., pp. 70-71. 
7Ren/ Descartes, "Discourse on Method" and "Meditations," trans. 
Laurence J. Lafleur (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1960), 
pp. 88-89. 
8Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," Poetry, 
Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 
Harper Colophon Books, 1975), p. 86. 
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interprets Heidegger's "das Ereignis," enownment.9 
Perception, for instance, is an enownment between man, Being, and 
time, in which the world opens up for man in his seeing, hearing, 
touching, smelling, tasting. In perception, what is other to the 
individual human being appears as enowned in its otherness. The 
house we see over there is seen as the dwelling place, whose 
entrance beckons or repels, which harbors within it the family, the 
hidden place of love and hate, conflict and healing. Saying, in 
uttering "house," has allowed this structure of enownment to appear 
and has opened up the possibility of ourselves grasping it and even 
entering into it to partake of the mode of life-presencing and 
-absencing which it makes accessible.10 
By embracing the world with our body, then, we make it our own, whereas 
the scientific world of objects situated in a geometrically abstract 
space can never interosculate the perceptual field, remaining fated to a 
desiccative world in which every thing has its uniquely proper "place" as 
the necessary condition for its being. And though the enunciation of 
this ready-made world represents the fixed end of a process which is only 
possible because in the world, as it is experienced or lived-through, my 
body is able to move around things, this motility is decisively over-
looked in favor of a pseudo object-horizon structure which slyly evades 
its interior dialectic, peremptorily identifying the priority of its 
content without a single interpellant gesture, never interrogating how 
it came to be or why it is at all. Thus, objective or scientific 
thought cunningly exerts an omnipotence which purports, with a money-back 
guarantee, to "save" us from the opaque and angular shadow-world of our 
own experience. The bargain, however, is only apparent, and ultimately 
expensive. True to its promise, this edulcorated object-world, shot 
through and through with the transparency of finest plate glass 
9Albert Hofstadter, "Enownment," Boundary 2 4 (Winter 1976) 369. 
10rbid., p. 374. 
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unceasingly bringing its content "to light," elucidates a completed 
picture of the world, but one which is fixed, static, forever consigned 
to a frozen image as though caught in a winter ice-storm; for "the 
absolute positing of a single object is the death of consciousness, since 
it congeals the whole of existence."ll 
Fortunately my body always presents itself to me from the same 
"angle" and thus precludes the possibility of ever being an object solely 
in-itself, for an object is precisely that thing on which I can have a 
multiple perspective and, in fact, move away from me until it disappears 
from view. I can move an object "in" and "out" of view at will, but I 
can never be absent from my own body, and it is this which secures its 
permanence from my point of view; it must always be with me, as my basic 
habit, since it can never be "in front" of me.l2 And as the tertium quid 
in the figure-background configuration, constituting a "double horizon of 
external and bodily space"l3 in so far as the perceptual "something" is 
always in the middle of something else as part of a field, it constantly 
evades the treatment to which science would "subject" it as an object of 
study. It refuses to become a "discipline;" indeed, it refuses to take 
an un-situated "place" in universal Being. When something touches my 
body, for example, it does not present itself to me "as a geometrical 
outline in which each stimulus occupies an explicit position."l4 So 
too with the visual experience; the phenomenal forces in my perceptual 
field, and not the "objective" forces, elicit my response or movement 
toward a potential world, so that it is "never our objective body that 
11Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 71. 12Ibid., pp. 90-91. 
13Ibid., p. 101. 14rbid., p. 108. 
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we move, but our phenomenal body."lS This phenomenal space surrounding 
my body constitutes a perceptual field which makes it possible, in the 
first place, for there to be a world of objects. The fixed, uniform, 
homogeneous space I disclose in a perspective receives its meaning from 
the non-objective field of bodily space in which I am situated. It is 
the situation which brings a spatial organization into being and allows 
consciousness to "derealize" itself and subsequently "throw itself'' into 
the object as an intention.16 In so far as consciousness is always a 
consciousness of something,17 as Husserl has defined it, its articulation 
and interpretation can never be expressed through inductive or causal 
thinking, as the relation of function to variable, but only as the inter-
penetration of intentional vectors. "Beneath intelligence as beneath 
perception, we discover a more fundamental function, 'a vector mobile.•n18 
Of course, that which lies at the very center of this intentional 
reticulation is existence itself. Perceptual intentionality19 discloses 
a non-positing, non-representational consciousness which negates the 
absolute."truth" of representation (Vor-stellung) claimed by the positing 
consciousness, for "space may be given to me in an intention to take hold 
without being given in an intention to know."20 The cerebellar patient, 
for example, can grasp a part of his body, but not be able to point to 
it. The phenomenal space of my body thus discloses a different kind of 
consciousness, consciousness of a world where the "object" does not 
15Ibid., p. 106. 16Ibid., p. 121. 
17cf. Remy C. Kwant, The Phenomenological Philosophy of Merleau-
Ponty (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1963), pp. 153-68. 
18Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 135. 
l9cf. Ibid., p. 121. 20Ibid. , p. 104. 
,,,, 
105 
represent extension itself, but presents itself as an "extension" of my 
own body, just as the blind man's walking stick becomes a "bodily 
auxiliary, an extensi~n of the bodily synthesis."21 In this "interior" 
space (in the sense of a non-objective space which negates the subject-
object dichotomy) the object is not a flat projection or total system of 
simultaneous perspectives from "everywhere;" it is not an idea or 
representation; it is not a sign, but an "aspect" or extension of my own 
body co-inhabiting the intentional co-ordinates of a non-geometrical 
space, that "intentional arc"22 of expressive space habitually projected 
around me. In the same way, the structure of consciousness in general 
displays a prehensility for apprehending an intelligible interior of 
meaning, just as the mass of ferromagnetic material inside a wire coil 
increases its external magnetic field. As Husserl expressed it: "Not 
every constitution has the schema: content of apprehension--apprehen-
sion."23 In the visual field, then, objects do not impress themselves 
upon me as local stimuli, now being explicitly "here," now "there," but 
primordially occupy a phenomenal space in which I intend to move; and 
there could be no "objective" space at all without this intentional 
spatialization via my body--this "vector mobile" moving, as Hochheimer 
expresses it in Analyse eines Seelenblinden von der Sprache, "in all 
directions like a searchlight, one through which we can direct ourselves 
towards anything, in or outside ourselves, and display a form of 
21Ibid., p. 152. 
22Ibid., p. 136. 
23Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Conscious-
~. ed. Martin Heidegger, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 25. 
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behavior in relation to that object."24 
The analogy of the searchlight, however, as Merleau-Ponty remarks, 
is inadequate "since it presupposes given objects on to which the beam 
plays, whereas the nuclear function to which we refer, before bringing 
objects to our sight or knowledge, makes them exist in a more intimate 
sense, for us."25 This intimate sense reflects my personal motor habit 
as an extension of my own existence, and bespeaks the way in which my 
perceptual habit brings me into the possession of a world.26 Indeed, 
the style of my gaze, the execution of perception, becomes a behavioral 
gesture which creates the possibility for the meaning of my world, a 
meaning which I always grasp via my body and its motility although 
perception itself can never imbue my life with fresh significance since 
it is always in the mode of the impersonal "One."27 Thus the "gaze," 
like the blind man's walking stick, provides us with a natural 
instrument which "gets more or less from things according to the way in 
which it questions them, ranges over or dwells on them. To learn to see 
colours is to acquire a certain style of seeing, a new use of one's own 
body; it is to enrich and recast the body image."28 Science, however, 
ignores the object's carnality, intentionality, and the function of 
body-motility in perception, for it intrudes itself upon a transparently 
completed form of existence; as with childhood, science ignores those 
things which do not comfortably fit into its world. Like illness itself, 
then, science represents a pathological disturbance which employs an 
24quoted in Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, pp. 135-36. 
25Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 136. 26Ibid., p. 153. 
27Ibid., p. 240. 28rbid., p. 153. 
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inflexible systematic set of procedures in order to compensate for 
certain deficiencies, a "repression" which continues to support its 
world despite the frequent creaking of its incomplete foundation. In 
effect, science 
reduces the object to a collection of successive 'characteristics,' 
perception to an abstract account, recognition to a rational 
synthesis or a plausible conjecture, and strips the object of its 
carnal presence and facticity. Whereas in the normal person every 
event related to movement or sense of touch causes consciousness 
to put up a host of intentions which run from the body as the 
centre of potential action either towards the body itself or 
towards the object.29 
This is to espouse a synergism in which the whole is, indeed, greater 
than the sum of its parts. My body is not merely an aggregation of 
parts which extemporize themselves by a harmonious juxtaposition in 
space; rather, my body articulates a dynamic fluxion which continually 
"digests" the world, transforming it to energy and waste with every 
"bite." I nevertheless remain in undivided possession of it through a 
body image in which all the parts are included.30 The possibility of a 
style, then, is the possibility of a non-objective body image, a 
completed "awareness" of posture not as the autonomous form of knowledge 
but as a kind of consciousness which trans-forms its "content" into the 
form of itself thereby giving structure and meaning to my "environment" 
and the objects which I "take up" in that environment. This intentional 
space provides the background against which my personal gesture or style 
stands out, and virtually signifies that my body, as a "subject," dwells 
face to face against the world.31 Here my personal bearing toward the 
world comes to light--a non-discursive significance which, like an art 
29Ibid., p. 109. 
31Ibid., p. 101. 
30Ibid. , p. 98. 
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work, discloses its meaning through an expressive time and space created 
by the "£orm."32 By "expressing" the world, my body takes "hold of it;" 
I come into the possession of a world by projecting a distinctly 
individual motility. And as the projection of a movement against the 
background of an integral structure of potential intentionality, this 
-._ new configuration or field reveals that my body touches the world. I 
live being through my fingertips.33 Thus, the spatiality of my body is 
clearly brought into being via its motility; it inhabits or dwells in a 
configuration constituted by both an "objective" and a "bodily" space. 
In this sense, perception itself is not even a deliberate act, but the 
background against which all my acts stand out; for the "content" of 
perception is always "inserted into a certain form of behaviour.n34 In 
this way, the world becomes an "expression" of my personal way of Being, 
the form of behavior; and world-structure becomes an expressive space. 
I 
Now an expressive space is precisely that kind of space which 
comes and goes. So long as we consider the space of the thing perceived, 
a framed space in so far as it constitutes an objectively total area 
which always gets fixed, we shall never expose the spatial relationship 
between the embodied subject and a world. Things can only begin to 
exist for us because we desire them; the affective life of the body 
32cf. Susanne K. Langer. Feeling and Form. New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1953, and Erich Heller. The Disinherited Mind. 
Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., Meridian Books, 1959. 
33william V. Spanos, "Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and the Hermeneutic 
Circle: Towards a Postmodern Theory of Interpretation as Dis-closure," 
Boundary 2 4 (Winter 1976) : 479. 
34Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, pp. xi and 208-09, respectively. 
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projects its own intentionality, one which consolidates a peculiar form 
of consciousness and expresses a typical structure incorporating other 
"forms" of behavior which reciprocally express it as well. As a 
constituent of this integrated network, the affective life underscores 
our distinctive way of taking up the world. We invite the world to us 
as we would a lover, gesticulating the appropriate postures in accord-
ance with how we would have it. If we wish to surprise it, we encounter 
it with a feigned lack of awareness as the courtier who, knowing his 
mistress is scheduled to walk across a certain path in the woods, 
nonchalantly situates himself against a tree which she will pass, 
perhaps crossing his legs and leaning into the tree at an angle which 
will flatter him the most. He fastens his gaze away from the direction 
by which she will come so that in taking her by surprise she is forced 
to "discover" him. Although at first glance this attitude seemingly 
represents a "predetermined" pose, the fact of our body repudiates an 
entirely "postureless" attitude, for we are always situated expressively 
whether we wish it or not. Every event in life is thus internally 
determined by our "demeanor," the style by which we ucourt" the wo:r;"ld as 
a projection of our own affective intentionality. As Merleau-Ponty 
points out, this is what Freud implied when he spoke of symptoms as 
always being "overdetermined." Because the body constantly transforms 
its "interiority" into de facto situations, it insures the world of an 
essential metamorphosis, one which substantiates the Ovidian universe 
and simultaneously confirms the meaning of existence. Similarly, it 
might be said that any myth, because it opens onto possible objectifica-
tions, grounds the de facto articulation of an "objective" world 
predicated on causality--not because it anticipates science, but because 
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its "noemata" can be set in a phenomenology which describes its function 
as a certain kind of consciousness which opens onto other possible 
consciousnesses. For example, the second law of thermodynamics 
singularly appropriates in scientific terms what the body had always 
"known" in phenomenal terms and existentially expresse'd as the "phoenix. 11 
Like the bird which rises from its own ashes, the second law of thermo-
dynamics merely describes a set of phenomena which accounts for the 
birth of a sun provisional to the paradoxical process of burning itself 
out, whereby hydrogen is converted to helium and then to oxygen and 
carbon, and so forth. Science, however, tells us nothing of this world 
as an event wherein the incorporeal content belies a more primordial 
"form," that most general space expressing a structure of Being endowed 
with emblematic and physiognomic characteristics, the metamorphic nature 
of perception itself; science merely defalcates its "discoveries" from a 
world absolutely there, a world, moreover, which ironically beckons to 
be raped because of its beautiful "mind," and not its "body." This kind 
of embezzlement mirrors the promethean endeavor of science to lay bare a 
universe stripped of its matter, a de-natured view of an anatomy denuded 
to a set of purely objective phenomena via an induction which can never 
arrive at necessity from the order of contingent facts. Today's 
"science fiction" sharply defines this attitude, although such writers 
as Poe and, more recently, H. P. Lovecraft had already established the 
ground for such a vision in an abstract "gothic." "The true 'hero' of a 
marvel tale," remarks Lovecraft, "is not any human being but simply a 
set of phenomena. Over and above everything else should tower the 
stark, outrageous monstrousness of one chosen departure from 
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nature." 35 By denying the world an expressive space, science fixes its 
gaze upon a theoretical area entirely framed and demarcated, a space 
implacably there irrespective of an embodied perceiver, which appropri-
ates a set of phenomena in terms of an idea whose truth is determined by 
the logical progression of a set of equations, and not the intentionality 
of an affective life. 
Such a vision precludes the possibility of removing one's self at 
will, for the bodiless perceiver is condemned to the absolute truth of 
its vision as an abstract function of the equation itself. As a testi-
mony to "objectivity" the perceiver relinquishes his will, becoming the 
slave to a world of self-sufficient "things" forever imprisoned in a 
space that lacks motility since it is always determined by an abstract 
system of co-ordinates which positions its objects with absolute 
finality. The bodiless observer can never go any "where" in this 
theoretical frame since no-"thing" can take up space. By forfeiting its 
sexuality this neutered entity can never come and go as it pleases, and 
subsequently forfeits the possibility of an "intercourse" with the world. 
A genuine subject, on the other hand, continually enjoys a freedom which 
not only transposes him upon the world effecting a "d,placement" toward 
various situations, but also allows him to withdraw from it in so far as 
he always has a body. Through this constant metamorphosis the body 
guarantees an inherited immunity to scientific thinghood, that fatal 
35Marginalia, quoted in Roger Shattuck, The Banquet Years: The 
Origins of the Avant Garde in France, 1885 to World War .!• rev. ed. 
(New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1968), p. 41. Cf. also, 
H. P. Lovecraft, Supernatural Horror in Literature (New York: Dover . 
Publications, Inc., 1973), p. 87: "Serious weird stores are .•• made 
realistically intense by close consistency and perfect fidelity to 
Nature except in the one supernatural direction which the author allows 
himself." 
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disease by which an entity remains forever susceptible to itself and the 
world. Indeed, my body constitutes the possibility of discarding 
every-thing, including, if I so desire, my very existence. In this 
process, however, my body is never self-sufficient, but always alongside 
a void, between the poles of transformation, "a prey to an active 
...,. nothingness."36 It is through the body that existence begins to appear, 
as a message in invisible ink begins to make itself present before our 
very eyes; and in this sense Binswanger defines the body as the hidden 
form of being ourself. 37 In the sexuality of my body, then, existence 
announces its ambiguous character, an ambiguity which inter-penetrates it 
to such an extent that we can never determine "where" sexuality leaves 
off and existence begins, for existence is the act of taking up a sexual 
situation;38 "The importance we attach to the body and the contradic-
tions of love are, therefore, related to a more general drama which 
arises from the metaphysical structure of my body, which is both an 
object for others and a subject for myself."39 This kind of transcen-
dence, whereby the world becomes meaningful to the extent that I take up 
a position, not only testifies that science can never get the "whole 
picture," but also indicates that we have at last escaped the anthro-
pologism of the traditional subject-object dichotomy. Though ontic 
relations within the world may initially obscure the "posture" or 
situation as an originating form of knowledge, I nevertheless discover 
36Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 165. 
37uber Psychotherapie, quoted in Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 
p. 166. 
38Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 169. 
39Ibid., p. 167. 
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through my body the primordial way in which I come into the possession of 
a world. So too with language: "it is the subject's taking up of a 
position in the world of his meanings."40 Thus, man's genius for 
ambiguity, as Merleau-Ponty refers to it, is disclosed through the 
experience of his own body, which refuses to be known in any way other 
than living it.41 To the extent that I possess experience at all, that 
experience inevitably bespeaks my body as the way I am: 
at the same time my body is as it were a 'natural' subject, a pro-
visional sketch of my total being. Thus experience of one's own 
body runs counter to the reflective procedure which detaches 
subject and object from each other, and which gives us only the 
thought about the body, or the body as an idea, and not the 
experience of the body or the body in reality.42 
By re-discovering the experience of my body and its basic structure, I 
re-discover, at the same time, the structure of the world, a structure, 
moreover, which like my body assumes a non-specific gravity, a density 
which continually evades the scientific transparency of objectification 
and, indeed, the world-view itself. 
Just as the synthesis of my body guarantees the object prior to 
constructing an idea of it, so too does it guarantee the world. "The 
thing, and the world, are given to me along with the parts of my body, 
not by any 'natural geometry', but in a living connection comparable, or 
rather identical, with that existing between the parts of my body 
itself."43 For example, the "orientation" of my body image constitutes 
the possibility of a co-related orientation in my visual field. Since my 
body is not determined by a transparent geometry but by an express.ive 
40Ibid., p. 193. 
41Ibid. Cf. also pp. 189 and 295-96, respectively. 
42Ibid., pp. 198-99. 43Ibid., p. 205. 
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unity which I discover by taking it up, this structure pertains to the 
world as well. By reason of my "position," I thus gain access to a 
visual field, a system of entities with which my gaze can get in touch. 
Reciprocally, my gaze acquires a certain style, a technique for "laying 
its hand" upon this field, proportionate to the experience accrued from 
using it. Similarly, all the senses display the unity of a perceptual 
field which inosculates a common world, as when a piece of music 
expresses an audible "space" which belongs to the eye as well as the ear, 
a depth inherent in the volume of a tone which seems to occupy all the 
room between us and its source, as William James has remarked.44 The eye 
here becomes an "auxiliary organ in order to concentrate attention upon 
the kinetic character of~music."45 Stravinsky goes so far as to express 
a disapproval of those who shut their eyes while listenin~ to music: 
I have always abominated listening to music with closed eyes, with-
out the eye taking an active part. Seeing the gestures and_motions 
of the different parts of the body that produce music is necessary 
and essential to grasping it in all its fullness. Those who claim 
to enjoy music fully only if their eyes are closed do not hear it 
better than if their eyes were open, but the absence of visual 
distractions allows them to abandon themselves, under the lulling 
influence of sounds, to vague reveries--and it is these which they 
love, far more than music itself.46 
Though such an eminent musician as Pablo Casals played and listened to 
music with his eyes shut, as Zuckerkandl points out, Stravinsky's remark 
aptly enunciates that primordially general space whence all perception 
transpires--the space, as Heidegger defines it, where things encounter us. 
44"The Perception of Space," quoted in Victor Zuckerkandl, Sound 
and Symbol: Music and the External World, trans. Willard R. Trask 
(New York: Pantheon Books, Bollingen Series XLIV, 1956), p. 275. 
45zuckerkandl, p. 340. 
46stravinsky, An Autobiography, quoted in Zuckerkandl, p. 340. 
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Indeed, perceptual experience is ambiguous to such an extent that 
11an audible rhythm causes cinematograph pictures to run together and 
produces a perception of movemen~ whereas, without auditory support, the 
same succession of images would be too slow to give rise to stroboscopic 
movement. 11 47 In so far as the form of an object inter-penetrates all the 
senses so that it is never a geometrical shape which we perceive, the 
form itself articulates a whole world. Because perception displays a 
world common to all the senses, poets have recognized the synaesthetic 
experience long before science committed it to second-order reflection. 
Thus, Dante's Hell typifies "A place made dumb of every glimmer of 
light."48 The sense configuration of the world adheres within the inten-
tiona! unity of my body, just as the unity of the single object g.rasped 
by my visual field adheres within the intentional unity of my "gaze," 
which replaces diplopia or the double image that scientific colligation 
would describe as superimposition. 
For my gaze to alight on near objects and to focus my eyes on them, 
it must experience double vision as an unbalance or as an imperfect 
vision, and tend towards the single object as towards the release 
of tension and the completion of vision. 'It is necessary to 
"look" in order to see.' The unity of the object in binocular 
vision is not, therefore, the result of some third person process 
which eventually produces a single image through the fusion of two 
monocular images. When we go from diplopia to normal vision, the 
single object replaces the two images, one is clearly not super-
imposed on the other: it is not of the same order as they, but is 
incomparably more substantial. The two images of diplopia are not 
amalgamated into one single one in binocular vision; the unity of 
the object is intentional. But--and this is the point we are 
trying to make--it is not therefore a notional unity. We pass from 
double vision to the single object, not through an inspection of 
the mind, but when the two eyes cease to function each on its own 
47Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 228. 
48The Divine Come4Y, 3 Vols., trans. Dorothy L. Sayers, vol. I: 
Hell (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1949), p. 98. 
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account and are used as a single organ by one single gaze.49 
The intentional synthesis of the phenomenal body projects around itself a 
certain setting "in so far as its 'parts' are dynamically acquainted with 
each other, and its receptors are so arranged as to make possible, 
through their synergy, the perception of the object."50 In this way, 
then, normal vision negotiates both the double image and the single 
object in so far as we use it; we cannot explain it as the focus of an 
anatomical visual apparatus, but only as an intentional function. 
Furthermore, learning to look, that is, seeing in general, is an acquired 
habit so that I always get from my gaze what I "put into it." For 
example, the visual sensation of the infant or the blind person, whose 
sight has been restored, saliently attests that seeing in perspective is 
ancillary to the development of a vision, but not its initial condition. 
Initially, the person whose sight has been restored makes no styptic 
contraction from the world by positing an "out there," but freely bleeds 
upon it, as it were, as though he were in direct touch with it. It is 
only later, through practice, that he locates places through a visual 
distance which foments the pandemic demarcation of "within" and "without." 
Thus, "the senses interact in perception as the two eyes collabo-
rate in vision."51 The pre-conscious unity of the body image sustains 
the perceptual synthesis just as the intentional unity of my gaze 
sustains the object; for the body is a synergic system which constitutes 
the general situation of being, that is, being-in-the-world. Perception 
is thus a "form" of behavior only to the extent that my body "occupies" 
49Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 232. 
51Ibid., p. 234. 
sorbid., PP· 232-33. 
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a phenomenal space, for all the forms belong to the phenomenal world.52 
Because the world is formal only in so far as it is phenomenal, movement 
forms the basis for the synergic unity of the senses in perception as a 
"project" or potential movement, and not as a transference in objective 
space.53 My body, then, is the very possibility of the world, a formal 
network of intentions co-inhabiting a phenomenal space; as such, my body 
expresses the world, conferring significance upon it by the fact of my 
situation. Now in so far as my body "occupies" space at all, as being-
in-the-world, it always does so in terms of its "situation" and not its 
"location."54 This is what is meant when we speak of the body as the 
"subject" of perception. Perception "occupies" me just as my body 
"occupies" space, by merging into it intentionally. For this reason I 
neither think the object nor myself thinking it any more than my body 
thinks its space; rather than being spread out before himself as a 
consciousness, the perceiver merges into the object thereby leaving his 
own subjectivity opaque and historical.55 If it were otherwise, there 
could be no discrepancy between consciousness and the world, for inten-
tionality would then "carry us to the heart of the object, and. simultan-
eously the percept would lose the thickness conferred by the present."56 
Because perception constitutes an "enownment," an appropriation, the 
object invites my body to take it up in a certain way, to which my body 
52Ibid., p. 232, footnote 2. 53Ibid., p. 234. 
54obviously, "location" is not meant in the sense which Heidegger 
speaks of it in "Building Dwelling Thinking," Poetry, Language, Thought, 
p. 154. 
55Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 238. 
56 Ibid. 
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responds by assuming an attitude which, in turn, makes the object deter-
min ate. 
The sensible configuration of an object or a gesture, which the 
criticism of the constancy hypothesis brings before our eyes, is 
not grasped in some inexpressible coincidence, it 'is understood' 
through a sort of act of appropriation which we all experience when 
we say that we have 'found' the rabbit in the foliage of a puzzle, 
or that we have 'caught' a slight gesture. Once the prejudice of 
sensation has been banished, a face, a signature, a form of 
behaviour cease to be mere 'visual data' whose psychological mean-
ing is to be sought in our inner experience, and the mental life 
of others becomes an immediate object, a whole charged with 
immanent meaning.57 
The perceptual situation, then, neither posits the subject nor the object, 
but discloses that my body is both a subject for me and an object for 
others; it constitutes the lived experience of both a unified subject and 
the intersensory unity of the thing.58 But how is this unification 
ultimately possible? 
If temporality is the ground of Being, as Heidegger's Being and 
Time demonstrates, it must simultaneously be the ground of perception. 
The perceptual synthesis is temporal: "Subjectivity, at the level of 
perception, is nothing but temporality."59 Temporality thus enables me 
to re-assign the object of my perception to the world, for I can, 
by slipping into the future, throw into the immediate past the 
world's first attack upon my senses, and direct myself towards the 
determinate object as towards a near future. The act of looking is 
indivisibly prospective, since the object is the final stage of my 
process of focusing, and retrospective, since it will present 
itself as preceding its own appearance, as the 'stimulus,' the 
motive or the prime mover of every process since its beginning. 
The spatial synthesis and the synthesis of the object are base~ on 
this unfolding of time. In every focusing movement my body unites 
present, past and future, it secretes time, or rather it becomes 
that location in nature where, for the first time, events, instead 
of pushing each other into the realm of being, project round the 
present a double horizon of past and future and acquire a 
57rbid., pp. 57-58. 58Ibid., p. 239. 59rbid. 
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historical orientation.60 
The perceptual "moment" is therefore essentially characterized by its 
"present;" for it is in the present that the act of focusing, for 
example, projects a past and future which constitute a history. And in 
this sense, my body takes possession of time in so far as it "looks" at 
the world. But because perception, by definition, is actual only so long 
as it is perceiving, because seeing is actual only so long as it is look-
ing, every act of seeing must continually be renewed. "The object 
remains clearly before me provided that I run my eyes over it, free-
ranging scope being an essential property of the gaze."61 The synthesis 
"Can be recaptured only in a fresh act which is itself temporal."62 
Thus, the perceptual claim to objectivity must perpetually be re-made. 
This failure of perceptual consciousness clearly reveals, then, how it is 
that my body can be both the subject of perception and yet an object for 
others, for it discloses that the subject of perception can never be an 
absolute subjectivity, but remains destined "to become an object for an 
ulterior I. Perception is always in the mode of the impersonal 'One. t.n6J 
Its being in the present, its characteristic ekstasis, is precisely what 
makes the perceptual act itself impersonal. 
It is not a personal act enabling me to give a fresh significance 
to my life. The person who, in sensory exploration, gives a past 
to the present and directs it towards a future, is not myself as 
an autonomous subject, but myself in so far as I have a body anQ am 
able to 'look.' Rather than being a genuine history, perception 
ratifies and renews in us a 'prehistory.•64 
Every perception thus "produces a new present which retains the past. 
The duality of naturata and naturans is therefore converted into a 
60Ibid., PP· 239-40. 61Ibid., p. 240. 
62Ibid. 63Ibid. 64Ibid. 
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dialectic of constituted and constituting time."65 
Still this does not get us to the most primordial horizon of Being, 
that which makes being-situated possible. Although we have described the 
temporal ekstasis of the perceptual situation itself, we have yet to 
define that ekstasis which makes perception possible in the first place. 
The possibility of perception belongs to the futural ekstasis, just as 
the possibility of the general situation being-in-the-world belongs to 
it, for the ultimate ground of perception is the ultimate ground of being-
situated. Although the perceptual "moment" is essentially characterized 
by the present, it is existentially grounded in the future, the temporal 
horizon of possibility itself. Like authentic Being, authentic 
perception is projective in its resoluteness. To the extent that 
perception makes the object determinate by throwing its indeterminate 
sensations into the past, it does so only in so far as it ceaselessly 
directs itself toward the object as a projected identity and thereby 
throws itself into the future; and to that extent, perception constitutes 
a primordial mode of concernful being-alongside the ready-to-hand, as 
well as solicitous being-with-others. Authentic perception frees me for 
the world by the directedness of its project, and .thus liberates my body 
for the potentiality-for-being appropriate to its own situation with 
respect to the disclosure of being. And like Being, authentic perception 
maintains itself in truth and un-truth simultaneously; it can never with-
draw from the actuality of its present for it would then cease to be, yet 
its possibility confers a style upon its own situation so that it is 
always situated within a temporal configuration constitutive of the 
~. 
I 
65rbid. 
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particular kind of space it presently negotiates vis-a-vis the resolute-
ness of its intention. In other words, perception is factually 
determined by the actuality of its present, though factically de-limited 
by the possibility of its future. Authentic perception has already put 
itself into the situation, for resoluteness "is authentically nothing 
else than Being-in-the-world."66 Anticipatory resoluteness "brings the 
Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-
hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others."67 
In the visual field, for example, objects disclose themselves by 
virtue of other objects which constitute their horizon. I can only "see" 
an object because other objects remain concealed, although they are still 
in the "field;" conspicuously, this is different from the perception in a 
perspective which adheres in terms of a single horizon constituted by an 
abstract vanishing "point." After all, perception discloses truth to the 
extent that it seeks to meet the world on its own terms; it directs 
itself to that end in order to bring forth the truth of the world by 
making room for the "clearing" where objects simultaneously conceal and 
de-conceal themselves. It is in this clearing that aletheia is figured 
in "relief." The inauthentic perception, on the other hand, rather than 
bring forth this clearing (Gestalt), seeks to close it off within the 
boundary or outline of an all-inclusive frame (Ge-Stell) so that it might 
secure the object in its place. It commandeers the absolute via the 
process of representation (Vor-stellen), and it is in this sense that 
inauthentic perception establishes the nature of modern technology, which 
assumes "the unconditional character of mere willing in the sense of 
66Heidegger, Being_ and Time, p. 344. 67rbid. 
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purposeful self-assertion in everything."68 Of course, this is its 
intention: it intransigently disallows the other to appear in its other-
ness. By refusing to meet the object on its own terms, as a mode which 
makes the presencing and absencing of life possible, the technological 
posture simultaneously denies the world the possibility of appearing in 
its self-deconcealing. In short, it spurns the phenomenal possibility of 
the world. By closing itself off from the phenomenon, it ironically 
denegates itself the truth, the very thing it claims to possess 
absolutely by virtue of the frame. This is comprehensible only in light 
of the fact that the technological attitude parasitizes on self-deception. 
As a self-deception, the inauthentic perception represents, in fact, a 
pseudo-posture, for it "pretends" not to be situated at all; modern 
technology fixes the world by its view and subsequently sets itself apart 
from the world so that it stands outside it. The technological pseudo-
posture is forced to sever itself from the world because it willfully 
intends to control it. Accordingly, its intention obdurately ignores 
the resolute call to Being and posits, in its place, the transparently 
un-situated correctness of an idea. 
By assuming an absolutely constituent consciousness, modern 
technology consigns its objects to a vavasory model-in-thought, subject 
to nothing but its own seigneuric indubitability, so that in effect it 
never has to perceive them at all. By abnegating the situation, that is, 
being-in-the-world, technology submits itself to a slavery historically 
unheralded, one which far exceeds that of the situation it seeks to 
escape. By virtue of its constitution, this hyperopic vision falls prey 
68Heidegger, "What are :Poets For?" Poetry, Language, Thought, 
p. 116. 
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to the foreshorten~d figures it attempts to emulate; these ''figures" 
which lure the ideal eye to an ultimate horizon-less invisibility where 
they disappear altogether, subsumed by the harmless obscurity called 
"infinity," merely pre-occupy the boredom of its vacuous vision which 
levels down everything, every ordo, "to the uniformity of production."69 
Because the technological vision would avoid that which lies closest to 
it, because it will not see what is nearest its own "eyeball," it is 
constantly frustrated by the ambiguous figure in the foreground which it 
cannot avoid and which gradually encroaches upon its "territory." It 
lives in perpetual fear of the day this figure will zoom-in upon its 
vision until it usurps the entire space of its frame, condemning the 
infinite light of its vision to eternal darkness. And what, more 
precisely, is this dark figure which technology would eternally negate? 
It is its very ground--finitude; it is, in short, death. "The self-
assertion of technological objectification is the constant negation of 
death. By this negation death itself becomes something negative; it 
becomes the altogether inconstant and null."70 The inauthentic techno~ 
logical perception thus negates itself in so far as it remains entirely 
contingent upon the content of its frame, a content which defines its own 
existence as eternally present-at-hand. In this respect, technology 
remains open to an invariably impossible future, wherein a single 
"present," eternally the same, continually dis-places the futural vector 
inherent in the act of individually renewing each successive perception. 
It thus corresponds, in many ways, to the psychoanalytical phenomenon of 
"repression." The technological attitude can never abandon its mono-
69rbid., p. 117. 70rbid., p. 125. 
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maniacal enterprise which indefinitely usurps its energy; it simulta-
neously pushes the traumatic experience of itself out of its frame so 
that the structure remains intact. By abstracting its existence to the 
third person, singular, this attitude subsequently forgoes the project of 
entertaining other "worlds" in the exclusive interest of one. As a 
phenomenon, however, this kind of repression nevertheless reveals that it 
can never truly escape its situation, that is, its finitude, and we are 
thereby led to the dynamics of its peculiar situation as autochthonous to 
its pervasive self-deception--a posture which pretends not to be 
situated.71 Authentic perception, on the other hand, brings itself into 
the fullness of being by articulating its own situation as an appropria-
tion, an enownment of the world, and thereby ratifies being-in-the-world 
as the very condition of its own possibility. I am able to appropriate a 
past for the present and direct that present towards a future "in so far 
as I have a body and am able to 'look."'72 In such a way, my subjectiv-
ity is grounded in the ultimate horizon of its finite temporality. 
Rather than purifying consciousness of its opacity, the temporal subjec-
tivity of perceptual consciousness brings us in touch with that 
primordial experience of the world which, in turn, grounds the possibil-
ity of a critical attitude capable of questioning the "gaze" and 
subsequently removing itself from the situation in order to penetrate it. 
Thus, the subjectivity of authentic perception is grounded in time. But 
if, at the outset, my perceptual field stands out against the background 
of a world in which neither subject nor object is posited,73 how can 
71cf. Merleau-Ponty's description of repression regarding the 
phenomenon of the "phantom limb," Phenomenology, pp. 82-83. 
72Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenal~, p. 240. 73Ibid., p~ 241. 
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there by an inter-subjectivity without objectification? How can a 
multiplicity of unique phenomenal "spaces" simultaneously share a common 
world? 
As a "form" of behavior, perception adheres to a world-structure 
which reamins consistently "there" with respect to the intentional field, 
but nevertheless refuses to concede the epistemological distinction 
between the insidedness and outsidedness of its space. Just as the 
temporality of perception is neither absolutely constituted nor 
constituting, its spatiality is neither absolutely spatialized nor 
spatializing. Empiricism, for example, concerns itself with a purely 
physical space whereas idealism concerns itself with geometrical space. 
In the first case, my body and things, their concrete relationships 
expressed in such terms as top and bottom, right and left, near and 
far, may appear to me as an irreducibly manifold variety, whereas 
in the second case I discover a single and indivisible ability to 
describe space. In the first case, I am concerned with physical 
space, with its regions of varied quality; in the second with 
geometrical space having interchangeable dimensions, homogeneous 
and isotropic, and here I can at least think of a pure change of 
place which would leave the moving body unchanged, and consequently 
a pure position distinct from the situation of the object in its 
concrete context.74 
Physical space is thus characterized by its content, whereas geometrical 
space is determined by some "pure unifying activity;"75 yet, our first-
hand experience of the world teaches us that we must look "on the hither 
side of the distinction between form and content."76 Cases of vision 
without retinal inversion, in which the subject is made to wear glasses 
which "correce' the retinal images, show us that our experience of "top" 
and "bottom," "up" and "down," and so forth can be altered with respect 
to its content as well as its form, since the altered visual appearances 
74Ibid., p. 244. 75Ibid., p. 248. 76Ibid. 
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"which, at the beginn:Lng, stood out against a background of previous 
space, develop round themselves . a horizon with a general orienta-
tion corresponding to their own."77 Direction in space, then, is neither 
the reception of a "real" space, nor the relationship dependent upon a 
certain number of fixed points arbitrarily chosen. Experience shows us 
"that the same contents can be successively oriented in one direction or 
another, and that objective relationships as registered on the retina 
through the position of the physical image do not govern our experience 
of 'up' and 'down,'" and so forth.78 But how, then, do we come into the 
possession of a world oriented in space? 
As Merleau-Ponty suggests, perception recognizes "a certain spatial 
level."79 What makes orientation in space possible in the first place is 
not my body as an object in an objective space, but rather my body as "a 
system of possible actions, a virtual body with its phenomenal 'place' 
defined by its task and situation. My body is wherever there is some-
thing to be done."80 I consequently acquire an orientation towards the 
world when my virtual body co-incides with my objective body, although it 
is the virtual body which ultimately makes it possible for me to change 
levels, and thereby accommodate a variety of different "spaces." I am 
able to understand space only to the extent that I can live it through my 
body: my body co-exists with the world, and it is this situation which 
"magnetizes experience and induces a direction in it."81 ln so far as it 
is perceived, the world is always grasped in terms of an orientation in 
77Ibid., p. 245. 
79Ibid., p. 248. 
81Ibid., p. 252. 
78Ibid,, p. 247. 
80Ibid., p. 250. 
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space which is not contingent upon the object, but grounded in the 
directionality of an intentional field which is able to "right" the 
world for every new spectacle which makes its appearance; and to this 
extent we can never disassociate "being" from the "situation," that is, 
being-in-the-world. My body, as a "system of anonymous 'functions' which 
draw every particular focus into a general project,"82 insures me of its 
inherence in the world. This spatial level, constitutive of perception, 
"endows every subsequent perception of space with its meaning, and it is 
resumed at every instant."83 Space is grounded, therefore, in our own 
facticity. The world is primordially spatial as a structural phenomenon 
wherein the subject is established in a setting inherent in the world. 
Because the spatial perception itself is always "motivated," my body 
similarly negotiates the situation vis-~-vis the general motion of the 
world; and in so far as motion is always involved in a setting, the 
world becomes that "space" where I am able to freely change my place of 
residence in accordance with every new appearance of it. In this sense, 
then, my perception of the world is determined by the way in which I am 
able to negotiate it, and to that extent perception constitutes a "form" 
of behavior grounded in a phenomenal space which is neither spatialized 
nor spatializing, neither objective nor subjective. 
Oriented or phenomenal space, in turn, is precisely what opens us 
onto a world of possible objectifications. The various structures of 
being-in-the-world guarantee a world common to all of them because they 
are ultimately grounded in a "natural" world prior to any reflective 
consciousness of it, wherein my gaze is able to lose itself entirely. 
82rbid., p. 254. 83Ibid. 
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In so far as space constitutes a lived experience, it is primordially 
existential; and can only open onto an objective "outside" because it 
simultaneously articulates a non-human space toward which my body 
projects me. Perception is not determined by analytical reflection, but 
can dissolve into the sensible where its verification and fullness are 
found.84 
I never wholly live in varieties of human space, but am always 
ultimately rooted in a natural and non-human space. As I walk 
across the Place de la Concorde, and think of myself as totally 
caught up· in the city of Paris, I can rest my eyes on one stone of 
the Tuileries wall, the Square disappears and there is then nothing 
but this stone entirely without history: I can, furthermore, allow 
my gaze to be absorbed by this yellowish, gritty surface, and then 
there is no longer even a stone there, but merely the play of light 
upon an indefinite substance.85 
Perception itself, then, discloses the co-incidence of subjectivity and 
objectivity as it is constitutive of the world and our normal experience 
of it. In "abnormal" states of consciousness, such as myth, dream, and 
insanity, we begin to lose touch with the world to the extent that its 
non-human space diminishes to the purely human. And yet the world still 
reveals its common appearance in so far as these states demonstrate a 
deviation from it. The primordial space of the world thus frees me for 
every possible setting because it binds me to the in-itself, whereas in 
dream, myth, or hallucination this space recedes toward a purely human 
structure. "What protects the sane man against delirium or hallucina-
tion, is not his critical powers, but the structure of his space: 
objects remain before him, keeping their distance and, as Malebranche 
said speaking of Adam, touching him only with respect."86 
This phenomenal or lived distance, through which I respectfully 
84Ibid., p. 293. 85Ibid. 86Ibid., p. 291. 
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keep in touch with the world, reveals its own kind of "perspective," a 
depth by which I grasp the world in terms of its actual opacity and not 
according to an ideal physical or geometrical space sustained by thinking 
the relation of its parts to each other via the "pictorial" perspective 
indicative of both empiricism and idealism. The primordial depth we 
experience in perception is not determined by the juxtaposition of its 
parts, for it is prior to objective space; the depth we experience in 
perception is a visible depth, and not the ideal depth which traditional 
theories of perception would relegate to the invisible foreshortened form 
of "breadth viewed in profile."87 An invisible depth pre-supposes the 
juxtaposition of simultaneous points in the direction of my gaze--a 
breadth seen from the side by virtue of a uniform space in which the 
subject abandons his individual point of view on the world in order to 
think himself into an un-situated, ubiquitous vantage point.88 Invisible 
depth, in fact, represents the way in which God would see the world. But 
this tells us nothing about the way we actually perceive it; although 
this concept, in itself, attests the self-evidence of an inter-subjective 
world.89 The leveled-down perspective of science derives from a 
primordial depth which belongs to the perspective itself and not to 
things; this primordial depth defines my relationship to the thing, and 
not the relation among things irrespective of a perceiving subject.90 
Without a subject, the object atrophies to a life-less ideality; 
perception, like Being, is necessarily incarnate. Richard Wilbur's "tall 
camels of the spirit," which "shimmer on the brink," beautifully describe 
the vacuous "rational" perspective which moves "with a stilted stride/ To 
87Ibid., p. 255. 88rbid. 89rbid., p. 256. 90rbid. 
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the land of sheer horizon, hunting Traherne's/ Sensible emptiness, there 
where the brain's lantern-slide/ Revels in vast returns;" and we are 
warned to 
Wisely watch for the sight 
Of the supernova burgeoning over the barn, 
Lampshine blurred in the steam of beasts, the spirit's right 
Oasis, light incarnate.91 
Phenomenal depth expresses the apparent size of an object, whereas 
"objective" depth defines the apparent size of an object as something 
measurable, the function of an invisible interval which reveals the "real" 
size with respect to other objects in space. But this "real" size is 
merely a mental size, a relation which does not take into account the 
perceiver, but conceptually vanishes in the object autonomously. The 
phenomenon of depth, however, discloses a vanishing point naturally 
established in the subject of the perception. Phenomenal "distance" can 
never be given to me as the height of a triangle together with its base 
and base angles, as Malebranche would have it,92 for my body does not 
occupy the same objective space of its perception. If it did, I would be 
already initiated into the world and would never need a perception. Of 
course, this is the way science would have it. But perception "does not 
bear upon a content of consciousness;" the mental image of the object is, 
in fact, "neither larger nor smaller than the physical image of the same 
object on my retina."93 Gestalt psychology has shown that the apparent 
size of an object is not the representation of an invisible depth for 
91"A World Without Objects is a Sensible Emptiness," 
Contemporary American Poetry, ed. Donald Hall (Baltimore: 
1962), p. 63. 
92Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 257. 
93Ibid., p. 260. 
in 
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"the apparent size of a retreating object does not vary proportionately 
to the retinal image."94 Consequently, there is no mental image consti-
tutive of a determinate size relative to the physical image which 
"stands like a screen between me and the thing."95 
The phenomenon of apparent size and distance are "two phases of a 
comprehensive organization of the field,"96 an act in which my gaze 
alters the perceptual field by focusing on the object in-itself, and 
thereby causes the apparent size of the object to appear. By breaking up 
the visual field, the perspective appears as a depth in intention; yet, 
this depth of perspective does not "measure" the apparent size of the 
object according to its distance, but rather grasps it prior to any 
geometrical judgment. The further away the object lies, the less 
completely it "occupies" my visual field--realizing, of course, that the 
visual field itself is not a measurable area, and has no definite 
capacity.97 My gaze can take in more or less objects depending upon how 
it negotiates the visual field, so that "near" and "far" define the 
situation, how my gaze takes hold of the objects in its field. In this 
respect, it differs radically from the daguerrean-like frame (Wilbur's 
"brain's lantern-slide") of the world-view which always contains the same 
number of things because it posits or sets them in an objective space 
incapable of changing its "content" precisely because of the frame. 
Increasing distance, then, is not "an augmenting externality: it 
expresses merely that the thing is beginning to slip away from the grip 
of our gaze and is less closely allied to it."98 Depth becomes a moment 
94Ibid., p. 259. 
96Ibid., p. 259. 
95rbid., p. 260. 
97rbid., p. 261. 98rbid. 
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in appropriating the single object; by taking up a factual situation, the 
unity of binocular vision transpires because the visual field itself is 
moving towards the most perfect possible symmetry.99 By appropriating 
the most determinate form, my gaze penetrates the object in such a way 
that depth appears as the significance of a certain organization in my 
visual field; "It is the dimension in which things or elements of things 
envelop each other, whereas breadth and height are the dimensions in 
which they are juxtaposed." 100 Thus, primordial depth does not assess a 
distance between objects; it is liminal regarding its applicability to 
things. 
Just as top and bottom, right and left are not given to the subject 
with the perceived contents, and are at each moment constituted 
with a spatial level in relation to which things arrange them-
selves--in the same way depth and size come to things in virtue of 
their being situated in relation to a level of distances and sizes, 
which defines the far and the near, the great and the small, before 
any object arises to provide us with a standard for comparison.lOl 
Primordial depth articulates the phenomenal hold my body has on its 
immediate surroundings, the style of my gaze, just as we can speak of a 
"small" responsibility which nevertheless "fills 1,1p," so to speak, the 
retinal structure of my intentional field--something which appears 
immanently close because it must be done immediately. Depth discloses, 
therefore, the phenomenal relation between a subject and space, that 
existential dimension of perspective anterior to the derivative perspec-
tive of physical and geometrical space, which conceptually designate "the 
one single form of being in a situation."l02 
Like the phenomenon of space in general, primordial depth is 
99rbid. , p. 262. 
IOlrbid., p. 266. 
100Ibid., pp. 264-65. 
I02rbid., p. 267. 
f. 
i 
l 
133 
equally grounded in temporality. Unlike the Kantian synthesis, which 
presupposes the discrete terms of a multiple perspective subject to 
analytical explication, the temporal dimension of depth constitutes a 
quasi-synthesis; for my gaze to grasp an object at a distance, it 
simultaneously grasps the object in time in so far as it "already holds" 
or "still holds" the object.l03 Spatial co-existence is temporal, then, 
because the perceived object and my perception of it are contemporary. 
The 'order of co-existents' is inseparable from the 'order of 
sequences', or rather time is not only the consciousness of a 
sequence. Perception provides me with a 'field of presence' in 
the broad sense, extending in two dimensions: the here-there 
dimension and the past-present-future dimension. The second 
elucidates the first. I 'hold', I 'have' the distant object with-
out any explicit positing of the spatial perspective (apparent size 
and shape) as I still 'have in hand' the immediate past without any 
distortion and without any interposed 'recollection•.l04 
We do not perceive distance as the content of an equidistant flat 
projection of the object any more than we understand memory as the inter-
position of a content between a past and present. Just as memory 
signifies an immediate possession of the past, a way of "being there," so 
too the perception of distance "can be understood only as a being in the 
distance which links up with being where it appears."l05 Once we admit 
time into the spatial setting, the phenomenon of movement shows up as an 
entity in its own right. "The thematization of movement ends with the 
identical object in motion and with the relativity of movement, which 
means that it destroys movement."l06 Granted, something must be in 
motion in order for a change to come about; yet, if we concern ourselves 
with "the particular manner of its 'passing,"' we discover a world made 
103Ibid., p. 265. 
I06rbid., p. 275. 
104rbid. 105rbid. 
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up not only of things, but also "pure transitions. 11 107 Only objective 
time is made up of successive moments.108 The unity of a lived time and 
space are always present to the perceiving subject because they envelop 
him within the unified scope of a behavioral configuration--his familiar 
setting in the world. Phenomenal time is not constituted by the 
successive moments of an "objective" time; "the lived present holds a 
past and a future within its thickness." 109 Similarly, the pure 
transition of phenomenal time reveals the unique way in which motion 
articulates the inextricable factuality of the situation. 
The motion in my visual field constitutes "a modulation of an 
already familiar setting;" at no time is it necessary that I be ~ware of 
any objective positions, for every object in motion is given to my visual 
field--a visual organization which, by definition, does not maintain an 
objectively stable point. 110 Unlike the frame, the edges of the visual 
field do not constitute a real line: "Our visual field is not neatly cut 
out of our objective world, and is not a fragment with sharp edges like 
the landscape framed by the window. We see as far as our hold on things 
extends, far beyond the zone of clear vision, and even behind us."lll 
Thus, when an object changes place in my visual field, its motion 
functions as a structural phenomenon; for the "very peculiar relationship 
which constitutes movement does not exist between objects." 112 Depending 
on that part of the field upon which my gaze focuses, the object is said 
to be either in motion or at rest. Like Proust's steeple of Saint-Hilaire, 
107rbid. 108Ibid. 109rbid. 
llOrbid., pp. 275 and 277, respectively. 
lllrbid., p. 277. 112rbid. 
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as we retreat from it in a carriage we can take it as a fixed point and 
feel ourself in motion around it as the narrator does; or we can watch it 
glide by in front of us as though our own position were fixed. The cloud 
~ ~- floats over the steeple only if my focus is on the cloud; as soon as I 
t f· focus on the steeple it begins to move ,113 Motion is the way in which my 
~'· 
gaze establishes a relation in the visual field with respect to a figure 
and its background; what makes part of the field the background, and 
another part its figure, is the way I look at it, the peculiar focus of 
my gaze. This relation between the moving object and its background 
"passes through my body" because my eye is never another object in the 
object space; I do not infer the immobility of the steeple, but by 
transferring my gaze from the steeple to the clouds, and so forth, its 
immobility simultaneously appears: "the two phenomena envelop each 
other: what we have is not two terms of an algebraic expression, but two 
'moments' in an organization which embraces them both."114 Thus it is 
the gaze which preeminently discloses the possibility of a pure trans!-
tion in the world, for in the body itself we discover that kind of motion 
entirely independent of a moving object. Like the orientation of top and 
bottom, motion is also a phenomenon of levels: 
The movement of my eye towards the thing upon which it is about to 
focus is not the displacement of an object in relation to another 
object, but progress towards reality. My eye is in motion or at 
rest in relation to a thing which it is approaching or from which 
it is receding. In so far as the body provides the perception of 
movement with the ground or basis which it needs in order to become 
established, it is as a power of perception, rooted in a certain 
domain and geared to a world.115 
So long as my visual field provides a setting where objects change place 
irrespective of any geometry or calculation via a juxtaposition of parts, 
113Ibid., p. 278. 114J:bid. 115Ibid., p. 279. 
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the phenomenon of movement must be designated as structural; and since 
this relation is not constituted by a movement between objects, it cannot 
be relative. "Once involved in a setting, we see motion appear before us 
as an absolute." 116 As a structural function of my visual field, then, 
motion discloses that the spectacle of the world is always appropriated 
as a kinaesthetic situation, the double-horizoned relationship between an 
object and my body. 
II 
When Gertrude Stein said of Picasso that with him "pictures 
commenced to want to leave their frames,"ll7 she prefigured the most 
elementary posture of twentieth-century art in general. Although the 
twentieth century divinizes the image of life framed by the world-view 
because it re-makes technology into the new godhead, its artists have 
relentlessly declared that God is, once and for all, dead. Very simply, 
this means that we can no longer unquestioningly accept the all-embracing 
grace of the ubiquitous vision of science. Rather than envision the 
world as God.would see it, twentieth-century art liberates the world for 
man; it situates him within the limited point of view, the freedom of his 
own perspective, and rids him of the cystostic vision of a technology 
which would control him with the same disrespect by which it controls its 
entire object-world. And this is what cubism explicitly proclaimed. It 
freed man for the thing, and the thing for itself, because it perceived 
the primordial constitution of the world's "space"--what Gertrude Stein 
called the "composition" of the world. "Nothing changes from generation 
Il6rbid., p. 280. 
117Picasso (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), p. 12. 
137 
to generation except the thing seen and that makes a composition."118 
This new way of seeing the world obtained from a characteristically 
different manner of looking at things: 
First. The composition, because the way of living had 
changed the composition of living had extended and each thing was 
as important as any other thing. Secondly, the faith in what the 
eyes were seeing, that is to say the belief in the reality of 
science, commenced to diminish. To be sure science had discovered 
many things, she would continue to discover things, but the 
principle which was the basis of all this was completely understood, 
the joy of discovery was almost over. 
Thirdly, the framing of life, the need that a picture exist 
in its frame, remain in its frame was over. A picture remaining in 
its frame was a thing that always had existed and now pictures 
commenced to want to leave their frames and this also created the 
necessity for cubism.ll9 · 
In cubism, then, twentieth-century art had found a beginning. By making 
a fresh start, by looking at things all over again, the artist simulta-
neously discovered the quasi-self-sufficiency of the thing as well as his 
own situation in the world; and this reflected an understanding of the 
primordial space of being-in-the-world. 
Because cubism appreciated the spectacle of the world as a certain 
kinaesthetic situation, it re-defined the significance of co-relative 
perspective in perception. In so far as it disclosed the opacity of the 
world to the extent that I have a body and that "through that body I am 
at grips with the world,"120 it renounced the transparently ubiquitous 
point of view which always "sees" the thing from an ideal perspective, as 
a mental construct or idea. Cubism demanded, in fact, a new spatial 
level in order to be perceived; it demanded a new attitude of the body. 
ll8"Composition as Explanation," in Selected Writings of Gertrude 
Stein, ed. Carl Van Vechten (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), p. 513. 
119stein, Picasso, p. 12. 
120Merleau-Pon ty, Phenomenology, .P. 303. 
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once that was achieved, the painting became "familiar" at last. "It is 
strange about everything, it is strange about pictures, a picture may 
seem extraordinarily strange to you and after some time not only it does 
not seem strange but it is impossible to find what there was in it that 
was strange."l21 What cubism re-defined in the perspective was the 
phenomenal space of the world, the non-geometrical space in which my 
relation to the thing is constituted by being-situated. Pictorial 
perspective was entirely abolished in favor of that unique perspective by 
which we take up the things in the world with our body; and that is why 
it required a new structure of expression. The ideal space of pictorial 
perspective could only re-present the object as it "appeared" to the 
mind, whereas the expressive space of cubism presented the object as it 
affected the body, just as "An oblique position of the object in relation 
to me is not measured by the angle which it forms with the plane of my 
face, but felt as a lack of balance, as an unequal distribution of its 
influences upon me."122 We primordially perceive the thing as a relation 
of our own body, and not in terms of an ideal spatial re-presentation; 
the mental representation constitutes a concept, it can never get us to 
the thing as it exists in its own right. Second-order consciousness thus 
removes us from the world in so far as it discounts the ancipital 
relation between the space of the thing and the space of my body. For 
this reason the discursive significance of pictorial perspective demands 
a particular kind of logic in order to be "seen" at all, and many people 
subsequently fail to recognize this kind of derivative visualization 
12lstein, Picasso, p. 14. 
122Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 302. 
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although it would be foolish to say that they do not perceive the world. 
For example, "Picasso at this period often used to say that Spaniards 
cannot recognize people from their photographs. So the photographers 
made two photographs, a man with a beard and a man smooth shaven and when 
the men left home to do their military service they sent one of these two 
types of photographs to their family and the family always found it very 
resembling."l23 In so far as the "realism" of the photograph is deriva-
tive, it tells us nothing of our primordial appropriation of a world. If 
art were to escape its utter subjection to the world-view, it had to re-
discover that primary "reality," being-in-the-world. 
Cubism pictorially articulated the primordial situatedness of Being, 
prior to its intussusception by a malignant theoretical optics. It 
reversed the traditional perspective of Euclidean space, once again 
making the spectator a participant, as Heidegger would express it, in the 
"worldling of the world." Like Hopkins' "inscape," this new kind of 
perceptual space invites the perceiver in, it surrounds him; by vanishing 
in the spectator, and not the object, it personalizes the world in so far 
as it renounces the objectively neutral space of the Newtonian 
landscape.124 Cubism thus internalized space at the terminus of the 
visual gradient;125 it publicly declared that space was essentially a 
personal affair. But even before cubism, painting had definitively 
disclaimed Euclidean space as an~ priori. Seurat, for example, had 
already reversed the traditional perspective, creating a formal or 
phenomenal space which replaced the hypotactic image of a geometrically 
123Stein, Picasso, p. 14. 
124McLuhan, Vanishing Point, p. 24. 125rbid., p. 28. 
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neutral space with the paratactic discontinuity of an expressive space. 
Prior to Ezra Pound's poetic "super-pository" technique and the modern 
cinematic technique of super-imposition, pointilism created paratactic 
space.126 As McLuhan remarks, by utilizing the Newtonian concept of the 
fragmentation of light, Seurat "came to the technique of divisionism, 
whereby each dot of paint becomes the equivalent of an actual light 
source, a sun, as it were;" through the deformation of an objectively 
continuous space, a space enclosed by the impersonal and linear flow of a 
series of geometrical equations, Seurat opened the painting onto the 
viewer's personal space and subsequently opened the art work onto the 
world--he returned to "the paratactic Egyptian image."127 In this 
respect, we are better able to understand Rousseau's remark to Picasso 
who, incidently, owned five Rousseau canvases: "We are the two great 
painters of this era, you in Egyptian style, I in modern style."l28 In 
so far as modern art breaks down the visual continuity of a homogeneous 
space, it articulates the phenomenal space of perception. By negotiating 
a virtual space--a dream space, as it were--it even pre-figures the 
electronic age: 
We are inclined today to regard paintings as radiant forms of 
energy much in the way that the Oriental world does. Perhaps the 
most obvious example of how space has ceased to be neutral, in the 
old visual and Newtonian sense, is to be found in the world of the 
astronaut. The totally designed environment necessary to life in 
the space capsule draws attention to the fact that the astronaut 
makes the spaces that he needs and encounters. Beyond the 
126cf. McLuhan, Vanishing Point, pp. 25-26, and Earl Miner, The 
Japanese Tradition in British and American Literature. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1958. 
127McLuhan, Vanishing Point, p. 24. 
128quoted in Shattuck, p. 108. 
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environment of this planet there is no space in our planetary or 
"container" sense. The gravitational point once transcended, the 
astronaut must have his own environment with him, as it were. 
There is no upside down in Eskimo art or in a space capsule any 
more than there is perspective or foreshortening (weight, or 
gravitational force, came in with perspective). Strong indications 
are given to the astronauts that objects, as well as people, create 
their own spaces. Outer space is not a frame any more than it is 
visualizable.129 
In his painting Le reve, for example, Rousseau presents the natural 
habitat as an artifact; 13° and his Le centenaire de l'independance 
refutes the uniform space of pictorial perspective as does a tryptich, 
forcing the eye to move over the scene discontinuously--indeed, 
"electronically:" 
Le centenaire de l'independance breaks down into three arbitrarily 
combined scenes like a tryptich, and not even a homogeneous three-
dimensional space is constructed to hold them together. On the 
right side in the immediate foreground stand three men and a 
woman; in the center the smaller figures of the dancers move with a 
lively disjointed rhythm under a spreading tree; on the left a 
drummer plays in the far background and some children watch the 
dancing. The three distinct groups are connected only by a line of 
banners which stretches across the upper part of the canvas. The 
eye moves over the scene not in a smooth line of flowing mass but 
in three jumps.131 
Rather than enclose the world, Rousseau's paintings, like Seurat's, 
complete it by opening onto the perceiver; this is what Kandinsky meant 
when he spoke of the "new realism" foreshadowed by Rousseau.l32 Unlike 
photographic realism, "a highly sophisticated development of the sensi-
bility absent from children's drawings and which did not devour the art 
of the West until the sixteenth century," Rousseau's realism evokes "the 
remembered or dream image set down directly in paint--an image seeking 
not to outrage the purely optical arrangement of the world, but to 
12~cLuhan, Vanishing Point, p. 25. 130Ibid., p. 173. 
131shattuck, p. 110. 132Ibid., p. 109. 
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complete it."133 When asked why he had placed the red sofa in the middle 
of a jungle (Le ~), Rousseau casually replied: "You shouldn't be 
surprised to find a sofa out in a virgin forest. It means nothing except 
for the richness of the red. You understand, the sofa is in a room; the 
rest is Yadwigha's dream." 134 Rousseau's "naivete" re-creates the 
primordial space of perception, and thus it was accurately said of him 
that he was not of his own century. In one of his final letters he 
explained, 
if I have kept my naivete, it is because M. Gerome, who was a 
professor at the Beaux-Arts, as well as M. Clement, director of 
Beaux-Arts at the Ecole de Lyon, always told me to keep it. You 
will no longer find that amazing in the future. And I have been 
told before that I was not of this century. I will not now be able 
to change my manner which I have acquired by stubborn application, 
believe me.l35 
Rousseau's images transact the "interior" space of the world; as formal 
or phenomenal spaces they are naive only to the extent that there is no 
"room" for an impersonal object. Rather than situate the object at a 
"distance," forever fixed in a geometrical location, Rousseau's canvas 
confers a certain "depth" upon the object as something "close" or "far" 
by virtue of the composition itself (as Stein calls it), which pulls us 
to it, envelops us, Rousseau accomplished this in terms of color. The 
surface tension of the foreground "favors the location of the 
composition in the front plane,"136 and subsequently coerces the space of 
the painting outward, beyond the edges of the canvas, beyond the frame; 
this frontal pull denies us easy access to the illusion of a perspective-
space while it simultaneously engages our gaze as an extension of its own 
133rbid. 134quoted in Shattuck, p. 111. 
135rbid., pp. 111-12. 136Shattuck, pp. 104-05. 
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insatiable field. In Le reve, for example, "lush magnified leaves spring 
up in the foreground, and meet, as if in the same plane, other plants 
which are much farther away. He incarnates his universe by 
painting it exhaustively and palpably close."137 In other words, the 
objects in the painting become an extension of our gaze, just as the 
blind man's walking stick becomes an extension of his own body; Rousseau's 
universe is incarnate because its space situates the body as the subject 
of perception, and not as another object in objective space. His space 
is phenomenal in so far as its forms cannot be separated from its color: 
it "expresses" the relation of distance, as well as value and mood.138 
In this respect, his ubiquitous lighting remains powerless to effect the 
color itself, and merely assists the composition in releasing its objects 
"to the voraciousness of surface design."139 In so far as Rousseau's 
space appropriates the primordial appearance of things, it invites our 
gaze to take up its objects, to touch them, to explore their surfaces.; 
and to this extent, his art graciously concedes the opacity of the world 
by opening onto it. It completes the world. Thus, Rousseau could 
incisively say of Cezanne's paintings, "I'd like to finish all these."140 
By manipulating its foreground, then, as the embolic function of an 
expressive depth, modern painting apprehended the object in its 
phenomenal space, one which in-corporates the spectator, takes him in, 
envelops him. Because it does not set the perceiver apart, as "viewer," 
its expressive space emancipates it .from the frame. Yet, in their 
unanimous insubordination to the emmetropic delineation of reality, 
137Ibid., p. 105. 
139Ibid., p. 106. 
138Ibid., p. 103. 
140quoted in Shattuck, p. 105. · 
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modern painters were not alone; for other artists had equally tired of 
this solitary confinement. Just as in painting the composition 
"commenced to leave its frame," so it was with the musical composition 
as well; for with "atonality" or "antitonality," as Stravinsky preferred 
to call it, the tonal function of chords escaped the frame of the 
diatonic system. In his Poetics of Music, Stravinsky declared, "From the 
moment when chords no longer serve to fulfill merely the functions 
assigned to them by the interplay of tones but, instead, throw off all 
constraint to become new entities free of all ties--from that moment on 
one may say that the process is completed: the diatonic system has lived 
out its life cycle."141 Although the development of the overtone had 
evolved, by Debussy's time, from the unison, through consecutive fifths, 
to the triad and the seventh, Debussy perceived "the complete harmony of 
the ninth, eleventh, thirteenth, as the true expression of nature which 
they are."142 Yet he employed the overtone as a true center in itself. 
Classical tonality had implied a closed circle of modulations; when 
Debussy discarded the significance of major and minor, he wished to 
escape the centrality of the C major scale. By transposing a variety of 
scales other than the tonal, Debussy achieved, as he expressed it to 
Guiraud: "Incomplete chords, floating. Il faut noyer le ton. One can 
travel where he wishes and leave by any door. Greater nuances."143 
141Igor Stravinsky, Poetics of Music in the Form of Six Lessons, 
trans. Arthur Knodel and Ingolf Dahl (New York: Random House, Vintage 
Books, 1947), p. 40. 
1.42E. Robert Schmitz, The Piano Works of Claude Debussy (New York: 
Dover Publications, Inc., 1950), p. 10. 
143quoted in Maurice Emmanuel, "Notes on Debussy's Conversations 
with Ernest Guiraud, 1890," in Claude Debussy: Prelude to "The Afternoon 
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Satie's experimental harmony encouraged Debussy toward a kind of opacity 
in his own harmonic structures in so far as he "omits the third in a 
triad, or alternate thirds in chords of the ninth or thirteenth, leaving 
superimposed fifths" whereby the subsequent modality remains undeter-
mined for the moment, opening onto two simultaneous horizons.144 Because 
the harmonic structures create this ambiguity, the chordal progressions 
step into the foreground, as it were, to take their place alongside the 
melody; and it is this transposition which, together, moves out of the 
diatonic system onto simultaneous "vistas" to touch our ear. But it was 
only by bringing the chordal progression into the foreground that Debussy 
was able to create this new kind of super-imposition in music. For 
example, in his Prelude to "The Afternoon of~ Faun," which generally 
progresses either by a fifth down or a fourth up, "The susceptibility of 
the C# and the G and their connecting line of melody to being harmonized 
with various chordal accompaniments • • . is the outstanding harmonic 
feature."145 The total context of the piece thus derives from the 
heightening of chordal significance; and it is precisely this which led 
many listeners, including Saint-Saens, to conclude that the Prelude 
lacked melody. Because "the parts seem to overlap each other," no part 
"spontaneously breaks lose to lodge in our memories as a tune."146 And 
yet, this ambiguous relation in the composition between the melody and 
of a Faun," An Authoritative Score, ed. William W. Austin (New York: 
W: W. Norton~nd Co., Inc., Norton Critical Scores, 1970), p. 130. 
144schmitz, p. 30. 
145william W. Austin, "Toward an Analytical Appreciation," Norton 
Critical Scores, p. 82. 
146rbid. , p. 71. 
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the harmony, what Debussy called "melodic harmonies," constitutes the 
basis on which Pierre Boulez designates the Prelude as the beginning of 
modern music: "just as modern poetry surely took root in certain of 
Baudelaire's poems, so one is justified in saying that modern music was 
awakened by L'Apres-midi d'un faune."147 
Parallel to Debussy's own career moved that of his dearest friend, 
Eric Satie; and together, like the chordal progressions they created, 
these two men transposed the direction of twentieth-century music. Taken 
together, these two careers opened music onto the world, freed it from 
its conceptual setting, just as the undetermined modality of their 
harmonic structures opened onto simultaneous hor~zons by means of super-
imposition. But with Satie, there were two "careers." The first, in 
unison with Debussy's own career, executed the basic posture of the 
fin-de-siecle in general--that period characterized by Satie's admonition 
to Debussy to forsake the "sauerkraut" of Wagner's aesthetic.l48 Debussy 
subsequently was to say of Wagner's Ring that it struck him as a sort of 
"vast musical city directory."l49 Indeed, it seems appropriate here to 
quote Stravinsky at length concerning the melodramatic--in fact, 
vaudevillian--nature of Wagner's music, for no one has ever put it better: 
Insubordination • • • does away with constraint in the ever-
disappointed hope of finding in freedom the principle of strength. 
Instead, it finds in freedom only the arbitrariness of whim and the 
disorders of fancy. Thus it loses every vestige of control, loses 
its bearings and ends by demanding of music things outside its 
scope and competence. Do we not, in truth, ask the impossible of 
music when we expect it to express feelings, to translate dramatic 
147"Modern Music Begins," Norton Critical Scores, p. 161. 
148shattuck, p. 127. 
149stravinsky, Poetics of Music, p. 80. 
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situations, even to imitate nature? And, as if it were not enough 
to condemn music to the job of being an illustrator, the century to 
which we owe what it called "progress through enlightenment" 
invented for good measure the monumental absurdity which consists 
of bestowing on every accessory, as well as on every feeling and 
every character of the lyrical drama, a sort of checkroom number 
called a Leitmotiv . . . . 
There are two kinds of Leitmotiv in Wagner: some symbolize 
abstract ideas . . . the others make the pretense of representing 
objects or concrete personages •... 
It is strange that skeptics who readily demand new proofs for 
everything and who usually take a sly delight in exposing whatever 
is purely conventional in established forms never ask that any 
proof be given of the necessity or even of the simple expediency of 
any musical phrase that claims to identify itself with an idea, an 
object, or a character. If I am told that the power of genius is 
here great enough to justify this identification, then I shall ask 
what is the use of those widely circulated little guides that are 
the material embodiment of the musical city directory Debussy had 
in mind, little guides that make the neophyte attending a 
presentation of Gotterdammerung resemble one of those tourists you 
see on top of the Empire State Building trying to orient himself by 
spreading out a map of New York. And never let it be said that 
these little memory-books are an insult to Wagner and betray his 
thought: their wide circulation alone sufficiently proves that 
they answer a real need. 
Basically, what is most irritating about these artistic 
rebels, of whom Wagner offers us the most complete type, is the 
spirit of systematization which, under the guise of doing away with 
conventions, establishes a new set, quite as arbitrary and much 
more cumbersome than the old. So that it is less the arbitrariness 
. • . that tries our patience than the system which this 
arbitrariness sets up as a principle.150 
So much for the pomp and "spectacle" of the Wagnerian horror show. 
Satie's second career, following his break with Debussy and his decision 
to return to school in order to study counterpoint under Albert Rousse1, 151 
singularly appropriated that unique musical form which was to characterize 
much of the first half of the twentieth century--jazz. "If the Sarabandes 
foretell the course of French music to 1914, The Gymnopedies and the 
150Ibid., pp. 79-81. 
151When Debussy advised Satie against it, saying "At our age you 
don't shed your skin again," Satie very simply replied, "If I lose, too 
bad. It would mean I had no guts in the first place;" quoted in 
Shattuck, p. 133. 
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Gnossiennes foretell the turn it was to take after the war."152 The 
turmoil instigated by Parade (1917) established the tone for the post-war 
years, "a turning to jazz and music hall and to all the paraphernalia of 
modern life, not in the spirit of realism, but with a sense of exhilara-
tion in the absurd." 153 The next year, 1918, jazz reached Paris when a 
black band from the States played the Casino de Paris.154 In 1890, 
Debussy had remarked to Guiraud, "Rhythms are stifling. Rhythms cannot 
be contained within bars. It is nonsense to speak of 'simple' and 
'composed' time. There should be an interminable flow of them both with-
out seeking to bury the rhythmic patterns."155 Interestingly, all of 
Satie's works during 1910 to 1915, with the exception of his songs, 
appear in published form without either bar lines or key signatures.156 
Besides escaping the diatonic frame, music was attempting to defy its 
very confinement to measure. 
In 1913, Stravinsky had already introduced the African rhythms of 
jazz into his Sacre du printemps, and Satie had subsequently written into 
Parade its first concert treatment in French music.157 The elliptical 
nature of jazz, its oblique quality, defies the homogeneous space of the 
traditional structures which demand to be filled in, so to speak, both 
rhythmically and melodically in order to work. Once this kind of theoret-
ical perspective was abandoned, modern music could transpose, like modern 
painting, all its elements into the foreground itself, creating its own 
152shattuck, p. 143. 
153Ibid., pp. 154-55. 154Ibid., p. 155. 
155Eimllanuel, "Notes on Debussy's Conversations," p. 130. 
156shattuck, p. 151 .. 157rbid., p. 155. 
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depth by means of an expressive structure rather than a discursive logic. 
Speaking of the African influence on jazz, Ernest Borneman has said: 
In language, the African tradition aims at circumlocution rather 
than at exact definition. The direct statement is considered 
crude and unimaginative; the veiling of all contents in ever-
changing paraphrases is considered the criterion of intelligence 
and personality. In music, the same tendency towards obliquity 
and ellipsis is noticeable: no note is attacked straight; the 
voice or instrument always approaches it from above or below, plays 
around the implied pitch without ever remaining on it for any 
length of time, and departs from it without ever having committed 
itself to a single meaning.l58 
The same is true of meter. Jazz distinctively brought the rhythmic 
improvisation of the soloist into the foreground so that its simultaneous 
inter-action with an isochronous meter articulated an open perceptual 
field; the resultant super-imposition generated an emblematic kind of 
"relief" which subsequently enveloped the listener within its own 
distinctive space. Thus, like the formal element of color in a Rousseau 
canvas, the formal element of rhythm created the "spatial depth" of a 
' melody in so far as it stepped forward, so to speak, to take its place 
alongside the other elements in its "field." In his Poetics of Music, 
Stravinsky phrased it this way: "Who of us, on hearing jazz music, has 
not felt an amusing sensation approaching giddiness when a dancer or a 
solo musician, trying persistently to stress irregular accents, cannot 
succeed in turning our ear away from the regular pulsation of the meter 
drummed out by the percussion?"159 In fact, Brunella Rondi, in his 
Prospetiva della musica moderna, argues that Debussy's greatest achieve-
ment was precisely in the area of rhythm, and he credits Debussy for 
158"The Roots of Jazz," in Jazz, ed. Nat Hentoff and Albert J. 
McCarthy (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1959), p. 17. 
159Stravinsky, Poetics of Music, p. 30. 
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having opened the way toward later developments in this respect.160 
Whether or not we agree with him about Debussy, jazz undeniably enhanced 
the aesthetic possibilities open to rhythm, and modern music in general; 
by fetching the entire scope of musical elements available to it into the 
foreground, jazz accomplished that super-imposition which somehow 
characterized all of modern art and which Gauguin decreed essential--"For 
there is no art if there is no transposition."161 And Satie, more than 
Debussy, was never hesitant to take advantage of these possibilities, 
instituting a major direction for post-war music. 
Ravel's respect for Satie was enormous; his first published work, a 
Menuet antique for piano (1895), clearly revealed the influence of the 
older composer in its liberated use of sevenths and ninths irrespective 
of their resolution.162 The year before, however, Debussy's Prelude had 
appeared, and shortly thereafter it was Debussy who became his life-long 
idol, although the Pavane pour une Infante defunte (1899) still showed 
the succession of thirteenths and ninths characteristic of Satie's early 
work, especially the Sarabandes. The Pavane, in so far as it fore-
shadowed the technique and style of Ravel's future compositions, stands 
singularly important in this respect; as Norman Demuth has said of it, 
"It is remarkable for its original lay-out; the tune itself requires 
considerable control of key, but when one thinks that he might have 
accompanied it with simple arpeggios . . . we can see the working of an 
160Austin, "Toward an Analytical Appreciation," p. 91. 
161Paul Gauguin, "Impressionism and After," Norton Critical 
Scores, p. 124. 
162Norman Demuth, Ravel (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 
p. 16. 
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original mind from the very start." 163 Notably, the second entry of the 
tun, widely spaced in so far as it is doubled at the fifteenth as well as 
the octave, portends a favorite device in his later works; its pianistic 
significance thus guaranteed it a place in the history of modern music, 
even though Roland-Manuel spoke disparagingly of it as a piece suitable 
for young girls.164 After the war, however, Ravel became increasingly 
more attracted to jazz and its origin, especially its rhythmic possibili-
ties, an interest which culminated, more or less, in 1928 following a 
tour of the States and Canada. Upon his return he began working on an 
orchestration which he was to call "a work for orchestra without music;" 
the result was Bolero. 165 Regardless of whether we consider it "great" 
music, Bolero discloses a similarly intense preoccupation with rhythm 
that we find in Satie and Debussy, with one major exception: the rhythm 
entirely dominates the piece. In its monotony, it bespeaks a kind of 
absurdity reminiscent of the initial declaration of Dada in 1916--that 
is, it takes us no-where. Its repetitive function merely serves to 
' incite the mounting intensity of an angular rhythm which builds to nearly 
hypnotic power until the startling change to E major thrusts us entirely 
out of this rhythmic orbit for eight measures, only to envelop us once 
again with the return to C for its coda.l66 The syncopation and dominant 
rhythm continually expand outward, like the circular ripples from a 
pebble thrown into a lake, creating a "surface" depth without any parti-
cular direction: the orchestra plays "like a gigantic guitar, with the 
percussion rattling out the pedal rhythm."167 As Demuth describes its 
163rbid., p. 67. 
165rbid., p. 54. 
164rbid., pp. 66-67. 
166rbid., p. 141. 167rbid. 
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first concert performance in Paris, "Its insistence played upon the 
senses to an inordinate degree. People clutched each other and crumpled 
their programmes into lumps of perspiring pulp."168 As for its title, 
the piece is called a "bolero;" yet, its rhythm is umistakably the 
rhythm of jazz. 
The form of jazz typically expresses the new aesthetic of modern 
music; its method of composition, like the composition of a modern paint-
ing, defies linear perspective--it defies the frame. As Rene Guillere 
expressed it in an article, "Il. n'y a plus de perspective:" 
Its basic parts: syncopation and a dominance of rhythm ••.. 
Rhythm is stated by angle--protruding edge, sharp profile. It has 
a rigid structure--firmly constructed. It strives towards plastic-
ity. Jazz seeks volume of sound, volume of phrase. Classical 
music was based on planes (not on volumes)-,.-planes arranged in 
layers, planes erected atop one another, planes horizontal and 
vertical, creating an architecture of truly noble proportions: 
palaces with terraces, colonnades, flights of monumental steps--all 
receding into a deep perspective. In jazz all elements are brought 
to the foreground. . • • Conventional perspective with its fixed 
focus and its gradual vanishing point has abdicated.169 
Modern painting, modern music--modern art in general--no longer acknowl-
edges the construction of the world grounded in a geometrical concept; 
its new "depth" of perspective reveals the object as it is grasped with 
both eyes, gropingly, and not as it is seen by an ideal eye. "We no 
longer construct the visual world with an acute angle, converging on the 
horizon. We open up this angle, pulling representation against us, upon 
us, toward us •••• We take part in this world." 170 Through this new 
168Ibid., p. 140. 
169quoted in Sergei M. Eisenstein, The Film Sense, trans. Jay Leyda 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., A Harvest Book, 1942), 
p. 96. 
170Eisenstein, The Fil~ Sense, p. 96. 
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kind of depth, modern art brings us back into the world; we enter the 
world, we touch it, we disclose it in so far as we become part of it once 
again; in short, we become situated. This new perception, like the 
Chinese landscape-painting, avoids leading the perceiver into a single, 
pre-determined perspective--instead, it stretches· out before him, inviting 
the perceiver into its field as surely as it reciprocally moves toward him. 
Eisenstein is incorrect when he describes this epoch as decadent because 
it lacks a higher unity and thereby places an over-emphasis on individual-
ism. As he sees it, "It is only in periods of decadence in the arts that 
this centripetal movement changes to a centrifugal movement, hurling apart 
all unifying tendencies." 171 But Eisenstein misses the point: all 
perception begins with the individual, although it undeniably ends with 
the world. Modern art attempted to re-establish the beginning of a 
world, how we know it in the first place, its perceptual constitution; 
this movement is obviously centrifugal in so far as it refutes a theoret-
ical world of any sort. Perception is an originating "consciousness," 
and to that extent it can never give us an idea of a whole world already 
there before us. Yet, the depth of perspective in modern art centri-
petally leads us to a world whose typical structure symbiotically invades 
the body as its setting. We can never have a "view" of this world simply 
because we can never leave it. "It exists primarily in its self-
evidence."172 Because of his social responsibility to the "state," 
however, Eisenstein is forced to retain an antique historical perspective; 
and to this extent he misses the point on purpose. 
In literature, of course, the same structure had dominated the 
171Ibid., p. 100. 172Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 325. 
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milieu as well. Here antique perspective took the form of detailed char-
acterization With strict adherence to a chronological plot, and framed by 
the linear connectedness and ubiquitous knowledgeability of the "narra-
tion," or point of view. The poem, the novel, the play--all represented 
a concise view of the world. As we have seen, the romantic poets, though 
seeming to turn away from chronology in favor of the "new" logic, psycho!-
ogy, continued to negotiate the isolated emotional moment as a 
recollection. As a detached observer of himself, the romantic poet 
thereby placed his own experience in an historically synchronic perspec-
tive. In this movement "backwards," toward discursive explanation, the 
poet appropriated his past as a dis-interested spectator in order to 
achieve a certain degree of "objectivity;" but this is nothing more than a 
reflection so that the emotional state may be re-presented in its 
supposedly original form. Because the recollection itself is never 
original, but claims to duplicate something which came before it, it 
impersonates a static moment in time, one which delineates an "idea" in so 
far as it exemplifies a distanced knowledge about something. Such a 
perspective nullifies the situation, and seeks repose in its very lack of 
intentionality--thus the romantic basis for creativity itself, emotion 
recollected in tranquility. The poem frames the emotion in terms of its 
mental prospect or view, "that prospectiveness of mind, that surview, 
which enables a man to foresee the whole of what he is to convey, 
appertaining to any one point; and by this means to subordinate and 
arrange the different parts according to their relative importance, as to 
convey it at once, and as an organized whole."l73 And again according to 
173Coleridge, ~iographia Literaria, in Selected Poetry and Prose, 
p. 294. 
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Coleridge, by situating himself outside the experience in order to look 
back, the poet must avoid a "state of excitement," for "the property of 
passion is not to create; but to set in increased activity." 174 The poem 
thus represents the telescoped reflection of a single, isolated image: 
"Nothing assuredly can differ either in origin or in mode more widely from 
the apparent tautologies of intense and turbulent feeling, in which the 
passion is greater and of longer endurance than to be exhausted or satis-
fied by a single representation of the image or incident exciting it."175 
In this respect, Wordsworth's Prelude expresses the most sustained attempt 
at such a linear perspective, vanishing on the horizon line of a 
tranquilly recollected past, though he described it best at Tintern Abbey: 
Five years have past; five summers, with the length 
Of five long winters! and again I hear 
These waters, rolling from their mountain-springs 
With a soft inland murmer.--Once again 
Do I behold these steep and lofty cliffs, 
That on a wild secluded scene impress 
Thoughts of more deep seclusion; and connect 
The landscape with the quiet of the sky. 
The day is come when I again repose 
Here, under this dark sycamore, and view 
These plots of cottage-ground ••.• 176 
The recollected moment is artificial and inauthentic in so far as it 
remains, as Kierkegaard said, "negatively directed backwards in opposition 
to the movement of life;"177 once it is freed of this frame, recollection 
can at last proceed forward to become an originating consciousness, as it 
does in Proust. Kierkegaard categorized this forward movement in 
174Ibid., p. 293. 175Ibid., pp. 293-94. 
176Poetical Works, pp. 163-64. 
177soren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, trans. Lee M. Capel 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, a Midland Book Edition, 1968), 
p. 155. 
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recollection as "repetition," and defined it as interested intentionality: 
"Repetition and recollection are the same movement, only in opposite 
directions; for what is recollection has been, is repeated backwards, 
whereas repetition properly so called is recollected forwards."l78 The 
"interestedness" involved in Kierkegaardian repetition fundamentally 
approximates the Heideggerian "Sorge," Dasein as being-in-the-world. 
Similarly, the recollected moment of romantic poetry negotiates the 
disinterested metaphysical attitude, and consequently portrays "the per-
spective sub specie aeternitatis or, as Kierkegaard puts it, aeterno ~. 
by 'aesthetically' reconciling opposites in the inclusive whole of pos~i-
bility and neutralizing the existential imperative to 'choose' resolutely 
in situation."179 Primordially, both recollection and repetition are 
grounded in "interest," the necessity of an existential significance; but, 
as William V. Spanos further explains it in his essay, "Heidegger, 
Kierkegaard, and the Hermeneutic Circle: Towards a Postmodern Theory of 
Interpretation as Dis-closure," 
in "recollecting backward"--in recalling in the sense of re-
collecting the unique temporal experience from the point of view of 
an already fully established concept of Being as realm of ideal 
Forms (as in Plato) or as ideal System (as in Hegel) that is prior 
to the contingent experience, the recollection resolves the contra-
dictions and annuls the very interest that originally generates the 
metaphysical question of what it means to be.l80 
By recollecting backwards, romantic poetry continued to deploy the anthro-
pological frame as a means to de-limit its pseudo-subjectivity; for by 
glancing over its shoulder, the art work merely receded toward a solitary 
pre-directed depth whose mental "correctness" was determined by its ideal 
178Repetition: An Essay in Experimental Psychology, trans. Walter 
Lowrie (New York: Harper and Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1964), p. 33. 
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and simultaneously identical perspective--the depth of infinity. Grounded 
in infinity, the representational power of the mind guarantees an 
objectivity which transcends the situation, re-locating the emotion in a 
body-less (subject-less) space, an objective space accessible to all by 
virtue of identical frequencies, as it were, and a zero phase difference. 
This synchronous point of view transcends the world like Wordsworth's 
imagination, which soars beyond the summit of Mount Snowdon, dwelling 
"above this frame of things."l81 To this extent, romantic poetry decreed 
that "the history of a Poet's mind/ Is labour not unworthy of regard;"l82 
but in so doing, it appropriated the very frame it rhetorically 
renounced--objectification. 
The chronological objectification of individual emotional states 
set before the poet "an image to be looked at from a distance," just as 
surely as the eighteenth century set before the poet a picture of the 
world to be painted, or technology set before the scientist "an It to be 
mastered."l83 Modern poetry, however, like painting and music, brought 
its hitherto background elements into the foreground in order to engage 
the reader's interest, constantly threatening and modifying his spatial 
and temporal perceptions vis..\-vis the situation. If Baudelaire 
launched the new beginning from which poetry would likewise commence to 
leave its frame, he did so in order to escape the world. And the "new 
order" of Mallarme' and Valtry, originating from Baudelaire himself, no 
more confronts the world in terms of being-situated than does romanticism; 
181Prelude, in Wordsworth: Poetical Works, p. 588. 
182Ibid. 
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it seeks. rather, to abandon it.184 
, 
Both Lautreamont and Rimbaud relied 
heavily on a hallucinative literary technique, but it is paradoxically 
here that we discern the beginning of the destruction of discursive logic 
and its subsequent chronological perspective in order to meet the world 
on its own terms, as something wonder-full to behold, and not in terms of 
a stagnant concept, a controlled or disciplined view. "With Rimbuad a 
new personage emerges: the 'child-man,' the grownup who has refrained 
from putting off childish things. Artists became increasingly willing to 
accept the child's wonder and spontaneity and destructiveness as not 
inferior to adulthood." 185 But it was not until Apollinaire that the 
poem inclusively opened onto the world. Apollinaire's poetry freed the 
appearance of the thing for the world; appearance and reality became one 
and the same. What was true of Picasso was equally true of Apollinaire, 
as Gertrude Stein pointed out: "The beginning of this struggle to 
express the things, only the really visible things, was discouraging, 
even for his most intimate friends, even for Guillaume Apollinaire."186 
Apollinaire's early literary endeavors already display this 
tendency to return to the things themselves as they appear in perception, 
and not as the invisible objects of a conceptualized lineality. With the 
publication of Alcools (1913) Apollinaire forsook all punctuation in 
order to undermine discursive unity by means of discontinuous sentences; 
and his "calligraphic" poems thoroughly dislodged the narrative from its 
traditionally logical sequence and thereby achieved a final liberation 
184rn so far as it "runs away" from the world, the poetry of 
Baudelaire and Mallarme1 discloses the kind of repression already 
discussed with respect to the scientific world-view itself. 
185shattuck, p. 31. 186stein, Pica~, p. 15, 
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from the frame. Apollinaire stated his own theory in Soirles: "Psycho-
logically it is of no importance that this visible image be composed of 
fragments of spoken language, for the bond between these fragments is no 
longer the logic of grammar but an ideographic logic culminating in an 
tion."187 This calligraphic structure involved the reader 
. ¥ JUXtapos
1
'-
j ust as/ cubism 
order of spatial disposition totally opposed to discursive 
involved the spectator as a participant in the art work; and it is no 
co-incidence that Stein discussed a similar calligraphic character in 
Picasso's painting at this time: 
During this period the cubes were no longer important, the cubes 
were lost. After all one must know more than one sees and one does 
not see a cube in its entirety. In 1914 there were less cubes in 
cubism, each time that Picasso commenced again he recommenced the 
struggle to express in a picture the things seen without associa-
tion but simply as things seen and it is only the things seen that 
are knowledge for Picasso. • • • And so then always and always 
Picasso commenced his attempt to express • really everything 
a human being can know at each moment of his existence and not an 
assembling of all his experiences. 
So in all this period of 1913 to 1917 one sees that he took great 
pleasure in decorating his pictures, always with a rather calli-
graphic tendency than a sculptural one, and during the naturalist 
period, which followed Parade and the voyage to Italy, the 
consolation offered to the side of him that was Spanish was 
calligraphy. 
Calligraphy, as I understand it in him had perhaps its most intense 
moment in the decor of Mercure. A little before that he had 
made a series of drawings, also purely calligraphic, the lines 
were extraordinarily lines, they were also stars that were stars 
which moved, they existed, they were really cubism, that is to say 
a thing that existed in itself without the aid of association or 
emotion.188 
Yet, in back of all this there existed that predominant and inter-
penetrating vector which underscored Apollinaire's entire oeuvre, and 
187quoted in Shattuck, p. 310. 
188stein, Picasso, pp. 35, 37, and 37-38, respectively. 
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which he had already defined as the "gratuitous act" of his pornographic 
novels: the total freedom to express what one sees, the absolute freedom 
of the individual in the face of society--Heidegger's authentic "care" in 
the face of the "they-self." 
Like cubism, Apollinaire's poetry freed the art work from its ideal 
perspective by bracketing "the arrogant anthropomorphic frame of reference 
of the metaphysical imagination, the Wille zum Willen, and its synchronic 
perspective in favor of a 'situated' or historical imagination and its 
diachronic standpoint, the standpoint of the ek-static Das.ein. " 189 In his 
struggle with time, Apollinaire recollects the past forward in so far as a 
unique past acquires its inter~st and significance as situated "being" in 
the present; at the same time, this repeition is guided beyond the 
present to the extent that its remembering constitutes a dis-covering of 
the world. "Nothing causes more melancholy in me than the passing of 
time. It is in such formal disagreement with my feelings, with my sense 
of identity, that it is the very source of my poetry."190 Apollinaire's 
authentically "subjective" (care-ful) mode grounds the reader in its 
becoming, in the openly anxious moment of its own freedom, by turning 
itself inside out, so to speak, so that its movement simultaneously 
negotiates both destruction and ekstasis. "It is as if his I were the 
exterior world from which, once he had radiated himself into it, he 
could look back wistfully and indulgently upon his old self as a pathetic 
object."191 This ambiguous reversal of consciousness devours the reader 
189spanos, p. 479. 
190Lettres ~ sa marraine, quoted in Shattuck, p. 312, footnote. 
191Shattuck, p. 316. 
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even as its posture digests the world: "But I know the savor of the 
universe."192 Apollinaire's iconoclastic technique breaks down the 
barrier between subject and object, leaving the reader unaccommodated; 
discontinuity dialogically engages the reader with the text and thus 
ruptures the referential surface of the metaphysical world-picture, that 
framed space of the world which Wallace Stevens described as not even our 
"own" much less our "self."193 Apollinaire perhaps expressed it best in 
"Cort~ge," where the "location" of his own being and, more inclusively, 
the world, refuses to be pinned down to a single vanishing point: 
One day 
One day as I invited my soul 
I said to myself William it's time to come 
So I at last may find out who I am 
All those who arrived and were not myself 
Brought one by one the fragments of myself •••• 194 
Like Satie's compositions which frequently revolve around a single 
interval, Apollinaire's poetry achieves an hermeneutic circularity which 
eludes linear development; indeed, he wrote his first calligraphic poems 
literally in circles, "the circles of expanding and contracting 
attention."l95 If the center no longer holds, as Yeats expressed it, it 
is because the self has at last "othered" the world, made it its ~; 
without the mediation of representational consciousness, the world becomes 
"the horizon of all horizons, the style of all possible styles, which 
192"vende'miaire," Alcools, trans. Anne Hyde Greet (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1965), p. 209. 
193spanos, pp. 474-75. 
194Alcools, pp. 67 and 71, respectively. Cf. Daniel Oster, 
Guillaume Apollinaire (Paris: Seghers, 1975), pp. 72-85. 
195shattuck, p. 38, footnote. 
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gaurantees for my experience a given, not a willed, unity underlying all 
the disruptions of my personal and historical life."196 Once we recognize 
the world as the primordial situation of Being, the distinction between 
subject and object disappears toward the invisible sphere to which it 
belongs. Apollinaire's poetry thus articulates the "pure art" of which 
Baudelaire spoke in L'art philosophique but left as an explicandum for the 
future: "Qu'est-ce que l'art pur suivant la conception moderne? C'est 
crfer une magie suggestive contenant ~ la fois l'objet et le sujet, le 
monde exte'rieur 'a !'artiste et !'artiste lui-m~me." 1 97 Apollinaire's 
poetry unequivocally cancelled out the endurance ratio of the technologi-
cal posture whose tensile strength could no longer sustain the stress of 
living the world; the fatuous attempt to control the world in the languid 
interest of a mentally detached view of life had failed. Ironically, the 
twentieth century has ignored this bankruptcy, resuscitating the techno-
logical value to its logically larcenous proportion; in so doing, it has 
of course simultaneously forfeited what is e~istentially its own--the 
world. But Apollinaire knew: "Our. civilization is more refined than the 
things which it employs/ There's more to it than the easy life."l98 
By recollecting forward, poetry had accomplished the destruction of 
19&.Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 330. 
197oeuvres Compl~tes de Charles Baudelaire, 7 vols. (Paris: Calmann 
, - --
Levy, Bibliotheque Contemporaine, 1889-1904), 3:127--"What is the modern 
conception of p~re art? It is to create a suggestive magic which contains 
both object and subject, the external world of the artist and the artist 
himself" (translation mine). 
198(Translation mine}: "Notre civilisation a plus de finesse que le 
choses qu'ils emploient/ Elle est au-del~ de la vie confortable," "A 
L' Italie, '~ Obus Couleur ~ Lune, in Oeuvres Poltiques D 'Apollinaire, ed. 
Marcel Adema and Michel Decaudin, pref. Andr~ Billy (Paris:. Gallimard, 
Biblioth~que de la Pleiade, 1965), p. 275. 
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the narrative and chronological frame; in bringing its own temporality 
into the foreground, the poem effected the transformation of conscious-
ness toward its primordial constitution in the "subject" and thereby 
authentically appropriated the world as its indivisible situation. This 
new awareness, as an originating consciousness, enveloped the reader in a 
world whose very constitution he helped to create, just as perceptual 
"consciousness" discloses the world through its participation in it. But 
with this re-creation of the past in the present, and toward a future, 
the modern poem was not alone. "What we have not had to decipher, to 
elucidate by our own efforts, what was clear before we looked at it, is 
not ours." 199 Thus speaks the narrator of Proust's revolutionarily 
brilliant oeuvre. Here, the re-awakened memory continually establishes 
itself in the foreground of the narration; not fettered to the lineality 
of a single chronological vanishing point, its temporality is free to 
"jump around" as the eye jumps over Rousseau's Le centenaire de 
l'independance. The ekstasis of this movement authentically enables the 
"subject" to dis-cover the world in so far as temporality expresses it; 
it becomes the very expression of Being. The "reality" of the work 
resides in the determination of this depth, a depth created by the world 
of the work itself, and not a mentally perspectived representation of it. 
"A writer reasons, that is to say he goes astray, only when he has not 
the strength to force himself to make an impression pass through all the 
successive states which will culminate in its fixation, its expression. 
The reality that he has to express resides . • • not in the superficial 
199Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things 
Scott Moncrief£ and Andreas Mayor (New York: 
Books, 1970), 7:140. 
Past, 7 vols. trans. 
Random House, Vintage 
--
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appearance of his subject but at a depth at which that appearance matters 
little."200 Because Remembrance of Things Past situates the memory in 
its affective context, it opens onto the world as a means of revealing 
its essential ambiguity: 
in fashioning a work of art we are by no means free •..• it is 
pre-existent to us and therefore we are obliged, since it is both 
necessary and hidden, to do what we should have to do if it were a 
law of nature, that is to say to discover it. But this 
discovery .•• is it not, I thought, really the discovery of what, 
though it ought to be more precious to us than anything in the 
world, yet remains ordinarily forever unkown to us, the discovery 
of our true life, of reality as we have felt it to be, which 
differs so greatly from what we think it is that when a chance 
happening brings us an authentic memory of it we are filled with an 
immense happiness? In this conclusion I was confirmed by the 
thought of the falseness of so-called realist art, which would not 
be so untruthful if we had not in life acquired the habit of giving 
to what we feel a form of expression which differs so much from, 
and which we nevertheless after a little time take to be, reality 
itself.201 
Proust's authentic moment, as recollection forward, discloses being-in-
the-world as "care," for it accommodates our basic susceptibility to the 
"they-self" while it simultaneously refuses to bend toward the solace 
proffered by the "they." In a sense, this movement constitutes Dasein's 
being toward its ownmost potentiality, a "letting-itself-come-towards-
itself" in so far as it takes over its own guilt.202 Rather than back 
away in the face of the "having been," Proust's narrator resolutely takes 
over his own thrown-ness; this moment of vision, "as an authentic Present 
or waiting-towards • . • permits us to encounter for the first time what 
can be 'in a time' as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand."203 
This is clearly not the "Having forgotten" (Vergessenheit) of 
200Ibid., p. 141. 201Ibid., p. 140. 
202Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 372-73. 
203rbid., p. 388. 
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having been, whereby I am "proximally and for the most part as-having-
been;" 204 otherwise, Proust's narrator could never "re-capture" the past 
creatively. It is not the "remembering" of a forgetting that "ret.ains"--
the kind of recollection backward of the romantic poets; Proust's moment 
of vision carries the past with it in anticipatory understanding--in 
openness and uncertainty. "The idea of death took up permanent residence 
within me in the way that love sometimes does ..•• and even if no 
object occupied my attention and I remained in a state of complete repose, 
the idea of death still kept me company as faithfully as the idea of my 
self."205 In creatively coming to terms with the authentic nature of 
this temporal ekstasis, Proust's narrator discloses a final anticipatory 
resoluteness: "In the past the fear of being no longer myself was some,.. 
thing that had terrified me But by dint of repetition this fear 
had gradually been transformed into a calm confidence."206 By the 
essentially dialogical process of the creative act, the narrator succeeds 
in rectifying that "oblique interior discourse which deviates gradually 
more and more widely from the first and central impression," bringing it 
back into line with the "authentic words which the impression ought to 
have generated;" like the love which he is finally able to reconcile with 
his own death, the oeuvre itself ultimately accomplishes this "laborious 
undertaking which our idleness would prefer to shirk."207 
Here all our feigned indifferences, all our indignation at the lies 
of whomever it is we love • • • in a word all that we have not 
ceased, whenever we are unhappy or betrayed, not only to say to the 
loved one but, while we are waiting for a meeting with her, to 
repeat endlessly to ourselves, sometimes aloud in the silence of 
204Ibid., p. 389. 
206Ibid., p. 263. 
205Proust, p. 267. 
207rbid., p. 148. 
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our room, which we disturb with remarks like: "No, really, this 
sor.t of behavior is intolerable," and: "I have consented to see 
you once more, for the last time, and I don't deny that it hurts 
me," all this can only be brought back into confonnity with the 
felt truth from which it has so widely diverged by the abolition of 
all that we have set most store by, all that in our solitude, in 
our feverish projects of letters and schemes, has been the 
substance of our passionate dialogue with ourselves.208 
By re-capturing the past, the memory does not "scan" it as a distant view 
on which it finally gets a perspective, but rather grasps an affective 
depth--its expression in the total temporal ekstasis of past-present-
future. Proust's art work thus avoids the misleading re-presentation, 
so often done by painters when they paint a sail or the peak of a 
mountain in such a way that, according to the laws of perspective, 
the intensity of the colors and the illusion of our first glance, 
they appear to us either very near or very far away, through an 
error which logical thinking subsequently corrects by, sometimes, 
a very large displacement. Other errors, though of a more serious 
kind, I might continue to commit, placing features, for instance, 
as we all do, upon the face of a woman seen in the street, when 
instead of a nose, cheeks and chin there ought to be merely an empty 
space with nothing more upon it than a flickering reflection of our 
desires. But at least, after seeing what I had seen ••• and even 
if I did not attempt . • • to represent some of my characters as ex-
isting not outside but within ourselves • • . and to vary also the 
light of the moral sky which illumines them in accordance with the 
variations in pressure in our sensibility (for an object which 
was so small beneath the clear sky of our certainty can be suddenly 
magnified many times over on the appearance of a tiny cloud of dan-
ger)--if, in my attempt to transcribe a universe which had to be 
totally redrawn, I could not convey these changes and many others, 
the needfulness of which, if one is to depict reality, has been 
made manifest in the course of my narrative, at least I should not 
fail to portray man, in this universe, as endowed with the length 
not of his body but of his years .•• ,209 
By recollecting forward, then, Proust brought the temporality of the 
novel into the foreground so that the events of its plot dis-continuously 
reveal themselves through super-imposition, and not the perspective of 
linear chronology; he simultaneously freed the narration from its frame. 
In doing so, Proust actualized the vector of the modern novel initiated 
208Ibid. 209rbid., p. 270. 
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by Flaubert and Dostoevsky, establishing the ground for what is loosely 
called "stream of consciousness" and the twentieth-century masterpieces 
of Gide, Joyce, and Faulkner. 
In drama, meanwhile, the immediacy of consciousness evolved toward 
a depth of its own. In his Death of Tragedy, Steiner dates the beginning 
of modern theatre from Ibsen's Pillars of Society (1877); 210 but the 
social orientation of Ibsen·' s early work seems hardly adequate to 
sufficiently rank it as modern. In fact, it is not until 1884, with 
Ibsen's Wild Duck, that the dramatic form absconds from its traditional 
frame, as Steiner himself remarks: "The limitations Qf the well-made 
play and its deliberate flatness of perspective began crowding in on 
Ibsen. While retaining the prose form and outward conventions of realism, 
he went back to the lyric voice and allegoric means of his early 
experimental plays, Brand and Peer Gynt. With the toy forest and 
imaginary hunt of old Ekdal in The Wild Duck, drama returns to a use of 
effective myth and symbolic action which had disappeared from the theatre 
since the late plays of Shakespeare."211 Ibsen's use of symbolic action 
brings the traditional idea of a "plot" or series_of incidents into the 
forefront of the dramatic frame so that personal gesture supersedes the 
external "event," taking its place alongside the other elements of the 
play; this stylized vision of life equally confers an emblematic signifi-
cance upon all the elements in so far as the drama now expresses the 
virtual shape of an "ethical interior." The very objects of the setting 
express an inner shape, an inward motion--the new steeple in The Maste~ 
210George Steiner, The Death of Tragedy (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1961)' p. 290. 
211Ibid., pp. 291-92. 
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Builder, the vine leaves in Hedda Gabler, Gabler's pistols, the wild duck, 
the flagpole in The Lady from the Sea, the tarantella dance in A Doll's 
Hous~, and so forth.212 
Ibsen's dramas presuppose the withdrawal of God from human affairs, 
and that withdrawal has left the door open to cold gusts blowing in 
from a malevolent though inanimate creation. But the most 
dangerous assaults upon reason and life come not from without, as 
they do in Greek and Elizabethan tragedy. They arise in the 
unstable soul. Ibsen proceeds from the modern awareness that there 
is rivalry and unbalance in the individual psyche. The ghosts that 
haunt his characters are •.• cancers growing in the soul. In 
Ibsen's vocabulary~ the most deadly of these cancers is 
"idealism" • . • • L 13 
In his later plays especially, the three-walled stage, with its 
perspective view into a slice of life, retracts toward an affective depth 
whose setting leads into an unchartered world, a world whose sign-posts 
we must discover all over again. By transposing the public form of drama 
into the highly subjective "key" of private expression, Ibsen re-defined 
the dramatic perspective itself. Strindberg achieved a similar kind of 
depth, but failed in the long run to effect the dramatically coherent 
structure we consistently find in Ibsen. What made the difference? 
Ibsen re-defined the very "focus" of the dramatic vision, a perspec-
tive which, since the Renaissance, had focused on external incidents or 
"plot." Taking its lead from Aristotle, who had defined the tragic 
vision as the imitation of an action, Renaissance dramatic construction 
subsequently employed chronology as the dramatic equivalent of pictorial 
perspective--the re-presentation of an event. In his Poetics, Aristotle 
had specifically insisted on this: 
The most important of the constitutive elements is the Plot, that 
is, the organization of the incidents of the story; for Tragedy in 
212Ibid., pp. 294-95. 213Ibid., p. 293. 
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its essence is an imitation, not of men as such, but of action and 
life, of happiness and misery. And happiness and misery are not 
states of being, but forms of activity; the end for which we live 
is some form of activity, not the realization of a moral 
quality. . . . In a play, consequently, the agents do not perform 
for the sake of representing their individual dispositions; rather, 
the display of moral character is included as subsidiary to the 
things that are done. So that the incidents of the action, and the 
structural ordering of these incidents, constitute the end and 
purpose of the tragedy.214 
This is consistent with the significance Aristotle gives to "beginning," 
"middle," and "end" so that the spectator, via the ubiquity of his per-
spective, is able to witness· the completely unified action within a 
single glance, as it were. With Ibsen, however, "plot" becomes the 
incrusted "epilogue" to a previous action; he begins where earlier 
tragedies had ended: "Suppose Shakespeare had written a play showing 
Macbeth and Lady Macbeth living out their black lives in exile after they 
had been defeated by their avenging enemies. We might then have the 
angle of vision that we find in John Gabriel Borkman."215 As the 
peripherally indeterminate ingress to a private interior, Ibsen's drama 
super-imposed the logic of interior time over an ·implied chronological 
moment, initiating the destruction of the plot as an imitation of an 
action or "life." It wasn't until Chekhov that the destruction was 
complete. 
Chekhov's plays not only abrogate the traditional perspective of 
the five-act division, but also meiotically terminate the anorectic 
teleology of beginning-middle-end. Chekhov fetches chronology into the 
foreground to such an extent that it touches our nose; a blurred tempo-
214Aristotle on the Art of Poetry, trans. Lane Cooper (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1947), p. 24. 
215steiner, pp. 296-97. 
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rality nebulously juts through the entire visual field of the play, so to 
speak. Time anxiously nudges us as we wait for something to happen, but 
it never does. In Chekhov absolutely nothing ever "happens." It is all 
talk; even suicide simply represents another rhetorical posture, for like 
the characters themselves, it accomplishes nothing. The structure of 
Chekhov's drama constitutes a magnetic field of psychological motion 
where "every word and gesture provokes a complex disturbance and regroup-
ing of psychological forces. . . . A Chekhovian dialogue is a musical 
score set for speaking voice."216 Like Satie's music, which often 
~ develops a single musical idea from different directions simultaneously 
rather than "at length," Chekhovian drama evolves by standing still. It 
endures. Whatever motion we may feel, it is the motion of a still 
center; and that center is everywhere at once. Like a carriage wheel, 
which appears to be going backward once it reaches a certain forward 
velocity, Chekhov's movement revolves in both directions at the same time. 
His interrogation of psychological time suggests a mutual motion and 
repose, just as with Satie's ostinato bass there is the suggestion of 
"permanent movement and permanent rest."217 What Roger Shattuck says of 
Satie might equally be said of Chekhov: "He varies only the bare contour, 
the notes in the melody but not its general shape, the chords in the 
• b · d · d n218 accompan1ment ut not 1ts om1nant moo • The enigmatic quality of 
Chekhovian dialogue derives from this super-imposition of simultaneous 
levels of consciousness which, in turn, creates its own distinctive sig-
nificance--absurdity. Chekhov' s plays take up where Socrates left off .in 
the Symposium, demonstrating that the spirit of tragedy is ultimately that 
216Ibid., p. 300. 217shattuck, p. 141. 218rbid. 
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of comedy as well. In this respect, we can better understand Chekhov's 
remark that he never wrote a tragedy; he intuitively recogQized life's 
ultimate absurdity. And what difference is there in the end, whether the 
listener or the talker falls asleep? Socrates' final comme~t in the 
Symposium is most ironically appropriate--silence. With his usual 
incisiveness, Kierkegaard remarks: 
What Socrates valued so highly, namely, to stand still and come to 
himself, i.e. silence, this is what his whole life is in relation 
to world history. He has left nothing from which a later age can 
judge him. • . • He belonged to that species of human beings with 
whom one is not content to remain with the external as such. The 
external always suggested an 'other', an opposite. He was not like 
a philosopher lecturing upon his views, wherein the very lecture 
itself constitutes the presence of the Idea; on the contrary, what 
Socrates said meant something 'other'. The outer and the inner did 
not form a harmonious unity, for the outer was in opposition to the 
inner, and only through this refracted angle is he to be 
apprehended.219 
Chekhov's plays articulated the silence of Socratic irony. 
If Chekhov pre-figured Ionesco, Genet, Beckett, and the "Theatre of 
the Absurd" in general, Alfred Jarry virtually launched it on the way. 
In its trans-valuation of the rational "attitude," the Ubu trilogy 
resembles "the incoherence--and significance of that other great 
monstrosity: Picasso's Guernica."220 If the perfect script were ever 
written for W. C. Fields, this is it; Ibsen's Peer Gynt constitutes a 
close second. In act one, scene one of Ubu Enchained, Pa Ubu, having 
"lorded" it over others as "king," initiates the general situation of the 
play: 
PA UBU •••• Now that we are in the land where liberty is equal to 
fraternity, and fraternity more or less means the equality of 
legality, and since I am incapable of behaving like everyone else 
and since being the same as everyone else is all the same to me 
seeing that I shall certainly end up by killing everyone else, I 
219The Concept of Irony, pp. 49-50. 220shattuck, p. 228. 
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might as well become a slave, Ma Ubu! 
MA UBU. A slave! But you're too fat, Pa Ubu! 
PA UBU. All the better for doing a fat lot of work. You, madam our 
female, go and set out our slave apron, and our unmentionable 
slave brush, and our slave hook, and our slave's shoe-polishing 
kit. But as for yourself, stay just as you are, so that everyone 
can see plainly that you are wearing your beautiful costume of 
slave cook.221 
In a single definitive gesture, Jarry levels the reflective consciousness 
which, in itself, attempts to level down all modalities of existence to a 
single consciousness. In fact, Ubu Enchained, begins with silence, as the 
stage directions indicate, when Pa Ubu "comes forward and says nothing."222 
Ma Ubu responds: "What! You say nothing, Pa Ubu! Surely you haven't 
forgotten the Word?"223 The "word" of course is Merdre--"Pschittl"--which 
brought the house down on 10 December 1896, when Ubu Rex opened at the 
ThJ~tre Nouveau in the Rue Blanche. Not since 1830, when Victor Hugo 
packed the house for the premiere of his own Hernani, had there been any-
thing like it. Pa Ubu's inability to pronounce the word at the beginning 
of Ubu Enchained merely underscores the absurdity of it all. Like 
Rousseau's canvases and Satie's music, Jarry's child-like posture recreates 
the structure of a pre-reflective consciousness where the apparent and the 
real remain entirely ambiguous; slavery and freedom are synonymous within 
the context of the play because Jarry never questions their relation 
initially. Jarry's vision is absurd precisely because he takes nothing--
or better, everything--for granted; his work addresses an interrogation 
221Alfred Jarry, The Ubu Plays, ed. Simon Watson Taylor (New York: 
Grove Press, Inc., 1968), p. 110. 
222rbid., p. 109. 
223rbid. 
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which is never even formulated.224 By suspending all affirmation, he 
stands, as Husserl would express it, in wonder before the world.225 
Jarry turned the world inside-out in so far as he lived his art; in 
his personal life he recreated the very figures which populate the pages 
of his oeuvre. As he says of Sengle, the protagonist of Days and Nights 
(1897)' 
he made no distinction whatsoever between his thoughts and his 
actions or between his dream and his waking; and perfecting the 
Liebnizian definition, that perception is a true hallucination, he 
saw no reason why one should not say: hallucination is a false 
perception, or more exactly: a weak one, or better yet: predicted 
(remembered sometimes, which is the same thing). And, above all, 
he considered that there existed nothing except hallucinations, or 
perceptions, and that there were neither nights nor days (despite 
the title of this book, which is why we chose it), and that life 
goes on without interruption; • • • and the first proof of life is 
the beating of the heart.226 
Here, as in his "pataphysics," the distinction between dream and waking 
does not represent a shift to consciousness but singularly indicates a 
continuity. Taken as a whole, this continuum constitutes consciousness 
itself so that we can never dismiss the dream on phenomenological grounds. 
The form of a dream appropriates a certain kind of consciousness by its 
very nature; otherwise, it could never be disclosed, for example, in the 
art work. This is what Rollo May implies when he exhorts the psycho-
analyst to approach the patient's dream as a series of spatial forms.227 
Concerning the structure of the dream, R. G. Collingwood made this 
distinction: 
224cf. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 295. 225rbid. 
226selected Works of Alfred Jarry, ed. Roger Shattuck and Simon 
Watson Taylor (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1965), p. 145-46. 
227Rollo May, The Courage to Create (New York: Bantam Books, 1976), 
p. 154. 
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It is essentially a structure which is, in the terminology of the 
psycho-analyst himself, unconscious. ,, The dreamer himself is unaware 
of it until, in collaboration with his psycho-analyst, he brings it 
to light. The mythological way of stating this fact is to say that 
the structure was 'in the unconscious'. This is frankly 
nonsense . . . because the structure is not in the unconscious but 
precisely in the dream, for it is the structure of the dream; and 
the dream is conscious enough. . •. the revelation made by psycho-
analysis is not the bringing into consciousness of what was 
unconscious, but the bringing into explicitness of what was implicit, 
the noticing of something already actually experienced in a light in 
which it had not been noticed before ..•. the new light in 
question is nothing but the hitherto overlooked structure of the 
experience in question . . . 228 
In so far as the dream embodies an implicit "logical" structure, it con-
stitutes a continuous or, better, contiguous "form" of consciousness. 
Jarry's works invert the logic of traditional consciousness, trans-forming 
it into the structure of the dream. Thus, Ubu asserts his freedom by 
ironically, and paradoxically, becoming a slave. This is the "magnificent 
gesture" which Jarry transformed, by way of a pun, into the "manifest 
imposture;" and it uniquely abridges the essence of his entire oeuvre. 
Merleau-Ponty has said it another way: "I face truth not with its 
negation, but with a state of non-truth or ambiguity, the actual opacity 
of my existence."229 Jarry set about "to upset the balance of waking 
(rational) logic and developed the elements of 'Pataphysics,' a kind of 
reasonable unreason;" the action of Ubu Rex, for example, takes place in 
Poland, "( ••• a country long condemned to the nonexistence of 
partition) an Eternity of Nowhere, and that contradiction is the mode of 
its logic."230 By virtue of the universal imposture, the typical becomes 
228speculum Mentis or The Map of Knowledge (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1924), pp. 93-94. 
22~erleau-Ponty, PhenomenoloEY• p. 295. 
230shattuck, pp. 202 and 206, respectively. 
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exceptional, and the exceptional, typical; this was the avowed purpose of 
his "pataphysics," the science of the realm beyond metaphysics: 
Pataphysics will examine the laws governing exceptions, and will 
explain the universe supplementary to this one; or, less ambi-
tiously, will describe a universe which can be--and perhaps should 
be--envisaged in the place of the traditional one, since the laws 
that are supposed to have been discovered in the traditional 
universe are also correlations of exceptions, albiet more frequent 
ones, but in any case accidental data which, reduced to the status 
of unexceptional exceptions, possess no longer even the virtue of 
originality. 2 31 
Like Picasso, who later collected Jarry's manuscripts, Jarry's art sets 
out to describe a universe which one can see; in this transformed space, 
the art work takes its place alongside the expressive space of the world. 
Because the art work has been freed of its frame, Andrl Breton could say 
that with Jarry, the separation between art and life has been annihilated 
once and for all.232 How poignantly Jarry disclosed the nature of his 
, 
own works when he analyzed the characters in a novel by Henri de Regnier, 
who through inverse mimicry "congeal their surroundings into their own 
image and erect palaces of space around themselves;" and he continues, 
"if every hero brings his own scenery with him, and if we never see the 
Prince of Praizig without his military greatcoat, Madame de Vitry without 
her rouge ••.• nor Madame Brignan without her dyed hair, then this 
proves, and no more evidence is needed, that the author has turned his 
creatures inside out and exposed their soul: the soul is a nervous 
tic."233 Liberated for its own unique space, the art work could at last 
231Exploits and Opinions of Doctor Faustroll, Pataphysician, in 
Selected Works of Alfred Jarry, pp. 192-93; cf. also, Shattuck, 
pp. 241-42. 
232Andr/ Breton, Les Pas Perdus (Paris: Gallimard, 1924), pp. 47-65. 
233"concerning Inverse Mimicry in the Characters of Henri de 
RJgnier," Selected Works of Alfred Jarry, pp. 91 and 92-93, respectively. 
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proceed to create its own world as well. In Ubu, Jarry initiated the 
prototype which he would incorporate into his later works; he created, in 
fact, the anti-Frankenstein monster, "a one-man demolition squad twenty 
years before Dada."234 Even more startling, as the science of laws 
governing exceptions, his pataphysics prefigured Heisenberg's principle 
of indeterminacy. No wonder that Cyril Connolly dubbed Pa Ubu the "Santa 
Claus of the Atomic Age," and that Apollinaire could say of Jarry himself 
that he was "the last sublime debauchee of the Renaissance."235 
By abandoning the lineality of a continuous and uniform perspec-
tive-space, the avant-garde exploded that most elemental perceptual bias 
which had plagued Western civilization for more than four centuries. In 
returning to the "composition" of the work, as Gertrude Stein expressed 
it, modern art abrogated the subject-object dichotomy constituted and 
sustained by the principles of resemblance, imitation, and re-presenta-
tion. More or less taking its lead from music, which came to epitomize 
an absolutely self-sufficient art, modern painting and literature in-
corporated the "spectator" into its own structure; this new "expressive" 
form appropriated a unique space in which the subject is expected to dis-
cover his own orientation all over again. We become a part of the field; 
we become incarnate. By virtue of a trans-position, either juxtaposition 
or super-imposition, modern art escaped the "transition," a discursive 
element which inevitably represents a second-order "reflection" in 
itself. Apollinaire called this transition-less quality of modern art 
"surprise." Surprise engages us in mutual creation with the artist 
234shattuck, p. 226. 
235quoted in Shattuck, pp. 224 and 251, respectively. 
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himself, as well as the art work, in so far as we disclose the signifi-
cance of the work. "In the old tradition the spectator knows in essence 
what must happen, and while the action unfolds we experience not surprise 
but verification of certain general truths. The peripety is fated from 
the start. Thus, any important event occurs, in effect, twice--and this 
analysis can be applied to Greek tragedy, to the early French novel, and 
to baroque architecture."236 By its nature an expressive form is 
intimate: rather than hold him at "bay," it invites the spectator into 
its own space. We no longer "observe" the art work from a pre-determined 
distance, as a "view," but touch it by entering onto its space. To the 
extent that modern art brings all its "elements" equally into the fore-
ground so that something is "in·front" or "in back" of something else 
only in so far as the "gaze" of the perceiver distinguishes it as such, 
the art work enters onto the world as an incomplete gestalt which demands 
to be completed in order to be experienced at all. Art, as e.e. cummings 
said of life, is no longer "a verb of two voices"--active and passive.237 
By manipulating or "handling" the appearance of the thing, modern art 
appropriates the perceptual freedom of the composition itself, the right 
to its own world irrespective of a preconceived externality. '!'his is the 
kind of visual freedom Gertrude Stein had in mind when she said that with 
Picasso's cubism the painting connnenced to leave its frame. 
Of all the cubists, perhaps Juan Gris expressed the new aesthetic 
and its subsequent methodology best: "Now painting is foreseeing--fore-
seeing what will happen to the general effect of a picture by the intro-
236shattuck, pp. 339-40. 
237Jacket copy of the play Him, New York: Boni and Liveright, 1927, 
quoted in Shattuck, p. 343. 
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duction of some particular form of some particular colour, and foreseeing 
what sort of reality will be suggested to the spectator. It is, then, by 
being my own spectator that I extract the subject from my picture."238 
In 1890, Maurice Denis had already redefined the composition of the paint-
ing, and it was his re-formulation of this issue which instituted modern 
criticism in general, he declared: "Se rappeler qu'un tableau--avant 
d'~tre un cheval de bataille, une femme nue, ou une quelconque anec-
dote--est essentiellement une surface plane recouverte de couleurs en un 
certain ordre assemblels."239 Rousseau seemed acutely aware of this 
distinction, employing color as the most significantly "formal" element 
in all his compositions. By 1912, Robert Delaunay had made enormous 
progress in this respect, directing his experiments with pure color toward 
an entirely non-figurative style while, at the same time, Kandinsky and 
Mondrian were performing similar experiments in Germany and Holland 
respectively.240 Out of this specific effort there evolved the general 
term "simultanism." In the paintings of Delaunay's Les fen~res series, 
for example, "we are simultaneously indoors and out of doors, inside an 
object and on all sides of it."241 But what makes this articul~tion of 
simultaneous points of view any different from the flat projection we 
238"Notes on My Painting," in Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler, Juan Gris: 
His Life and Work, rev. ed., trans: Douglas Cooper (New York:--aarry N. 
Abrams, Inc., 1968), p. 194. Cf. "Reply to the Questionnaire: 'Chez les 
cubistes'," 1925, ibid., p. 202: " •.• for the only relationship that 
existed was that between the intellect of the painter and the objects and 
practically never was there any relationship between the objects 
themselves." 
239Thlories: 1890-1910, 4th ed. (Paris: L. Rouart and J. Watelin, 
1920), p. 1: "Recall that a painting--before being a horse in battle, a 
naked woman, or any kind of anecdote--is essentially a plane surface 
covered with colors and arranged in a certain order" (translation mine). 
240shattuck, pp. 279-80. 241Ibid., p. 349. 
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encounter in the ubiquitousness of the world-view? Precisely this--the 
visual field remains entirely indeterminate. Like the newspaper cut-outs 
in a cubist collage, the "objects" of a simultanist painting constitute a 
possible horizon for other objects in the field. Rather than vanish in 
the determinate point of a single horizon, each object engages my 
attention in so far as it opens onto an indeterminate periphery. I 
complete the "gestalt" a different way each time my gaze "takes it up" 
which, in turn, determines how my body orients itself to the unique space 
of the painting's world. I can only make the world of the painting the 
familiar setting of my own life to the extent that I intend to take it up 
completely. In this respect, the art work enters onto my own world; it 
compels me to become familiar with it in so far as it dialogically 
engages my attention, and I negotiate its unfamiliar space in order to 
arrive at the most determinate "form" possible. Only beyond the "edges" 
of the painting, however, is this completion actualized, just as my 
visual gaze appropriates the objects "in back of me" as part of its 
field. Because the formal possibilities subsequently remain open by 
virtue of this double horizon, I encounter nothing less than the 
existential ek-stasis itself--that is, temporality. Situated in the 
diachronic standpoint, the art work engages my interest in so f~r as it 
stands out from the temporal horizon as a whole, past-present-future. 
Thus, for example, the so-called "simultaneous" points of view in 
simultanism constitute, in effect, neither a simultaneity in space nor 
in time. Shattuck locates the essence of not only simultanism but of 
modern art in general in an eternal and continuous present, and calls it 
"tbe art of stillness;" as he remarks, "Stillness represented its unity, 
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its continuous present, its sole permanence."242 For Shattuck, modern 
art represents, then, a synchronic standpoint, the "place" where every-
thing happens at once. This, however, merely re-locates its perspective 
within the larger frame of the world-view itself, whereas, in fact, this 
art appropriates an essential quality just the opposite of stillness, and 
that is motion. 
The lack of connectives in modern art pre-figures the electronic 
cultural milieu in which we live today. Like the mechanism in Jarry's 
"How to Construct a Time Machine" (1899), it even anticipates the theory 
of relativity: 
If we could remain immobile in absolute Space while Time elapses, 
if we could lock ourselves inside a Machine ~hat isolates us from 
Time • • • all future and past instants could be explored success-
ively, just as the stationary spectator of a panorama has the 
illusion of a swift voyage through a series of landscapes.243 
Yet, in so far as it is phenomenal, the motion of modern art is not 
relative. The absence of transition in modern art, whether it be a 
musical score, a painting or a literary piece, produces that kinaesthetic 
sensation whereby we experience a certain "speed" or motion in the form, 
though never to the point where formal elements concur simultaneously. 
This motion, however, possesses no "properties" in itself, but only a 
certain style. "The moving object, as object of an indefinite series of 
explicit and concordant perceptions, has properties, the mobile entity 
has only a style."244 Movement does not necessarily pre-suppose a moving 
object; "it is sufficient that it should include 'something that moves', 
or at the most 'something coloured' or 'luminous' without any actual 
242Ibid. 243Selected Works of Alfred Jarry, p. 115. 
244Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, pp. 273-74. 
181 
colour or light. The logician excludes this middle term: the radii of 
the circle must be either equal or unequal, motion must either have or 
not have a moving body."245 We are concerned here with the non-thematic 
significance of movement, for the thematization of movement "ends with 
the identical object in motion and with the relativity of movement, which 
means that it destroys movement."246 Phenomenally speaking, a "world" is 
constituted not only by things but by change as well, whereas the "world" 
constituted by the world-view recognizes only the thing itself in transit. 
Thus, its most peculiar characteristic--having to account for "where" 
everything "is at" thematically. Spatial and temporal lineality thus 
enable the percipient to always define his experience of the world by 
virtue of an unequivocal predicate--that is, its "theme." If it cannot 
be expressed in a single definitive sentence, it simply isn't there. 
Similarly, transition in the art work helps to define the relation of all 
its parts in so far as the art work as a whole occupies a certain space; 
even to say that the art work is greater than the sum of its parts still 
implies a mathematical function which ultimately gets us nowhere, In 
traditional drama, or literature in general for example, the "event" 
merely constitutes another "thing" in the manipulation or construction of 
plot. Modern art, on the other hand, recognizes the pure transition it:-
self, the manner of a thing's passing. "The something in transit which 
we have recognized as necessary to the constitution of a change is,to be 
defined only in terms of the particular manner of its 'passing'."247 In 
other words, the modern art work defines itself primarily in terms of its 
"behavior" and not its "properties." Because it is essentially 
245Ibid., p. 274. 246rbid., p. 275. 247Ibid. 
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transitio.n-less, modern art appropriates the "pure transition" in it-
self--that is, motion. The motion of modern art begins to appear as the 
"modulation of an already familiar setting" in my perceptual field,248 
only in so far as I acquaint myself with it entering onto its space. To 
the extent that my perceptual "gaze" supplies the appropriate figure and 
background to the field, and to that extent alone, does the motion of the 
work become structural, though never "relative," for the "very peculiar 
relationship which constitutes movement does not exist between 
objects."249 In my perception of the modern art work, then, whether it 
be music, painting or poetry, the pre-objective ekstatic temporality of a 
lived present holds me within the thickness and opacity of past and 
future as well; unlike objective time determined by successive moments, I 
experience the phenomenon of motion "without being in any way aware of 
objective positions."250 Shattuck's thinking is faulty in this respect 
precisely because he conceives of the perceiver as another object in 
objective space; he thus implicitly accepts the assumption that motion 
can, and does, occur between two objects. This is why he discovers, at 
the heart of modern art, an absolute stillness: "An object in motion has 
difficulty taking into account ot~er motions. Only by achieving rest, 
arrest, can we perceive what is happening outside ourselves."251 This 
is, of course, a logical conclusion only if we conceive of the perceptual 
act transpiring without a field. The necessity of a double horizon 
constituted by both physical and bodily space leads us to a far different 
248Ibid. 249Ibid., p. 277. 
250Ibid., p. 275. 
25lshattuck, p. 350. 
183 
conclusion indeed, whereby motion, as we have seen, becomes an 
absolute. 252 
In its demand to be completed, modern art asserts an ontological 
priority in time, and appropriates this significance in so far as the 
motion becomes identical with its completed appropriation. Its trans-
position, which Gaugin decreed essential to all modern art, thus 
constitutes what today, in effect, we call "montage." Here, as we saw 
during the Renaissance, it was art which once again preceded technology 
and its most significant product since the daguerreotype--the "motion" 
picture. Cinematic montage primordially articulates the "pure 
transition," the manner of a thing's passing. Indeed, contrary to 
George Sarton's insidiously arrogant remark noted in the previous chapter, 
that "if we try to explain the progress of mankind, the history of 
science should be the very axis of our explanation,"253 the progress of 
mankind is primordially and for the most part grounded in its art. As 
Sir Herbert Read has said, art precedes other forms; on the basis of its 
activity, "a 'symbolic discourse' becomes possible, and religion, philos-
ophy and science follow as consequent modes of thought."254 Rollo May 
amplifies Sir Herbert's statement as follows: 
This is not to say that reason is the more civilized form and art 
the more primitive one, in a pejorative sense--an egregious error 
unfortunately often found in our rationalistic Western culture. 
This is, rather, to say that the creative encounter in the art form 
is "total"--it expresses a wholeness of experience; and science and 
philosophy abstract partial aspects for their subsequent 
study.255 
252Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 280. 
253sarton, The Renaissance, p. 55. 
254quoted in May, p. 99. 255May, pp. 99-100. 
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At any rate, the motion in modern art pre-figured cinematic montage and 
its purely transitional nature--temporal juxtaposition. And here, 
Roger Shattuck is true to the mark: "Having no subordinate conjunctions 
and no punctuation except the retarded timing of the fade and the mix, 
film is organically juxtaposition."256 No one has examined the history 
and nature of the film more perceptively, perhaps, than Sergie Eisenstein. 
In his Film Sense, he says of juxtaposition: 
The basic fact was true, and remains true to this day, that the 
juxtaposition of two separate shots by splicing them together 
resembles not so much a simple sum of one shot plus another shot--as 
it does a creation. It resembles a creation--rather than a sum of 
its parts--from the circumstance that in every such juxtaposition 
the result is qualitative!~ distinguishable from each component 
element viewed separately. 57 
In other words, this new entity, as a product of juxtaposition, transcends 
any and all re-presentation whatsoever--by virtue of its very motion it 
escapes the limitations of its frame. As an example, Eisenstein cites 
Ambrose Bierce's "The Inconsolable Widow" where a woman in widow's 
attire stands weeping upon a grave. 
"Console yourself, madame," said a Sympathetic Stranger. 
"Heaven's mercies are infinite. There is another man somewhere, 
besides your husband, with whom you can still be happy." 
"There was," she sobbed--"there was, but this is his grave."258 
Eisenstein then explains: "The woman • • • is a representation, the 
mourning robe she is wearing is a representation--that is, both are 
objectively representable. But ·~widow,' arising from a juxtaposition 
of the two representations, is objectively unrepresentable."259 Thus, 
256shattuck, p. 334, footnote. 
257Eisenstein, The. Film Sense, pp. 7-8. 
258quoted in Eisenstein, The Film Sens~, p. 5. 
259Eisenstein, The Film Sellse, p. 8. 
the unity of a film derives from its ability to transcend not only the 
content enclosed by the single frames, but also the juxtaposition of 
these separate contents with each other.260 "Hence the image of a 
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scene, a sequence, of a whole creation, exists not as something fixed and 
ready-made. It has to arise, to unfold before the senses of the 
spectator."261 What unfolds before us is nothing less than the spatial 
"world" of the film, its composition. Ultimately grounded in the 
temporality of its vision, the "motion" picture, like all of modern art, 
invites us into its space in so far as we take it up intimately, with the 
personal style of our "gaze." Phenomenally situated within the pre-
objectivity of perception, the film demands a new spatial level in order 
to be "seen" at all. As Gertrude Stein said of art, defining it as the 
"composition" of the world--"Nothing changes from generation to 
generation except the thing seen and that makes a composition."262 
Modern art not only opened onto the revolutionary form of the film 
and its subsequent technological development, but once again laid the 
ground for all of the seminal advances in the science and technology of 
the twentieth century. It created, in fact, the very possibility of a 
"post-modern" physics some fifty years ahead of its time. In so far as 
contemporary physics is beginning to admit that it can no longer 
entertain a total picture of the universe, it is ultimately fated to 
relinquish its world-view; and with it must go, once and for all, the 
pseudo-salvation of the ubiquitous vision of science in general. It is 
simply a matter of time. Meanwhile, the central question which plagues 
260Ibid., p. 9. 261Ibid., p. 18. 
262"composition as Explanation," in Selected Writings, p. 513. 
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the contemporary physicist echoes the significant question which haunted 
the avant-garde some fifty years before: is the physical space of the 
universe essentially symmetrical as Galileo and Newton would have it, or 
is it primordially the expression of an incomprehensible pattern or 
"form." Post-modern physics discloses a world not only at odds with 
reason, but with our imagination as well. As Huston Smith remarks in 
his essay, "The Revolution in Western Thought," 
the problems which the new physics poses for man's sense of order 
cannot be resolved by refinements in scale. Instead they appear to 
point to a radical disjunction between the way things behave and 
every possible way in which we might try to visualize them. How, 
for example, are we to picture an electron traveling two or more 
different routes through space concurrently or passing from orbit 
to orbit without traversing the space between them all? What kind 
of model can we construct of a space that is finite yet unbounded, 
or of light which is both wave and particle?263 
In so far as we cannot form a picture of it, this "new" world refuses to 
be visualized at all--at least in the traditional perspective; it is 
entirely beyond reason; it is truly, in Kant's sense of the term, 
"sublime." Yet what, after all, is the space of the electron, wherein it 
concurrently travels through two or more different routes without 
traversing the space between them at all, if not the pre-objective, 
"behavioral," situated space of being-in-the-world? It is nothing less 
than the expressive space of modern art. Thus, post-modern physics finds 
itself describing the universe in such purely metaphorical terms as 
"light years," "bent space," "absolute negative temperatures," and 
"audible radio stars."264 P. W. Bridgman of Harvard has put it this way: 
The structure of nature may eventually be such that our processes 
263nialogue on Science, ed. William R. Cozart (Indianapolis: 
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1967), p. 26. 
264shattuck, p. 349. 
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of thought do not correspond to it sufficiently to permit us to 
think about it at all. . . . The world fades out and eludes 
us. . . . We are confronted with something truly ineffable. We 
have reached the limit of the vision of the great pioneers of 
science, the vision, namely, that we live in a sympathetic world 
in that it is comprehensible by our minds.265 
The post-modern physicist is subsequently encouraged to talk about a 
theory in terms of its "elegance," rather than its "truth." And in so 
doing, he has at last returned to a world of beauty, the very world of 
art from whence he originally emerged during the Renaissance. 
187 
Rationality or utility is no longer of paramount importance, but rather 
subsumed, as Rollo May remarks, "as part of the character of being 
beautiful. The harmony of an internal form, the inner consistency of a 
theory, the character of beauty that touches one's sensibilities--these 
are significant factors determining why a given idea emerges •••• in-
sights emerge not chiefly because they are 'rationally true' or even 
helpful, but because they have a certain form, the form that is beautiful 
because it completes an incomplete Gestalt."266 As it did when Einstein 
introduced his theory of relativity and Heisenberg his principle of 
indeterminacy, the world henceforth runs the risk of continually being 
upset--indeed, re-appropriates the very principle of chaos as part of its 
ground.267 The perceptually biased "defense mechanisms" of optical 
perspective are, at last, de trop. Apollinaire knew it some fifty years 
before, as did the avant-garde in general; and he articulated what has 
become the basic posture of the twentieth century in his brilliant poem 
265quoted in Smith, "The Revolution in Western Thought," in 
Dialogue on Science, p. 26. 
266May, pp. 73-74. 
267cf. May, p. 78. 
-"Zone," as we now begin to disclose the affective distances of 
inter-planetary space: 
God who dies Friday and rises Sunday 
Christ who flies higher than the aviators 
And holds the world's record 
Christ pupil of the eye 
Twentieth pupil of the centuries he knows his business 
And changed to a bird this century ascends like Jesus • 
268Alcools, p. 5. 
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CHAPTER III 
HAWTHORNE'S DIORAMIC GAZE: PERCEPTION 
For the nineteenth century, the daguerreotype appreciably offset 
the temporal and spatial displacement caused by the latest technology; 
for it securely located man within the perspective co-ordinates of his 
world-view. Yet, violent technical innovation engenders alienation and 
the pain of isolation in any age.l Hawthorne's fiction definitively 
expresses the alienation and pain of isolation which his own age experi-
enced. It does so only because Hawthorne himself was eminently aware of 
the condition of his environment: "The artist has the power to discern 
the current environment created by the latest technology. Ordinary human 
instinct causes people to recoil from these new environments and to rely 
on the rear-view mirror as a kind of repeat or ricorso of the preceding 
environment."2 Hawthorne's fiction condemns th~ unconscious bias of 
perception in his own culture, and thus opens the possibility of new 
perceptions with respect to the counter-environments of the fiction 
itself. As McLuhan puts it: 
The function of the artist in correcting the unconscious bias of 
perception in any given culture can be betrayed if he merely 
repeats the bias of the culture instead of readjusting it. In 
fact, it can be said that any culture which feeds merely on its 
direct antecedents is dying. In this sense the role of art is to 
create the means of perception by creating counterenvironments that 
open the door of perception to people otherwise numbed in a 
nonperceivable situation.3 
lMcLuhan, Vanishing Point, p. 235. 
2Ibid., p. xxiii. 3Ibid., p. 241. 
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Although it is difficult to assess the degree to which Hawthorne was con-
sciously aware of himself as the creator of counter-environments--a means 
of perceiving the actual environment over and against the pseudo-environ-
ments created by technology and their resultant fictions of space and 
time--Hawthorne's fiction clearly speaks against the age; and it does so 
with remarkable consistency. But what is this speaking against? What is 
it that Hawthorne so violently detested and which, in short, becomes the 
brunt of his attack? Perhaps what he most generally disliked about his 
age was its attitude toward the visual sense, an attitude which over-
whelmingly reflected the major concern of his day as it appeared 
' vis-a-vis technology--specifically, the "daguerrean" or world-view. 
Hawthorne's use of mirrors, for example, counterbalances the transillumi-
nated image of the daguerrean plate; rather than perfectly reflect the 
world, his mirrors obliquely demonstrate its perceptual opacity prior to 
second-order consciousness; that is, prior to reflection itself. The 
mirror translates, the reflexivity of the sensible, that in which my o~ 
externality completes itself: "More completely than lights, shadows, and 
reflections, the mirror image anticipates, within things, the labor of 
vision."4 The mirror reciprocates what.!. see, by disclosing what ~binss 
see of me; the body-image transcends itself to become a spectacle in its 
own right. Like any spectacle, moreover, the mirror plays its own game~, 
optical tricks by which the metamorphic nature of vision illusively. 
appears in order to enclose itself. In fact, from an "objective" point 
of view, the mirror image must be re-reflected, that is, translated 
mentally, before it accurately represents its derivative spatial 
4Merleau-Ponty, Primacy, p. 168. 
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reflection. The image in the mirror is transitory, its transpositional 
ambiguity escapes us even as we look. Thus, "Monsieur du Miroir" 
ironically illustrates the futility of any attempt to capture "the 
picture or visible type of what I muse upon, that my mind may not wander 
so vaguely as heretofore, chasing its own shadow through a chaos, and 
catching only the monsters that abide there."S Like many painters, who 
use the mirror to paint themselves in the act of painting, Hawthorne 
frequently employs his "mirrors" in order to write himself into the 
writing. Indeed, on an aesthetic level, the mirror "mirrors" his own 
maieutic method. Hawthorne's socratic narrator not only questions his 
subject-matter and audience, but repeatedly interrogates himself. In so 
doing, he places a counterfeit image before himself, an opaque alternative 
which recreates the perceptually and ontologically ambiguous dialectic of 
"within" and "without." This primordial ambiguity sets the tone through-
out much of Hawthorne's oeuvre, for the self-interrogative narrator is 
often the source of his irony as well. Like Matisse, Hawthorne enjoyed 
drawing himself into the very structure of the work: "Farewell, 
Monsieur du Miroir! Of you, perhaps, as of many men, it may be doubted 
whether you are the wiser, though your whole business if REFLECTION."6 
Inescapably, Hawthorne's fiction is predominantly visual, but to 
5"Monsieur du Mirroir," in The Centenary Edition of the Works of 
Nathaniel Hawthorne, ed. William Charvat, Roy Harvey Pearce, and Claude 
M. Simpson, XVIII vols. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1962-
present), X, pp. 169-70. Subsequent references to Hawthorne's works, 
unless otherwise noted, will be exclusively to this edition, hereafter 
referred to by volume and page number only. Volumes I through XI have 
appeared to date, with volume XII projected for early December. I have 
had no opportunity to research Hawthorne's "missing notebook," most 
recently discovered in Boulder, Colorado, covering the years 1835-1841. 
6Ibid., p. 171. Cf. also, "Fancy's Show Box," IX, p. 221, where 
Mr. Smith gazes at his own reflection in the madeira glass. 
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the extent that it is visual at all it is always counter-visual; its 
perception is antithetical to the public bias. Throughout his life, 
Hawthorne remained half-convinced that the reflection was indeed the 
reality.7 As Normand remarks: 
Even though his intent in escaping from the maze of customs he had 
been brought up in was not to seek out new ways of being and think-
ing, but simply to see what there is hidden beneath appearances, he 
was none the less a traitor to society, for he was refusing to play 
the game. He had therefore forfeited all his rights, his identity, 
indeed all reality, and even in his own eyes.8 
Thus, Hawthorne acquired what Malcolm Cowley calls his "compulsive 
habit;" for he adorned "his imagined rooms and landscapes with mirrors of 
every description--not only looking-glasses but burnished shields and 
breastplates, copper pots, fountains, lakes, pools, anything that could 
reflect the human form."9 Yet, in so far as the "reality'' to which 
Hawthorne's eyes fell forfeit remained solely constituted by the techno-
logical frame of his age, he "lost" nothing more than the static, pre-
conceptualized determinateness of its perspective view. Grounded in 
finite temporality, Hawthorne's gaze never gives us the whole picture any 
more than the mind is able to grasp the meaning and value of Being within 
a single and systematic mental equivalent: "Perhaps there are higher 
intelligences that look upon all the manifestations of the human mind--
metaphysics, ethics, histories, politics, poems, stories &c &c--with the 
same interest as we do on flowers, or any other humble production of 
7The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 360. 
8Jean Normand, Nathaniel Hawthorne: An Approach to an Analysis of 
Artistic Creation, trans. Derek Coltman (Cleveland: The Press of Case 
Western Reserve University, 1970), p. 41. 
9"Hawthorne in the Looking-Glass," Sewanee Review 56 (October-
December 1948) : 545. 
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nature."10 Thus, it is not so much that Hawthorne sought what was hidden 
beneath appearances, as that he consistently made attempts in both the 
notebooks and the fiction itself "to re-educate his eyes, to rediscover 
direct perception."11 In fact, after 1837 Hawthorne's notebooks reveal a 
marked shift in his own perceptual habits, a shift toward minute observa-
tion of the appearance of things. "His eye became a faceted mirror 
reflecting a reality fragmented into elements of microscopic size."12 
Nevertheless, it remains phenomenally true that the hidden necessarily 
constitutes an essential "aspect" of any "appearance." Hawthorne always 
recognized this phenomenon. In the American Notebooks, for example, he 
says of Una's beauty, "Her beauty is the most flitting, transitory, most 
uncertain and unaccountable affair, that ever had a real existence; 
• if you glance sideways at her, you perhaps think it is illuminating 
her face, but, turning full round to enjoy it, it is gone again."13 
Hawthorne's emphasis on fee.ling, sensibility, and interiority reflects 
his reaction to the prevalent "rationalism" of his day, and appropriates,. 
in its place, the changing appearance of each object with respect to the 
temporality of perception itself. His fiction proclaims a new moment in 
its discovery of the world, a moment freed for itself in order to become 
apparent; that is, personal and opaque. By appearing for the first time,. 
as an originating consciousness, it repeatedly warns us never to approach 
the world it discloses with a pre-conception, but rather encourages "the 
discipline of looking always at what is to be seen."l4 
10The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 256. 
11Normand, p. 115. 12Ibid., p. 121. 13vrri, p. 413. 
14Henry David Thoreau, .¥alden; or, Life in the Woods (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961), p. 162. 
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I doubt if anybody ever does really see a mountain, who goes for 
the set and sole purpose of seeing it. Nature will not let herself 
be seen in such cases. You must patiently bide her time; and by 
and by, at some unforeseen moment, she will quietly and suddenly 
unveil herself and for a brief space allow you to look right into 
the heart of her mystery. But if you call out to her preemptorily, 
'Nature! unveil yourself this very moment!' she only draws her veil 
the closer; and you may look with all your eyes, and imagine that 
you see all that she can show, and yet see nothing.15 
Because it compels us to reorient ourselves to a world previously envi-
sioned as "familiar," Hawthorne's gaze simultaneously reveals the 
primordial opacity of Being in general--"the things that constantly 
surround us, we end up by not seeing them anymore."16 The changing 
technological milieu forcibly brought this point home to Hawthorne, for 
in the mechanistic utilitarianism of contemporary science he apprehended 
the very ground of the transparently fixed idea which dominated his own 
century as it had shaped the distinctive contour of Western civilization 
since the Renaissance. 
Prior to Bergson's Creative Evolution (1907), very few writers had 
reacted more critically to the nineteenth-century scientific view than 
Hawthorne. An unsigned review of 1860, in The Times, expressed a typical 
utilitarian response to Hawthorne's fiction in general: 
There is a peculiar type of the American mind which is strongly in 
revolt against American utilities, and which is predisposed by the 
very monotony of its surroundings to hues of contrast and attitudes 
of antagonism. . . . It is emphatically the desire of idealists 
like .•• Mr. Hawthorne to escape from the 'iron rule' of their 
country and the 'social despotism' of their generation. They 
disdain to be parts of a complicated scheme of progress, which can 
only result in their arrival at a colder and drearier region than 
that they were born in, and they refuse to add to 'an accumulated 
15Hawthorne, The English Notebooks, quoted in Critical Heritage, 
p. 508. 
16Nathalie Sarraute, Do You Hear Them?, trans. Maria Jolas 
(New York: George Braziller, 1973), p. 144. 
195 
pile of usefulness, of which the only use will be, to burden their 
posterity with even heavier thoughts and more inordinate labour 
than their own. '17 
Rather than paint the time in which he lived, Hawthorne chose to attack 
its fundamental beliefs. In science he recognized the mechanical 
illustration of ready-made truths about the meaning of life in which only 
a mind imbued with the most rigid principles can take delight.l8 And 
like his scientists, Hawthorne's intellectuals and reformers similarly 
display the same conceptually sterile fixation so characteristic of the 
age. Thus, all three groups seek not so much to discover but to verify. 
Accomplished "anatomists" that they are, Hawthorne's villains attempt to 
penetrate the ambiguity of appearance, to see through the illusive 
opacity of both body and mind in order to substantiate their own trans; 
parent views. Aylmer, Rappaccini, Chillingworth, Westervelt, 
Hollingsworth, Holgrave--all represent men with minds conditioned by 
inflexible concepts, the single ubiquitous perspective of a rational and 
fixed idea. Obsessed by the absolute invariability of its belief, this 
mentality is forced to use any means to prove its truth; for without 
proof its whole intellectual super-structure will collapse: witness 
Aylmer. The scientific frame of reference provided Hawthorne with 
images which enabled him to interiorize the world afresh in order to 
communicate with it,19 to rediscover its primordial texture and 
consistency rather than describe its popularly accepted fixation in 
physical, chemical, and biological laws, as it was by such naturalists 
as Zola in France, and Dreiser and Crane in the States. 
17quoted in Critical Heritage, p. 329. 
18Normand, p. 245. 19rbid., p. 173. 
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Because Hawthorne's concerns were wholly other than those expressed 
by the popular literature of his day, in conflict with public 
sensitivity, he was condemned to failure from the start. As one critic 
put it: 
Mr. Hawthorne, we are afraid, is one of those writers who aim at an 
intellectual audience, and address themselves mainly to such. We 
are greatly of opinion that this is a mistake and a delusion, and 
that nothing good comes of it. The novelist's true audience is the 
common people--the people of ordinary comprehension and everyday 
sympathies, whatever their rank may be.20 
In the critical vocabulary of the time, Hawthorne's fiction apportioned 
too much "shadow" and insufficient "sunshine." In an age when the 
general truths of the world were supposed to inhere in the unambiguous 
divinity of light, the daguerrean view came to represent the scientific 
certitude of reason itself. In typically ironic fashion, Hawthorne 
discussed this aesthetic obstacle in his preface to The Marble Faun: 
"No author, without a trial, can conceive of the difficulty of writing a. 
Romance about a country where there is no shadow, no antiquity, no 
mystery, no picturesque and gloomy wrong, nor anything but a common-place 
prosperity, in broad and simple daylight."21 Poe's disapprobation of 
Hawthorne's propensity toward the dark and hidden articulated the co~on 
sentiment of that age, and its naive faith in the ultimate guarantee of 
rationality: "Let him mend his pen, get a bottle of visible ink."22 
Like Baudelaire, Hawthorne was necessarily compelled to l.imit his 
audience to a few select readers who would understand him. One such 
20An unsigned essay, "Modern Novelists--Great and Small," 
Blackwood's Magazine, 1855, quoted in Critical Heritage, p. 313. 
21 IV, p. 3. 
22"Tale Writing--Nathaniel Hawthorne," Godey's Lady's Book, 1847, 
quoted in Critical Heritage, p. 150. 
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reader was John Lothrop Motley, who had written to Hawthorne in praise of 
The Marble Faun: "I like those shadowy, weird, fantastic, Hawthornesque 
shapes flitting through the book. I like the misty way in which the 
story is indicated rather than revealed; the outlines are quite definite 
enough from the beginning to the end to those who have imagination enough 
to follow you." 23 On 1 April 1860, Hawthorne replied: 
You are certainly that Gentle Reader for whom all my books were 
exclusively written. . . . It is most satisfactory to be hit upon 
the raw, to be shot straight through the heart. It is not the 
quantity of your praise that I care so much about (though I gather 
it all up most carefully, lavish as you are of it), but the kind, 
for you take the book precisely as I meant it • • . • You work out 
my imperfect efforts, and half make the book with your warm 
imagination; and see what I myself saw, but could only hint at. 
Well, the romance is a success, even if it never finds another 
reader.24 
Unfortunately for Hawthorne, the cheery optimism indigenous to the 
scientific "sunshine" of the age had autonomously transferred itself onto 
the thematic and tonal import of the literature in general, where it came 
to represent an essentially feminine talent as opposed to the masculine 
strength of scientific inquiry. While Hawthorne observed this 
impoverished spectacle, he was simultaneously "consumed with fury at 
having to watch a damned mob of scribbling women reaping a harvest of 
easy popularity at his expense, while the most enlightened critics of the 
age were for their part awaiting the appearance of the male genius, 
America's poetic Jupiter."25 He had, of course, arrived. The general 
public, however, lacked the sophisticated sensitivity Hawthorne would 
have liked it to have; unfortunately, "it was not even responsible for 
the quality of its emotions--emotions that those with the necessary 
23quoted in Critical Heritage, p. 327. 
24Ibid. 25Normand, p. 173. 
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astuteness make it their business to provoke. . . . His inward themes 
could reach the ear of a lazy public only with great difficulty."26 As 
one critic so aptly described the technological prejudice for trans-
parency, and Hawthorne's subsequent lack of recognition by the general 
public: "Taste and culture, in fact, the outgrowths of educated thought, 
are drawbacks to popularity, so far forth at least as they tend to add 
angles reflective and refractive to the media through which people see 
works of art. The law is, the more transparent the medium, the more 
instinctive the recognition."27 Richard Holt Hutton equally recognized 
the obliquity of Hawthorne's perceptual gaze in his essay "Nathaniel 
Hawthorne," and specifically applied it to the thematic treatment of the 
tales: "For the secret of his power lies in the great art with which he 
reduplicates and reflects and re-reflects the main idea of the tale from 
the countless faces of his imagination, until the reader's mind is 
absolutely saturated and haunted by it."28 
Because Hawthorne's fiction interiorized the certainty which its 
public ascribed to the external world, interrogating the basic prejudices 
of a superficially self-sufficient and indigently smug facade, ~t 
required a commonly accepted ground from whence it could thereafter 
proceed to undermine that very foundation. If anything, what has 
traditionally been called Hawthorne's allegorical method constitutes. 
nothing more than a front or "masque" to catch the public off-guard, a 
ceremonial way of getting the reader into the more significant fictional 
26Ibid., p. 172. 
27An unsigned review, Southern Review, 1870, quoted in Critical 
Heritage, pp. 465-66. 
28National Review, 1860, quoted in Critical Heritage, p. 372. 
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vision, a convenient method of fixing things in a superficial form both 
accessible and acceptable to his general public.29 Reduced to a single 
"optical" appearance, it is the nature of allegory to imprison its 
content within the unequivocal confines of an insubstantial abstraction. 
Hawthorne's external objects, on the other hand, consistently defy their 
abstracted allegorical frame; the letter, the house, the statue, the 
serpent, the ribbon, the maypole, the veil, the lime-kiln--these objects 
significantly function as something more than mere moral or visual 
divertissement. They signify, in fact, the interior appropriation of a 
world, partial elements of a spatial configuration, the personal 
completion of a structural "gestalt" within a subject. For Hawthorne, 
an object is "objective" only to the extent that it perceptually informs 
the partial aspect of a "field." By definition, a field of vision is 
never in the object; as such, it is fated to remain ultimately ambiguous 
in so far as we can never "trace it out" in its entirety. The different 
parts of the whole possess a significance beyond the particular qualities 
of its individually determinate "figures." As Merleau-Ponty remarks, 
"Already a 'figure' on a 'background' contains, as we have seen, much 
more than the qualities presented at a given time. It has an 'outline', 
which does not 'belong' to the background and which 'stands out' from it; 
it is 'stable' and offers a 'compact' area of colour, the background on 
the other hand having no bounds, being of indefinite colouring and 
'running on' under the figure~"30 So it is with Hawthorne's greatest 
symbol, the scarlet letter. 
29cf. Normand, p. 244. 
30Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 13. 
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In the most basic sense of the term, all of Hawthorne's symbols 
are, in fact, emblems. They exist within a spatial configuration, and 
appear as "figures" against an ambiguously indeterminate "background." 
The woodcut emblems of the New England Primer had indelibly engraved 
themselves upon Hawthorne's consciousness. What constitutes hi~ 
emblematic technique, then, is not so much an allegorical content 
supplemental to the visual image, as it is the apprehension of a figure 
on a background. Hawthorne's fiction abrades the traditional descriptive 
distance; we find ourselves in a revolutionarily unique landscape where 
the immediate encroaches so entirely upon our perceptual attention that 
we can scarcely obtain a perspective at all.31 Though few critics 
recognized the significance of Hawthorne's emblematic gaze and its 
incomplete external contours, an anonymous commentator remarked in an 
unsigned review, 1863, that the English sketches delineate "outlines not 
drawn from notes or from reminiscences painfully recalled, but phototyped 
from the very retina of the inward eye, and filled in with the very hues 
and shadings supplied at the moment by the author's taste, wit, sympathy, 
or disgust."32 Although the influence of Newtonianism and the daguerrean. 
prejudice is apparent in the critical terminology, at least the critic 
seemed aware of the perceptual demands which Hawthorne exacted of himself 
as well as his reader. Charles Webber had expressed a similar observa-
tion in the American Whig Review, 1846: 
One of his finest traits is a sort of magical subtlety of vision, 
which though it sees the true form of things through all the misty 
obscurations of humbug and cant, yet possesses the rare power of 
31cf. Henry Tuckerman, "Nathaniel Hawthorne," Southern Literary 
Messenger, 1851, quoted in Critical Heritage, p. 215. 
32North American Review, quoted in Critical Heritage, p. 391. 
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compelling others to see their naked shapes through a medium of its 
own. • . • It is a favorite expression with regard to Hawthorne, 
that he 'Idealizes' everything. Now what does this Idealization 
mean? Is it that he improves upon Nature? Pshaw! this is a 
Literary cant which it is full time should be exploded! ••• Now, 
Hawthorne does not endeavor to improve upon the Actual, but with a 
wise emulation attempts--first to reach it, and then to modify it 
suitably with the purpose he has to accomplish. Of course he is 
led by his fine taste to desire to see it himself, and make you see 
it in precisely that light in which it shows best--in which its 
highest beauty is revealed.33 
And he adds, "We can't get away from the physical, and just as our 
material vision informs the inner life will that inner life know 
Wisdom."34 In the American Notebooks, Hawthorne himself had remarked: 
"An innate perception and reflection of truth gives the only sort of 
originality that does not finally grow intolerable."35 For Hawthorne, 
then, perception becomes an originating consciousness, the interior 
reflection of a structural "gestalt." 
Unlike Emerson, for whom symbolism represented "the looking-glass 
raised to its highest power,"36 Hawthorne's symbolism re-creates a 
personal and emblematic point of view, a unique moment in the perception 
of a thing, and not its derivative conceptual resemblance to something 
else. In effect, then, Hawthorne's fiction abrogates the subject-object 
dichotomy: "there is no longer any question of subjective expression or 
objective description."37 Consequently, this new.perceptual moment is 
metamorphic, grounded as it is in time: "Were we to sit here all day, a 
week, a month, and doubtless a lifetime, objects would thus still be 
33"Hawthome," quoted in Critical Heritage, pp. 130-31. 
34Ibid., p. 131. 35vni, p. 358. 
36Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Edward Waldo Emerson and 
Waldo Emerson Forbes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1912) VIII, p. 99. 
37Feidelson, p. 52. 
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presenting themselves as new, though there would seem to be no reason why 
we should not have detected them all at the first moment."38 Perhaps 
this moment is best expressed in Hawthorne's description of Pearl, the 
very embodiment of the object upon which all eyes in the novel gaze in 
order to dis-cover the "shape" of its meaning: "The child could not be 
made amenable to rules. In giving her existence, a great law had been 
broken; and the result was a being, whose elements were perhaps beautiful 
and brilliant, but all in disorder; or with an order peculiar to them-
selves, amidst which the point of variety and arrangement was difficult 
or impossible to be discovered."39 The peculiar order of Pearl's 
"arrangement" derives from the metamorphic nature of the perceptual act; 
imbued with the changing variety of an indeterminate background or 
"field," Pearl signifies the temporal aspect of the letter itself: "This 
outward mutability indicated, and did not more than fairly express, the 
various properties of her inner life. Her nature appeared to possess 
depth, too, as well as variety.n40 As an emblem in her own right, her 
"figure" subsequently stands out against "an absolute circle of 
radiance around her, on the darksome cottage-floor •• Pearl's aspect 
was imbued with a spell of infinite variety; in this one child there were 
many children, comprehending the full scope between the wild-flower 
prettiness of a peasant-baby, and the pomp, in little, of an infant 
princess."41 She is of course the rose itself, and figures as the wild-
flower emerging from the prison-house gloom of Puritanism. Unlike the 
38The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 247. 
39The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 91. 
40Ibid., p. 90. 41Ibid. 
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scientifically transparent objectification of the world, Pearl's signifi-
cance obtains from the structural "gestalt" of the perceiver, just as the 
ambiguous embellishment of the letter against its own darksome background 
is variously interpreted by those who see it to stand for anything from 
"Adultery" to "Angel" to "Abel. " 42 Indeed, Hawthorne's oeuvre addresses 
the opacity of perception on nearly every page, and in this respect he 
stands uniquely by himself in the history of American letters. If we 
interpret it correctly, the scarlet "A" signifies nothing less than 
Hawthorne's "Art." And though he is continually singled out by critics 
as having no precedent, it is equally true that he has no antecedents; he 
stands alone in American literature as Bach does in the history of music. 
It is as though his unfinished manuscripts dare anyone else to complete 
them. 
I 
The daguerrean artist assumes the fixed transparency of a world 
uniformly illuminated by light in its primordial constitution. Whatever 
shadow the daguerreotype secures merely represents an artistic "effect" 
in the reproduction of an absolutely accessible truth. In this respect, 
art simply impersonated the technological vision itself, a viewpoint 
appropriate to the time, "that individual differences in artistic 
renderings indicate flaws in perception, at least for the recording 
arts."43 Even the sophisticated aesthetic of a daguerreotypist such as 
Albert Southworth betrays this desire to fix the object in its trans-
parently inflexible truth, though it appears deceptively attractive at 
42rbid., pp. 158 and 160, respectively. 
43Rudisill, p. 85. 
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first sight. In the attempt to capture the essence of his "subject," the 
daguerreotypist, as Southworth remarks, "feels its expression, he sympa-
thizes with its character, he is impressed with its language; his heart, 
mind, and soul are stirred in its contemplation. It is the life, the 
feeling, the mind, the soul of the subject itself."44 Ultimately, 
however, the daguerreotypist can procure the desired representation only 
in so far as his sympathetic facility enables him to see through the 
appearance into the heart of its transparent reality, its contemplatively 
universal significance--its "soul." Holgrave epitomizes the primary 
manifestation of this attitude; he dares the existent to stand still and 
show itself worthy of representing not only the truth of itself, but the 
truth of life in general. As the translator and divine agent of light, 
the daguerreotypist cannot error to the extent that he appropriates this 
in-sight or view "through" the world, Holgrave's willingness to challenge 
the existent 4erives from this belief, and the attendant belief in the 
absolute disclosability of nature. His naive trust in the ability of 
light to elucidate the truth of the world sustains his equally concomitant 
confidence in its transparency. "Most of my likenesses do look unamiable; 
but the very sufficient reason, I fancy, is, because the originals are so. 
There is a wonderful insight in heaven's broad and simple sunshine. 
While we give it credit only for depicting the merest surface, it 
actually brings out the secret character with a truth that no painter 
would ever venture upon, even could he detect it."45 Holgrave's 
44Albert S. Southworth, "An Address to the National Photographic 
Association of the United States," The Philadelphia Photographer 8 
(October 1871) : 322. 
45The House of the Seven Gables, II, p. 91. 
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daguerreotype of Judge Pyncheon, for example, despite numerous efforts to 
make it more agreeable, persistently reveals the judge as a morally 
despicable person. Indeed, his desire to fix the truth of nature in 
general, to catch it in the act, to permanently hold or capture the 
existent amidst its fleeting variety of form and shape, reminds us of 
Emerson. Like Emerson, Holgrave challenges nature to "hold still," to 
prove itself. In this respect, his powers alarm Phoebe: "He made her 
uneasy, and seemed to unsettle everything around her, by his lack of 
-----
reverence for what was fixed; unless, at a moment's warning, it could 
establish its right to hold its ground."46 Thus, despite Holgrave's 
apparent "lack of reverence for what was fixed," we are inveterately 
deceived if we misconstrue him to figure as the representation of 
modernism and change in the novel. For though he seemingly argues 
against the kind of permanence suggested by the house itself, he no 
sooner prepares to leave it than he expresses the desire to preserve the 
exterior while altering the interior to suit the individual's taste: 
But I wonder that the late Judge • • • should not have felt the 
propriety of embodying so excellent a piece of domestic architec-
ture in stone, rather than in wood. Then, every generation of the 
family might have altered the interior, to suit its own taste and 
convenience; while the exterior, through the lapse of years, might 
have been adding venerableness to its original beauty, and thus 
giving that impression of permanence, which I consider essential to 
the happiness of any one moment.47 
Hawthorne was especially intrigued by scientific advances in media, 
and it was only natural that the daguerreotype fascinated him. Through-
out his life, his work was continually discussed in reference to 
daguerrean technique. Already in 1842, Gaylor Clark had compared his 
46Ibid., p. 177. 
47Ibid., pp. 314-15. 
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mind to "the plates of a daguerreotype;"48 and in 1850, George Ripley 
said of The Scarlet Letter, "The introduction, presenting a record of 
savory reminiscences of the Salem Custom House, a frank display of auto-
biographical confessions, and a piquant daguerreotype of his ancient 
colleagues in office, while surveyor of that port, is written with 
Mr. Hawthorne's unrivalled force of graphic delineation."49 
E. A. Duyckinch, in a review of 1852, remarked on The Snow Image: "It is 
no Chesterfieldian vacuum of politeness, but a world of realities, a 
camera obscura of the outer world delicately and accurately painted on 
the heart."SO And in 1864, the year of Hawthorne's death, George 
William Curtis said of him that he "treated his companions as he treated 
himself and all the personages in history or experience with which he 
dealt, merely as phenomena to be analyzed and described, with no more 
private malice or personal emotion than the sun, which would have photo-
graphed them, warts and all."51 Curtis, like most of the critics, 
saliently misses the point; for in drawing an analogy between Hawthorne's 
fiction and the daguerreotype, he misperceived the essential quality of 
Hawthorne's descriptive technique. Even today, contemporary criticism 
continues to analyze him with respect to the aesthetic catchword of his 
own age, "chiaroscuro." In his book, The Power of Blackness, Harry Levin 
discusses Hawthorne in terms of "that obsessive dark room which is always 
behind the focus of his vision;" and elsewhere he says of the interplay 
48Knickerbocker, quoted in Normand, p. 382, note 13. 
49New York Tribune Supplement, quoted in Critical Heritage, p. 159. 
50Literary World, quoted in Critical Heritage, p. 238. 
51North American Review, quoted in Critical Hertage, p. 417. 
\ 
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between light and dark in Hawthorne--"la feuille blanche, le roman 
noir"--that in the twelve years of solitude at Salem, "His mind itself 
became a camera obscura, a dark room which sensitively registered the 
infiltration of light from outside."52 True enough, Hawthorne often 
emphasized the inter-action of high-light, middle tint, and shadow, as 
207 
Gabriel Harrison had defined the daguerrean method; but what the critics 
have predominantly failed to see is how the effect of Hawthorne's light-
ing obscures a more profound perceptual principle. His description of 
the drowned girl in the American Notebooks, for example, later used in 
The Blithedale Romance to depict the death of Zenobia, reveals an 
exceptionally stark realism, dramatically high-lighted by lantern as in 
a Goya painting: 
When close to the bank, some of the men stepped into the 
water and drew out the body; and then, by their lanterns, I could 
see how rigid it was. • • . They took her out of the water, and 
deposited her under an oak-tree; and by the time we had got ashore, 
they were examining her by the light of two or three lanterns. 
I never saw nor imagined a spectacle of such perfect horror. 
The rigidity, above spoken of, was dreadful to behold. Her arms 
had stiffened in the act of struggling; and were bent before her, 
with the hands clenched. She was the very image of a death-agony; 
and when the men tried to compose her figure, her arms would still 
return to that same position. • • • The lower part of the body 
had stiffened into a more quiet attitude; the legs were slightly 
bent, and the feet close together. But that rigidity!--it is 
impossible to express the effect of it; it seemed as if she would 
keep the same posture in the grave, and that her skeleton would 
keep it too, and that when she rose at the day of Judgment, it 
would be in the same attitude.53 
Hawthorne's wife equally misperceived his descriptive dynamics, mistaking 
the above passage for photographic realism. Editing her husband's note-
books for publication, Sophia wrote to James T. Fields in 1867, 
52New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958, pp. 63, 28, and 36, 
respectively. 
53vrrr, pp. 263-64. 
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inquiring whether they should publish "this wonderful photograph of the 
terrible night."54 And when it first appeared, it thoroughly shocked the 
reviewer, Thomas Higginson, who considered it "almost too frightful to 
put into words,--certainly to put into types; 11 he continued, had there 
been introduced "a series of photographs from the Paris morgue, the 
result would not have been more terrible. 11 55 
However, beneath the daguerrean appearance of the drowned girl's 
description, there lurks the hidden drama of an expressiveness 
inaccessible to the photographic medium itself. For the effect of the 
lighting is primordially disclosed as a function of its 11discovery, 11 the 
very motion inherent in the perceptual act of a subject, and not as the 
elucidation of an invariable object. The photograph objectively fixes 
its content by virtue of a single and constant source of light. 
Hawthorne's description, on the other hand, subjectively unfolds in time 
in so far as its variable lighting reflects an affective "distance" 
between the scene and the spectator. We perceive the changing aspects of 
the drowned girl at various distances which more or less express the 
significant 11figures" Hawthorne would have us perceive or, better, 
"complete11 against the indeterminate periphery of the bla(,!kness 
surrounding the 11 field." "Near" and "far" are not determ:lned by the 
single continuity of a perspective, but rather appear as a function of an 
ambiguous interior expressiveness contingent upon how significantly each 
detail appropriates the whole effect, an effect which Hawthorne rhetor-
ically claims "it is impossible to express, 11 but nonetheless gets 
54rbid., p. 685. 
55"Nathaniel Hawthorne and His Wife, 11 Atlantic Monthly 55 
(February 1885) : 264. 
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expressed most affectively. Thus, the drowned girl's clenched hands, 
which perspectively figure to be smaller than the arms, appear, in fact, 
much larger; they loom beyond their graphic relation to the arms and come 
to designate, in themselves, the general rigidity of the entire image. 
Here, Hawthorne's metonymic gaze, the attention to synecdochic detail, 
reveals his general proclivity toward contiguous relationships, relations 
which "logically" digress from a continuously uniform setting in space 
and time. Like the cubists, Hawthorne's descriptive gaze transforms the 
object into a set of synecdochic oscillations whose visual orientation 
strives toward maximum determinateness. It obtains only in so far as the 
perceiver "completes" it himself. This technique is clearly cinematic, 
and pre-figures the changing angle, variable perspective, and repertoire 
of variously focused "shots" indicative of the highly-sophisticated 
"motion" picture of the twentieth century. The close-up or "tight shot" 
of the drowned girl's hands momentarily fills the visual field no less 
effectively than the revolutionary metonymic "set-ups" in the productions 
of D. W. Griffith.56 Hawthorne's changing light manifests this 
perceptual "distance" as an expressive function of the gaze itself. Our 
proximity to any given figure in the field is solely predicated upon the 
descriptive intention to "take it up." Because description discloses the 
affective aspect of an object, its perceptual enownment primordially 
reflects an intentional "motion" in the subject, and not the representa-
tiona! determination of an object as such. Again, Richard Holt Hutton 
incisively recognized the "gestalt" structure of Hawthorne's gaze: 
56cf. Roman Jakobson, "Two Aspects of Language: Metaphor and 
Metonymy," in European Literary Theory anc!_ Practice: From Existential 
Phenomenology to Structuralism, ed. Vernon W. Gras (New York: Dell 
Publishing Co., Inc., Delta Book, 1973), pp. 124-25. 
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"every touch and line in his imagined picture is calculated to impress 
some leading thought on the reader."57 Thus, in Hawthorne, distance 
invariably constitutes the expressive completion of a figure against a 
background, and not the static and fixed pictorialism of photographic 
perspective. Hawthorne's variable lighting alters the discovery of its 
objects according to the changing situatedness of the perceiver. 
Conversely, what Hawthorne most admired in the Rembrandt-like 
achromaticism of the daguerreotype was its expressive ability to suggest 
a hidden psychological drama or intuition. The portrait genre particu-
larly accommodated this interest in dramatic expressiveness: "What he 
looked for in a portrait was expression, pathos, the hidden drama of a 
Beatrice Cenci; what interested him in a still life was the materiality 
of the objects."58 The portrait of Beatrice in The Marble Faun abides 
unique in this respect: 
It is a peculiarity of this picture, that its profoundest 
expression eludes a straightforward glance, and can only be caught 
by side glimpses, or when the eye falls casually upon it; even as 
if the painted face had a life and consciousness of its own, and, 
resolving not to betray its secret of grief and guilt, permitted 
the true tokens to come forth only when it imagined itself unseen. 
No other such magical effect has ever been wrought by penci1.59 
Of portraits in general, Hawthorne commented: "The pursuit has 
always interested my imagination more than any other; and I remember, 
before having my first portrait taken, there was a great bewitchery in 
the idea, as if it were a magic process."60 In order to capture this 
moment, however, the portrait painter was forced to wrestle with time, 
57"Nathaniel Hawthorne," Nat~onal Review, 1860, quoted in 
Critical Heritage, p. 370. 
58Normand, p. 94. 59Iv, 204-05. 
60The American Notebooks, VIII, pp. 492-93. 
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"casting quick, keen glances at me, and then making hasty touches on the 
picture, as if to secure with his brush what he had caught with his 
eye."61 Elsewhere, the narrator of "The Prophetic Pictures" observes: 
Nothing, in the whole circle of human vanities, takes stronger 
hold of the imagination, than this affair of having a portrait 
painted. Yet why should it be so? The looking-glass, the polished 
globes of the andirons, the mirror-like water, and all other 
reflecting surfaces, continually present us with portraits, or 
rather ghosts of ourselves, which we glance at, and straightway 
forget them. But we forget them, only because they vanish. It is 
the idea of duration--of earthly immortality--that gives such a 
mysterious interest to our own portraits.62 
Yet, less than two months after The Scarlet Letter first appeared in 
print, Hawthorne had remarked in a notebook entry of 5 May 1850: "In 
fact, there is no such thing as a true portrait; they are all 
delusions • A bust has more reality."63 Ten years later not only 
the bust, but the entire body as well, would come to life in Donatello. 
Despite frequent critical attacks on Hawthorne's ability to appreciate 
sculpture, evidence suggests quite the opposite, and points to the 
unique quality of Hawthorne's descriptive gaze. A notebook entry for 
10 August 1842 already reveals his visual inclination toward the tactile 
and tangible qualities of sculpture, anticipating the marvelously ironic 
work of Hans Arp in our own century. 
Summer squashes are a very pleasant vegetable to be acquainted 
with;--they grow in the forms of urns and vases, some shallow, 
others of considerable depth, and all with a beautifully scalloped 
edge. Almost any squash in our garden might be copied by a 
sculpture, and would look beautifully in marble, or in china-ware; 
and if I could afford it, I would have exact imitations of the 
real vegetable as portions of my dining-service.64 
And again, "when a great squash or melon is produced, it is a large and 
61Ibid., p. 498. 62 IX , p • 1 7 3 . 
63The America~! Notebooks, VIII, p. 491. 64Ibid., p. 329. 
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tangible existence, which the imagination can seize hold of and rejoice 
in."65 Because the eye delights in the tangible, that around which it 
can "play" in order to investigate the hidden qualities of an object, 
its intentional function suggests an opaque subjectivity in so far as it 
completes the object itself. For Hawthorne, the portrait was "false" to 
the extent that it presumed to complete an expressiveness entirely dis-
proportionate to any predetermined objectification, for the significance 
or implicitness of expression necessarily inheres in the subject of 
perception, and not the object. Thus, Hawthorne's own technique so 
often reveals a natural affinity for the "sketch," which, like sculpture 
itself, invites completion by virtue of its opaque suggestiveness. 
Perceptually speaking, Hawthorne's gaze always seeks to complete the 
suggestive contours of the sketch or "trace:" "There was formerly, I 
believe, a complete arch of marble, forming a natural bridge over the 
top of the cave; but this is no longer so;" "We climbed to the top of 
the arch, in which the traces of water having eddied are very 
perceptible;" "Sometimes the image of a tree might be almost traced; 
then nothing but this sweep of broken rainbow;" "The foundation of a 
spacious porch may be traced on either side of the central portion; 
some of the stones still remain; but even where they are gone, the lille 
of the porch is still traceable by the greener verdure."66 Neither the 
portrait not the daguerreotype in general provided Hawthorne with the 
kind of situated or three-dimensional "gestalt" he demanded of 
description for, in themselves, both are fated to remain transparently 
65rbid., p. 330. 
66rbid., pp. 100, 133, 158, and 160, respectively. 
r 
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fixed and dead. 67 Like the portraits which continually haunt the 
painter's imagination in "The Prophetic Pictures," Hawthorne's 
description completes the expressiveness of an object, its subjectivity, 
the interiority of the world: "Whether I look at the windows or the 
door, there it is framed within them, painted strongly, and glowing in 
the richest tints--the faces of the portraits--the figures and action 
of the sketch!"68 
The "frame," which figures so prominently in Hawthorne, accordingly 
provides an emblematic background against which the possibility of an 
expressive delineation first appears; like the portrait painter of "The 
Prophetic Pictures," it was seldom Hawthorne's impulse "to copy natural 
scenery, except as a frame work for the delineations of the human form 
and face, instinct with thought, passion, or suffering."69 Hawthorne's 
perceptual figures uniquely stand out against an emblematic context which 
varies their meaning by virtue of a situated gaze, and not the ubiquitous 
transparency of scientific "vision;" rather than delimit its content, the 
frame enables Hawthorne to define perception contextually. His frames 
never constitute the traditionally isolated and uniform view by whtch 
the object had previously been envisioned for centuries; for when 
Hawthorne specifically uses the word "frame," it nearly always means the 
background by which a foreground figure affectively comes to be set off, 
and not the optical representation of a perspective section of space. In 
67For further references to portraits, pictures, engravings, 
etchings, and the like, cf. the following pages in The American Notebooks, 
VIII: 53, 65, 130, 149, 212, 214-15, 218, 226, 227, 231, 233-34, 235, 
242, 254, 255, 259, 260-61, 263, 293, 321, 331, 366, 383, 385-86, 394, 
396, 399, 400, 401, 403, 407-08, 416, 417, 418-19, 444, 490, 491, 492, 
495, and 498-99. 
68Ix, p. 180. 69Ihid., p. 178. 
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itself, the Hawthornian frame most clearly approches what, today, 
Gestalt theory calls a field of vision. For proof of Hawthorne's 
perceptual intention despite this apparent contradiction in terminology, 
one need only consult the American Notebooks, that indispensible record 
of his observatory techniques: "this gentle picture strangely set off 
by the wild mountain frame around it;" "On the slope of Bald Mountain, 
a clearing, set in the frame of the forest on all sides;" "Towards the 
dimness of evening, a half-length figure appearing at a window:--the 
blackness of the back ground and the light upon the fa~e cause it to 
appear like a Rembrandt picture;" "Monument Mountain stands out in great 
prominence, with its dark forest-covered sides, and here and there a 
large white patch, indicating tillage or pasture land;--but making a 
generally dark contrast with the white expanse of the frozen and snow-
covered lake at its base, and the more undulating white of the 
surrounding country;" "I saw the face and bust of a beautiful woman 
gazing at me from a cloud. • The vision lasted while I took a few 
steps, and then vanished. I never before saw nearly so distant a 
cloud-picture--or rather sculpture; for it came out in alto relievo on •· 
the body of the cloud;" "an open eye in earth's cot,Jntenance;" "There are 
broad and peaceful meadows, which, I think, are among the most satisfying . 
objects in natural scenery; the heart reposes on them, with a feeling 
that few things else can give, because almost all other objects are 
abrupt and clearly defined; but a meadow stretches out like a small 
infinity, yet with a secure homeliness, which we do not find either in an 
expanse of water or of air;" "I return with them (flowers) to my wife, of 
whom what is lovliest among them are to me the imperfect emblems;" "it 
seems as if the picture of our inward bliss should be set in a beautiful 
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frame of outward nature;" "The fireplace had a white marble frame about 
it, richly sculptured with figures and reliefs."70 Concerning a 
"gestalt," the Letter is by far Hawthorne's most appropriate emblem for 
man's very Being; like Heidegger's later works, it locates the primordial 
ground of existence in language itself. By 1839, Hawthorne had already 
insinuated such ontological implications in a journal entry explicitly 
concerned with perception: "Letters in the shape of figures of men, &c. 
At a distance, the words composed by the letters are alone distinguish-
able. Close at hand, the figures alone are seen, and not distinguished 
as letters. Thus things may have a positive, a relative, and a 
composite meaning, according to the point of view."71 Generally speaking, 
then, Hawthorne's use of the frame purveys a supralogical background or 
field in order to embody his symbols, and yet by virtue of its subjec-
tive constitution, the field extends beyond the edges of whatever 
particular device Hawthorne chooses as the frame itself. His emblematic 
field allows the image to be reflected and re-reflected off of its 
surrounding surfaces, just as the entire surrounding scene bounces off 
the many-faceted sides of Endicott's armour,72 or the scarlet letter, in 
the transformed shape of Pearl, is reflected off the polished, convex 
mirror of the breastplate in "exaggerated and gigantic proportions, so as 
to be greatly the most prominent feature of her appearance. In truth, 
she seemed absolutely hidden behind it." 73 Hawthorne's gaze lures the 
70viii, pp. 132, 138, 259, 305, 311, 320, 321-22, 333, 366, and 
490, respectively. 
71Ibid., p. 183. 
72"Endicott and the Red Cross," IX, p. 434. 
73The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 106. 
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object out of its perspective depth and toward the "surface," where it 
leaves the artificial confines of its optical frame to become part of the 
world; with Hawthorne's emblematic symbols, image and object are always 
one and the same. Thus, as Holgrave unveils the recess in the wall, 
disclosing the ancient deed, the debilitated portrait, "frame and all, 
tumbled suddenly from its position, and lay face downward on the 
floor."74 
With the scarlet letter, the blackness of its emblematic frame 
indeterminately extends beyond the precisely embroidered figure of the 
"A" which measures, as we are told in the "Custom-House," exactly three 
and one-quarter inches on each side. The Letter formally proffer,s a 
reliable ingress to Hawthorne's perceptual labyrinth, and why it differs 
so radically from the daguerrean view; for in embroidery, Hawthorne 
discerned a felicitous tactile analogy for the gaze itself. Unlike 
pictorial perspective, where a visual content resides somewhere "in back 
of" the pictorial surface toward an invisibly inaccessible "location," 
its vanishing point, the visual content of an embroidery extends outward, 
"in front of" its optical surface toward a tangibly tactile space. The 
embroidered emblem virtually protrudes to "touch" our eye. It thus 
reciprocates the sculptural quality of Hawthorne's gaze, and approximates 
the general situatedness of perception as such. Hawthorne intuitively 
understood the "situation" as the reciprocal basis of perception as well 
as Being. Like the painting which Ishmael encounters at the Spouter Inn, 
whose ambiguous "something" in the middle evades definitive articulation, 
the perceptual "shape" of the "A" is likewise variously interpreted 
74The House of the Seven Gables, II, pp. 315-16. 
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according to the situation of the individual perceiver, and therefore 
destined to remain ultimately opaque; we can never get an absolute 
perspective on it. Similarly with life, the brilliantly embroidered 
Letter equally applies to the meaning of Being: "A life, generally of a 
grave hue, may be said to be embroidered with occasional sports and 
fantasies." 75 And herein emerges a veritable key to the nature of 
Hawthorne's lighting as such, and his descriptive affinity for the 
"powers of blackness" which Melville attributed to him,76 rather than the 
light and sunshine of his own age. As Henry James expressed it, 
Hawthorne's fiction exposes his cat-like facility for seeing in the dark 
which Emerson, "as a sort of spiritual sun-worshipper, could have 
attached but a moderate value to."77 Taking his lead from Bacon, with 
whose writing he was well acquainted, Hawthorne solidified his basic 
emblematic habit. In "Of Adversity," Bacon had written: "We see in 
needleworks and embroideries, it is more pleasing to have a lively work 
upon a sad and solemn ground, than to have a dark and melancholy work 
upon a lightsome ground: judge therefore of the pleasure of the heart by 
the pleasure of the eye."78 Melville was one of those rare critics who 
immediately understood Hawthorne's counter-visual response to the 
daguerrean prejudice of his age, and its concomitant emphasis on the 
transparently absolute efficacy of light, in favor of this darkness 
75rhe American Notebooks, VIII, p. 235. 
76"Hawthorne and His Mosses," Literary World, 1850, quoted in 
Critical Heritage, p. 116. 
77Hawthorne (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Cornell 
Paperbacks, 1966), p. 79. 
78complete Essays of Francis Bacon, intra. Philip H. Bailey 
(New York: Belmont Books, 1962), p. 24. 
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which gives "more effect to the ever-moving dawn, that for ever advances 
through it, and circumnavigates his world."79 Indeed, Melville seems to 
have been the only one to perceive the "gestalt" significance of "this 
black conceit" which pervades Hawthorne through and through: 
You may be bewitched by his sunlight . . . but there is the black-
ness of darkness beyond; and even his bright gildings but fringe 
and play upon the edges of thunder-clouds. In one word, the world 
is mistaken in this Nathaniel Hawthorne. He himself must often 
have smiled at its absurd misconception of him. • this black-
ness it is that furnishes the infinite obscure of his back-
ground.80 
Thus, unlike the daguerrean representation which seeks to bring 
into sharp focus the entire content of its frame, Hawthorne's emble-
matic field, grounded in darkness itself, merely suggests the incomplete 
:, outlines of its figures as they are intermittently elucidated by the 
perceptual intention to take them up. In the same way, Goodman Parkerts 
lantern gleams along the street, "bringing to view indistinct shapes of 
things, and the fragments of a world, like order glimmering ~hrough 
chaos, or memory roaming over the past."81 Whatever objects this gaze 
personalizes or enowns ambiguously appear set off against an indetermi-
nate surrounding. For every object the gaze investigates, it 
simultaneously forfeits its hold upon the other objects in its field; 
they, in turn, slip away or fade back toward the obscure periphery from 
whence they originally came, "in harmony with the low relief and dimness 
of outline of the objects that surrounded them."82 The rose momentarily 
79"Hawthorne and His Mosses," quoted in Critical Heritage, p. 115. 
80Ibid., p. 116. 
8l"The Wives of the Dead," XI, p. 196. 
82James, p. 99. 
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appears in relief against the gloom of the prison;83 the blurred meteor 
temporarily disrupts the vacant regions of the night sky;84 the lime-
kiln juts out from the surrounding darkness to swallow us;85 the stark 
fir-tree punctuates the desolate landscape, covered with its solitary 
growth of living branches from the middle up;86 the Great Stone Face 
emerges against the perpendicular side of a mountain;87 the lightsome 
couple spontaneously issues forth from the band of gothic monsters, this 
crew of Comus, to relieve the darksome face of the English priest, shaded 
by the maypole; 88 the Letter itself writhes and twists its contorted 
shape upon the sable field which provides an ambiguous backdrop for the 
ocular metamorphoses of this illuminated manuscript.89 Hawthorne's 
descriptive gaze approaches the object gropingly; it must feel around it 
as a blind man runs his bands over the features of another's face--thus, 
its peculiar sculptural or tactile quality. It brings the object out 
from its surroundings toward an affective depth peculiarly constituted by 
the perceiving subject. For Hawthorne, Being is incarnate throughout, 
the image made flesh between the double horizon of physical and bodily 
space, the cold marble resuscitated in the warmth of the Faun. 
Hawthorne's gaze initiates the discovery of a situated, material world, 
83rhe Scarlet Letter, I, p. 48. 
84 Ibid., p. 154. 
85"Ethan Brand," XI, p. 89. 
86"The Gentle Boy," IX, p. 70. 
87"The Great Stone Face," XI, p. 27. 
88"The May-Pole of Merry Mount," IX, pp. 56-57. 
89rhe Scarlet Letter, I, p. 106. 
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the outsidedness of the "self" where objects encroach upon one's vision, 
touching the fingertips of the "I." The world seen from within magnifies 
the body to infinity, reversing the traditional perspective on an 
object; the vanishing point hurtles toward me, as I simultaneously 
explode the boundaries of its frame. To emphasize rationality is to 
ignore the world's body; 90 thus Hawthorne shunned the ubiquitous view of 
his age which pretended to ignore the interior, ambiguous carnality of 
Being. On the pillory, the minister's vigil, temporarily illumined by 
the radiance of the meteor, dramatically pierces the all-encompassing 
blackness of the night which endosmotically threatens to devour it once 
again at any moment. This extraordinary light constitutes nothing less 
than the unique and personally individualized gaze, the original 
discovery of a world in which its previously familiar objects appear 
anew for the first time. 
So powerful was its radiance, that it thoroughly illuminated the 
dense medium of cloud betwixt the sky and earth. The great vault 
brightened, like the dome of an immense lamp. It showed the 
familiar scene of the street, with the distinctness of mid-day, 
but also with the awfulness that is always imparted to familiar 
objects by an unaccustomed light ••.. all were vieible, but with 
a singularity of aspect that seemed to give another moral 
interpretation to the things of this world than they had ever 
borne before.91 . 
Unlike the enfiladed continuity of an objectively detached perspective,92 
90william Van O'Conner, "The World as B<:>dy," Sewanee Review 56 
(July-September 1948) : 441. 
91The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 154. 
92cf. the following passages in The American Notebooks, VIII: "At a 
distance, mountain summits look close together, and almost forming one 
mountain, though in reality, a village lies in the depth between them" 
(p. 101); "It is amusing to see all the distributed property, the 
aristocracy and commonality, the various and conflicting interests of 
the town, the loves and hates, compressed into a space which the eye 
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Hawthorne sketches his most affectively dramatic scenes palpably close 
precisely because they are perceptually inquisitive, demanding a new 
level of visual awareness in order to be disclosed at all. "It is a 
singular thing, that at the distance, say, of five feet, the work of the 
greatest dunce looks just as well as that of the greatest genius,--that 
little space being all the distance between genius and stupidity."93 A 
perceptual osmosis transpires between subject and object, an osmosis 
which obliterates the objectification of the world-view. Like the modern 
art work, Hawthorne brings the object out of its predetermined location 
and to the surface, just as the mountain prefigures Earnest's face upon 
its side. Thus, man "rediscovers himself through topography."94 In this 
sense, Hawthorne never "paints" or pictures his most perceptually intense 
scenes, but rather disrupts them from the inside out; his gaze engages the 
object in so far as it seduces the object outward and away from the 
familiar security of its perspective depth. Hence, he could immediately 
preface his description of the minister's vigil as "one of those ugly 
nights, which we have faintly hinted at, but forborne to picture forth~n95 
Hawthorne's diction (to picture forth) reveals to what extent he .treate~ 
takes in as completely as the arrangement of a tea-table"(p. 102); the 
"prospect from the top of Wachusett is the finest that I have seen--the 
elevation being not so great as to snatch the beholder from all sympathy 
with the earth. The roads that wind along at the fobt of the mountains 
are discernable; and the villages, lying separate and unconscious of, one 
another, each with their little knot of peculiar interests, but all 
gathered into one category by the observer above them"(p. 260); "the 
beholder takes in at a glance the estates on which different families 
have long been situated . • . acting out the business of their life, 
which looks not so important when we can get up so high as to comprehend 
several men's portions in it at one glance"(p. 274). 
9Jrbid. ' p. 16. 94Levin, p. 50. 
95The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 146. 
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description as a projective activity--the perceptual intentionality of a 
subject, not unlike that activity of the minister himself who thereafter 
started from his chair, and "stole softly down the staircase, undid the 
door, and issued forth."96 Hawthorne's descriptive gaze negotiates the 
factuality of the object as it strikes the eye, its original effect upon 
the senses prior to rational interpretation; the facts speak for them-
selves.97 As Melville incisively remarked: "We think that into no 
recorded mind has the intense feeling of the visable [sic] truth ever 
entered more deeply than into this man's. By visable truth, we mean the 
apprehension of the absolute condition of present things as they strike 
the eye of the man who fears them not, though they do their worst to 
him."98 And so with the meteoric lighting which temporarily illuminates 
the scaffold during the minister's vigil; it sets off each of its 
objects with a "singularity of aspect;" like the pre-rational gaze of 
perception, it discloses the perceptual reciprocity between subject and 
object in a world common to both--a world, moreover, which makes the 
birth of Being possible in the first place: "They stood in the noon of 
that strange and solemn splendor, as if it were ~he light that is to 
reveal all secrets, and the day-break that shall unite all who belong to 
one another."99 
Lighting had always beguiled Hawthorne, and the American Notebooks 
repeatedly reveal this preoccupation: "It is wonderful what a difference 
sunshine makes; it is like varnish, bringing out the hidden veins in a 
96rbid. 97cf. "Earth's Holocaust," X, pp. 381-404. 
98Melville, The Letters of Herma~ Melville, quoted in Critical 
Heritage, p. 190. 
99The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 154. 
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piece of rich wood. . . . The sunshine gradually spreads over the whole 
landscape; and the whole sombre mass is changed to a variegated 
picture."lOO And elsewhere he says, "The sun shone strongly in among 
these trees, and quite kindled them; so that the path seemed brighter for 
their shade, than if it had been quite exposed to the sun."101 Such 
passages, however, can be misleading; for unlike the daguerreotypist, 
Hawthorne's interest in light primarily derives from its ability to cast 
a shadow, to elucidate some new perceptual "aspect" of an obscurely 
darkened world, or to transform, rather than accurately record the thing 
itself or "bring it to light." Thus, rather than light his objects by 
the constancy of the sun, Hawthorne illumines his scenes by the ambiguous 
flicker of the lantern, the torch, the fire, the moon •. Such partial and 
intimate lighting subtly discloses its objects, previously envisioned as 
familiar, in strange and new disguises. 
Moonlight, in a familiar room, falling so white upon the carpet, 
and showing all its figures so distinctly,--making every object so 
minutely visible, yet so unlike a morning or noontide 
visibility,--is a medium the most suitable for a romance-writer to 
get acquainted with his illusive guests •••• whatever, in a word, 
has been used or played with, during the day, is now invested with 
a quality of strangeness and remoteness, though still almost as 
vividly present as by daylight.l02 
Like Verlaine, Hawthorne's description appropriates the principle, "Pas 
la couleur, rien que la nuance."l03 Margaret overlooks the street scene 
from her window, where a lantern momentarily reddens the foreground 
surrounded by the deluge of darkness which envelops every other object;l04 
Robin finds his kinsman amidst the labyrinthian procession illuminated 
lOOvrrr, p. 218. 10lrbid., p. 219. 
102The Scarlet Letter, I, pp. 35-36. 103Levin, p. 39. 
104"The Wives of the Dead," XI, p. 195. 
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by the dense multitude of torches which temporarily disrupts the chilly 
detachment of the moonbeams;105 Goodman Brown discovers his fellow towns-
men assembled at the black mass in the forest around the grotesque blaze 
of the fire, just as the ambiguous moonlight originally allowed him 
access to that clearing;l06 Ethan Brand stands virtually hypnotized 
before the dazzle of the lime-kiln to which he surrenders through 
identification; 107 the indistinct moonlight dimly reveals the body of 
Dorcas' son lying dead upon the bones of her father.108 Unlike the sun-
drenched world of scientific objectification, Hawthorne depicts an 
ambiguous world of shadow. Like the child, science would paint a world 
transparently clear, as Hawthorne observed of his daughter Una, who 
"wants there to be all sunshine and no shadow, like a Chinese picture."109 
Hawthorne, on the other hand, was steadfastly aware that the truth of 
consciousness inheres in man's primordial interrogation of the world, 
replete with doubt and contradiction. Thus, the dark shadow of 
ambiguity falls across every page of his work: "Hawthorne could not 
prevent himself from seeing darkness even at high noon." 110 Whereas his 
age demanded that the new American psyche be white, just as its litera-
ture be pure, Hawthorne fearlessly discerned beneath its facade the 
monadic truth of black: "That blue-eyed darling Nathaniel knew 
105"My Kinsman, Major Molineux," XI, p. 229. 
106"Young Goodman Brown," X, pp. 84-85. 
107"Ethan Brand," XI, pp. 99-100. 
108"Roger Malvin's Burial," X, p. 360. 
109The American Notebooks, VIII, pp. 418-19. 
11~ormand, p. 163. 
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disagreeable things in his inner soul. He was careful to send them out in 
disguise." 111 Hawthorne's descriptive gaze perceived the void which man 
inhabits between affective poles of transformation, the "black, 
impenetrable nothingness" which awaits all who would wander from the 
security of their familiar surroundings into the "obscurity that hems them 
in." 112 Similarly, we often find in Hawthorne's descriptive sketches the 
unique and variously achromatic shades of black-on-black, as in the 
opening scene of The Scarlet Letter, where "the wooden jail was already 
marked with weather-stains and other indications of age, which gave a yet 
darker aspect to its beetle-browed and gloomy front." 113 Indeed, some-
times the dark ambiguity of one shadow merely comes to be replaced by 
that of another which juts its indistinctive gloom through the surrounding 
field, piercing the ambiguous light of the camera-eye more profoundly 
than light penetrates the retina of one emerging from the dark. Thus, 
the prison-house opaquely intersects the clearing "long after the fall of 
the gigantic pines and oaks that originally overshadowed it.n114 
Even Hawthorne's portraits elude their daguerrean likenesses which 
would freeze them in their Being, to become "a ground of perceptual meta-
morphosis under cover of dim shadows."llS "In most of the pictures, the 
whole mind and character were brought out on the countenance, and concen-
trated into a single look, so that, to speak paradoxically, the originals 
hardly resembled themselves so strikingly as the portraits did."ll6 Set 
llln. H. Lawrence, Studies in Classic American Literature 
(New York: The Viking Press, Compass Books, 1964), p. 83. 
112"Night Sketches," IX, pp. 427 and 429, respectively. 
113r, p. 47. 114rbid., p. 48. 115Normand, p. 304. 
116"The Prophetic Pictures," IX, p. 170. 
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in relief by varying degrees of darkness, the faces emerge to touch us 
with their glance, just as the pale but unfaded Madonna, "who had perhaps 
been worshipped in Rome now regarded the lovers with such a mild and holy 
look that they longed to worship too." 117 Simultaneously these faces 
recede into the surrounding darkness, like the two old bearded saints who 
had nearly vanished "into the darkening canvass." 118 The portrait 
completes the spectator's gaze while the spectator's gaze, in turn, 
completes the portrait: "They hung side by side, separated by a narrow 
panel, appearing to eye each other constantly, yet always returning the 
gaze of the spectator." 119 In fact, Hawthorne's portraits paradoxically 
light the rooms which they inhabit like the pictures of Walter and Elinor 
which, "concealed for months, gleamed forth again in undiminished splendor, 
appearing to throw a sombre light across the room, rather than to be 
disclosed by a borrowed radiance." 120 Like the incomplete silhouette of 
Hepzibah, framed by "the dusky, time-darkened passage" into which she 
steps, "a tall figure, clad in black silk,"121 the portraits of Walter and 
Elinor are variously completed in accordance with the individual gaze 
which perceives them. 
Such persons might gaze carelessly at first, but, becoming 
interested, would return day after day, and study these painted 
faces like the pages of a mystic volume. • • • they sometimes 
disputed as to the expression which the painter had intended to 
throw upon the features; all agreeing that there was a look of 
earnest import, though no two explained it alike.122 
By virtue of his indirect lighting, then, Hawthorne's gaze suggests the 
117Ibid. 118Ibid. 119rbid., p. 176. 120rbid., p. 181. 
121The House of the Seven Gables, II, p. 32. See also, p. 129: 
"Hepzibah spread out her gaunt figure across the door, and seemed really 
to increase in bulk." 
122"The Prophetic Pictures," IX, pp. 176-77. 
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incomplete contours of a world primordially constituted by the perceiving 
subject. It explodes the predetermined objectification of a reality trans-
parently and uniformly illuminated by the scientific vision, which would 
impose its own inflexibly rigid structure in order to manipulatively 
dominate the delimited content of its fixed and sterile view. The world of 
Hawthorne's fiction passionately defrays the inordinate cost of an 
objectively neutered universe and its bankrupt vision, in favor of a polar 
and metamorphic reality situated in the personal glance of a perceiver. 
Amidst this sexually ambiguous world, Hawthorne's gaze enowns the 
interiority of its objects as they in turn reconstruct the subjective 
consciousness perceiving them. Like the echoes in "The Hollow of the 
Three Hills," Hawthorne's objects rebound from various external surfaces 
to strike our eyes only in so far as they are deflected, reflected, and 
re-reflected in the gaze which temporarily beholds them. 123 Perceptually 
grounded in the mutability of time, the object refuses the absolute 
determination assigned to it by the formal and spatial priority of the 
world-view. Hawthorne's ambiguous lighting enables the object to escape 
the scientific schematization to which the daguerrean view would subject 
it: the Letter ricochets off the armor in fragmented form in order to be 
completed a different way in the "shape" of Pearl, who in turn perceives 
a similar image in the head-piece, 
smiling at her mother, with the elfish intelligence that was so 
123rx, p. 201: "Their voices are encompassed and re-echoed by the 
walls of a chamber, the windows of which were rattling in the breeze; the 
regular vibration of a clock, the crackling of a fire, and the tinkling 
of the embers as they fell among the ashes, rendered the scene almost as 
vivid as if painted to the eye"(italics mine). Cf. Leland Schubert, -
Hawthorne the Artist (New York: Russell and Russell, 1963), p. 24, for 
an interesting structural comparison between "The Hollow of the Three 
Hills" and Grant Wood's painting American Gothic. 
familiar an expression on her small physiognomy. That look of 
naughty merriment was likewise reflected in the mirror, with so 
much breadth and intensity of effect, that it made Hester Prynne 
feel as if it could not be the image of her own child, but of an 
imp who was seeking to mould itself into Pearl's shape.124 
The inter-play of light and shade, of reflected and refracted light 
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against an obscure backdrop of black, allowed Hawthorne to populate his 
universe with objects enowned or interiorized by the opacity of human 
consciousness itself. These ambiguously changing figures defy the 
reflection which would petrify them as they appear in the poo1, 125 the 
fountain, 126 the we11, 127 and then just as suddenly disintegrate back to 
the mutably indeterminate form from whence they originally came. "It is 
hard to follow one great vision in this world of darkness and of many 
changing shadows. Among those shadows men get lost."128 
Among the shadowy folds of darkness which encompass it, the House 
of the Seven Gables acquires its "concentration of intimacy;"129 via the 
forces which beseige it, the House becomes human. It even reciprocates 
Hepzibah's desire to decorate her hat with ribbons by growing flowers on 
its roof, and imitates her frown with its "meditative look,'' its "impend-
ing brow," its "thoughtful gloom," its "rusty" and "battered visage."130 
124The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 106 
125"The Hollow of the Three Hills," IX, p. 203. 
126"The Vision of the Fountain," IX, p. 214. 
127The House of the Seven Gables, II, p. 88. 
128John G. Neihardt, Black Elk Speaks (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1961), p. 254. 
129cf. Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. Maria Jolas 
(Boston: Beacon Press, Beacon Paperbacks, 1969), p. 36. 
130The House of the Seven Gables, II, pp. 27, 28, 12, 56, and 81, 
respectively. 
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In the same way, regarding the interior life of the House, the dim look-
ing-glass that used to hang in one of the rooms "was fabled to contain 
within its depths all the shapes that had ever been reflected there."l31 
Yet, Hawthorne no more needs this apparently lost device than the 
inhabitants of the house, for his own descriptive gaze invests the 
objects within the house, as it does all the significant objects of his 
oeuvre, from the very walls to the portraits which adorn them, with the 
"human" or expressive space by which they come to life. Hawthorne's 
radical perception indirectly illuminates the objects of its gaze from 
within; it permits, in fact, the objects to enlighten us, just as 
Beatrice's face "positively illuminated the more shadowy intervals of the 
garden path." 132 Moreover, once the object is brought to prominence in 
this way, the human world ceases to be a metaphor, "and becomes once 
more what it really is, the seat and as it were the homeland of our 
thoughts. The perceiving subject ceases to be an 'acosmic 1 thinking 
subject, and action, feeling, and will remain to be explored as origin~l 
ways of positing an object, since 'an object looks attractive or 
repulsive before it looks black or blue, circular or square•.rrl33 Thus, 
each object brings its own unique degree of lighting with it and 
appropriately discloses its truth in so far as a subject gropingly enowns 
it in perception, just as the Great Carbuncle refuses to unveil its light 
to anyone who would seek it "objectively," that is, as a detached 
observer in search of absolute truth, and instantaneously mutates to 
131rbid., p. 20. 
132"Rappaccini's Daughter," X, p. 102. 
133Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 24. 
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"opaque stone, with particles of mica glittering on its surface."l34 
Hawthorne's Faustian gaze dared to see reality differently than his age 
would have him view it; rather than intellectually codify the images of 
experience, he ventured into its primordial chaos in order to resurrect 
the very body of the world itself, a body whose physical and opaque 
carnality had long since been discarded by the disembodied image of 
daguerrean perspective, the flat projection of the scientific and 
technological world-view. 
II 
Whatever constancy accrues to the objects within the world o~ 
Hawthorne's work does so because the objects themselves appear against a 
double horizon wherein the embodied perceiver articulates the general 
setting of that world. Thus, the perception of a world simply 
constitutes the dilation of a subject's presence within the structures of 
an indeterminate field, whereby the body "takes up room" among the 
objects which surround it without ever becoming an object in itself. The 
physical presence of a perceiver thus "makes room" for the world by 
virtue of a space which is neither entirely subjective nor objective, and 
which accommodates its objects only to the extent that they reciprocally 
call each other into Being. The meteor punctuates the surrounding dark-
ness just as surely as the darkness "creates" the meteor; the lime-kiln 
reveals the night just as the night illuminates it; the people on "the 
other side" of the veil appropriate its meaning as equiprimordially as 
the veil discloses them. Each makes the other possible in the first 
place, and contemporaneously exist only because they "touch" the 
134"The Great Carbuncle," IX, p. 165. 
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affective surface of an incarnate gaze. In this sense, every object 
becomes a metaphor; must be, in fact, a metaphor before it can become an 
object as such, for an object is factual only by virtue of a situated 
subject who perceives it as part of an affective setting in the first 
place. Although, at the outset, the Letter measures precisely three and 
one-quarter inches on each side, its significant factuality remains 
dormant without a factical subjectivity which calls it into Being. Thus, 
Hawthorne's initial description of the letter engages its immediate 
qualities, those aspects which pre-reflectively arrest the gaze, and not 
its geometrical properties. 
But the point which drew all eyes, and, as it were, transfigured 
the wearer,--so that both men and women, who had been familiarly 
acquainted with Hester Prynne, were now impressed as if they beheld 
her for the first time,--was that SCARLET LETTER, so fantastically 
embroidered and illuminated upon her bosom. It had the effect of 
a spell, taking her out of the ordinary relations with humanity, 
and inclosing her in a sphere by herself.135 
Similarly, the Letter has yet to become a unified sensory experience 
because it remains to be lived by the reader-perceiver throughout the 
course of the novel. Each perceiver must discover his own way into the 
thing. Hawthorne implicitly understood this fact, and recreated the 
perceiver's ingress into the thing itself as it primordially transpires 
in perception. Thus, the phenomenon of lighting (Lichtfuhrung) looms 
paramount. Rather than confer a notional meaning on the object, 
Hawthorne's inosculation of light and shade implicitly organizes a 
structural field in which the object is only in so far as my perception 
disrupts into it; my experience of the world can only transcend itself in 
the objects of that world because it is born amidst the incarnate setting 
135The Scarlet Letter, I, pp. 53-54. 
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of the situation. Indeed, the conspicuous absence of color in Hawthorne's 
oeuvre invites further investigation. 
In perception, the reflection of light functions incidentally; its 
presence confers life upon the objects it illumines, whereas its absence 
deprives them of all "expression." Similarly, lighting "is not presented 
to our perception as an objective, but as an auxiliary or mediating 
element. It is not seen itself, but causes us to see the rest." 136 
Because lighting constitutes an aspect of the field, lingering in the 
background without drawing specific attention to itself, it encourages or 
guides the gaze toward maximum determinateness, and hence reveals the pre-
reflective way in which the gaze takes up its objects in perception. The 
ubiquity of the daguerrean view posits the framed prospectus of a world 
uniformly illuminated from without along each of its indivisible 
"points." Technology merely substantiated this fiction. "In our 
civilization, which has the same light everywhere, and puts electricity 
in its cellars, we no longer go to the cellar carrying a candle. But the 
unconscious cannot be civilized. It takes a candle when it goes to the 
cellar."l37 So with perception: the gaze engages its objects gropingly 
within the intentionality of a subject. Like the incomplete light of the 
candle which shows up certain objects at the expense of others, the gaze 
enowns a thing by virtue of the thing's contemporaneous relation to a 
phenomenal body somehow already alongside the objective body as such, 
whereby a nebulous and inconspicuous lighting initially allows the gaze 
to take it up at the expense of other objects in the field. Now an 
136Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 309. 
137Bachelard, Poetics of Space, p. 19. 
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object primordially announces itself to us in terms of its immediate 
"expression," its contours as they strike a kinaesthetic displacement of 
the phenomenal body. Perception itself goes straight to the thing, "and 
by-passes the colour, just as it is able to fasten upon the expression of 
a gaze without noting the colour of the eyes." 138 Conversely, color may 
appear to us in modes other than the fixed quality of a reflective 
attitude. Thus, the dark-green moss which covers the burial-stone of 
Parson Hooper appears to the receptive eye as black,l39 as does the · 
verdure of the forest in "Young Goodman Brown." 140 Reciprocally, to 
certain eyes the Letter may appear "freshly green, instead of scarlet!"l4l 
Indeed, the blackness which persists beneath the scarlet of the Letter is 
less a sensible quality than a lugubrious power which affectively emerges 
from the object, constantly insinuating its presence even when "sensibly" 
absent from sight. Moreover, whether it is seen in the direct light of 
the sun or the reflected and refracted light of the polished armor, the 
Letter affectively retains its constancy in modes other than the "sensory" 
itself. It is visible primarily in the sense that moral blackness is 
visible. 142 
In this respect, Hawthorne's descriptive gaze anticipates the 
elemental function of lighting anterior to the distinction between colors 
as such. His lighting directs the gaze so that we discover the objects 
it discloses, and complete them, in accordance with the foreshadowed 
138Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 305. 
139"The Minister's Black Veil," IX, p. 53. 
140x, p. 83. 141The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 178. 
142cf. Merleau-Ponty, Phenome~ology, p. 305. 
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spectacle previously given, just as Sir William Howe discerns his own 
image beneath the cloaked figure which unexpectedly issues from the 
• 
shadow and then recedes before the spectators are able to catch a glimpse 
of it.l43 Set in relief by the folds of darkness which surround them, 
Hawthorne's figures surface to the gaze by virtue of the suggestive 
lighting which nudges them forth, redistributing whatever color 
"qualities" they possess back to the neutrality at "neutral territory" 
from whence they are initially mediated according to the variable level 
of lighting itself. 
A child's shoe; the doll, seated in her little wicker carriage; the 
hobby-horse;--whatever, in a word, has been used or played with, 
during the day, is now invested with a quality of strangeness and 
remoteness, though still almost as vividly present as by daylight. 
Thus, therefore, the floor of our familiar room has become a 
neutral territory, somewhere between the real world and fairy-land, 
where the Actual and the Imaginary may meet, and each imbue itself 
with the nature of the other.l44 
Similarly, the red of the roses is lost to the "dark and glossy curls" of 
the two youths encompassed within the ring of monsters at the maypoLe;l45 
the motley colors of the clearing are neutralized by the Puritans, 
invisibly watching the spectacle, who compare these revelers to the dark-
some evil that populates the "black wilderness;"146 the richly-colored 
garments of the figures, which emerge atop the staircase of the Province-
House during the masked ball, gradually fade to dusk so that the shapes 
"appeared rather like shadows than persons of fleshly substance;"l47 the 
143"Howe's Masquerade," IX, p. 253. 
144rhe Scarlet Letter, I, pp. 35-36. 
145"The May-Pole of Merry Mount," IX, p. 56. 
146rbid. 
147"Howe's Masquerade," IX, p. 251. 
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passionately gorgeous aspects of the plants in the garden reflect the 
artificiality of man's depraved fancy, "glowing with only an evil mockery of 
beauty."l48 Thus, Hawthorne's black and white vision significantly out-
weighs his color-daubing, but only because his descriptive gaze inclines 
toward the primary constitution of the perceptual act prior to its 
thematization. Like Rousseau, he utilizes bold and simple colors, yet 
engagingly set off against a tenebrous background which averts attention 
from itself because it creates the primordial space of perception: "in 
the momentary gloom, the fire seemed to be glimmering amidst the vague-
ness of unenclosed space."l49 Already alongside an objective "eye," the 
phenomenal space of an expressive bodily "eye" opens onto the object 
itself, and makes it visible, in so far as it seizes the interplay of 
light and shade without recognizing the light and shade as such. Light-
ing always lingers hidden in the background as a structural phenomenon 
whenever it makes an object visible, for in order to see the object "it 
is necessary not to see the play of shadows and l:i,ght around it."l50 The 
shadows of the tree boughs which flicker over the dead figure of Judge 
Pyncheon amidst the gloomy room further articulate the slumping object 
while they simultaneously interrogate the birth of the perceiving 
subject. Conversely, these shadow-branches which reach out to touch us 
by reason of their unique space appear doubly there as they synchronously 
suggest an actual counter-part, beyond the window frame, presented in 
profile against the object they e~body. The lighting thus directs our 
148"Rappaccini' s Daughter," X, p. 110. 
149"The Artist of the Beautiful," X, p. 448. 
15D.Merleau-Ponty, Primacy, p. 167. 
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gaze toward the lifeless shape in the chair as "one" who has already been 
there, and leads us to the object to the extent that we submit or entrust 
ourselves to it. Expressively situated, we perceive the spectacle in 
conformity with the light which surrounds the body and permits the object 
to confront us. The lighting itself is neutral; only later, once the 
object has become determinate, do colors as such appear. 
By reason of Hawthorne's indirect lighting, then, which gravitates 
toward the absence of color, objects apportion color among themselves in 
so far as they resist this new ambience. The quality of color in an 
object becomes determinate only after its renitency to some variable 
level of lighting. Initially, Hawthorne's lighting is always on the side 
of the subject, and not the object. Prior to the distinction between 
color, the effect of lighting is precisely what gets us into the percep-
tual situation in the first place. For example, when a painter wishes to 
portray some striking object, "he does so less by applying a bright 
colour to that object than by a suitable distribution of light and shade 
on surrounding ones."151 Hawthorne's description of the dead Judge 
poignantly exemplifies this perceptual phenomenon: 
Meanwhile the twilight is glooming upward out of the corners of the 
room. The shadows of the tall furniture grow deeper, and at first 
become more definite; then, spreading wider, they lose their 
distinctness of outline in the dark, gray tide of oblivion, as it 
were, that creeps slowly over the various objects, and the one 
human figure sitting in the midst of them. The gloom has not 
entered from without; it has brooded here all day, and now, taking 
its own inevitable time, will possess itself of everything. The 
Judge's face, indeed, rigid, and singularly white, refuses to melt 
into this universal solvent. Fainter and fainter grows the light. 
It is as if another double-handful! of darkness had been scattered 
through the air. Now it is no longer gray, but sable. There is 
still a faint appearance at the window; neither a glow, nor a 
151Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 312. 
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glimmer--any phrase of light would express something far brighter 
than this doubtful perception, or sense, rather, that there is a 
window there. Has it yet vanished? No!--yes!--not quite! 152 
Moreover, just as the harmony of a piece of music may structure itself 
around a dominant tone, Hawthorne's descriptive gaze orders its objects 
around a variable level of lighting, which in itself always tends toward 
the dominant "color" inherent in his oeuvre. And this elemental 
constancy within the world of Hawthorne's work, and which sustains the 
very setting of that world, uniformly appears as black--the total absence 
of color. Thus, the twilight glooming upward in the room where Judge 
Pyncheon motionlessly slumps ultimately obtains from this pre-dominant 
darkness, and involucrately subsists within it. Ontologically, of course, 
this perceptual "dominant" constitutes nothing less than the horizon of 
finite temporality, that double horizon of Being and nothingness which 
threatens at any moment to annihilate our perceptual consciousness, and 
all other forms of consciousness as well: 
And there is still the swarthy whiteness--we shall venture to marry 
these ill-agreeing words--the swarthy whiteness of Judge Pyncheon's 
face. The features are all gone; there is only the paleness of 
them left. And how looks it now? There is no window! There is no 
face! An infinite, inscrutable blackness has annihilated sight! 
Where is our universe? All crumbled away from us; and we, adrift 
in chaos, may hearken to the gusts of homeless wind, that go 
sighing and murmuring about, in quest of what was once a world!153 
Hence, Hawthorne's lighting suggests an ontological significance far 
beyond its descriptive surface, and subsequently points back to the 
subjective nature of perception itself. In the sense that lighting 
corroborates the perceptual situation, spontaneously guiding the gaze 
toward an object which can only become determinate to the extent that it 
152The House of the Seven Gables, II, p. 276. 
153Ibid., pp. 276-77. 
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comes into being amid a general setting whose structure unfolds or "sur-
rounds" both subject and object, the subject-object dichotomy concurrently 
coalesces to a dialectic of inside and out. 154 Just as the meteor and the 
darkness are mutually impossible without each other, the perceptual sub-
ject can experience neither without the phenomenal lighting which allows 
them to appear. Hawthorne's descriptive gaze accommodates this "double" 
space within the single image because it is willing to forfeit the visual 
frame of perspective, which merely appropriates the object, in favor of 
the ambiguous, though constant, experience of a subject. The world itself 
guarantees this constancy, for Being is always situated. 
Furthermore, Hawthorne's darkness expressively situates us at an 
interior "center," although that situated central "point" can never be 
located geographically or geometrically, but rather phenomenally, for 
"anywhere is the center of the world."155 Unlike the detached observer, 
such as Coverdale or Kenyon, whose preconceived perspective constitutes a 
world uniformly illumined from without, Hawthorne's dark creates a 
specific, situated point of view whereby the observer participates in the 
perceptual enownment of the object; the surrounding blackness dissolves 
the "objective" distance between spectator and world which the 
spiritualized Paul Pry takes for granted,156 since it situates us toward 
an intentional "where-we-are" and not the spatial "where" of scientific 
objectification. As the consummate master of a two-dimensional art,157 
154cf. Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, pp. 211-31. 
155Neihardt, p. 43. 
156cf. "Sights from a Steeple," IX, pp. 191-98. 
157cf. Levin, pp. 66-67, who sees the narrator in similar terms as 
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for example, the Virtuoso's collection of objects transfers the value of 
pictorial perspective back upon the world; and he consequently dismisses 
the narrator's deception by Parrhasius' trompe-l'oeil with the single 
remark, "You need not blush." 158 In a previous and parallel scene, the 
narrator had already rejected such an attitude by refusing the invitation 
to Cornelius Agrippa's magic glass, another two-dimensional illusion: 
"There are so many greater wonders in the world, to those who keep their 
eyes open, and their sight undimmed by custom, that all the delusions of 
the old sorcerers seem flat and stale."l59 With Parrhasius' painting, of 
course, it is ironically the art work which deceives; for like the phenom-
enal space of perception, the space of the art work is similarly virtual, 
and must be phenomenally "touched" in order to reveal its proper depth. 
Conversely, an object can purely vanish "into thin air" only at the l,.evel 
of theoretical objectification, for at the threshold of perception, it 
must always go somewhere else, even though it is momentarily concealed. 
Furthermore, while he rhetorically cl~ims a situated point of view based 
solely in the present, the Virtuoso's view constitutes the flat projection 
of a world-view grounded in infinity, for he is doomed to live forever. 
Like the objects of his collection, he envisions the history of man in 
terms of a trans.parent perspective which is simultaneously everywhere and 
nowhere. Inhabiting, or better, constituting a world grounded in illusion, 
he thus betrays a repressed resentment160 for the concrete object itself, 
"' well. Levin's interpretation, however, is contradicted by the narrator's 
own remarks. 
158"A Virtuoso's Collection," X, p. 492. 159Ibid., p. 482. 
160cf. Max Scheler, Ressentiment, trans. William W. Holdheim 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1972), pp. 55-56. 
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the very thing his "collection" or view claims to appropriate with 
finality. Fearing the incarnate specificity of the thing itself, which 
comminates at any moment to annihilate his comprehensive "picture," the 
Virtuoso subsequently comes to hate all objects. Analogous to the in-
authentic understanding of the technological perception, the Virtuoso has 
likewise "learned to despise all things." 161 Indeed, Hawthorne may have 
specifically had in mind here the Kantian category of the Understanding 
when his narrator rejoins: "'To despise all things!' repeated I. 'This, 
at best, is the wisdom of the understanding.'"l62 Hawthorne's descriptive 
technique, on the other hand, encourages the percipient to disrupt or 
merge into the "content" of his gaze by virtue of the darkness which 
surrounds him and which, at every moment, threatens to obliterate his 
world, "like the archway of an enchanted palace, all of which has 
vanished but the entrance into nothingness and empty space.rrl63 In order 
to transcend or overcome the dark, this world must be continually 
reconstituted by a perceiver who, in fact, must turn himself inside-out 
with each successive image which appears. Every new image of a world thus 
guarantees a primordial coherence between subject and object, wherein the 
percipient sensibly participates in the Being of that world, and thereby 
loses his reflective identity. 
Because visual experience naturally pushes objectification further 
than the tactile, the scientific-technological world-view flatters itself 
that it constitutes the world: "it presents us with a spectacle spread 
16l"A Virtusos's Collection," X, p. 485. 
162Ibid. 
163The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 133. 
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out before us at a distance, and gives us the illusion of being immedi-
ately present everywhere and being situated nowhere."164 Tactile 
experience, on the other hand, "adheres to the surface of our body; we 
cannot unfold it before us, and it never quite becomes an object."165 It 
is through the body itself that a subject opens onto the world. By 
internalizing a certain style as part of my motor potentiality, I thus 
disclose a perceptual field which immediately brings me into contact with 
phenomena, so that the world symbiotically invades me just as I respond to 
and accept its advances. Hawthorne implicitly understood this pre-
objective structure of perception, and descriptively endeavored to bring 
us back in touch with our initial pre-reflective perception of the world 
prior to its apophantical interpretation. By reason of its indirect 
lighting, Hawthorne's gaze suggests the object through delicate operations 
which already begin to function cinematically. In order to create the 
perceptual "motion" of his pictures, however, Hawthorne was required to 
establish, if only unconsciously, the constant setting by which the world 
of his work would phenomenally cohere. If his indirect lighting were to 
articulate the objects of an emblematic gaze so that they virtually pro-
trude to touch us, he would have to project a personal and concrete field 
which interpenetrates every experience of his world, and concomitantly 
allows for the inter-sensory unity of every "thing" in that world. 
Through this setting, we come into the possession of the world of 
Hawthorne's work. In other words, Hawthorne's emblematic gaze required a 
means at his disposal by which he could capture the reality of the world 
of his vision, and his appropriation of the emblem partially accomplished 
164Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 316. 165Ibid. 
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that task, for in the emblematic technique he discerned that indeter-
minate field which insinuates the object and perceptually enables it to 
come to life. Yet, the affective depth of his vision demanded something 
more, and he unearthed that key in the diorama: 
If Hawthorne continued after his illness was over to shut himself 
away in order to look at things in the dark, if he displayed an 
interest in magic lantern shows and fairground dioramas, he did so 
in no dilettante spirit but with deliberate intent. It was upon a 
foundation of shadow that he built up his technique of indirect 
lighting. Light came for him, as it did for Van Gogh, through 
darkness.166 
This all-encompassing darkness which informs Hawthorne's vision, 
and which Melville so brilliantly acknowledged at. the center of his art, 
not only structures our experience of that vision, but also sustains the 
general setting which circumscribes the perceptual situation as such. 
Hawthorne's interest in the confessional further reinforces his 
descriptive predilection for the dark. Clearly, it was the visual as 
well as the psychological phenomenon of the confessional that excited his 
imagination, for it provided a darkness which could articulate both 
"inside" and "outside" of a world. Already by 1842, he had observed this 
nuance in a journal entry: "A Father-Confessor--his reflections on 
character, and the contrast of the inward man with the outward, as he 
looks round on his congregation--all whose secret sins are known to 
him."167 Similarly, Hilda's confession in The Marble Faun enables her to 
discard the personal burden of guilt, which she attaches to her own 
identity, by welcoming the anonymity of the enclosing dark. Only after-
166Normand, p. 308. By "diorama," we mean throughout, not only a 
three-dimensional, translucent scene in miniature, but any such scene 
produced with similar effects as well, including those displayed before 
a collective audience--e.g., Daguerre's diorama~ double effet. 
167The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 235. 
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wards, in the determinate world of the cathedral, is she compelled to 
discuss it face to face.168 Yet, however much the confessional may have 
fired Hawthorne's imagination, it was the diorama which represented, for 
him, the most expressively intense perceptual model of how we primor-
dially articulate the world. What best characterizes the dioramic 
experience is its ability to absorb a reflective identity via the 
circumambient darkness constitutive of the precondition for involvement~ 
Speaking of this effect in contemporary cinema, V. F. Perkins has 
remarked: 
In the(ideally) comforting, self-forgetting darkness of the movie-
house we attain faceless anonymity, a sort of public privacy, 
which effectively distances the real world and our actual 
circumstances. That the darkness is an essential insulator will 
have been realized by any reader who has had to watch films in an 
insufficiently darkened cinema. The deterioration of the image on 
the screen matters far less than the absence of the 'shield' which 
darkness customarily offers. The erection of the shield seems to 
be the precondition of involvement.169 
Just as silence constitutes the ground of all communication, darkness 
makes it possible. Darkness is immanence.170 Darkness recreates the 
interior of Being, the way in which the world makes its first appearance; 
for without a subject there could be no "world." 
To speak in these terms, however, is not to place the subject 
perceptually or ontologically prior to the "world," for Hawthorne's 
dioramic darkness engages the spectator-reader by surrounding him, and 
thus establishes the specific situatedness by which a percipient makes 
168The Marble Faun, IV, pp. 357-58. 
169Film as Film (London: Penguin Books, Cox and Wyman Ltd., 1972), 
p. 134. 
170wladimir Jankelevitch, "Le Romantisme allemand," quoted in 
Normand, p. 318. 
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the birth of Being posslble in the first place. Reciprocally, because it 
encloses the spectator within the immediacy of its own perceptual re-enact-
ment, this dioramic darkness concurrently generates the creation of a 
self-sufficient world. 171 In fact, the spectator-reader has already been 
put into the situation by virtue of the presencing temporality of those 
images which spontaneously appear amidst the ground of chaotic darkness, 
and are already on the way toward a determinate order. Thus, Hawthorne's 
images are essentially cinematic. Against the enclosing dark, the cine-
matic image "takes shape," and prematurely stands out against this 
indeterminate field "like someone on the screen when the film is half over 
and one has only just walked into the darkness of the cinema. the 
image, before one's eyes, is already in the present indicative."172 
Hawthorne's description of the dead Judge, for example, intimately engages 
the reader in this active, interior moment. From the twilight glooming 
upward, toward the swarthy whiteness of the Judge's face, and finally to 
that inscrutable blackness which annihilates all traces of any world "out 
• 
there" beyond the window--Hawthorne's description paradoxically transforms 
the transparency of an objective world "without" into the ambiguous 
opacity of an interior space which ultimately locates the subject at the 
center of a world that is, ironically, himself. Like the cinematic vision 
which Georges-Michel Bovay, in his essay "Poe'sie et rlalisme," defines as 
. , 1 
"la vision interieure d'un monde," 73 Hawthorne's diorama-like technique 
171cf. Raymond Durgnat, Films and Feelings (London: Faber and 
Faber Ltd., 1967), p. 99. 
172Jules Supervielle, "The Man Who Stole Children," trans. Alan 
Pryce-Janes, in Selected Writings (New York: New Directions, 1967), 
pp. 194-95. 
173Cin~a: un oeil ouvert sur le monde, ed. Georges-Michel Bovay 
(Lausanne: La Guilde du Livre, 1952), p. 95. 
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eliminates the traditional or daguerrean frame and enables us to perceive 
and complete the image in so far as we are situated; that is, engulfed by 
the surrounding darkness. Here, a commonplace event, the coming of night, 
"is transformed into apocalyptic revelation through description that 
conveys the internal vantage point of diorama--that conveys the sense of 
immersion in a changing scene in which real time expands into dioramic 
time, into dream time." 174 This perceptual, physical blackness which 
pervades Hawthorne thus yields the key that unlocks not only the percep-
tual habit of Hawthorne the man, but also discloses the interior, self-
sufficient world of his oeuvre. ' As Lautreamont remarked: "It is only by 
admitting the night physically that one is able to admit it morally."175 
Thus, through the interplay of light and shade, grounded in dioramic 
darkness, Hawthorne was able to create "a total ambiguity that would 
enable him to achieve the freest possible interplay of substances, 
identities, and physical, moral, and psychological realities."176 
At the interior of this ambiguous vision, Hawthorne created the 
affective depth by which an expressive space superannuates the perspec-
tive distance of the daguerrean view. Through his dioramic gaze, the 
world no longer stands before the spectator as a representation, but 
rather becomes visible in its interior immediacy. The world is born 
anew. Because the daguerrean frame supports a view upon the outside in 
174Benjamin Lease, "Diorama and Dream: Hawthorne's Cinematic 
Vision," Journal of Popular Culture 5 (Fall 1971) : 321. 
175comte de Lautrlamont, Le Chants de Maldoror, trans. Guy Wernham 
(New York: New Directions, 1965), p. 306. Compare Goodman Brown, who 
cannot bring himself to accept the moral darkness he discovers in the 
forest. Is it, perhaps, because he cannot accept the physical darkness 
of the night itself? 
176Normand, p. 311. 
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terms of its optical relation to the world, it always represents a 
spectacle of something else--something outside of it. As Hawthorne 
observed on his journey up Green Mountain: 
As we ascended the zig-zag road, we looked behind, at every opening 
through the forest, and beheld a wide landscape of mountain-swells, 
and vallies intermixt. . • . Over this wide scene, there was a 
general gloom; but there was a continual vicissitude of bright 
sunshine flitting over it; now resting for a brief space on 
portions of the heights, now flooding the vallies with green 
brightness • • • . But we, who stood so elevated above mortal 
things, and saw so wide and far, could see the sunshine of 
prosperity departing from one spot and rolling towards another; so 
that we could not think it much matter which spot were sunny or 
gloomy at any one moment.177 
Indeed, from such a "godly" vantage point, nothing much matters; it is 
all the same. This abstracted perspective, divorced from the affective 
details ("we could not think it much matter"), is simultaneously 
indifferent to time as well ("at any one moment"). Whenever it is seen 
in perspective, the external world is somehow always beyond time; for 
ultimately, everything can and will be located in its proper place. Even 
history arrays itself before us in its fastidious chronological order~ 
Thus, in the preface to ! Wonder ~' Hawthorne explains that he. felt no 
reluctance to shape anew, "as his fancy dictated, the for:ms that have 
been hallowed by an antiquity of two or three thousand year6."H8 
Hawthorne's perceptual and reflective habits naturally gravitated toward 
man's interior facticity rather than his external factuality. Correspond-
ingly, in the preface to his Biographical Stories for Children, he 
advances the personal and intimate approach to the history of a life: 
"It is here attempted to give our little readers such impressions as they 
• 
177The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 129. 
1 7 Bvii , P . 3 • 
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might have gained, had they themselves been the playmates of persons, who 
have long since performed important and brilliant parts upon the stage of 
life."l79 At the other end of daguerrean objectification, the diorama 
initially investigates the spectacle for its own sake; it is first and 
foremost autofigurative: "The spectacle is first of all a spectacle of 
itself before it is a spectacle of something outside of it."180 In 
Hawthorne, the image is able to exist for its own sake because it spon-
taneously emerges from a primordial darkness which circumscribes the 
percipient, and touches him with its animate becoming. Hawthorne's 
dioramic blackness engages us from a situated point of view whereby an 
object becomes an object in its specific carnality before our very eyes 
and, at the same time, engenders or suggests an affectively unified 
world: "Every new aspect of the mountains, or view from a different 
position, creates a surprise in the mind." 181 Elsewhere Hawthorne 
observes: "The mountains look much larger and more majestic some times 
than at others--partly because the mind may be variously situated so as 
to comprehend them."182 Unlike Wordsworth's transparent and ubiquitous 
perspective from the top of Mount Snowdon, Hawthorne's dioramic technique 
guarantees the ambiguous contour of Being for, within the expressive 
space of its interior, it makes the object determinate only to the extent 
that it reverses the objective dimensions of "locality." The spectator 
thus assumes a spatial relation to the thing in terms of his restricted 
1 7 9vr , p • 213 • 
180Merleau-Ponty, Primacy, p. 181. 
181The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 104. 
182Ibid., p. 125. 
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situation, and not the transparently ubiquitous position of optical 
perspective, which merely treats the body as another object in external 
space. Hawthorne appreciated the individual and limited aspect of a 
thing, and employed a descriptive technique that surprises us with every 
new appearance of the image. In a journal entry of 1 June 1842, he 
expressed it thus: 
The greater picturesqueness and reality of back-yards, and every-
thing appertaining to the rear of a house; as compared with the 
front, which is fitted up for the public eye. There is much to be 
learnt, always, by getting a glimpse at rears. When the direction 
of a road has been altered, so as to pass the rear of farm-houses, 
instead of the front, a very noticeable aspect is presented.l83 
By definition, a situated point of view can only see one aspect at a time; 
in such a light, the object is ultimately destined to remain partially 
unknown. The perceptual aspect of a thing, in turn, substantiates the 
limited ability of the gaze at all times; it constitutes the Rubicon 
which can never be crossed perceptually. Thus, aspectiviti always puts 
"solidity" on the hither side of the distinction between affective and 
rational space in so far as it dynamically animates the primordial depth 
of the visible. Hawthorne knew what Cezanne was to discc;>ver, and what 
cubism would repeat: "that the external form, the envelope, is secondary 
and derived, 1 that it is not that which causes a thing to take form, that 
this shell of space must be shattered."184 At the same time, pure forms, 
possessing an apparent solidity internally determined, can never disclose 
the interstitial aspect of depth. During his middle period, Cezanne 
experimented in this direction, "and came to find that inside this space, 
183rbid., p. 239. Eight years later, Hawthorne indulged in just 
such a sketch; see pp. 496-97. 
184Merleau-Ponty, P~imacx, p. 180. 
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a box or container too large for them, the things began to move, color 
against color; they began to modulate in instability. Thus we must seek 
space and its content as together."l85 Only between the double horizon 
of physical and expressive space, then, does an object begin to secure 
its perceptual and ontological dimensions. "Aspectivity" thus confirms 
the reciprocity between subject and object in a world common to both, and 
disparagingly makes nonsense of each apart from the other. Within the 
interior of its expressive space, Hawthorne's dioramic gaze confers upon 
perception a facticity which daguerrean objectification merely relegates 
to the sun-drenched status of the factual. Indeed, once the world of 
factual objects is abolished, perception gravitates toward a world 
entirely devoid of any objects whatsoever. This approximates, in fact, 
the dioramic or cinematic world prior to the appearance of its first 
image. It impersonates the night, that pure and simple being-in-the-dark. 
Analogously, it is the night which brings me back in touch with my 
contingency: 
Night is not an object before me; ~t enwraps me and infiltrates 
through all my senses, stifling my. recollections and almost 
destroying my personal identity. I am no longer withdrawn into. my 
perceptual look-out from which I watch the outlines of objects 
moving by at a distance. Night has no outlines; it is itself in 
contact with me and its unity is the mystical unity of the ~· 
Even shouts or a distant light people it only vaguely, and then it 
comes to life in its entirety; it is pure d·epth without foreground 
or background, without surfaces and without any distance 
separating it from me.l86 
If the reflective attitude sustains its space by thinking the illuminated 
relation of its parts, the pre-reflective interior of dioramic darkness, 
on the other hand, unites me to an affective space precisely because it 
185Ibid. 
186Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 283. 
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intimately merges with the surface of my body, and threatens to absorb 
the very reflective identity which can always disperse it by "turning on 
the lights." Because it constitutes a dimension in which I am entirely 
enveloped, darkness thus recreates the depth of an interior space wherein 
I am perceptually situated at all times. Without anchor in externally 
objective co-ordinates, Hawthorne's dioramic darkness grounds the world 
of his work in the ambiguous affectivity of a subject, that zone of not-
being-in-front-of whereby things are primordially able to come to light, 
and, on the descriptive level, provides the very darkness necessary in 
the cinema in order to show up the performance.l87 
However, if dioramic space can be distinguished from the daguerrean 
view in so far as it essentially envelops us rather than spreading i.ts 
content out before us, and therefore outside of us, it also distinguishes 
itself on another equiprimordially meaningful level. Like the scientific-
technological world picture, the daguerrean view fixes the content of its 
frame in order to secure the object with finality. The scientific-
technological posture thus impetuously appropriated the daguerreotype, 
for in so doing it felt it had at last discovered the absolute means of 
making a "lasting impression," in fact, a permanent one--one, moreover, 
which would be true for all times, places, and Dasein. Grounded in its 
steadfastly frozen genuflection to infinity, this world-view naturally 
despises that which it attempts to control with absolute mastery; that 
is, situated time and space. Thus, to guarantee its continuous 
domination of "nature," which uncompromisingly gets the better of it 
because nature always holds the upper hand, it professes salvation in 
187Ibid., pp. 100-101. 
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the heavenly beatitude of a repressed, omnipotent goal, and consciously 
takes the form: "If only we could eliminate the awkward discomfort of 
time and place once and for all •.•• " Yet the other side of "angel" 
is always "devil," and one demands the other--in fact, calls it into 
being; for on the hither side of Being, where both reside, they are one 
and the same. Hawthorne knew it better than anyone. Within the techno-
logical frame of his age, he detected the survival of an ancient 
witchcraft, whose roots "lay in the very lowest of human instincts"--in-
stincts which were bound "to people the world with monstrous shapes."188 
Hawthorne alone was first to discern the monster gnawing at man's heart, 
obscuring his vision, isolating him from his own world in the name of 
objectivity. Beneath the Janus-faced exterior of scientific optimism, 
Hawthorne espied the demon loosed upon the world in the name of pro~ress; 
it haunted the recesses of his imagination as severely as it threaten~4 , 
the freedom of his vision. That monster was, of course, the machine. , It 
represented the plunderous extent to which man had been dispossessed of 
his world by the scientific promise of salvation and its insidiously 
concomitant evils. Amidst the beauty of the pre-technological garden, 
Hawthorne perceived the fiendish whistle of the locomotive; its 
devastating potential leveled his perceptual and aesthetic sensitivity 
as it would Faulkner a century later. In the steam engine, he anticipated 
the twentieth-century horrors inevitable in the race for technological 
supremacy, the battle between opposing world-views which endangers the 
very life of the planet today. The referential surface of the technolog-
ical world picture could no longer assuage the subsequently frightening 
188Normand, p. 182. 
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disjunction of its own applied content. While describing a passenger 
waiting in the station for a train, Hawthorne elicits his fundamental 
disorientation as the train approaches: 
and comes down upon you like fate, swift and inevitable. In a 
moment, it dashes along in front of the Station-house and comes to 
a pause . . . • A moment passes, while the baggage men are putting 
on the trunks and packages; then the bell strikes a few times, and 
away goes the train again; quickly out of sight of those who remain 
behind, while a solitude of hours again broods over the Station 
House, which, for an instant, has thus been put in communication 
with far-off cities, and then has only itself . • . 
Meantime, the passenger, stepping from the solitary station-house 
into the train, finds himself in the midst of a new world, all in a 
moment; he rushes out of the solitude into a village; thence 
through woods and hills; into a large inland town •••• 189 
Grounded in alchemy and with the help of technology, Science was now able, 
via the machine, "to r:ealize certain of the ancient magicians' dreams, 
such as that of abolishing distance: in the flight of the two 'suspects,' 
the two 'owls,' the railroad becomes a substitute for the witch.' s 
'! broom. u190 Even Hawthorne could not foresee the extent to whi,ch his own 
k ~t 
monsters were anticipations of history: "He saw himself, and his work as 
well, excluded from the world of the machine. He had no idea that men 
would return to his own 'chimaeras' in order to explain some very real 
monstrosities to come."l91 Moreover, like the train which it describes, 
the new perceptual moment in Hawthorne ironically and most significantly 
obtains from motion. 
III 
If Hawthorne discovered, in the diorama, the circumscriptive black 
in which the shape of his images could make their first appearance, he 
189rhe American Notebooks, VIII, p. 488. 
19~ormand, p. 182. 19lrbid., pp. 75-76. 
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also detected an interior "motion" by which they unfold before us and come 
to life. By Hawthorne's time the "moving picture" had already undergone 
several revolutionary advances. Originally the invention of Philippe de 
Loutherbourg, this new art first appeared in London in 1781 under the 
name of Eidophusikon. De Loutherbourg's invention, however, was in no way 
comparable to the later panoramic productions, amounting to a kind of 
panoramic moving peep show. 192 Shortly thereafter, Robert Barker's 
"cyclorama" appeared, "the picture that encircled its spectators with 
actual objects carrying the painted detail out beyond the foreground."l93 
When word reached Charles Willson Peale in Philadelphia, 1784, he was 
immediately captivated by the prospect of pictures "that lived and moved, 
changed color, a magic release from the static character of all art 
hitherto."194 By the autumn of 1784, Peale was already adding a sky-
lighted room to the end of his long gallery in order to house the equip-
ment, while the pictures were to be viewed from the seats in the gallery 
itself.195 The Pennsylvania Packet advertized the exhibit in the 
following terms: "Mr. Peale, respectfully informs the public, that with 
great labour and expence, he hath prepared a number of eerspective views, 
with changeable effects, imitating nature in vari()us movements."l96 
Historically, Peale's moving pictures represent the first appearance in 
America of the startling progress in pictorialism which began in England 
during the 1780's, most notable the inventions of De Loutherbourg and 
192John Francis McDermott, The Lost Panoramas of the Mississippi 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 175. 
193charles Coleman Sellers, Charles Willson Peale (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), p. 211. 
194rbid., p. 204. 195rbid., p. 2os. 196rbid. 
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Barker. Some years later, Rubens Peale would display colored magic-
lantern projections in motion. Yet, it was not until the 1820's that the 
moving picture received its major impetus, where its development closely 
paralleled that of photography. Investigations into the persistence of 
vision led Roget to publish his paper, "Persistence of Vision with regard 
to Moving Objects," in 1824. 
Optical toys based on this principle began to appear shortly after-
wards. The first, manufactured in 1826, was a flat disc with a 
picture on each side; spinning the disc made the pictures seem to 
merge. This simple toy was described by i·ts makers as a 
'Thaumatropical Amusement. To illustrate the seeming paradox of 
Seeing an Object which is Out of Sight and to demonstra~e the 
faculty of the Retina of the eye to retain the impression of an 
object after its disappearance'. In 1832 there appeared a new toy, 
the Phenakistascope, which made more sophisticated use of the 
principles formulated by Roget; a series of drawings, depicting 
separate stages in an action, was printed on a cardboard disc. 
Rotated, and viewed in a mirror through slots in its circumference, 
the Phenakistascope disc provided the first genuine moving 
pictures.197 
Along similar lines, Daguerre too was working toward the production of 
pictorial illusions. Widely known in France and England as a scene 
designer and operator of supremely persuasive dioramic presentations long 
before the invention of photography, Daguerre's three-dimensional views 
"of a storm in the Alps or of a midnight mass in a great cathedral were 
so effective that visitors from the provinces threw coins onstage to test 
the apparent spatial depth they thought they saw."198 In 1822, Daguerre 
and Bouton exploited panoramic effects in their first diorama by using 
the rotonde "as an auditorium that turned on a pivot before huge 
stationary pictures."199 Of even greater significance, however, were the 
dioramas'a double effet which Daguerre began showing toward the commence-
197Perkins, p. 41. 198Rudisill, p. 37. 
19~cDermott, Lost Panoramas, p. 6. 
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ment of 1831: 
A typical example was his Midnight Mass at Saint-Etienne-du-Mont. 
The first view of this picture, daylight, showed an empty church. 
Gradually day gave way to twilight and then to night. The 
sanctuary lighted up and the church was seen crowded with people. 
All this was done within one frame and on one piece of canvas. The 
effects were achieved by painting the clearer picture on the right 
side of the canvas and the second on the back, and by careful 
manipulation of the lighting. Effects of sky and distance, and 
sometimes of fire and of moonlight, could be obtained also by 
another device: the use of two or more transparent surfaces on 
separate frames placed a short distance apart. Sometimes part of 
these surfaces might be cut away to create highlights.200 
In its dioramic effects of lighting, Daguerre's Midnight Mass strikingly 
resembles Hawthorne's description of the dead Judge, where twilight 
gradually fades to night; and it is even more startling when we consider 
that Hawthorne was most probably nescient of these technical developments 
which preceded his mature works. Yet, one final step was necessary for 
the dioramic effects utilized by the massive panoramas of the 1840's, and 
with which Hawthorne was undoubtedly familiar: designing the machinery 
by which they could move. 
200rbid. For further discussion of these effects, cf. W. Williams, 
Transparency Painting on Linen. London: Winson and Newton, n.d. 
McDermott quotes the following from the above mentioned work: 
The sky and distance being seen through two transparent surfaces 
have their tints modified and softened, insomuch, that a surprising . 
aerial effect is obtained. The objects also, on the second surface, being 
seen through the first, maintain their tone of middle distance, and the 
boldness of the foreground objects on the front surface, secures for the 
combined subject a powerful and truthful appearance. • • • By such 
arrangements, very successful effects of moonlight, of winter scenery, 
and of fire, are obtainable. In some instances, portions of the middle 
and back surfaces are cut away, in such forms as will admit of light 
being thrown on particular spots on the front surface, in order to secure 
at those places the highest points of light. Thus, in employing two 
surfaces, we may, by cutting from one, or both surfaces, the quantity 
corresponding with the extent of the light, throw a bright light upon 
foreground figures, buildings, or other near objects, and communicate to 
them a striking reality of relief and brilliancy. Moonlight scenes, with 
reflection on water, sharp bright lights on the trees, and the ruined 
tower, all enhanced by the contrast of an expanse of sombre tone and 
shade, are subjects well adapted for this treatment(pp. l75-76). 
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In its earliest form, the panorama consisted of nothing more than a 
circular painting, arranged so that the spectator, placed in the center 
of the room, saw only the subject portrayed: "The frame around an 
ordinary landscape or historical scene constantly reminded one that he 
was after all looking at a picture. The panorama, inclosing him, made him 
feel that he was in the midst of the scene about him. He was not standing 
before a work of art but in the very 'presence of nature.' Nothing 
existed but the picture and the spectator."201 In order to achieve this 
effect, the exhibitor required a circular hall with a conical roof. 
In the center of such a room there was provided a platform on which 
the spectator was placed in order that he might be kept at an even 
distance from the painting. An opening in the lower part of the 
roof permitted the light to fall from above and behind on the 
painting, while a shelter over the head of the spectator allowed 
him to see the full picture but nothing above it. To accustom him 
to the change from the outside world the spectator was taken 
through a dark passage so that the reality of the picture might be 
doubly effective.202 
As early as 1829, a moving panorama was exhibited in London, the movement 
simply achieved by unrolling the canvas from one upright roller and 
winding it back on another. Thus, by 1840 technical advances were more 
than adequately able to accommodate the huge panoramic canvases which 
characterized the decade. For example, during the 1840's the St. Louis 
newspapers mention five panoramas of the Mississipi River which 
measured anywhere from four hundred and forty yards up to twelve hundred 
and fifty in length by four in height, and were exhibited as moving 
newsreels or travelogues. 203 Hence, even the newsreel or travelogue is 
201Ibid., p. 5. 202Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
203lbid., p. vii. In one way or another, all these artists had 
career connections with St. Louis, two of the panoramas having been 
painted there, and three of them exhibited in the home town (pp. vii-viii). 
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no invention of the twentieth century, as many would like to think, for 
by the 1840's it had already attained an aristocratic demeanor: "It had 
grown to a length that required an audience to sit for two or three hours 
while hundred of yards of colorful canvas were slowly unwound from one 
cylinder and wound onto another."204 And though it did not talk, it 
provided an elaborate program in which a commentator offered all 
necessary explanation while "a handsome young lady rendered appropriate 
accompaniment on the pianoforte."205 Ironically, by a lamentable quirk 
of history, Henry Lewis' vast panorama of the Mississippi showed late in 
the summer of 1850 at Salem. Unfortunately, by April of that very same 
year, Hawthorne had already left Salem, never to return. What marvelous 
literary chef d'oeuvre might have obtained from such an encounter we shall 
never know •. Nevertheless, by the 1850's the panorama had reached 
prodigious popularity, and its production was now implemented by the 
daguerreotype itself. John Wesley Jones' Pantoscope of California was 
painted not only from artist's sketches, but also from some fifteen 
hundred daguerreotypes taken by himself; and after showing at Hope Chapel, 
New York, in November, it was still doing business the following March.206 
Finally, in 1861, three years before Hawthorne's death, Peale's grandson, 
Coleman Sellers, Jr., first showed photography in motion by means of his 
"Kinematescope."207 Thus, daguerreotype and diorama mutually conditioned 
the advancement of each other, though each was to retain its own 
distinctive characteristics throughout its development. Meanwhile, other 
204rbid., p. 7. 205rbid. 
20~cDermott, "Gold Rush Movies," California Historical Society 
Quarterly 33 (March 1954) : 30. 
207sellers, p. 461. 
........ 
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inventions, using the same basic method as the "Phenakistascope," were to 
direct the diorama toward both its logical and technological termination 
in the modern cinema: the "Heliocinegraphe" (1850), the "Zoetrope" 
(1860), and finally Reynaud's "Praxinoscope Theatre" (1877). According to 
Perkins, "Reynaud, the inventor of the Praxinoscope, devised a machine to 
combine his toy with the magic lantern. Using drawings printed on a long 
roll of paper instead of the usual short and repetitious strip, Reynaud's 
'Tht~tre Optique' presented a moving picture show to a large audience. 
This, the earliest form of cinema, was quite independent of photog-
raphy."208 Thus, the refinement and development of the diorama, with its 
numerous variations, represents a history in Europe and America which 
both occasioned the application of photography while it culminated in the 
"motion picture" as we know it today. Through its manifold effect of 
lighting, the diorama initiated this inherent movement which emminently 
characterizes the modern cinema of the twentieth century. 
Hawthorne's dioramic lighting, his perception of light in dark, 
creates an affective depth at its interior, a depth which expresses the 
very motion characteristic of the perceptual act itself. The images 
which engage us during the showman's exhibit in ''Main-Street," and which 
animate a past, bringing it to life before our very eyes, simultaneously 
refute the daguerrean attitude of the critic in the audience, who would 
always make it a point "to see things precisely as they are."209 
In my daily walks along the principal street of my native town, it 
has often occurred to me, that, if its growth from infancy upward, 
and the vicissitude of characteristic scenes that have passed along 
208Perkins, pp. 41-42. 
209"Main-Street," XI, p. 52. 
this thoroughfare, during the more than two centuries of its 
existence, could be presented to the eye in a shifting panorama, 
259 
it would be an exceedingly effective method of illustrating the 
march of time. Acting on this idea, I have contrived a certain 
pictorial exhibition . • . by means of which I propose to call up 
the multiform and many-colored Past before the spectator, and show 
him the ghosts of his forefathers, amid a succession of historic 
incidents, with no greater trouble than the turning of a crank. Be 
pleased, therefore, my indulgent patrons, to walk into the show-
room, and take your seats before yonder mysterious curtain . • . • 
the lamps are trimmed, and shall brighten into noontide sunshine, 
or fade away in moonlight, or muffle their brilliancy in a 
November cloud, as the nature of the scene may require; and in 
short, the exhibition is just ready to commence.2IO 
In typically ironic fashion, these images which shift, fade, and come 
into variously sharpened focus with no more effort than the turning of a 
crank, represent the pre-reflective way by which we take them up in 
perception. Like the dwellings of Balch, Norman, and Woodbury--"such is 
the ingenious contrivance of this piece of pictorial mechanism," that 
these images "seem to have arisen, at various points of the scene, even 
while we have been looking at it."211 Indeed, with Endicott's arrival, 
"We seam to hear it with our own ears; so perfectly is the action 
represented in this life-like, this almost magic picture.n212 Hawthorne's 
images depend upon their internal visual composition, and the inter-
relation of each to the other, to such an extent that they pre-figure the 
visual aesthetic of the silent movie some fifty years before its 
inception. The critic of the showman's exhibit, however, refuses to 
assume a situated point of view whereby "the proper light and shadow will 
transform the spectacle into quite another thing," 213 even as the Puritan 
meeting-house fades, before his very eyes, into another image where 
carpenters are busy in constructing a new one. What Hawthorne is 
210Ibid., pp. 49-50. 2llrbid., p. 54. 
212rbid., p. 56. 213Ibid., p. 57. 
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concerned with, here, is nothing less than the modern cinematic technique 
of montage or, more precisely, superimposition. The image of the 
carpenters is literally "supered" over the image of the meeting-house, as 
it fades into the altered image which succeeds it. Such a radical 
technique demands a new level of perceptual awareness in order to be 
apprehended, a level toward which the critic of the exhibit refuses to 
respond, just as the innovative techniques of D. W. Griffith demanded a 
revolutionary perceptual level in order to be incorporated into the 
twentieth-century film aesthetic. In fact, by Hawthorne's time, dioramic 
effects of lighting were already able to prod~ce such contemporary 
cinematic effects as the "dissolve." For example, an ad iri the St. Louis 
Missouri Republican for 13 September 1849, commented on Leon romarede's 
panorama of the Mississippi that it would conclude "with a beautiful 
dissolving view of the Great Fire at St. Louis, on the night of 17th May,. 
representing that awful and terrific conflagration in all its fury • 
Gradually the devouring element subsides, and daylight appears, like.a 
messenger from God, to stay the wreck of destruction."214 Similarly, 
Hawthorne's lighting characteristically exhibits such dioramic effects; as 
with the death of Judge Pyncheon, the showman in "Main-Street" displays 
admirable mastery of the dissolve. From the gray light of early morning, 
"slowly diffusing itself over the scene,"215 the image effortlessly 
shifts to dusk, then night, in the twinkling of an eye. 
It will be hardly worth our while to wait two, or it may be three, 
turnings of the hour-glass, for the conclusion of the lecture. 
Therefore, by my control over light and darkness, I cause the dusk, 
214quoted in McDermott, Lost Panoramas, p. 145. 
215"Main-Street," XI, p. 65. 
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and then the starless night, to brood over the street; and summon 
forth again the bellman, with his lantern casting a gleam about his 
footsteps, to pace wearily from corner to corner, and shout 
drowsily the hour to drowsy or dreaming ears.216 
If on an elementary level the diorama initiated the vast repertoire of 
"shots" peculiar to modern cinema, it is Hawthorne's cinematic imagina-
tion itself, nonetheless, which securely places him among the twentieth-
century masters of light and shade such as Griffith, Eisenstein, Renoir, 
Cocteau, Bergman, and Bunuel. His use of indirect lighting creates the 
interiority of cinematic depth, like the landscape by Claude in The House 
t: of the Seven Gables, "where a shadowy and sun-streaked vista penetrated 
' ~ so remotely into an ancient wood, that it would have been no wonder 
~ 
~· if ... fancy had lost itself in the picture's bewildering depths."217 i 
t Hawthorne's klieg-like beams of light glimmer in transfigured shapes {. 
i· 
which entrap us amidst their evanescent mutability, like the Pyncheon 
garden whose aspect becomes incarnate in the movement of the lighting 
which animates it, bringing it to life. At night, this daytime "green 
play-place of flickering light" transmutes into "a great, wet mass of 
tangled and broad-leaved shadow."218 Equally, the Letter illuminates a 
world, disclosing the objects of a perceptual consciousness by reason of 
the transfigurative and ambiguous lighting which emanates from it, and 
which simultaneously projects its own shape onto the blank screen of the 
darkened night-sky. Hawthorne's dioramic technique fosters.the "interior 
shot," anticipating Bergman especially in its use of darkened, oscillatory 
areas within the composition of the image. Typically, Hawthorne 
manipulates the blackened silhouette against an even more obscurely 
216Ibid., p. 67. 217rr, p. 203. 
218rbid., pp. 145 and 246, respectively. 
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darkened background: the figures of Hepzibah, Dimmesdale, Goodman Brown, 
Chillingworth, Judge Pyncheon, Clifford, Ethan Brand--all appear before 
us, at one time or another, within the ambiguous and opaque lighting of 
the diorama, as in a dream. Reciprocally, this obscurity reflects an 
interior light which radiates from the center out, as the dark counten-
ance of Reverend Burroughs emanates an inward light that "glorifies his 
figure, in spite of the soil and haggardness of long imprisonment,--in 
spite of the heavy shadow that must fall on him, while Death is walking 
by his side."21 9 More abruptly, Hawthorne's lighting disrupts this 
abstruse world with a dazzling brilliance which blinds us, as when the 
black sky is invaded by the flaming Letter, "dilating like a luminous eye 
upon a screen,"220 or when Pearl's reflection in the armor resplendently 
beguiles us like t~e multi-faceted Madeira glass221 through whose 
brilliant medium we behold the simultaneously-faceted images of a compound 
arthropod eye, as in a Kandinsky painting. 
More often, however, Hawthorne resorts to less obvious effects; such 
is his use of the "soft focus," whereby an image appears within the 
toned-down atmosphere or "neutral territory" of a more difftlsed.or "gre1y 
medium," as in the blurred cinematic portrait of Hepzibah whose features . 
disappear "behind the warm and misty glow."222 As Normand remarks, 
Hawthorne's technique, here, "not only renders the faces indistinct, 
evasive, but also means that we do not see them until after they have 
219"Main-Street," XI, p. 76. 
220Normand, p. 311. 
221"Fancy's Show Box," IX, p. 221; cf. also, Schubert, p. 25. 
222The House of the Seven Gables, II, pp. 117 and 106, respectively. 
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passed across the screen: it filters out the details, the features, and 
then allows them to settle gradually into their final forms."223 Thus, 
like the portrait of her ancestor upon which Hepzibah gazes: 
In one sense, this picture had almost faded into the canvas, and 
hidden itself behind the duskiness of age; in another, she could 
not but fancy that it had been growing more prominent, and strik-
ingly expressive, ever since her earliest familiarity with it, as 
a child. For, while the physical outline and substance were dark-
ening away from the beholder's eye, the bold, hard, and, at the 
same time, indirect character of the man seemed to be brought out 
in a kind of spiritual relie£.224 
As with the pre-reflective gaze prior to the perception of color as such, 
these "inward traits" insinuate themselves "into the essence of the 
picture," and are seen only "after the superficial coloring has been 
rubbed off by time.n225 In conjunction with the above technique, 
Hawthorne deftly employed the "dissolve," as when, for example, the show-
man in "Main-Street" executes a temporal transition without abrupt spatial 
displacement: "Under cover of a mist that has settled over the scene, a 
few years flit by, and escape our notice. As the atmosphere becomes 
transparent, we perceive a decrepit grandsire, hobbling along the 
street."226 Conversely, with the dissolve, Hawthorne has simultaneously 
mastered the "fade:" 
Behold here a change, wrought in the twinkling of an eye, like an 
incident in a tale of magic, even while your observation has been 
fixed upon the scene. The Main-street has vanished out of sight. 
In its stead appears a wintry waste of snow, with the sun just 
peeping over it, cold and bright, and tinging the white expanse with 
the faintest and most ethereal rose-color. This is the Great Snow 
of 1717, famous for the mountain-drifts in which it buried the 
whole country.227 
223Normand, p. 312. 
224The House of the Seven Gables, II, p. 58. 
225Ibid., p. 59. 226xi, p. 79. 227Ibid., p. so. 
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In "The Wives of the Dead," the indistinct and bulky silhouette of Mary, 
hovering over the slumbering Margaret, temporarily merges with the massive 
shadows reflected on the lantern-lit wall, before fading into the darkness 
of the night.228 Moreover, with the fade, Hawthorne also discovered the 
"cross-fade:" chapter III of The Scarlet Letter fades out as Hester is 
returned to the prison. "With the same hard demeanour, she was led back 
to prison, and vanished from the public gaze within its iron-clamped 
portal. It was whispered, by those who peered after her, that the scarlet 
letter threw a lurid gleam along the dark passage-way of the interior.n229 
Her image immediately returns at the commencement of chapter IV in sharp 
focus: "After her return to the prison, Hester Prynne was found to be in 
a state of nervous excitement that demanded constant watchfulness."230 
And shortly thereafter, as the Physician is admitted to her cell, 
Hawthorne zooms in for a more arresting close-up: feeling her pulse, 
Chillingworth gazed into Hester's eyes with a calm and intent scrutiny, 
"a gaze that made her heart shrink and shudder, because so familiar, and 
yet so strange and.cold.n231 Elsewhere, Hawthorne employs the cross-fade 
to incorporate chapters XI and XII, as Dimmesdale disappears into the 
night ("he stole softly down the staircase, undid the door, and issued 
forth"), only to return beside the pillory the very next instant 
("Walking in the shadow of a dream, as it were, and perhaps actually under 
the influence of a species of somnambulism 
22Bxi, p. 199. 
229The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 69. 
230Ibid., p. 70. 
231tbid.' p. 72. 
Mr. Dimmesdale reached the 
r 
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spot, where, now so long since, Hester Prynne had lived through her first 
hour of public ignominy"), 232 And again, Hawthorne integrates the 
conclusion of chapter XIV with the opening segment of chapter XV as 
Chillingworth, with a wave of his hand, recedes from Hester to gather 
herbs, and then returns in sharp focus, decrepitly bent, nearly crawling 
along the ground.233 
Even then, Hawthorne's repertoire of cinematic shots is by no means 
exhausted. The "traveling shot" which follows Robin through the labyrin-
thian streets of the town234 also attends Kenyon through the serpentine 
streets of Rome at Carnival time. 235 Hawthorne's traveling shots 
naturally capture the visual frenzy of one of his favorite themes, the 
.procession, although he reciprocally employs a stationary camera placed 
above the scene in order to apprehend the larger, more general pattern of 
a processional image. Placed in a window, for example, the stationary 
downward shot permits the camera eye to seize the motion of those objects 
which frenetically pass it by: from the "arched window," Clifford views 
the microscopic activity of the town as part of the larger macrocosm of a 
world--a vision which tempts him toward a greater involvement with 
humanity by virtue of its homogeneous constitution: 
As a mere object of sight, nothing is more deficient in picturesque 
features than a procession, seen in its passage through narrow 
streets. The spectator feels it to be fool's play, when he can 
distinguish the tedious common-place of each man's visage •••• 
In order to become majestic, it should be viewed from some vantage-
232Ibid., pp. 146 and 147, respectively. 
233Ibid., pp. 174-75; see also, Normand, p. 325. 
234"My Kinsman, Major Molineaux," XI, pp. 209-12, 215-16, 219. 
235The Marble Faun, IV, pp. 444-54. 
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point, as it rolls its slow and long array through the centre of a 
wide plain, or the stateliest public square of a city; for then, by 
its remoteness, it melts all the petty personalities, of which it 
is made up, into one broad mass of existence.236 
Similarly, from his window, Giovanni espies the lovely Beatrice and 
conspires to join her in the garden;237 from the steeple, the narrator 
distinguishes various processions converging at right angles from two 
different streets, and likewise discerns the ironic situation of a lover, 
an old man, and his daughters; 238 from the balcony, Hilda discovers 
Kenyon as the crowd of revelers repetitiously flows beneath her.239 At 
other times, Hawthorne reverses this precipitous angle of the camera, 
preferring to shoot upward, as when the camera assumes Kenyon's point of 
view, gazing toward the balcony on which Hilda appears,240 or the monkey's 
point of view, turning his wrinkled visage toward the arched window from 
whence Phoebe and Clifford watch the organ-grinder's performance, a point 
of view or attitude, moreover, that mimics the organ-grinder's previous 
pecuniary observation ("With his quick professional eye, he took note of 
the two faces watching him from the arched window, and, opening his 
instrument, began to scatter its melodies abroad11 ).241 
The "long shot" enables Hawthorne to alter dramatic distance and 
involvement by forcing the spectator to gaze even more intensely: toward 
236the House of the Seven Gables, II, p. 165. 
237"Rappaccini's Daughter," X, pp. 96-97. 
238"Sights from a Steeple," IX, pp. 194-97. 
239The Marble Faun, IV, p. 453. 
240Ibid., pp. 450-52. 
241the House of the Seven Gables, II, pp. 164 and 162, 
respectively. 
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the middle ground, Sir Richard Saltonstall greets Governor Winthrop in 
the street; the image blurs and, toward the background, further down the 
same street, the camera focuses on Emanuel Downing and his son; then even 
further back it glimpses the eccentric mannerisms of Nathaniel Ward.242 
In like fashion, the entire square recedes from the close-up of its own 
image reflected off the breastplate of John Endicott, just as Endicott 
himself not only integrates a spatial long shot of the square as its 
central object, but also determines the vanishing point of a temporal 
retrospect historically leading to the Revolutionary "foreground;"243 
Hester emerges from the prison gloom into the crowd of Puritans at a 
"respectable" distance which not only amplifies her isolation from 
humanity, but also encourages us to ascertain a closer look; 244 Donatello 
regresses toward the gleam and shadow of the forest paths within the 
Villa Borghese while awaiting his tryst with Miriam, just as the personi-
fied figure of Death invisibly anticipates the unsuspected wanderer during 
the full heat of summer at the end of a dim vista; 245 the Gray Champion 
suddenly appears at the end of a deep perspective, "a paved solitude, 
between lofty edifices," before advancing toward the Governor and his 
party.246 At the other extreme, Hawthorne's cinematic vision selects a 
close-up or "tight shot" whenever the dramatic action dictates an altered 
level of consciousness: following the Gray Champion's advance, the 
242"Main-Street," XI, pp. 61-62. 
243"Endicott and the Red Cross," IX, pp. 434, 436, and 441, 
respectively. 
244The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 52. 
245The Marble Faun, IV, pp. 74 and 73, respectively. 
24611The Gray Champion," IX, p. 14. 
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Governor and his party hastily bring their mounts forward, "as if they 
would have pressed their snorting and affrighted horses right against the 
hoary apparition;"247 the apprehensive faces of Leonard Doane and his 
sister accost the narrator's inquisitive gaze before he leads the fated 
pair to the newly made grave;248 the frozen figure at the entrance of a 
cave repulses the glance of the farmer who uncovers the mystery of its 
forbidding frown;249 the Reverend Lynn slowly issues from the obscure 
forest into the sunlit street, gradually drawing nearer until w~ virtually 
overhear him memorizing his sermon out loud;250 the half-length image of 
Ethan Brand touching his heart in a "medium shot," instantaneously 
"zooms" to a single detail of the face as he breaks into scornful 
laughter--a whale-sized mouth protrudes to devour us like Jonah; 251 the 
meteor encroaches so palpably close upon the minister's field of vision, 
"that it seemed still to remain painted on the darkness" long after it had 
vanished, "with an effect as if the street and all things else were at 
once annihilated.n252 Perhaps Hawthorne's most affective tight shot, 
however, attends the death of Judge Pyncheon; it significantly concludes 
that phantasmagoric scene, and composes the final image of the Judge 
before returning to the street outside, at dawn: "And there we see a 
fly--one of your common house-flies, such as are always buzzing on the 
247Ibid., p. 15. 
248"Alice Doane's Appeal," XI, p. 275. 
249"The Man of Adamant," XI, p. 168. 
250"Main-Street," XI, p. 66. 
251"Ethan Brand," XI, p. 87. 
252The Scarlet Lette~, I, p. 156. 
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window-pane--which has smelt out Governor Pyncheon, and alights now on 
his forehead, now on his chin, and now, Heaven help us, is creeping over 
the bridge of his nose, towards the would-be chief-magistrate's wide-open 
eyes!"253 Hawthorne not only deploys his camera in imaginative space, 
but utilizes the very syntatic nature of the written word as well; after 
abruptly jumping from forehead to chin, and then to nose, Hawthorne's 
syntactic "eye" intersperses three hyphenated words before landing on the 
eyes--would-be: chief-magistrate's: wide-open: eyes. To the vacant 
stare of the dead Judge, this focused speck of a fly no longer even 
constitutes the terrifying shadow flitting about at the periphery of a 
visual field. The camera reciprocates this vacancy: freeze frame--a 
compound arthropod eye stares into nothingness! 
Hawthorne often balances the internal composition of his image in 
order to emphasize the significant relation of its parts: "But the one 
edifice, which gives the pledge of permanence to this bold enterprise, is 
seen at the central point of the picture. There stands the meeting-house, 
a small structure, low-roofed, without a spire;"254 "Ever since sunrise, 
Daniel Fairfield has been standing on the steps of the meeting-house, 
with a halter about his neck • • • Dorothy Talby is chained to a post at 
the corner of Prison Lane ••• while, through the bars of that great 
wooden cage, in the centre of the scene, we discern either a human being 
or a wild beast, or both in one, whom this public infamy causes to 
roar;"255 "hemmed in by the dark wall of the forest, arose a rock, bearing 
253The House of the Seven Gables, II, p. 283. 
254"Main-Street," XI, p. 57. 
255Ibid., p. 66. 
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some rude., natural resemblance either to an altar or a pulpit, and 
surrounded by four blazing pines, their tops aflame, their stems 
untouched, like candles at an evening meeting;"256 "Next, moving slowly, 
with a confused clatter of hoofs on the pavement, rode a party of mounted 
gentlemen, the central figure being Sir Edmund Andros;"257 "The central 
object, in the mirrored picture, was an edifice of humble architecture, 
with neither steeple nor bell to proclaim it,--what nevertheless it 
was,--the house of prayer;"2S8 "And there stood the minister, with his 
hand over his heart; and Hester Prynne, with the embroidered letter 
glimmering on her bosom; and little Pearl, herself a symbol, and the 
connecting link between those two.n259 By ordering and balancing his 
imagery from within, Hawthorne subtly leads us from "representation" to 
"composition;"260 the intensity of perception increases in direct 
proportion to the augmented demands of the pattern. Through the inter-
play of human experience, Hawthorne arrives at the structural elements 
of a phenomenon, and correspondingly composes these elements into visuals 
which most affectively structure the human emotions from which they 
derive. Furthermore, the structural composition of the image itself often 
discloses not only the camera-narrator's attitude toward his audience as 
well as himself, but also toward the art work. For example, the triadic 
image of Pearl upon the scaffold connects her to both Hester and 
256"Young Goodman Brown," X, p. 84. 
257"The Gray Champion," IX, p. 12. 
258"Endicott and the Red Cross," IX, p. 434. 
259The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 154. 
260cf. Eisenstein, The Film Sense, p. 192. 
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Dimmesdale, not only as the "focal point" of their relationship, but also 
~ as the expressive center of Hawthorne's tone throughout the work. Specif-
r 
~; 
ically, it is through Pearl that we discover Hawthorne's attitude toward 
the novel. In this case, the history or "construction" of Pearl is 
grounded in the very same law by which the art work itself is determined. 
Thus, when Hawthorne raises the question whether she has any discoverable 
principle of Being, it is, most simply, rhetorical. The question has 
already been answered; she is the Letter in another form, "the scarlet 
letter endowed with life!"261 Moreover, as an art work Pearl is neither 
subject nor object, but abides somewhere between the two: she is both. 
In lavishing her time and ingenuity upon the Letter, Hester succeeds in 
creating "an analogy between the object of her affection, and the emblem 
of her guilt and torture. But, in truth, Pearl was the one, as well as 
the other; and only in consequence of that identity had Hester contrived 
so perfectly to represent the scarlet letter in her appearance."262 The 
labor of art, the labor of childbirth, art work and child, both are 
products of flesh, blood, and sweat. Hence, against the Romantic notion 
of inspiration, Hawthorne, through the "mask" of Pearl, blasphemously 
remarks: "I have no Heavenly Father!"263 Both art work and child are 
grounded in the finitude of masculine and feminine principles; that is, 
Being. Like Virginia Woolf's Orlando, the Haunted Mind is androgynous. 
As with Pearl, the art work requires that its "unquiet elements" be 
somehow "soothed away" or integrated into a larger structure before it 
can accommodate a world.264 In such a way, each partakes of "depth, too, 
261The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 102. 
262Ibid. 263tbid., p. 98. 264rbid., pp. 94-95. 
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as well as variety."265 In typically ironic fashion, Hawthorne thus 
declares Pearl to be "the richest heiress of her day, in the New World."266 
Indeed, she truly is the first great novel to be crafted on North American 
shores; it remained for another to refine and send her to foreign shores. 
When we read in the concluding pages that Pearl grew up an heiress and 
traveled abroad, "we realize that we can pursue her further adventures 
through the novels of Henry James."267 
If, however, Hawthorne's internal composition affectively 
structures the image and subsequently determines the tone of the entire 
work, it is his manner of accommodating the relationship between images 
which most significantly constitutes the revolutionary aspect of his 
oeuvre. In the juxtaposition or, more properly speaking, the "transpo-
sition" of his images, we find Hawthorne's brilliant cinematic vision 
most pronounced. If his internal composition shapes the significant 
content of the image, it simultaneously forms those images which precede 
and succeed it, for the sequence of his imagery is predicated on the pre-
reflective motion of perception, that motion in the visual field which 
"makes sense" of the objects it discovers. As Goethe remarked: "In 
nature we never see anything isolated, but everything in connection with 
something else which is before it, beside it, under it, and over it."268 
Hawthorne's cinematic "shots" constantly alter in proportion to the extent 
of their discovery, ·for they continuously suit or accommodate the trans-
figurative motion of perception, the discernment of variously changing 
265Ibid., p. 90. 266rbid., p. 261. 26hevin, p. 78. 
f68conversations with Eckermann, 1825, quoted in Eisenstein, Film 
Form, trans. Jay Leyda (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 
Harvest Book, 1949), p. 45. 
r 
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figures against an indeterminate field or background. Thus, the 
"recognition" which initiates chapter III of The Scarlet Letter succinctly 
and compendiously describes the significant distinction between being 
conscious, which always partially includes the "self" as object, and the 
concomitant shift to perceptual consciousness, which necessarily excludes 
the "self" in absolute surrender to the object being discovered. At the 
beginning of chapter III, Hawthorne completely reverses the dominant point 
of view in chapter II; from being an object of consciousness and observa-
tion in her own right, Hester becomes a subject of perception, a camera 
eye which opens onto the surrounding scene in order to articulate it 
situatedly: "From this intense consciousness of being the object of 
severe and universal observation, the wearer of the scarlet letter was at 
length relieved by discerning, on the outskirts of the crowd, a figure 
which irresistibly took possession of her thoughts."26 9 This "double-
exposure" which concludes one ch?pter and, at the same time, opens the 
next, universally characterizes the transpositional nature of Hawthorne's 
imagery and its subsequent motion. Like the modern art work, the 
succession of Hawthorne's images defies the daguerrean or allegorical 
framing of life, both perceptually and ontologically, by making the 
spectator a participant in the creation of a world. By super-imposing 
specific and individually situated points of view, Hawthorne's work, like 
that of the cubists, transcends the isolated, daguerrean frame and enters 
onto the world itself. 
In the diorama, Hawthorne had already discovered montage. 
Hawthorne's mind, of course, had always delighted in the juxtaposition of 
269The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 60. 
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two apparently unrelated things to produce a new third thing. In a 
journey to Shelburne Falls, 31 August 1838, which necessitated trans-
versing Green Mountain, he remarked: "It was chill and bleak on the 
mountain-top, and a fire was burning in the bar-room."270 His specific 
use of the conjunction "and" reveals his facility to accommodate 
disparately concurrent images. Coincidentally or not, the passage 
immediately follows his description of the old Dutchman, who travels the 
country with his diorama, in a wagon: "We looked through the glass 
orifices of his machine, while he exhibited a succession of the very 
worst scratchings and daubings that can be imagined.n271 And Hawthorne 
concludes the passage with an image that rivals Griffith's first 
cinematic close-up of a huge "severed" head smiling c:tt the public for the 
first time, which caused such panic in the theatre:272 "When the last 
picture had been exhibited, he caused a country boor, who stood gaping 
beside the machine, to put his head within it, and thrust his tongue out. 
The head becoming gigantic, a singular effect was produced."273 Else-
where, speaking of pigs, Hawthorne once observed: "I suppose it is the 
knowledge that these four grunters are doomed to die within two or three 
weeks, that gives them a sort of awfulness in my conception; it makes me 
contrast their present gross substance of fleshly life with the nothing-
ness speedily to come."274 The superimposition of temporal frames within 
270The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 131. 
271Ibid., p. 130. 
• 
272Blla Bal;zs, Theory of the Film, trans. Edith Bone (London: 
Dennis Dobson, 1952), p. 35; see also, Perkins, pp. 72-73. 
273The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 130. 
274Ibid., p. 204. 
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the mind's conception only serves to reaffirm the ek-static present in 
which perception is grounded. Hawthorne's dioramic gaze naturally 
bolstered this kind of contrast visually as well. In a passage 
strikingly reminiscent of Eisenstein's example of montage taken from 
Ambrose Bierce's "The Inconsolable Widow," Hawthorne relates an incident 
in which his son, Julian, arrives at a similar kind of conclusion from the 
juxtaposition of two separate images. Eisenstein quotes the following 
passage from Bierce, previously noted in chapter II: 
A Woman in widow's weeds was weeping upon a grave. 
"Console yourself, madam," said a Sympathetic Stranger. 
"Heaven's mercies are infinite. There is another man somewhere, 
besides your husband, with whom you can still be happy." 
11There was," she sobbed--11 there was, but this is his grave."275 
Hawthorne notes the following remark, made by his son while looking through 
a series of drawings and engravings: "'What's that crying for his 
father?,' asks he, looking at a picture of a widow and her son. 11276 Both 
examples suggest a new image from the juxtaposition of two previous ones. 
Speaking of Julian, Hawthorne continues: 11 He brings me Flaxman's drawings.· 
of Juno and Minerva going to assist the Greeks, in a car, drawn through 
the celestial regions by two horses; and calls it 'Horses running so hard 
to get to the barn.'"277 Julian's 11 interpretation" of these images 
suggests conclusions similar to those which Eisenstein proposes in his 
275quoted in Eisenstein, The Film Sense, p. 5. 
276The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 416. 
277Ibid.; cf. also: "Little Julian now sits with a slate and 
pencil, drawing as he says a bird--and next, a chair--both objects being 
represented by a similar scratch"(p. 409): "Children always seem to like 
a very wide scope for imagination, as respects their babies, or indeed any 
playthings; this cushion, or a rolling-pin, or a nine-pin, or any casual 
thing, seems to answer the purpose of a doll, better than the nicest 
little wax figure that the art of man can contrive"(p. 410). Similarly, 
compare Hawthorne's description of Pearl: 11The unlikeliest materials, a 
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works on film. In so far as the new image is qualitatively distinguish-
able from each component element viewed separately, it reduces "actuality" 
to "suggestion." 278 The new image is in ~o way fixed, or ready-made, but 
arises from the process itself; thus, montage transforms the representa-
tiona! into the presentational, obliging the spectator to create the new 
image himself. 279 Because it transcends or transforms the individually 
framed images which produce it, montage creates the illusion of motion--a 
cinematic phenomenon which exists "on the higher levels of film structure 
as well as on the very threshold of film illusion, for 'persistence of 
vision' from frame to frame of the film strip is what creates the 
illusion of film movement."280 Hawthorne employed the literary equivalent 
of montage in order to create a similar kind of motion in the mind's eye. 
Hawthorne's images constantly manipulate the affective distanc~ 
between spectator and scene not only as a function of space, but also in 
time. In addition to his various cinematic shots which, as we have seen, 
include such superimpositional techniques as the fade and cross-fade, he 
also regulates and modifies the tempo by which they appear. In a passage 
remarkably similar to Merleau-Ponty's discussion of pure transition, 
Hawthorne once observed of a bird in flight: "Then the shadow of a bird 
flitted across a sunny spot; there is a peculiar impressiveness in this 
mode of being made acquainted with the flight of a bird; it affects the 
stick, a bunch of rags, a flower, were the puppets of Pearl's witchcraft, 
and, without undergoing any outward change, became spiritually adapted to 
whatever drama occupied the stage of her inner world"(Th~ Scarlet Letter, 
I, p. 95). 
278Eisenstein, The Film Sense, pp. 8 and 24, respectively. 
279Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
280Ibid. , p. 80. 
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mind more than if the eye had actually seen it."281 Speaking of the 
tbematization of movement and its subsequent negation of a pure 
transition, Merleau-Ponty explains: 
The something in transit which we have recognized as necessary to 
the constitution of a change is to be defined only in terms of the 
particular manner of its 'passing'. For example, the bird which 
flies across my garden is, during the time that it is moving, 
merely a greyish power of flight and, generally speaking, we shall 
see that things are defined primarily in terms of their 'behaviour' 
and not in terms of their static 1 properties•.282 
Perhaps the most analogous visual example of cinematic motion in the 
ordinary world obtained, for Hawthorne, from seeing an obscure image flit 
across a doorway or window. Such images, projected in motion against 
their functional "screen," frequently appear in the notebooks: watching 
the window of a house, Hawthorne observes, "occasionally, a lady's 
figure, either seated, or appearing with a flitting grace, or dimly 
manifest farther within the obscurity of the room;" and elsewhere he 
remarks, "In the interior region of the stable, everything is dim and 
undefined; half traceable outlines of stalls; sometimes the shadowy aspect 
of a horse, with a man in a white frock, and therefore more distinguish-
able, leading him along."28 3 Such attention to transition securely 
influenced Hawthorne's editorial technique of "cutting" and "splicing" 
the tempo of his narration. Sylph Etherege gazes at the superimposition 
of her own features with those of her lover (animus and anima) in the 
miniature portrait which she holds in her hand. Suddenly the focus blurs, 
the features change to bold, acrimonious strokes betraying a charcoal 
281The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 247. 
282Phenomenology, p. 275. 
283rhe American Noteboo~~. VIII, pp. 497 and 504, respectively. 
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sketch of her lover's secret face; 284 disillusioned by this revelation, 
she resolves to seek the true image that she loves elsewhere, in death: 
the eye of the camera stares out into infinity.285 Hawthorne's camera-
eye penetrates the interior texture of a world whose objects disclose the 
various "rhythms" of perceptual consciousness by virtue of their meta-
morphic displacement in space. The camera recreates perceptual 
consciousness in its endeavor to complete a situated and intentional 
"gestalt" via a series of temporally displaced figures which articulate 
a composite, yet indeterminate, field. Amidst a sequence of moving shots 
which firmly establish a particular setting, for example, Hawthorne's 
dioramic gaze will often come to a complete halt, permitting various 
"figures" to enter its "field:" after surveying the crowd which surrounds 
the prison, the camera freezes on the jail itself, as Hester emerges into 
> the open air with Pearl;286 following its investigation of the darkened 
parlor, where the dead Judge slumps in his ancestral arm-chair while 
Hepzibah stares around the room from its threshold, the camera pauses as 
Clifford appears before her, obliquely emerging from within the room's 
interior, reflecting in his pale countenance the dark secret at its 
center;287 from the human commotion surrounding him along the road where 
he sleeps, David Swan remains the single, stationary figure of the 
solitary scene he so forcefully disrupts at the beginning.288 
Hawthorne's images continually increase or decrease in tempo, 
284"sylph Etherege," XI, p. 116. Cf. also, Normand, p. 317. 
285Normand, p. 317. 
286The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 52. 
287The House of the Seven Gables, II, p. 249. 
288"David Swan," IX, p. 184. 
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displaying the pre-reflectively supple time and space of cinematic 
consciousness; his method of composition thus recreates perceptual 
consciousness itself. As Eisenstein has said of compositional embodi-
ment in film, it asserts :its own unique affect upon its perceivers, "not 
only because it is raised to the level of natural phenomena, but also 
because the laws of its construction are simultaneously the laws 
governing those who percei;re the work." 289 In "The Haunted Mind," 
Hawthorne's camera presents a stepped-up sequence of "supered" shots 
which create the depths of reverie from whence they derive; 290 likewise, 
the supered images which revolve around the static image of Hester on the 
pillory, consolidate a rapid series of tableaux which reconstructs the 
associative process of memory, 29 1 just as the story itself moves through 
"a series of tableaux in which everything seems to stand still;"292 the 
swift succession of cross-cuts shifting from room to house, house to 
street, and then back again, in "The Wives of the Dead," solidifies the 
hectic activity of the night, pre-figuring the final "freeze-frame" in 
close-up of a tear trickling down a cheek;293 the hasty progression of 
images instantaneously fabricated by Fancy, Memory, and Conscience in 
Mr. Smith's mind, convey the ineffable complexity and ambiguity of 
life,294 "almost as if a modern psychologist were putting us through one 
289Film Form, p. 161. 
290Ix, PP· 306-07. 
291The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 58. 
292Mark Van Doren, Nathaniel Hawthorne (New York: The Viking Press, 
1949; reprinted., Westport: Greenwood Press, 1972), p. 164. 
293xi, p. 199. 
294"Fancy's Show Box," IX, pp. 224-25. 
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of his tests in thematic apperception." 295 More often, however, 
Hawthorne's visual effects do not demand fast cutting. Indeed, in many 
instances fast cutting would ruin the desired effect, for the movement is 
frequently located within the image and virtually demands a fixed, 
consistent camera-viewpoint. 296 For example, with the escape of Clifford 
and Hepzibah on the train, Hawthorne more properly creates his affective 
visual tension by a sequence of long takes, rather than a series of brief, 
sporadic cuts which the locomotion superficially seems to demand. While 
Clifford's eyes take in the rapidly passing scenes that beseige him, 
Hepzibah's mind's eye returns to the iron fetters of the House, that 
ubiquitously fixed idea from which she cannot escape. 
With miles and miles of varied scenery between, there was no scene 
for her, save the seven old gable-peaks, with their moss, and the 
tuft of weeds in one of the angles, and the shop-window, and a 
customer shaking the door, and compelling the little bell to jingle 
fiercely, but without disturbing Judge Pyncheon! This one old 
house was everywhere! It transported its great, lumbering bulk, 
with more than railroad speed, and set itself phlegmatically down 
on whatever spot she glanced at.297 
Moreover, as the world races past these "two owls" ("Everything was 
unfixed from its age-long rest, and moving at whirlwind speed in a 
direction opposite to their own"), Hawthorne juxtaposes the interior life 
of the railroad car, wherein decelerated long shots of passengers 
engaged by such everyday past-times as reading, penny-papers, and ball 
off-set the accelerated montage of images which beleaguer them from 
without.298 Immediately thereafter, Hawthorne abridges both interior and 
295Levin, p. 44. 
296cf. Durgnat, p. 35. 
297The House of the Seven Gables, II, p. 258. 
298Ibid., pp. 256 and 257, respectively. 
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exterior motion to a stand-still, as Clifford attracts the conversation 
of a passenger. Then, just as suddenly, the image once again shifts; we 
cut to a long shot outside the car, as the train comes to a stop and 
Clifford and Hepzibah terminate their giddy flight for a more stable 
perch on solid ground. Instantly, from the center of the track, a 
stable camera hypnotically gazes toward a vast infinity, and theoreti-
cally swallows the incompatibly perpendicular lines which threaten to 
explode the transparent perspective of a single horizon. The train, with 
all of its interior life, gradually recedes toward this external 
distance, rapidly lessening to a point which, in another moment, vanishes 
altogether.299 Clifford and Hepzibah re-enter a static prospectus framed 
by the House. The two owls become eagles. 
Hawthorne's strong, eloquent arrangements between successive 
images, and within the single image (mise-en-s~ne),300 subsequently 
invites a further stylistic comparison with Eisenstein, especially his 
later style in Ivan the Terrible, where he had already evolved away from 
a rapid "cutting" style to a slow, elaborate pictorialism, stylistically 
nearer to Dreyer and Sternberg.301 What Durgnat says of Eisenstein seems 
equally true of Hawthorne; both tend to think of each screen picture "as 
a little composition of its own, so deliberate and strong that one 
becomes aware of each image, organized as a whole, following and replac-
ing its predecessor, with a little impact. The pictures are joined by 
their 'collision', which sets a kind of solid, hard-edged mood, much as 
brushstrokes set mood in painting." 302 Like the later Eisenstein, 
299Ibid., p. 266. 300cf. Durgnat, p. 35. 
301Ibid., p. 36. 302rbid., p. 48. 
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Hawthorne's predominant tempo is slow; slow motion, delayed and 
deliberate cutting, these most suitably accommodate his preferred theme 
of the processional. Indeed, the more a work benefits from rapid change 
of image, the less it can draw on the equally expressive possibilities 
of change within the image.303 Hawthorne's proclivity toward slower 
tempos reflects not only his individual style, but the significance of 
his vision as well. By controlling the pace of his work, by constructing 
a coherent emphasis, Hawthorne simultaneously shapes his theme. The 
more closely he adjusts the relationship among the parts, the more 
intimate and personal the work becomes. Yet, in so far as Hawthorne's 
personal style reflects a way of seeing, it similarly encompasses a way 
of showing; it not only embodies his relationship to characters and 
objects, but also defines his relationship to us. If point of view 
determines the correlation between foreground and background, it is more 
readily understandable why Hawthorne prefers a slower movement between 
successive images, rather than a rapid cutting style, for it gives him 
more time to create an ambience, to animate the scene, to linger, to 
suggest--the speed, in short, which allows the most extensive interchange 
between his foreground figures and background objects. Through a series 
of reflected ricochets, the figures of Pearl, Endicott, Goodman Brown, 
and Ethan Brand variously reciprocate the armor, the breastplate, the 
fire, the lime-kiln, as these objects, in turn, define the figures they 
illumine. 
To the extent that Hawthorne's dioramic darkness creates a center 
around which a world coheres, it simultaneously discloses the motion of 
303Perkins, p. 115. 
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pre-reflective intentionality at the very heart of the perceptual act 
which allows a subject to be "missing" from himself in order to 
primordially dwell within the fabric of the world. I am always absent 
from myself at the center of Being, for if it were otherwise I could 
never inhabit a world as such; the interior of Being osmotically engages 
both subject and object in a single, "consubstantial" involvement. In a 
journal entry for 9 October 1841, Hawthorne descriptively implied this 
kind of perceptual engagement between a subject and his world: "Now, 
every tree seems to define and embody the sunshine. And yet, the 
spectator can diffuse himself throughout the scene, and receive one 
impression from all this painted glory." 304 In so far as "seeing" is an 
act of the body, and not the mind, vision is always conjoined to move-
ment, and prefigured in it. "What would vision be without eye movement? 
And how could the movement of the eyes bring things together if the 
movement were blind?"305 The inauthentic technological perception would 
have it precisely this way, for it conceives of perception as a function 
of thought which sets before the mind a representational picture of the 
world. Consequently, its only retreat is towards the invisible, where it 
finds safety and salvation from an incarnate world whose ambiguity it 
cannot tolerate. Authentic perception, on the other hand, opens itself 
onto a world whenever it is genuinely "looking," and thereby holds things 
around itself from an interior depth which is never merely a transparently 
measureable displacement in external space. When Hawthorne measures the 
Letter, its mathematical length reveals nothing. "Certainly, there was 
304The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 213. 
305Merleau-Ponty, Prima~, p. 162. 
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some deep meaning in it, most worthy of interpretation, and which, as it 
were, streamed forth from the mystic symbol, subtly communicating itself 
to my sensibilities, but evading the analysis of my mind."306 Within 
this expressive, heteroclitical space, the space of the heart, the 
dialectic of inside and out congeals to an ambiguous locality wherein 
"the mind has lost its geometrical homeland and the spirit is drifting."307 
Amidst the world of Hawthorne's work, this interior and visible motion 
transpires within and between the images themselves, and designates the 
way in which they come to articulate the perceptual constancy of that 
world. Hawthorne's shadow and light, grounded in the finitude of an 
inclusive darkness, interpenetrate one another to such an extent that 
they autonomously express this double space of Being as it is realized in 
the double-horizoned structure of the perceptual act itself. The space 
of Hawthorne's imagery always constitutes both an interior concavity and 
an exterior convexity; the cave and mirror reflect the outside world 
"like an eye that has become, in its turn, a projector and is able to 
people the entire universe with its images in the manner of a magic 
lantern."308 Hawthorne's imagery is thus clearly cinematic; its interior 
motion reflects an intentional subjectivity beneath perception which not 
only accounts for the birth of a world, but also sustains the reality of 
that world. He anticipated the modern cinema by more than half a 
century, and in that process he prefigured the articulation of an 
affective spatial depth wherein perception primordially transpires. 
306The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 31. 
307Bachelard, Poetics_ of Space_, p. 218. 
308Normand, p. 154. 
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Thus Hawthorne's dioramic gaze displaces daguerrean representation 
with cinematic composition, pattern in motion.309 His descriptive 
technique transcends the representational nature of allegory, exemplify-
ing Clive Bell's statement that "The representative element in a work of 
art may or may not be harmful; always it is irrelevant."310 As a result, 
Hawthorne's use of montage creates an expressive space whereby individual 
figures and objects come to life by virtue of the motion which 
articulates them. As V.I. Pudovkin has remarked in his Film Technique 
and Film Acting: "every object, taken from a given viewpoint and shown 
on the screen to spectators, is a dead object, even though it has moved 
before the camera • • . • Only if the object be placed together among a 
number of separate objects, only if it be presented as part of a synthesis 
of different separate visual images, is it endowed with filmic life."311 
Hawthorne's dioramic gaze pierces the prejudiced and conventional 
barriers of the technological world-view, for in its exploration of 
physical reality it exposes a world never seen before. As Siegfried 
Kracauer suggests: "physical nature has been persistently veiled by 
ideologies relating its manifestations to some total aspect of the 
universe • The truly decisive reason for the elusiveness of 
physical reality is the habit of abstract thinking we have acquired under 
the reign of science and technology."312 Hawthorne's cinematic vision 
309cf. Vachel Lindsay, The Art of the Moving Picture, rev. ed. 
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922. 
310Art (London: Chatto and Windus, 1923), p. 25. 
311London: Vision Press, 1958, p. 25. 
312Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 299-300. 
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consistently proclaims reality to be more inclusive than any single view, 
for it must always remain primordially ambiguous in its opacity. Just as 
any dialogue is grounded in silence, and punctuates that ground with its 
meaning or significance, so Hawthorne's dioramic gaze is grounded in 
darkness, and intermittently pierces that dark with its ambiguously 
groping disclosures. Image and object become one in the pre-reflective 
gaze which articulates them. 
Hawthorne's cinematic vision recreates the pure transition of the 
visual field in order to explore reality face to face against the world. 
Because it negotiates a world close-up, and not in terms of a uniformly 
fixed perspective, it mutually and proportionately conceals whatever it 
reveals. Hawthorne's dioramic gaze thus frees the image from its frame 
and, like the modern art work, matriculates it onto the world. Unlike 
the technological loco-motion of the train, which merely represents a 
transference in geographical space, this dioramic gaze reconstructs the 
intentional motion of a percipient and thereby accommodates a space both 
physical and virtual in which object ~nd subject inclusively constitute 
that ambiguous reality called "world." With Hawthorne, therefore, it is 
never a question of "objective" space, but rather its subjectively 
heteroclitical equivalent which continuously refutes a homologously framed 
geometric-mathematic transparency devoid of Being. Light and shadow, 
external and internal world inosculate each other and simultaneously 
ratify an ambiguous dialectic of "without" and "within." Hawthorne's 
pre-objective gaze explodes the absolute, projected space of the 
daguerrean view, in favor of a space concurrently projected and interior, 
that double-horizoned space where object and image abide as one. 
Hawthorne prefigured on the screen of the mind's eye what Renoir would 
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project on the modern cinematic screen nearly a century later, propheti-
cally liberating vision from its erroneous analogies with both perspec-
tive, and painting in general. As Andr/Bazin said of Renoir: 
In visual terms the screen is habitually equated with a picture-
frame and, dramatically, with the proscenium. These parallels 
result in an organization of visual material whereby the image is 
composed in relation to the sides of the rectangle • . . • But 
Renoir saw clearly that the screen was simply the counterpart of 
the camera's viewfinder and therefore not a frame ••• but its 
opposite: a mask whose function is as much to exclude reality as to 
reveal it •.. ; what it shows draws it value from what it 
conceals.313 
As an originating consciousness, prior to objective knowledge as such, 
Hawthorne's dioramic gaze articulates a lived-through world of experience 
in which an object is never merely represented or identified, but 
contingently lingers as opaque and ambiguous; for being-in-the-world is 
primordially pre-objective, pre-apophantical, and decidedly personal. 
This is not, however, to place the burden of the world upon a subjective, 
"noetic" analysis, but rather to remain faithfully within the object 
itself, as Husserl defined his "noematic" reflection, in order to 
discover the world prior to any falling back upon ourselves: "it is the 
ambition to make reflection emulate the unreflective life of 
consciousness."314 To the extent that Hawthorne's oeuvre reproduces this 
pre-reflective life of perceptual consciousness, disrupting the 
apophantical authority of the scientific-technological world-view, he is 
unequivocally "modern." 
Finally, Hawthorne's revolutionary use of montage implicitly 
affirms the ontological priority of time itself. Cinematic "cutting" 
313cahiers du Cintma, 1952, quoted in Perkins, p. 38. 
314Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. xvi. This is, of course, the 
aim of Husserl's eidetic reduction. 
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ignores objective space; as such, its simultaneous spatial transposition 
of images reciprocally neglects the temporal displacement as well. The 
expressive space of cinematic montage confirms the possibility of pure 
transition, since it no longer "measures" time as a function of 
space--that is, how long it takes to get from one place to another. In 
so far as it is virtual, it obliterates the spatial priority of the 
world-view as a primordial function of time. Thus, like cinema, 
Hawthorne's spatial relationships become metaphors for human relation-
ships. The virtual space of Hawthorne's dioramic gaze reduplicates the 
interior subjectivity of an intentional, perceptual motion, that motion 
grounded in the double horizon between both objective and affective space. 
Like the perceptual space of the visual field, cinematic space comes and 
goes. Thus, its most distinctive characteristic: "it creates a virtual 
present, an order of direct apparition. That is the mode of dream."3lS 
If the style of Hawthorne's gaze asserts the perceptual constancy of the 
thing as a completed function of time, it nevertheless continues to 
sustain the ontological ambiguity of a world. As the "measure" of Being, 
time underpins the lived-through experience of Hawthorne's fictional 
world. Yet, by definition, a world accommodates not only "objects," but 
"subjects" as well. In its subjective constitution, the vague phantasms 
which inhabit the world of Hawthorne's work are no less "real" than its 
perceptions. Because it is an individual which embraces every "thing," 
and not a collection of objects linked by causal relations, the world is 
always destined to remain the ambiguous theatre of all experiences.316 
315Langer, Feeling and Form, p. 412. 
316Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 343. 
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Hawthorne's fictional world exploits this antepredicative tolerance, "and 
our bewildering proximity to the whole of being in syncretic experi-
ence."317 At its interior, Hawthorne's world appropriates this 
ontological proximity to Being in so far as it accommodates the 
expressive subjectivity of dream_, which dwells at the very heart of its 
vision. To the extent that Hawthorne's dioramic gaze visually dislocates 
"reality," it adhibits the hypnagogic image--those images, as 
F. 0. Matthiessen observed, "subsisting on the borderland of the uncon-
scious which surrealism has seized for its peculiar dornain." 318 Like the 
cinematic consciousness itself, the dream mode is able to draw the 
spectator into a creative act "in which his individuality is not 
subordinated to the author's individuality, but is opened up throughout 
the process of fusion with the author's intention."319 Rather than close 
itself off within the self-evident certitude of a uniformly framed view, 
Hawthorne's dioramic gaze expressively affirms the equivocal nature of a 
world anterior to rational investigation. If anything, the superimposed 
questioning voice at the center of Hawthorne's narration constitutes the 
rhetorical negation of all certitude whatsoever. For example, the 
"supered" interrogative voice attending Hawthorne's description of the 
dead Judge ("Has it yet vanished? No!--yes!--not quite!"), reflects the 
universal epistemological ambiguity of his entire oeuvre. It is the 
disembodied voice of the dream, the secret witness whose vision we 
317rbid. 
318Arnerican Renaissance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), 
p. 232. 
319Eisenstein, The Film Sense, p. 33. Cf. also, Ernest Lindgren, 
The Art of the Film (London: Allen and Unwin, 1948), p. 92: It is the 
spectator:-'s own mind that moves. 
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share.320 Thus, what made dioramic effects particularly significant to 
the implementation of Hawthorne's descriptive gaze was their singular 
appropriateness to the world he characteristically evoked--"a dream 
world halfway between reality and fantasy in which truth is 
simultaneously, maddeningly, graspable and evanescent."321 As with 
Montaigne, the world of Hawthorne's work confines itself to an 
interrogation which is never even formulated, for any such formulation 
would implicitly demand a determinate reply.322 Conversely, Hawthorne's 
fictional world substantiates the lived-through identity of both Being 
and appearance, the ambiguous opacity of existence; in both cases, we 
have the same silence and the same void.323 It is toward the silence 
and the void of this world that we must now turn. 
320Lease, p. 321. 
321rbid. 
322cf. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 295. 
323rbid. 
CHAPTER IV 
HAWTHORNE'S ONTOLOGICAL ABODE: THE INTERIORITY OF BEING 
If Hawthorne's dioramic gaze enabled him to reveal an indeterminate 
world no longer constituted by the daguerrean frame or world-view, it si-
multaneously structured a consciousness which was itself ambiguously 
circumvoluted. Because cinematic consciousness projects a space which 
comes and goes, it subsequently creates an iconology whose jagged edges 
split and tear the image rather than seal it off.l In so far as these 
images which shift and fade occupy an haptic foreground, emerging to 
touch the cutaneous surface of our gaze, they articulate a concernfully 
situated posture rather than the objectively detached view of daguerrean 
representation. In other words, they are expressive. Vision in high 
definition always discourages empathy, 2 whereas Hawthorne's fragmented 
vision encourages participation by virtue of the indefinite edges of its 
"field," a field which affectively enters onto the expressive space of 
the world. At the interior of this disconnected, unenclosed vision, 
Hawthorne heuristically interrogates the meaning or significance of those 
apparitions which inhabit the world of his work. Left to its own 
devices, the visual sense always seeks to outrage the ambiguous opacity 
of appearances by seeking "reality" elsewhere; indeed, the rift between 
appearance and reality is already built into that kind of seeing which 
lMcLuhan, Vanishing Point, p. 2. 
2Ibid., p. 77. 
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pictures the world as a view. The seventeenth-century portrait, for 
example, which stares back at us in full view, evidences the correctness 
of itself--that is, the artist's view--in opposition to the ambiguous 
way it is drawn by the light. It similarly frames the spectator by 
placing him in the center of its own objectively correct space. The 
portrait becomes a baby-sitter. Beyond the ambiguous boundary of Being, 
man thus forfeits his right to live the world in any way other than as a 
detached observer. Reality subsequently becomes the representation of 
an isolated moment in time, a three-dimensional perspective of the mind, 
a concept. Man goes blind. The world of Hawthorne's work, on the other 
hand, previews the purely apparitional space of cinema and its irreverent 
disregard for objectivity by re-incorporating appearance and reality. In 
order to escape the rationalism of the visual frame which had dominated 
Western civilization for centuries, Hawthorne's oeuvre recovers an 
iconography whose interior vision once again involves the spectator as a 
participant in the world. Amidst a mosaic of appearances, Hawthorne's 
world refuses the spectator the possibility of escaping those questions 
which it raises. He can deny them, but he must address them first. 
Hawthorne's cinematic vision expresses this immediacy, the immediacy of 
its apparitions. Grounded in facticity, Hawthorne's world is thus 
formal only in so far as it is phenomenal; because it has no framework 
fixed in a physical or pictorial space, but merely structures the mobile 
reticulation of intention, it thus asserts, as its primary formal 
characteristic, a virtual present.3 It is in the mode of dream. 
Hawthorne's fiction characteristically evokes a dream mode, a mode 
3cf. Langer, Feeling and Form, p. 412. 
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which like all of modern art brings its elements equally into the fore-
ground. As Susanne Langer has remarked: 
The most noteworthy formal characteristic of dream is that the 
dreamer is always at the center of it. Places shift, persons act 
and speak, or change or fade--facts emerge, situations grow, objects 
come into view with strange importance, ordinary things infinitely 
valuable or horrible, and they may be superseded by others that are 
related to them essentially by feeling, not by natural proximity. 
But the dreamer is always "there," his relation is, so to speak, 
equidistant from all events. Things may occur around him or unroll 
before his eyes; he may act or want to act, or suffer or contem-
plate; but the immediacy of everything in a dream is the same for 
him.4 
The dream is thus essentially iconic, and not pictorial; the psychiatrist 
merely forms the story line.5 Like the dioramic gaze, Hawthorne's 
cinematic or dream consciousness is pervasively present; the dreamed 
reality "can move forward or backward because it is really an eternal and 
ubiquitous virtual present."6 The dream provided Hawthorne with a 
diastolic counterbalance to the ponderous systole of rationalism and its 
synchronic historical perspective. From a Freudian point of view, the 
dream project is disclosable (Darstellbarkeit) precisely to the degree 
that it is "over-determinate;" and this is what frustrates the rational 
attitude the most. As Freud observed, the principles of "over-determina-
tion" and "condensation" allow the dream mode to expressively transpose 
disparate and discontinuous elements or moments in time. Hawthorne 
implicitly understood this dynamic, and explicitly reconstructed the 
logic of dream consciousness in order to undermine the arrogant and 
manipulative certitude of the daguerrean view, thus undercutting the 
4Ibid., p. 413. 
5McLuhan, Vanishing Point, p. 137. 
6Langer, Feeling and Form, p. 415. 
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subject-object dichotomy itself. As the narrator in "P. 's Correspondence" 
remarks: "More and more I recognize that we dwell in a world of shadows; 
and, for my part, I hold it hardly worth the trouble to attempt a 
distinction between shadows in the mind, and shadows out of it. If 
there be any difference, the former are rather the more substantial."7 
Again, in The American Notebooks, Hawthorne said it another way: 
"students out to be day-dreamers, all of them--when cloud-land is one and 
the same thing with the substantial earth."8 Hawthorne typically adopted 
the stance of conscious dreamer9 so that the world of his work 
consistently remains opaque throughout. Against the transparency of 
scientific certitude, Hawthorne's fiction asserts the ambiguous 
concealedness of truth and its corresponding epistemological appropri-
ation by a factical subjectivity which must call it into Being. And 
though his use of the "doppelganger" technique in such stories as 
"Monsieur du Mirroir" and "Graves and Goblins" represents a superficial 
attempt to get outside the "self," his most effective efforts addressing 
the problem of knowledge paradoxically derive from quite the opposite 
point of view. For it is only when Hawthorne delves to the very interior 
of consciousness that he ironically achieves his most poignantly 
perceptive angle of vision on the truth of the world. 
By re-establishing the primacy of the phenomenon, Hawthorne's 
dream-like vision returns to the immediate order of apparitions as they 
make their first appearance in consciousness, and by which the world, in 
7x, p. 367. 
Bviii, PP· 122-23. 
9cf. Joseph C. Pattison, "Point of View in Hawthorne," PMLA, 82 
(October 1967) : 365-66. 
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turn, originally announces itself. The dream enabled Hawthorne to 
structure a vision of the world primordially grounded in appearance, a 
vision indistinguishable from the "reality" it is presumed to re-present. 
Over and against the scientific-technological objectification of the 
world and its attendant manipulation of Being, Hawthorne's cinematic 
dream-consciousness concernfully enowns the facticity of things within 
the openness of Being. It encourages the thing to rest within itself, 10 
and likewise rescues truth from its invisibly transparent fixation in the 
mind. Reality becomes the oblique transformation of appearances, a 
lived-through structure whereby man's facticity announces itself anew. 
As Heidegger observed: "What is lasting in the presence of objective 
things is not their self-subsistence within the world that is their 
own."ll Hawthorne implicitly recognized that the "worldly" character of 
truth implies the whole of Being: "Truth often finds its way to the mind 
close-muffled in robes of sleep, and then speaks with uncompromising 
directness of matters in regard to which we practice an unconscious self-
deception, during our waking moments."12 In opposition to the Platonic 
tendencies inherent in romanticism, transcendentalism, and the 
scientific-technological world-view, Hawthorne's fiction proclaims the 
phenomenal nature of "form," and thereby re-confirms the factical whole-
ness of Being itself. Since neither truth nor beauty subsist 
"objectively" within the whole of Being, they must be sought on the 
hither side of an artificial distinction between subject and object. 
lOcf. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 130. 
llibid. 
12"The Birth-Mark," X, p. 40. 
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Both physical and metaphysical inquiry willfully ignore their own 
interrogative relation to the "nature" they so obdurately seek to dis-
close by virtue of the theoretical frame which they employ, and which 
subsequently places the "content" of their investigation outside of the 
inquirer himself. Because it divorces itself from the very inquiry it 
undertakes, an "objective" posture is always forced to judge the truth of 
its discoveries in terms of an absolute, impersonal "One" (das Man). For 
example, Kant's position from the outset is tantamount to "One 
knows II Thus, the transcendental unity of apperception is no 
one's in particular. In so far as both rationalism and idealism demand 
the same "objective" point of view, then, they demand in fact no point of 
view at all--that is, Leibniz's perspectiveless posture. In other words, 
"one knows" in the same way "one sees," by virtue of a ubiquitous and 
uniform rational space, the uniform space of perspective. It is this 
very dynamic, or lack of it, which makes the body-less point of view 
inauthentic; it lacks a "self." It constitutes the care-less voice of 
the "they" (das Man), as when we explain what is "correct," for example, 
with the exclamation: "one does this" or "one does that." Only in this 
way can the perspectiveless posture accommodate a contradiction it 
denies to "reality" itself: the distinction between natural and 
unnatural. Pascal knew better: "The nature of man is wholly 
natural There is nothing he may not make natural; there is 
nothing natural he may not lose." 13 To the extent that Being is always 
"at home" with itself, it autonomously relegates the "unnatural" to the 
13Blaise Pascal, Pens/es, 
trans. W. F. Trotter and Thomas 
1941) , p. 3 7. 
in "Pensles" and "The Provincial Letters" 
-- --- -~--=-=- _;_:_..;;....o.~..:.. 
M'Crie (New York: The Modern Library, 
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realm of the absurd. Man can do things to nature, for nature, against 
nature; but they are never unnatural, for the formal possibilities of a 
world are already alongside each other in so far as a world is 
structured by whatever can be. Hawthorne expressed it thus: "Nothing 
comes amiss to Nature--all is fish that comes to her net. If there be a 
living form of perfect beauty instinct with soul--why, it is all very 
well, and suits Nature well enough. But she would just as lief have 
that same beautiful, soul-illumined body, to make worm's meat of, and to 
manure the earth with."l4 For Hawthorne, the dream mode cancelled out 
the abstracted and theoretical logic of second-order consciousness; the 
truth of the world no longer obtains from its non-contradictory agreement 
within a fixed and sterile mental perspective of correct and true ideas. 
Indeed, dream even distorts the "probable," that quantitative security-
blanket by which the masses live their lives mathematically. As Pascal 
has remarked: "Take away probability, and you can no longer please the 
world; give probability, and you can no longer displease it."l5 
Hawthorne's interior world of dream translates the dioramic gaze 
into the "subjective" realm of metaphysics as an analogous model of 
logic. In contrast to the mediate, reflective consciousness of the 
rational attitude, this new interior consciousness reveals a logic 
immediately in touch with Being. In so far as he "occupies" a finite 
middle between two infinite extremes, man must learn to seek repose 
within the center of Being itself, a sphere whose circumference is 
nowhere. "For in fact what is man in nature? A Nothing in comparison 
14The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 272. 
15Pens~s, p. 318. 
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with the Infinite, an All in comparison with the Nothing, a mean between 
nothing and everything. Since he is infinitely removed from comprehending 
the extremes, the end of things and their beginning are hopelessly hidden 
from him in an impenetrable secret. 11 16 Thus, Owen Warland, whose butter-
fly becomes a heap of glittering fragments, at last enowns the object of 
his life-long labors only when it ceases to be objective: "the symbol by 
which he made it perceptible to mortal senses became of little value in 
his eyes, while his spirit possessed itself in the enjoyment of the 
Reality."17 Only outside Being does man objectify the object; within 
the concernfully solicitous sphere of his existence, the object is 
objective only in so far as it "objects." Hawthorne's ontological turn 
toward the interior of Being discloses a logic which converts the 
immanent abjectness of consciousness into the heart's innermost region. 18 
Within this intimate space, the heart takes up the things of the world as 
} 
they proximally express the nearness of Being. The drama which trans-
pires amidst the world of Hawthorne's work articulates an affective 
"locale" wherein the object virtually comes to life; this Ovidian 
universe announces itself to the degree that it becomes animate. The 
Letter, the House, the statue, the ribbon, the pipe, the oaken lady, the 
mountain, the lime-kiln19 __ these objects touch us with their own reality 
only to the extent that they kindle an affective life within. The 
16Ibid., p. 23. 
17"The Artist of the Beautiful," X, p. 475. 
18cf. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 131. 
19The Scarlet Letter, I; The House of the Seven Gables, II; The 
Marble Faun, IV; "Young Goodman Brown," x;"Feathertop," X; "Drowne's 
Wooden Image," X; "The Great Stone Face," XI; "Ethan Brand," XI. 
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controlling consciousness at the center of Hawthorne's vision is thus 
discovered in the heart's inner space; the logic of the heart brings 
things into the fullness of Being where a restructured consciousness 
accommodates the very nearness of Being itself: "Bringing near in this 
way, nearness conceals its own self and remains, in its own way, nearest 
of all."20 
That the remoteness of Being, which the perspective of the scienti-
fic-technological attitude takes for granted, represents the most 
pressing dilemma of a visual culture is already indicated in the growing 
sense of division between appearance and reality; thus, in conjunction 
with its aforementioned evils, the perspective of a world view also intro-
duced an obsession with the problem of hyprocisy: witness Moli~re's 
Tartufe, Tourneur's Revenger's Tragedy, and Fielding's Tom Jones. 21 
Rather than reflect the Baroque quest for depth through duality,2 2 
Hawthorne's oeuvre, like the mirrors which populate it, seeks to direct 
or turn consciousness away from itself, and back to a single-minded 
injunction long forgotten since Socrates. And it is now remembered in 
the same way that we recall a friend who was once dear to us. Because 
this single-minded injunction constitutes the forgetting of itself in a 
particularly personal way, it is now recalled with an affective ardor 
that surprises us with the immediacy of its truth--an immediacy which 
forms a revolutionary directive for the future. At the same time, this 
injunction evokes a "general image" 23 which initially hovers before the 
20Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 178. 
21McLuhan, Vanishing Point, p. 99. 22rbid., p. 101. 
23cf. Eisenstein, The Film Sense, p. 31. 
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world of Hawthorne's work, and which completes the work itself. And 
though Hawthorne's metonymic iconology manipulates its "space" so that it 
freely moves about, his interior consciousness and its corresponding 
logic of the heart's inner space nevertheless creates an intimate and 
unified bearing toward the world of his work, a bearing spiritedly at 
odds with the continuous and fixed attitude of the world-view. It is this 
intimate and unified bearing which recalls the single-minded injunction 
long since forgotten: "to thine own self be true!" This imperative so 
immediately undercuts the hypocritical duality of the world-view that its 
recognition at once illuminates the deceitful disposition of the techno-
logical attitude and its attendant evils. As Pascal remarked of his own 
age, which was already on the way toward the technological era: "I set 
it down as a fact that if all men knew what each said of the other, there 
would not be four friends in the world." 24 For Pascal, as for Hawthorne, 
man can only transcend the hypocritical tendencies of the rational 
attitude by beginning with the "self." Like Hawthorne's single-minded 
injunction, Pascal asserts the factical beginning of Being: "One must 
know oneself. If this does not serve to discover truth, it at least 
serves as a rule of life, and there is nothing better."25 By being true 
to himself, man can at last learn to accept the reciprocal "reality" of 
appearance and its formal relation to the structure of the world. 
Hawthorne's oeuvre attests this fact, and solicits the truth of Being 
within the ambiguous openness at the interior of the heart's inner space. 
Hawthorne's work accomplishes this venture by transforming the techno-
logical dominion of purposeful self-assertion in the objective into the 
24Pensles, p. 41. 25Ibid., p. 20. 
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saying of an inner recall; and ~t inaugurates this transformation with 
the single-minded injunction. Once Being has been dared this way, it now 
lies in the balance. As Heidegger expressed it: "The hard thing consists 
not only in the difficulty of forming the work of language, but in the 
difficulty of going over from the saying work of the still covetous 
vision of things, from the work of the eyes, to the 'work of the 
heart. '"26 The venture thus begins in going over from objective repre-
sentation to the logic of the heart,27 where Being lies in the balance. 
The world of Hawthorne's work safely negotiates this balance once it 
executes the saying of the inner recall. In going over from the 
calculating will to the interior of the heart, the world's inner space, 
the conversion is therein complete, whereby consciousness secures Being 
for itself. Thus, the conversion of consciousness at the interior of 
Hawthorne's world appropriates a "physics of the exception"28 rather than 
the rule; it care-fully takes man beyond the protective rule of uniformity 
toward that interior space which bears the personal and unique stamp of 
Being. Hawthorne's oeuvre arrives out of the future; the future is 
present in it: "The greater the concealment with which what is to come 
maintains its reserve in the foretelling saying, the purer is the 
arrival."29 In "The Hall of Fantasy," the narrator's guide explains it 
thus: "If a man be in advance of his age, he must be content to make 
his abode in this hall, until the lingering generations of his fellow-
26cf. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 138. 
27Ibid., p. 133. 
28cf. Gaston Bachelard, The Psychoanalysis of Fire, trans. Alan 
C. M. Ross (Boston: Beacon Press, A Beacon Paperback, 1968), p. 82. 
29Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 142. 
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men come up with him. He can find no other shelter in the universe. But 
the fantasies of one day are the deepest realities of a future one."30 
It was only the destitution of his own age which, unaware of what it was 
doing, prevented Hawthorne's work from becoming timely.31 The world of 
Hawthorne's work is present to us now. 
I 
More often than not, Hawthorne considered life itself a dream. He 
did so with the implicit recognition that those passing apparitions which 
beseige the interior life of consciousness, especially those which assail 
the "haunted mind" somewhere between waking and slumber, bespeak of a 
reality at odds with the noonday certitude of everyday experience, and 
yet constitute a unified aspect of that experience. Like the narrator of 
"The Celestial Rail-Road," it is easy to dismiss the ambiguous interior 
of consciousness with the facile cliche', "it was only a dream."32 For 
Hawthorne, however, this clichl represents the ultimate, pathetic gesture 
in escape from self-knowledge. 33 It is always those characters who 
reject the dream that are most foolish. Assuming of course, that only 
one who is intelligent can be foolish, 34 Hawthorne's work attests the 
bankruptcy of that intelligence which denies its own apparitions. At 
30 9 X, p. 17 • 
31Heidegger says the same of Holderlin's poetry; cf. Poetry, 
Language, Thought, p. 142. 
32x, p. 206. 
33Joseph C. Pattison, "'The Celestial Rail-Road' as Dream-Tale," 
American Quarterly, 20 (Summer 1968) : 236. 
34cf. Max Scheler, Man'~ Place in Nature, trans. Hans Meyerhoff 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, The Noonday Press, 1961), p. 29. 
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Blithedale, Coverdale's ultimate failure is already prefigured on one of 
his first nights in the community by his dismissal of a dream: "Had I 
made a record of that night's half-waking dreams, it is my belief that it 
would have anticipated several of the chief incidents of this narrative, 
including a dim shadow of its catastrophe."35 In the preface, Hawthorne 
had observed that his own experience at Brook Farm was "essentially a 
day-dream, and yet a fact . . . offering an available foothold between 
fiction and reality."36 Hawthorne's fiction addresses a perceptive 
audience whose sensibility, as he said of his daughter Una, "is more 
readily awakened by fiction than reality."37 Similarly, with the 
Pyncheons, "rejection of dream at cost to their humanity is 
characteristic . Haughtily as the Pyncheons bear themselves in the 
noonday streets, however, they are 'no better than bondservants to these 
plebian Maules, on entering the topsy-turvy commonwealth of sleep'."38 
As with the world-view, those who reject dream inevitably find themselves 
cut off from their own humanity and the world which they inhabit--witness 
Goodman Brown: "A stern, a sad, a darkly meditative, a distrustful, if 
not a desparate man, did he become, from the night of that fearful 
dream."39 Throughout his life, everything predisposed Hawthorne to day-
dreaming, toward unfocused diversions of the mind and senses;40 
35The Blithedale Romance, III, p. 38; cf. also, Pattison, "'The 
Celestial Rail-Road' as Dream-Tale," p. 227. 
36Ibid., p. 2. 
37The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 415. 
38Pattison, "'The Celestial Rail-Road' as Dream-Tale," p. 227. 
39"Young Goodman Brown," X, p. 89. 
40Normand, p. 107. 
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single-mindedly, his work accomplished this oneiric transformation of 
reality, articulating a world constituted by images both from without and 
within. In a journal entry, 1842, he expressed it thus: "To write a 
dream, which shall resemble the real course of a dream, with all its 
inconsistency, its strange transformations, which are all taken as a 
matter of course, its eccentricities and aimlessness--with nevertheless a 
leading idea running through the whole. Up to this.old age of the world, 
no such thing ever has been written."41 
As the spectator of his own dreams, Hawthorne's cinematic 
consciousness reclaims the Ovidian universe as man's primordial homeland: 
We find ourselves on the borders of the region of primitive 
romance, of the supernatural, of dreams. We are entering a land of 
chimeras where everything is possible, where everything is capable 
of metamorphosis: houses transformed into vegetables, human trees, 
wooden figureheads with faces of flesh--we stand once again in the 
province of magic--in which objects and beings are simultaneously 
themselves and other than themselves, change their faces, their 
forms, their colors, appear and disappear ••• the country in 
which things become animate, in which living beings suddenly become 
statues, in which the dead move, in which man is on the same scale 
as nature • • • • 42 
Against the scientific-technological world-view, which always makes man 
"larger than" nature as the "measure" or subjectum, Hawthorne's 
convoluted dream mode not only gives man back to nature, and nature to 
man, but also places him within the circular sphere of Being. Indeed, 
because it puts him on the same scale as nature, it re-places man within 
the ambiguous texture of the existent. Through the dream mode, 
Hawthorne's iconic imagery recreates the expressive labyrinth of a world 
whose ownmost image is itself to be discovered at the interior of the 
41The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 240. 
42Normand, p. 294. 
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heart's inner space. Each work being a sphere, the interwoven texture of 
the world finds its reciprocal convexity and concavity enclosed by 
mutually opposing mirrors which constantly reflect the ambiguous image of 
Being back upon itself:43 the echoes which ricochet from the hills are 
exclusively supported by the hollow, perpetually drawing them back to its 
center;44 the images of the past which circle around Hester are 
inclusively maintained within the frozen silence of the pillory;45 the 
images which evolve inside the showman's box are ultimately grounded by 
its finite, temporal center;46 the interior labyrinth which Goodman Brown 
discovers in the forest paradoxically encloses that which it reveals, as 
the forest itself reciprocally revolves about him.47 The dream-like 
contour of Hawthorne's convoluted sinuosities actively provokes the 
antagonism of the straight line, and the acute aggressive angle.48 
Antipodal to the transparent perspective of the daguerrean view, and its 
explicit sanctification of the straight line and acute angle, the dream 
process opposes all reflective distance by which we "know" the objects of 
a world. As with the equidistant images which revolve around Hester on 
the pillory, dream puts us directly in touch with the objects of a 
consciousness immediately our own. It thus articulates a world 
independent of a priori, rational or mental constructs; it is the 
43cf. Ibid., p. 298. 
44"The Hollow of the Three Hills," IX, p. 201. 
45The Scarlet Letter, I, pp. 58-59. 
46"Main-Street," XI, pp. 49-50. 
47"Young Goodman Brown," X, pp. 83-84. 
48Normand, p. 300. 
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incarnate reality of immediate appearance. As Werner Wolff points out: 
"Most investigators of the dream knowledge that the dream is a 
reflection of waking experiences, but none has stated that our waking 
experiences are also reflections of our dreams;" and though in dream man 
searches for the fulfillment of reality, the opposite is equally true as 
well: "in reality, man searches for the figures of his dream."49 
Similarly, Hawthorne's narrator often questions the "reality" of events; 
he merely states a "fact" and then casts doubt upon it. Thus, the 
narrator achieves a kind of dream logic in the "telling." The ambiguous 
references to illusion and reality accommodate Hawthorne's opaque 
technique without precisely having to define the nature of the experi-
ence--for example, whether it is "actual" or "imaginary." 
In dream, objects of the conceptual mind become but dim shadows to 
the "eye;" the image returns to the incarnate setting of a world. "The 
Haunted Mind" defines the oneiric urgency of this moment: "Passion and 
Feeling assume bodily shape, and the things of the mind become dim 
spectres to the eye."50 As with Keats' "negative capability," the 
haunted mind relinquishes its will to will in favor of a sensibility more 
or less entirely passive, a sensibility, moreover, which invites the 
world to it in order to appear. "In an hour like this, when the mind has 
a passive sensibility, but no active strength; when the imagination is a 
mirror, imparting vividness to all ideas, without the power of selecting 
or controlling them; then pray that your griefs may slt~ber, and the 
49The Dream: Mirror of Conscience (New York: Grune and Stratton, 
1952), pp:-299-300. Cf. also, Erich Fromm, The Forgotten Language. 
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1951. 
50 IX, p. 306. 
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brotherhood of remorse not break their chain."51 For centuries, the 
ontical world of science had contented itself with "observation," a 
procedure which Hawthon1e found at best superfluous. In so far as 
scientific observation merely notices or "takes note of" the conspicuous, 
it is redundant. For this kind of "seeing," the world, as merely the 
sum of all those individual entities that we encounter in it, becomes 
significant only as a concept in the mind. That this theoretical frame-
work became the sole model for dis-covering the world is still evidenced 
today in the expression, "do you see what I mean!" For Hawthorne, 
however, "to see" is to perceive the inconspicuous, to discover something 
in a way which is peculiarly original. In this sense, seeing is always a 
uniquely singular activity. At the old Manse, for example, Hawthorne 
once observed: "The trees have a singular appearance in the midst of 
waters; the curtailment of their trunks quite destroys the proportions of 
the whole tree; and we become conscious of a regularity and propriety in 
the forms of Nature, by the effect of this abbreviation."52 As with the 
diorama, Hawthorne employed the analogous pre-reflective consciousness of 
dream in order to disclose the world anew. 
Unlike the objective analytic of the scientific-technological 
world-view, which "subjects" the world to a determinate number of 
discrete entities or "categories," dream expresses the existential 
unitary structure of the world itself. As Freud observed: "Dreams are 
particularly fond of reducing antitheses to uniformity, or representing 
them as one and the same thing."53 Ambiguity is thus central to the dream 
51 Ibid. 52The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 381. 
53sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. A. A. Brill 
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937), p. 304. 
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logic. By ambiguity, for example, the Letter comes to mean things 
opposite to the Puritan conception of sin.54 Dream both reveals and yet 
conceals that which can never be seen by the willful and arrogant "view." 
It is, in other words, that mode which best lends itself to "burrow-
ing ... into the depths of our common nature," which Hawthorne found 
most suitable to the purposes of "psychological romance;" and whosoever 
pursues his researches in such a dusky region must necessarily do so as 
much "by the tact of sympathy as by the light of observation."55 More-
over, while dream often reveals that which most affectively "lies" 
closest to us, it always does so in disguise. In fact, the hypnagogic 
image discloses that which is most "closed off" from the reflective 
"self," including its attitudes about itself. Coverdale's central dream 
refutes the abstract, reflective logic of his waking moments, that logic 
which gets articulated through his narration, while it expressively con-
firms the logic of his heart, the truest and most profound feeling which 
the narration itself denies. Although he constantly refers to himself 
as a minor figure in the drama of Blithedale, his intermediate position 
between Zenobia and Hollingsworth, as they stand on either side of the 
bed reaching across to exchange a kiss, amidst the torment of his dream, 
reveals in fact that he considers himself central to both their lives; 
indeed, as he beholds this passionate exchange between the two, the image 
of Priscilla entirely fades away so that the dream itself discloses what 
even his final confession conceals: he was in love with Zenobia and not 
Priscilla.56 Similarly, if Goodman Brown's experience in the forest was 
54Pattison, "Point of View in Hawthorne," p. 369. 
55Preface to The Snow-Image, XI, p. 4. 
56rhe Blithedale Romance, III, pp. 153 and 247, respectively. See, 
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only a dream, "alas! it was a dream of evil omen;"57 for in denying the 
evil in himself, he henceforth severed himself from both his wife and the 
remainder of humanity as well. 
Furthermore, in its deployment of images, the dream mode always 
functions cinematically. Consequently, even those works which do not 
explicitly concern themselves with dream nevertheless appropriate its 
technique, for it is a rare work of Hawthorne's which avoids the immedi-
ate mode of "appearance," and usually one of significantly lesser 
artistic quality. "Hawthorne was simply consciously exploiting the 
cinematic resources of the soul. He was one of the first to discover, 
and to demonstrate in dazzling fashion, that the cinema had always 
existed potentially in our imagination, and that it is part of our mental 
activity."58 Conversely, because the moving photograph satisfies our 
sense of reality, it subsequently became an ideal medium for making 
fantasy seem real.59 The interior landscape of "Young Goodman Brown" 
engages us as urgently as if we were "actually" there. Through the 
cinematic play of light and shade, this ambiguous nightmare arrests our 
attention at the very surface of its dramatic "screen:" up front and 
center. It is entirely private. In a similar way, the action of '~y 
Kinsman, Major Molineux" refutes a public space and time, but rather 
"rearranges" its materials by means of montage as in a dream: "Indeed, 
in the sense of the rapid succession of images that the story gives us 
Claire Sprague, "Dream and Disguise in The Blithedale Romance," PMLA, 84 
(May 1969) : 596-97. 
57"Young Goodman Brown," X, p. 89. 
58Normand, p. 329. 
59Durgnat, p. 31. 
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and in the definite effect of condensation and acceleration involved 
we almost seem--as though we were Robin--to dream rather than read the 
story."60 The focus of Robin's gaze alters in proportion to its 
discoveries, and with an alacrity which iimnediately reflects the dramatic 
situation itself: rooftops become walls, walls become mansions, mansions 
become balconies, balconies become pillars, pillars become a gothic 
window.61 This montage, however, disappears abruptly at the end. The 
procession fades out first, leaving the scene by itself; the sense of 
location goes last as the procession moves on, bequeathing a silent 
street behind--and out of this silence, there comes the break in the 
fabric of the dream.62 Hawthorne's sharp focus at the conclusion of the 
story merely punctuates the solitary privacy of his vision, and 
re-situates us toward the public space and time outside the labyrinthian 
interior from which Robin has emerged. And in a final ambiguous gesture, 
the gentleman refuses Robin's request: "'Will you show me the way to the 
ferry?' 'No, my good friend Robin, not to-night, at least,' said the 
gentleman. 'Some few days hence, if you continue to wish it, I will 
speed you on your journey. Or, if you prefer to remain with us, perhaps, 
as you are a shrewd youth, you may rise in the world, without the help of 
your kinsman, Major Molineaux.'"63 Obviously, Robin's perception of his 
kinsman at the conclusion of this illusively shattering experience is 
diametrically opposed to that which he had before when his kinsman 
60Franklin B. Newman, "'My Kinsman, Major Molineux': An 
Interpretation," University of Kansas City Review, 21 (March 1955) 
61"My Kinsman, Major Molineux," XI, p. 221. 
62Newman, p. 209. 
63"My Kinsman, Major }lolineaux," XI, p. 231. 
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visited him in the country, the very~ priori conception he brought with 
him when he first entered the town. Yet, everyman may have two faces. 
So Robin's laughter at the end, as loudest of all, supplants even that 
of the double-visaged figure, suggesting that his momentary perception 
of the world as ambiguous and often contradictory reinforces the under-
lying irony of all things, and further implies a new and different kind 
of wisdom as the modern image of the conventional jester. 
In addition to nightmare and dream, however, the haunted mind 
accommodates reverie as well; indeed, "it contains the entire cinema of 
consciousness, with its methods, its technique, its screen, its 
camera."64 Properly speaking, Hawthorne's haunted mind more closely 
approximates what, today, contemporary psychology calls the "theta 
state." "You sink down in a flowery spot, on the borders of sleep and 
wakefulness, while your thoughts rise before you in pictures, all dis-
connected, yet all assimilated by a pervading gladsomeness and beauty;" 
or, to vary the metaphor, "you find yourself, for a single instant, wide 
awake in that realm of illusions, whither sleep has been the passport, 
and behold its ghostly inhabitants and wondrous scenery, with a 
perception,of their strangeness, such as you never attain while the 
dream is undisturbed." 65 Like reverie, a world of fragmented images 
arises before the haunted mind within "the space of a summer night;"66 
images which reveal the depths of the heart; it is the present moment of 
a time thoroughly detached from all biographical perspective, a time 
64Normand, p. 329. 
65"The Haunted Mind," IX, pp. 308 and 304, respectively. 
66Ibid., p. 305. 
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without past or future. "Yesterday has already vanished among the 
shadows of the past; to-morrow has not yet emerged from the future. You 
have found an intermediate space, where the business of life does not 
intrude; where the passing moment lingers, and becomes truly the present; 
a spot where Father Time, when he thinks nobody is watching him, sits 
down by the way side to take breath."67 It is the time of "conscious 
sleep."68 Like the images which engage us when we are seated before a 
fire, each lingers in the mind's eye long after darkness has swallowed 
the reality.69 Around the principle of the haunted mind, Hawthorne thus 
structures his most effective tales; through reverie-like associations, 
he transcends the everyday world of conventional consciousness. 
Harassed by the phantasms which arise before him, Goodman Brown struggles 
forward through the gloom of the forest;7° plagued by the panorama of her 
past, Hester momentarily displaces the anguish of the pillory with that 
of another;71 compelled by his curious sense of unreality, the adventurer 
of the "Night Sketches" hastens through the black of the night, guided 
only by an occasional flicker of light--a reverie of street-lamps rather 
than fire.72 And so the consciousness of reverie articulates a parallel 
between human life and itself: "In both you emerge from mystery, pass 
through a vicissitude that you can but imperfectly control, and are borne 
onward to another mystery." 73 
67Ibid. 68Ibid. , p. 307. 69Ibid., p. 308. 
70"Young Goodman Brown," X, p. 81. 
71rhe Scarlet Letter, I, p. 58. 
72Ix, pp. 428 and 431, respectively. 
73"The Haunted Mind," IX, p. 309. 
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Beside the blaze of the fire, Ethan Brand struggles against those 
images that beseige him, recalling the smoldering panorama of his life 
within a single instant. More than anything else, fire invites reverie. 
As Bachelard observes: "If fire, which, after all, is quite an 
exceptional and rare phenomenon, was taken to be a constituent element of 
the Universe, is it not because it is an element of human thought, the 
prime element of reverie?"74 Hawthorne's own life reveals a marked 
fascination, if not obsession, with this phenomenon--as does his oeuvre. 
In Salem, as a child, he often went to watch the fires that broke out; 
and if one occurred late at night, he used to send his sister to investi-
gate, reporting back to him whether it was worth getting out of bed to 
see.75 Both the notebooks as well as the fiction abound with references 
to the fireside. Distinct from the attention of observation and 
contemplation, reverie before a fire expresses the unitary structure of a 
total phenomenon. Thus, Ethan Brand "sat listening to the crackling of 
the kindled wood, and looking at the little spirts of fire that issued 
through the chinks of the door. These trifles, however, once so 
familiar, had but the slightest hold of his attention; while deep within 
his mind, he was reviewing the gradual, but marvellous change, that had 
been wrought upon him by the search to which he had devoted himself.n76 
The fire itself reflects this sudden change, the withering of a heart 
having "ceased to partake of the universal throb." 77 In a typically 
74The Psychoanalysis of Fire, p. 18. 
75Normand, p. 21. 
76"Ethan Brand," XI, p. 98. 
77rbid., p. 99. 
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astute psychological perception, Hawthorne thus conjoins this transforma-
tion to both the stunted life of the fire and the plenary life of the 
lime-kiln, a world unto its own, as Ethan ascends the hill toward the top 
of the structure. In its own way, of course, the reverie has already 
accomplished this task: 
Fire is for the man who is contemplating it an example of a sudden 
change or development and an example of a circumstantial develop-
ment. Less monotonous and less abstract than flowing water •.. 
fire suggests the desire to change, to speed up the passage of 
time, to bring all of life to its conclusion, to its hereafter. 
In these circumstances the reverie becomes truly fascinating and 
dramatic; it magnifies human destiny; it links the small to the 
great, the hearth to the volcano, the life of a log to the life of 
a world. The fascinated individual hears the call of the funeral 
---------~- For him destruction is more than a change, it is a 
renewal.78 
Thus Ethan, through identification, surrenders the cold marble of his own 
heart to the heart of the flames. Unlike the mayfly, however, this 
incomplete lesson in eternity leaves a trace--the shape of his heart 
endures upon the surface of the lime. 79 Yet, once the lime-burner 
crushes the remains, the lesson is complete: Ethan paradoxically 
reappropriates the warmth of humanity's common bond, the heart. 
Ironically, death in the flames is the least lonely of deaths; through 
it, Ethan attains the cosmic: an entire world is reduced to 
nothingness.BO Only the dream remains: "That night the sound of a 
fearful peal of laughter rolled heavily through the sleep of the lime-
burner and his little son; dim shapes of horror and anguish haunted their 
dreams, and seemed still present in the rude hovel when they opened their 
78Bachelard, The Psychoanalysis of Fire, p. 16. 
79cf. Ibid., p. 17. 
BOcf. Ibid., p. 19. 
eyes to the daylight."81 
In so far as it thus accommodates nightmare, dream, and reverie, 
the haunted mind evades objective time and space; because it envelops 
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a personal consciousness, the haunted mind exemplifies the plenitude of 
a world where intentional subjectivities primordially abide. Within this 
ambiguous and opaque abode, the transparent "cogito" gets thrown back 
upon its equivocal, subjective adherence in pre-objective phenomena. 
Like the gothic edifice in "The Hall of Fantasy," the haunted mind, as 
with fantasy itself, admits the light of "heaven" or reason "only through 
stained and pictured glass, thus filling with many-colored radiance, and 
painting its marble floor with beautiful or grotesque designs; so that 
its inmates breathe, as it were, a visionary atmosphere, and tread upon 
the fantasies of poetic minds."82 This edifice of poetic fantasy forever 
remains man's true and lasting homeland, for though it superficially 
gives "the impression of a dream, which might be dissipated and 
shattered to fragments, by merely stamping the foot upon the pavement," 
yet, "with such modifications and repairs as successive ages demand, the 
Hall of Fantasy is likely to endure longer than the most substantial 
structure that ever cumbered the earth."83 Hence, the logic of the 
haunted mind is nothing less than poetic; it articulates the interior 
growth of consciousness, that unchartered region which we are so prone 
to isolate from "reality," either to grant it an immaterial existence 
apart or to deny its existence altogether. Indeed, Hawthorne's world 
converts the poetic consciousness into an organ, a thing of flesh and 
81"Ethan Brand," XI, p. 100. 
B2x, p. 112. 83Ibid., PP· 172-73. 
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blood "whose substance may be tenuous but which can also become 
extremely dense and weigh down with a great weight in the physical 
world."84 Because the haunted mind identifies itself with the substance 
of its images, the very identity between object and image, it is always 
already alongside or, better, inherent in the reality it discloses: 
"consciousness awake and consciousness asleep--consciousness questing or 
fleeing, following its own arabesques, mingling with itself, fighting 
against itself without cease."85 For this reason, great poets should 
have iron sinews. 86 Likewise, as with the Hall of Fantasy, "we see but 
a small portion of the edifice,"87 for the poetic consciousness is 
incarnate; it scorns the intellectual transparency of the world-view 
whose schemes for "fixing the reflections of objects in a pool of water, 
and thus taking the most life-like portraits imaginable,"88 must always 
go awry. 
Hawthorne's poetic consciousness, furthermore, reasserts the 
primacy of time over and against the spatial objectivity of the world-
view. In its convulsive, Laocoon-like sinuosity, poetic consciousness 
unequivocally rejects the infinite transparency of heaven for the finite 
"apparency" of earth: "I fear that no other world can show us anything 
just like this."89 Grounded in time, the poetic consciousness of the 
haunted mind appropriates the appearance as a significant part of the 
reality it discloses. As Lessing observed: "All bodies, however, exist 
84Normand, p. 350. 85rbid. 
86"P.'s Correspondence," X, p. 375. 
87"The Hall of Fantasy," X, p .. 173. 
88rbid., p. 178. 89rbid., p. 184. 
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not only in space, but also in time. They continue, and, at any moment 
of their continuance, may assume a different appearance and stand in 
different relations." 90 Moreover, in so far as he inhabits the Hall of 
Fantasy daily, "the poet knows his whereabout, and therefore is less 
likely to make a fool of himself in real life."91 He thus ironically 
occupies the solid ground of earth more often than the dream-tower to 
which the scientific attitude always assigns him: "the root of human 
nature strikes down deep into this earthly soil; and it is but reluctantly 
that we submit to be transplanted, even for a higher cultivation in 
Heaven. I query whether the destruction of the earth would gratify any 
one individual; except, perhaps,. some embarrassed man of business, whose 
notes fall due a day after the day of doom."92 Rather than analyze its 
constituent elements, the poet invites the earth to his bosom endearingly, 
and for the sake of her own apparent beauty, and not her abstracted 
schematization in the mind. To be sure, the multitude generally desires 
that the earth continues to endure as well; yet its reasons are invariably 
selfish: "In short, nobody seemed satisfied that this mortal scene of 
things should have its close just now. Yet, it must be confessed, the 
motives of the crowd for desiring its continuance were mostly so absurd, 
that, unless Infinite Wisdom had been aware of much better reasons, the 
solid Earth must have melted away at once."93 The poet, on the other 
hand, accepts the solicitous call to Being: 
90Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocoon: An Essay Upon the Limits of 
Painting and Poetry, trans. Ellen Frothingham (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, The Noonday Press, 1969), p. 91. 
91"The Hall of Fantasy," X, p. 177. 
92Ibid., pp. 182-83. 93Ibid., p. 183. 
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For my own part, not to speak of a few private and personal ends, 
I really desired our old Mother's prolonged existence, for her own 
dear sake. 
"The poor old Earth!" I repeated. "What I should chiefly regret 
in her destruction would be that very earthliness, which no other 
sphere or state of existence can renew or compensate. The 
fragrance of flowers, and of new-mown hay; the genial warmth of 
sunshine, and the beauty of a sunset among clouds; the comfort and 
cheerful glow of the fireside .•. even the fast-falling snow, 
and the gray atmosphere through which it descends--all these, and 
innumerable enjoyable things of earth, must perish with her."94 
This new poetic consciousness in Hawthorne embraces the finite as its very 
ground and, in so doing, subsequently hands back the truth of Being to the 
illusive and ambiguous sphere of "beauty" from whence the truth of Being 
primordially makes its first appearance. Indeed, appearance is beauty. 
Hence, the beautiful does not occur alongside and apart from this truth, 
but "belongs to the advent of truth, truth's taking of its place."95 
Poetic consciousness thus penetrates the dream-like opacity of the 
haunted mind only in so far as it articulates those interior voids or 
subjectivities which dwell within the fold of Being, those impenetrable 
gaps in the texture of the existent which both disclose and conceal the 
universal veil of Being itself. As P. remarks: "The reality--that which 
I know to be such--hangs like remnants of tattered scenery over the 
intolerably prominent illusion. Let us think of it no more."96 Like his 
"irrational" correspondence, the dream-like consciousness of the haunted 
mind disrupts the synchronic standpoint of the world-view and its 
distanced chronological perspective, in favor of an ek-static present 
which diachronically appropriates the past with Care (Sorge). As the 
94Ibid., PP· 183-84. 
95Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 81. 
96"p. 's Correspondence," X, p. 371. 
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correspondent explains: 
My unfortunate friend P. has lost the thread of his life, by the 
interposition of long intervals or partially disordered reason. 
The past and present are jumbled together in his mind, in a manner 
often productive of curious results . . . . The poor fellow • • • 
meets, in his wanderings, a variety of personages who have long 
ceased to be visible to any eye save his own. In my opinion, all 
this is not so much a delusion, as a partly wilful and partly 
involuntary sport of the imagination .... 97 
In having lost the "thread" of his life, P. disrupts the synchronically 
detached standpoint itself. Against the dis-interested standpoint of 
rational observation, his interested "repetition" or recollection forward 
dialogically engages him with the whole of Being. Reality ceases to be 
prior and becomes, in turn, ontologically grounded in the Being of 
Dasein, for reality is dependent upon Care.98 Because it thus refers the 
metaphysical "reality" of the idea (eidos) back to the phenomenon of Care, 
the unitary structure of Dasein, the unorthodox logic of P.'s "irrational" 
mind simultaneously returns the idea itself back to the ambiguous, 
incarnate texture of Being from whence it makes its initial appearance. 
Similarly, this unorthodox logic spontaneously consolidates itself "into 
almost as material an entity as mankind's strongest architecture. It ~s 
sometimes a serious question with me, whether ideas be not really vis.ible 
and tangible, and endowed with all the other qualities of matter."99 
Like the recollected figure of Keats in P.'s own haunted mind, who has 
"thrown his poem forward into an indefinitely remote future,"lOO P.'s 
poetic consciousness likewise recollects the past forward, in intere.sted 
97 6 Ibid., p. 3 1. 
98Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 255. 
99"P.'s Correspondence," X, p. 362. 
lOOib:i,d., p. 375. 
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repetition, in order to dialogically recall the most primordial question 
of Being, a question which the metaphysical tradition of Western civili-
zation had forgotten since Parmenides--the ontological question of Being, 
and not the pseudo-problematic of those ontical "beings" constitutive of 
a world. In so far as "appearance" itself--that is, the phenomenon--pri-
mordially discloses the truth of the world, it simultaneously reveals to 
what extent reality is ontologically grounded in a factical subjectivity 
which makes the birth of Being possible, and to whom the question of 
Being can become an issue in the first place. Open to its ownmost 
possibilities, P.'s haunted mind recreates the visionary moment of 
anticipatory resolution, that authentically historical temporality which 
"deprives the 'today' of its character as present."101 Like the Proustian 
consciousness, those figures which populate P.'s past persistently haunt 
his present as well by virtue of an interested recollection forward, and 
by which they have become incarnate: "Were it only possible to find out 
who are alive, and who dead, it would contribute infinitely to my peace 
of mind. Every day of my life, somebody comes and stares me in the face, 
whom I had quietly blotted out of the tablet of living men, and trusted 
never more to be pestered with the sight or sound of him." 102 Heidegger 
has said it another way: "When, however, one's existence is 
inauthentically historical, it is loaded down with a legacy of a 'past' 
which has become unrecognizable, and it seeks the modern. But when 
historicality is authentic, it understands history as the 'recurrence' 
of the possible, and knows that a possibility will recur only if 
101Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 444. 
102"P.'s Correspondence," X, p. 377. 
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existence is open for it fatefully, in a moment of vision, in resolute 
repetition." 103 Similarly, "the fantasies of one day are the deepest 
realities of a future one."l04 
The poetic consciousness thus assures the appearance of its 
reciprocal place in reality. Through its dream-like vision, the world of 
Hawthorne's work opens a phenomenal ingress to the question of Being, 
without which the poetic consciousness would leave that very world behind. 
Hence, dream provides the necessary link between both subject and object 
which indivisibly cohere within the unitary structure of a world. As 
Merleau-Ponty has remarked: 
In the same way, though it is indeed from the dreamer that I was 
last night that I require an account of the dream, the dreamer 
himself offers no account, and the person who does so is awake. 
Bereft of the waking state, dreams would be no more than 
instantaneous modulations, and so would not even exist for us. 
During the dream itself, we do not leave the world behind: the 
dream space is segregated from the space of clear thinking, but it 
uses all the latter's articulations; the world obsesses us even 
during sleep, and it is about the world that we dream.l05 
Because the haunted mind recreates a consciousness whose fluid interior 
unceasingly equivocates the transparent picture that scientific conscious-
ness demands, it expresses the very situated structure of Being itself, 
a structure wherein free and multiple consciousnesses articulate the 
hidden reality of a world beyond the edges of an objective frame. "What 
a strange, incongruous dream is the life of man!" 106 Hawthorne's fiction 
resuscitates the psychic vitality and validity of dream in order to secure 
103Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 444. 
104"The Hall of Fantasy," X, p. 179. 
105Phenomenology, p. 293. 
106"P.'s Correspondence," X, p. 373. 
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the world's inner space, the space of the heart. The dream can never 
"lie;" its truth is inherently there, though often in disguise. By 
reason of its own logic, dream discloses those aspects of the "self," and 
its relation to the world, which intellectual observation would deny. 
"Ordinary people have the power of not thinking of that about which they 
do not wish to think." 107 Similarly, the heart has reasons of which 
reason itself knows nothing. 108 Hawthorne's world expresses the 
bankruptcy of an objective view grounded in the intellect, for only the 
reality of the heart can touch man in his whole nature, allowing him to 
openly hold his world around him in wonder and awe. "How many kingdoms 
know us not!"l09 The logic of the heart is thus extraordinary in so far 
as it takes man beyond the protective and self-defensive bounds of 
objectification, the self-assertive domination of Being. Only within the 
openness of man's own heart is he secure. Speaking of Shelley's later 
works, P. expresses it thus: "They are warmer with hwnan love, which has 
served as an interpreter between his mind and the multitude. The author 
has learned to dip his pen oftener into his heart, and has thereby 
avoided the faults into which a too exclusive use of fancy and intellect 
was wont to betray him."llO Long before Freud, Hawthorne knew his 
psychology well. Within the logical structure of the dream, Hawthorne 
discovered an analogous logic of the heart--the interior logic of the 
world's inner space which both expresses the poetic consciousness itself 
107Pascal, Pensles, p. 91. 
108rbid., p. 95. 
109rbid., p. 75. 
llO"P.'s Correspondence," X, p. 373. 
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and, at the same time, recalls the single-minded injunction long forgotten 
since Socrates: "Be true! Be true! Be true! Show freely to the world, 
if not your worst, yet some trait whereby the worst can be inferred!"l11 
In an age when men's minds were still oriented toward moral analysis, 
Hawthorne's fiction brought about a psychological revolution in American 
literature, "a revolution that in no way prefigured the introduction into 
the average American's everyday life of a psychoanalysis imbued with a 
superstitious regard for the social norm, but, on the contrary, that 
upheld both the rights of the outstanding individual and the rights of 
the poet."112 As Dimmesdale's life attests: 
It is the unspeakable misery of a life so false as his, that it 
steals the pith and substance out of whatever realities there are 
around us, and which were meant by Heaven to be the spirit's joy 
and nutriment. To the untrue man, the whole universe is false,--it 
is impalpable,--it shrinks to nothing within his grasp. And he 
himself, in so far as he shows himself in a false light, becomes a 
shadow, or, indeed, ceases to exist.113 
II 
Because it abnegates the distanceless remoteness of the world-view, 
Hawthorne's oeuvre turns the transient and therefore preliminary 
character of object-things away from the invisible region of the 
producing consciousness and toward the true interior of the heart's 
space: "Only what we thus retain in our heart (par coeur), only that do 
we truly know by heart." 114 Those objects which populate the interior 
space of Hawthorne's world synecdochically express the whole of Being at 
111The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 260. 
112Normand, p. 236. 
l13The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 146. 
114Heidegger, Poetr~, Language, Thought, p. 130. 
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its most primordially affective depth, a depth whose meaning obtains from 
an opposing "ob-," that factical subjectivity which initially calls the 
ob-ject into Being. 115 Thus, Hawthorne's superficial observance of 
historical objectivity often merely constitutes an ironic posture; like 
Goethe and Tieck, he delighted in destroying this "objectivity" every 
chance he got. Indeed, Hawthorne's irony frequently satirizes the past 
as a value in itself. Whereas only one glass of whiskey suffices to 
produce the rather doubtful "Edward Randolph's Portrait," for example, 
the story of Lady Eleanor represents the product of three glasses of 
madeira.116 Hawthorne's ambiguously ironic pose persistently refutes the 
object as objective, redeeming its synoicous essence while simultaneously 
returning it to the incarnate setting of a world. Against the scientific-
technological objectification of the world, which distances the thing by 
virtue of its frame or view, Hawthorne's interior logic of the heart 
reappropriates the thing for man, and man for the thing. Being is near 
whenever it stays the object in its presence, just as man appropriates 
the nearness of Being whenever he allows it to come up to itself and 
back into the nature of its truth.ll7 The dichotomy between "head" and 
"heart" which pervasively characterizes Hawthorne's work, and which the 
critics have so often discussed, subsequently structures the "nearness" 
and "farness" of Being within a larger metaphysical picture, a picture 
whose referential surface Hawthorne's oeuvre sets out to destruct or 
de-structure. Because the scientific or "intellectual" attitude, that of 
ll5Ibid., p. 177. 
116Alfred H. Marks, "German Romantic Irony in Hawthorne's Tales," 
Symposium, 7 (November 1953) : 278. 
117Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 131. 
325 
the head, sets man at odds with nature, and thus with himself, it simul-
taneously sets him apart from the world he seeks to "picture" or know. 
Such is the case with all of Hawthorne's villains. Chillingworth manip-
ulates Dimmesdale with the detached perspective of a behavioral 
psychologist observing the reactions of his guinea pigs;118 Westervelt 
controls both Zenobia and Priscilla with an intensity equalled only by 
his monomaniacal attachment to his own dark schemes;119 Aylmer tinkers 
with an insignificant imperfection in his wife only to discover that in 
curing the "disease" he has killed the patient; 120 Rappaccini 
experiments on his daughter with no more affection than he displays 
toward the noxious plants within the encapsulated garden, a garden which 
not only isolates them from the world, but from each other as well--that 
is, he treats her ob-noxiously;l21 even Hollingsworth, whose philanthropy 
has turned inward and back upon itself to the point of madness, 
obsessively envisions mankind as one vast body in desparate need of 
reform. 122 
Hawthorne's villains unanimously deny the supplications of the 
heart; at best, the heart becomes an object of investigation. Because 
they intellectually separate themselves from whatever object their 
investigation undertakes, both the scientist and reformer sever their 
"self" from its affective relation to the world. The nature and purpose 
118The Scarlet Letter, I, pp. 129-38. 
11 9The Blithedale Romance, III, pp. 158-59 and 201-02. 
120"The Birth-Mark," X, p. 56. 
12l"Rappaccini's Daughter," X, p. 114. 
122The Blithedale Romance, III, pp. 70-71. 
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of their investigation has already determined this. In so far as they 
must "undertake" the object of their investigation in order to discover 
it objectively, they have already placed themselves outside the solicitous 
sphere of Being. Indeed, the infinite remoteness necessary for holding 
the object at bay precludes their ownmost freedom to "take it up" 
affectively. Since they cannot take the object to themselves--that is, 
bring themselves to it--Hawthorne's villains "undertake" the world in the 
very same way we undertake a disagreeable chore. The world henceforth 
becomes a necessary evil, an evil whose existence must be tolerated in 
order to theoretically transfer it to the mind where its material 
resistance ceases to be an ob-stacle entirely. A theory thus becomes 
the world, and the world becomes "becoming" to the subjectum. At the 
same time, however, because this "space" has receded toward the purely 
human, indifferent to the intentional space of "others," it has already 
gone insane. "It is remarkable, that persons who speculate the most 
boldly often conform with the most perfect quietude to the external 
regulations of society. The thought suffices them, without investing 
itself in the flesh and blood of action." 123 Even Hester is not exempt 
from this inclination: "Much of the marble coldness of Hester's 
impression was to be attributed to the circumstance that her life had 
turned, in a great measure, from passion and feeling, to thought;" 
standing alone in the world, "she cast away the fragments of a broken 
chain. The world's law was no law for her rnind." 124 Hester's love and 
concern for Dimmesdale, however, secures her from the total isolation 
123The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 164. 
124rbid. 
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experienced by Hawthorne's villains, who "by an iron framework of 
reasoning"125 obdurately seek to verify their own stunted intellectual 
convictions. By im-posing their "space" on others, both scientist and 
reformer religiously take upon themselves the burden of the world--that 
is, the freedom and responsibility of others. They become, in other 
words, religious fanatics. And as Pascal so forcefully points out: "Men 
never do evil so completely and cheerfully as when they do it from 
religious conviction."126 
Chillingworth deceptively begins his initial investigation "with 
the severe and equal integrity of a judge, desirous only of truth, even 
as if the question involved no more than the air-drawn lines and figures 
of a geometrical problem, instead of human passions, and wrongs inflicted 
on himself."127 Yet, such an over-simplified attitude is easily 
distorted since it neglects its own facticity: "But, as he proceeded, a 
terrible fascination, a kind of fierce, though still calm, necessity 
seized the old man within its gripe, and never set him free again, until 
he had done all its bidding."128 At the same time, Dimmesdale's natural 
bent exhibits similar tendencies, for his entire bearing toward the 
world has been "etherealized" by extended years of weary toil among his 
books; all he lacked "was the gift that descended upon the chosen 
disciples, at Pentecost, in tongues of flame; symbolizing, it would seem, 
not the power of speech in foreign and unknown languages, but that of 
addressing the whole human brotherhood in the heart's native language."129 
125rbid., p. 162. 126Pens~es, p. 314. 
127The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 129. 
I28Ibid. 129rbid., pp. 141-42. 
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Like Hester, however, the burden of guilt and complicity with mankind 
irrevocably stays his intellectual tendencies, ironically bestowing upon 
him that very faculty the pentecostal flame ignites: "But this very 
burden it was, that gave him sympathies so intimate with the sinful 
brotherhood of mankind; so that his heart vibrated in unison with theirs, 
and received their pain into itself, and sent its own throb of pain 
through a thousand other hearts, in gushes of sad, persuasive 
eloquence."l30 It is, of course, this brotherhood which Goodman Brown 
rejects. Nevertheless, so long as Dinnnesdale remains untrue to himself, 
this hidden complicity continues to gnaw at his heart, while even his 
eyes reflect the deep secret at his interior; thus, "it was the 
clergyman's peculiarity that he seldom, now-a-days, looked straightforth 
at any object, whether human or inanimate." 13l What subsequently 
differentiates Dimmesdale, however, from the true villain, is that his 
human complicity, though hidden, interpenetrates the solicitous sphere of 
Being, whereas Goodman Brown, for example, deliberately chooses to stand 
apart from the existent as a whole. 
This self-imposed isolation characterizes all of Hawthorne's 
villains. They lack heart; "they would not make a friend of it."132 
Instead, they often seek to penetrate its secrets, to analyze its 
operations, to rationalize its "reasons," to objectify its ambiguous and 
evasive logic. Hawthorne's villains are thus chronically deceived in 
their obsessive endeavors, for though a disease of the heart may very 
well affect, or infect, the body, it can never become transparent to an 
130Ibid., p. 142. 131Ibid., p. 131. 
132Pascal, Pensles, p. 73. 
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intellectually comprehensive view. Although the propositions of the 
intellect are inferred, the principles of the heart are always intuited: 
"it is as useless and absurd for reason to demand from the heart proof 
of her first principles, before admitting them, as it would be for the 
heart to demand from reason an intuition of all demonstrated 
propositions before accepting them."133 As Dimmesdale remarks to 
Chillingworth: "There can be, if I forebode aright, no power, short of 
the Divine mercy, to disclose, whether by uttered words, or by type or 
emblem, the secrets that may be buried with a human heart.n134 
Ironically, the secret buried within Dimmesdale's own heart discloses 
itself emblematically; but even then, as a psychosomatic phenomenon, 
this tell-tale emblem emblazoned on his bosom shows signs of a 
disturbance in its purely symptomatic manifestation. Even after the 
physician discovers the burning emblem on Dimmesdale's breast, stealing 
into the room while he sleeps, it only encourages Chillingworth's 
curiosity the more. His compulsion forces him to delve deeper and 
deeper into an investigation which has no perceptible end in view. Like 
the vanishing point of a perspective, it is infinitely remote. The 
"reasons" of the heart can never array themselves before the intellect 
within a single, unified picture; the heart, like the body itself, 
evades such a transparent manipulation precisely because it is always 
situated. We can never have it before us, entirely in view. Because it 
equivocates the objectification to which Hawthorne's villains would 
subject it, the heart throws the intellectual attitude back upon itself 
133rbid., p. 96. 
134rhe Scarlet Letter, I, p. 131. 
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where it is now further frustrated by its insatiable attempt to know or 
objectify not only the "other," but its "self" as well. The villain 
becomes his own most dangerous enemy. Trusting no one, he can no longer 
recognize the enemy when he actually appears. By treating the "other" as 
an object in an object-world, he subsequently loses his ownmost "self." 
Having once created this affective void at the center of his being, the 
villain, bereft of a world, must thereafter depend upon the object of his 
investigation for his own existence. He thus paradoxically becomes an 
active agency only in so far as he expropriates the being of the "other." 
He ceases to participate in the life of the existent as a whole. Hence, 
with Dimmesdale's death, Chillingworth is doomed as well: 
All his strength and energy--all his vital and intellectual 
force--seemed at once to desert him; insomuch that he positively 
withered up, shrivelled away, and almost vanished from mortal 
sight, like an uprooted weed that lies wilting in the sun. This 
unhappy man had made the very principle of his life to consist tn 
the pursuit and systematic exercise of revenge; and when, by its 
completest triumph and consummation, that evil principle was left 
with no further material to support it,--when, in short, the·re was 
no more devil's work on earth for him to do, it only remained for 
the unhumanized mortal to betake himself whither his Master would 
find him tasks enough, and pay him his wages duly.l35 
Similarly, all of Hawthorne's villains maniacally attach themselves 
to the disembodied ubiquity of a transparent idea; and all are equally 
destined to forfeit the object of their solitary pursuit: governed by 
the obsession to eliminate the crimson imperfection on Georgiana's cheek, 
Aylmer employs his utmost energy only to lose her in the end;l36 
encouraged by his feeble curiosity and the dispassionate desire to see 
Beatrice transcend the sphere of ordinary women, Rappaccini rears his 
135rbid., p. 260. 
136"The Birth-Mark," X, p. 56. 
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only daughter amidst the poisonous experiments of his garden only to 
behold her death at the hands of an ironically fatal antidote;137 
haunted by the quest to discover the Unpardonable Sin, Ethan searches 
throughout the world only to destroy himself in impotent surrender to the 
blaze of the lime-kiln;138 driven by his will to power, Westervelt 
deploys his hypnotic skills toward Zenobia and Priscilla only to forfeit 
both. 139 Like Mr. Lindsey in "The Snow-Image," Hawthorne's villains 
utilize an inflexible, systematic frame by which they negotiate the world 
without exception. In this sense, they are uniformly unexceptional. 
Furthermore, the reformer is, in many ways, the most dangerous of all the 
Hawthorne villains, for since his object of concern is always the "other," 
the sphere of his power is most often prone to run away from the very 
reponsibility his view professes. What Hawthorne concludes of 
Mr. Lindsey holds equally true for all of his reformers; it would make 
profitable reading today in a curriculum for social workers: "it behoves 
men, and especially men of benevolence, to consider well what they are 
about, and, before acting on their philanthropic purposes, to be quite 
sure that they comprehend the nature and all the relations of the 
business in hand. What has been established as an element of good to one 
being, may prove absolute mischief to another." 140 Perhaps Hollings-
worth's character itself best describes that extreme to which the 
"benevolent" attitude is most disposed: 
137"Rappaccini's Daughter," X, p. 128. 
138"Ethan Brand," XI, p. 100. 
139The Blithedale Romance, III, pp. 203 and 234, respectively. 
Cf. also,"liihe Man of Adamant," XI, and "The Ambitious Guest," IX. 
140"The Snow-Image," XI, p. 25. 
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admitting what is called Philanthropy, when adopted as a profession, 
to be often useful by its energetic impulse to society at large, it 
is perilous to the individual, whose ruling passion, in one 
exclusive channel, it thus becomes. It ruins, or is fearfully apt 
to ruin, the heart; the rich juices of which God never meant should 
be pressed violently out, and distilled into alcoholic liquor, by 
an unnatural process; but should render life sweet, bland, and 
gently beneficient, and insensibly influence other hearts and other 
lives to the same blessed end. I see in Hollingsworth an 
exemplification of the most awful truth in Bunyan's book of such;--
from the very gate of Heaven, there is a by-way to the pit!141 
As the novels of Henry James so aptly confirm, the unattainable ideal 
makes monsters of us all. Within the finite realm of Being, those who 
would be God would be Satan as well, for the other side of Angel is 
always Devil. "Man, as man, has always measured himself with and 
against something heavenly. Lucifer, too, is descended from heaven."142 
Pascal has said it another way: "Man is neither angel nor brute, and the 
unfortunate thing is that he who would act the angel acts the brute." 143 
Hawthorne's reformers are not alone in this respect; for both the 
scientist and the intellectual in general are precariously poised above 
this egocentric "pit." Since, by definition, the monomaniacal enterprise 
undertakes its mission with its gaze fixed solely on an isolated 
"objective" which constitutes the infinitely remote vanishing point of 
its view, it ignores, like the inauthentic technological perception, that 
which lies closest to its immediate "field." In other words, it avoids, 
at all costs, the responsibility for itself. Because it has not 
questioned its own raison d'ttre, it simultaneously denies itself the 
possibility of self-reproach for whatever failure it encounters. If 
141The Blithedale Romance, III, p. 243. 
142Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 221. 
143Pensles, p. 118. 
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ever, the lesson is learned too late. Thus, Ethan's final, "involuntary 
recognition of the infinite absurdity of seeking throughout the world for 
what was the closest of all things to himself, and looking into every 
heart, save his own, for what was hidden in no other breast,"l44 
ironically terminates eighteen years of futile, blind volition. What 
else is left to will of any significance but his own death? Similarly, 
years after his experience at Blithedale, Hollingsworth has yet to reform 
a single criminal; 145 after seven years of uninterrupted observation, 
Chillingworth has yet to whole-heartedly entrap his prey;l46 after 
complete surrender to an ideal quest, Owen Warland has yet to permanently 
materialize the aim of his original intention; 14 7 after a twenty-year 
leave of "absence" from his wife in order to observe her, Wakefield has 
yet to discover that the final joke is on him.l48 And we may confidently 
assume the same of Aylmer, Rappaccini, and Westervelt. Even Dimmesdale, 
who likewise learns his lesson too late, exhibits the egotistic tendencies 
of Hawthorne's villains. His perception of the Letter against the 
darkened night sky is thus imputed solely to the disease of his own eye 
and heart--"Not but the meteor may have shown itself at that point, burn-
ing duskily through a veil of cloud; but with no such shape as his guilty 
imagination gave it; or, at least, with so little definiteness, that 
another's guilt might have seen another symbol in it."149 Hawthorne 
144"Ethan Brand," XI, p. 87. 
145The Blithedale Romanc~, III, p. 243. 
146The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 256. 
147"The Artist of the Beautiful," X, p. 475. 
148"wakefield," IX, p. 140. 149The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 155. 
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further comments: 
But what shall we say, when an individual discovers a revelation, 
addressed to himself alone • . . . In such a case, it could only 
be the symptom of a highly disordered mental state, when a man, 
rendered morbidly self-contemplative by long, intense, and secret 
pain, had extended his egotism over the whole expanse of nature, 
until the firmament itself should appear no more than a fitting 
page for his soul's history and fate.l50 
Paradoxically, then, the intellectual attitude inclines toward both 
extremes of consciousness: in its quest for the "objective" this 
attitude implicitly places itself above all "others," while at the 
opposite extreme it may turn in upon its "self" out of frustration so 
that the "self" explicitly becomes its own "object." In either case, the 
"self" becomes divine. 
The ruinous effects of egotism or the "bosom-serpent," however, are 
nowhere more pronounced than in Roderick Elliston. Tortured by the void 
of his own heart, Roderick must socialize his "disease" in order to 
maintain any sense of individuality--he must show himself to the world. 
In his nothingness he henceforth becomes the supreme egotist, for he 
cannot bear the emptiness of his heart alone. 
All persons, chronically diseased, are egotists, whether the 
disease be of the mind or body; whether it be sin, sorrow, or 
merely the more tolerable calamity of some endless pain, or 
mischief among the cords of mortal life. Such individuals are 
made acutely conscious of a self, by the torture in which it 
dwells. Self, therefore, grows to be so prominent an object with 
them, that they cannot but present it to the face of every casual 
passer-by ••.• for it is that cancer, or that crime, which 
constitutes their respective individuality.l51 
Thereafter, Roderick draws his misery around him like a cape, and looks 
triumphantly down upon all whose interior nourishes no deadly 
lSOibid. 
15l"Egotism; or, The Bosom-Serpent," X, p. 273. 
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monster.152 Indeed, it is this very emptiness which operates as an anti-
dote against any who would attempt a cure, for nothing can come up to it; 
it is incomparable. Like a "black hole" in space, it blindly swallows 
all "other" intentions in its own intentional void. Its only remedy is 
in forgetting that which it cannot forget, and in remembering that which 
it has repressively forgotten--the "other:" "Could I, for one instant, 
forget myself, the serpent might not abide within me. It is my diseased 
self-contemplation that has engendered and nourished him!" 153 As 
Coverdale remarks at Blithedale: 
It is not, I apprehend, a healthy kind of mental occupation, to 
devote ourselves too exclusively to the study of individual men and 
women. If the person under examination be one's self, the result 
is pretty certain to be diseased action of the heart, almost before 
we can snatch a second glance. Or, if we take the freedom to put a 
friend under our microscope, we thereby insulate him from many of 
his true relations, magnify his peculiarities, inevitably tear him 
into parts, and, of course, patch him very clumsily together again. 
What wonder, then, should we be frightened by the aspect of a 
monster, which, after all--though we can point to every feature of 
his deformity in the real personage--may be said to have been 
created mainly by ourselves.154 
Unlike most of Hawthorne's villains, however, Roderick learns his lesson 
in time; with the appearance of his estranged wife, Rosina, the cure is 
affected. Roderick thus typifies the extremity of those two qualities 
which Pascal universally ascribes to the "self:" "it is unjust in itself 
since it makes itself the centre of everything; it is inconvenient to 
others since it would enslave them; for each Self is the enemy, and 
would like to be the tyrant of all others."l55 
Isolated from the world they seek to know, both Hawthorne's 
152Ibid., p. 274. 153Ibid., pp. 282-83. 
154The Blithedale Romance, III, p. 69. 
155Pensles, p. 151. 
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scientists and reformers are necessarily forced to turn back upon them-
selves as the ultimate object of their own consciousness, for in having 
refuted a situated consciousness in favor of the absolute truth of a 
ubiquitous vision, they paradoxically deny themselves the very objectiv-
ity they so obsessively wish to impose upon the world. 
This is always true of those men who have surrendered themselves to 
an over-ruling purpose. It does not so much impel them from with-
out, nor even operate as a motive power within, but grows 
incorporate with all that they think and feel, and finally converts 
them into little else save that one principle. When such begins to 
be the predicament, it is not cowardice, but wisdom, to avoid these 
victims. They have no heart, no sympathy, no reason, no conscience. 
They will keep no friend, unless he make himself the mirror of their 
purpose; they will smite and slay you, and trample your dead corpse 
under foot, all the more readily, if you take the first step with 
them, and cannot take the second, and the third, and every other 
step of their terribly straight path. They have an idol, to which 
they consecrate themselves high-priest, and deem it holy work to 
offer sacrifices of whatever is most precious, and never once seem 
to suspect--so cunning has the Devil been with them--that this 
false deity, in whose iron features, immitigable to all the rest of 
mankind, they see only benignity and love, is but a spectrum of the 
very priest himself, projected upon the surrounding darkness. And 
the higher and purer the original object, and the more unselfishly 
it may have been taken up, the slighter is the probability that 
they can be led to recognize the process, by which godlike 
benevolence has been debased into all-devouring egotism.156 
In negating themselves the very objectivity they claim to acquire, 
Hawthorne's villains reciprocally commit one of the two most all-
inclusive of human errors enumerated by Pascal: "1. To take everything 
literally. 2. To take everything spiritually."157 The first of these 
intellectual over-simplifications applies to the scientist, the second 
to the reformer. Against the over-simplified intellectual attitude, 
Hawthorne's oeuvre explores the "interior" of reality vis-'a-vis a 
revolutionary conversion of consciousness. By "translating" both 
156The Blithedale Romance, III, pp. 70-71. 
157Penstes, p. 217. 
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the daguerrean and dioramic "postures" into their analogously respective 
modes of logic, they subsequently become subjective, metaphysical 
spheres of consciousness in their own right--Hawthorne's dichotomy 
between "head" and "heart." Thus determined, that mode of consciousness 
proper to the daguerrean model corresponds to the logic of calculating 
reason: Descartes' consciousness of the ego cogito. On the other hand, 
that mode of consciousness proper to the dioramic model corresponds to 
the world's inner space: Pascal's logic of the heart,158 Consequently, 
daguerrean logic, if we may speak of it thus, delineates what Heidegger 
(via Rilke) calls "customary consciousness," whereas dioramic logic 
articulates "uncustomary consciousness." The interior conversion of 
consciousness central to Hawthorne's world metaphysically subsists within 
this opposition of consciousness, wherein the head remains directed out-
ward while the heart turns toward its own interior, the interiority of 
the world's space. Hawthorne's oeuvre begins to negotiate this 
conversion at the psychological level of psychosomatic disturbances. 
That Hawthorne anticipated modern psychology is all the more 
impressive when we consider his constant desire to make moral "diseases" 
appear as corresponding physical diseases. Throughout his life, Hawthorne 
was incessantly concerned with the body's relation to both the world and 
it's "self." "What happened in the heart became manifest in the flesh; 
and, conversely, one could arrive at inner truths by scrutinizing 
appearances or by watching their reflections in a mirror."159 A note-
book entry for 27 October 1841 already reveals Hawthorne's fascination 
158cf. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, pp. 127-28. 
159cowley, p. 562. 
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with the psychosomatic problem: "To symbolize moral or spiritual disease 
by disease of the body;--thus, when a person committed any sin, it might 
cause a sore to appear on the body;--this to be wrought out."160 And 
again, on 1 June 1842: "A physician for the cure of moral diseases." 161 
The idea, of course, is exquisitely "wrought out" in The Scarlet Letter. 
In his exhortation to Dimmesdale to deal with Hester, the Reverend Wilson 
ironically betrays the very issue most central to Dimmesdale's own 
conscience: "Truly, as I sought to convince him, the shame lay in the 
commission of the sin, and not in the showing of it forth."l62 From the 
outset, Chillingworth detects some dark secret fatally lodged within the 
intense sensibility of Dimmesdale's breast: "Wherever there is a heart 
and an intellect, the diseases of the physical frame are tinged with the 
peculiarities of these. In Arthur Dimmesdale, thought and imagination 
were so active, and sensibility so intense, that the bodily infirmity 
would be likely to have its groundwork there." 163 Thus, Chillingworth 
early decides upon his plan of attack, delving to the most profound 
interior of his patient's bosom: "A man burdened with a secret should 
especially avoid the intimacy of his physician." 164 The investigator 
himself, however, is no more immune from the psychosomatic disease than 
the patient, so that Chillingworth's own physical aspect undergoes a 
reciprocal change. Moreover, the crowd is readily disposed to perceive 
this change only in so far as it "forms its judgment, as it usually does, 
160The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 222. 
16lrbid., p. 235. 
162The Scarlet Letter, I, pp. 65-66. 
163rbid., p. 124. 164rbid. 
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on the intuitions of its great and warm heart," whereas whenever it 
"attempts to see with its eyes, it is exceedingly apt to be deceived."165 
On the other hand, Dimmesdale too is able to perceive the change 
transpiring both within himself, and without, and rightfully attributes 
it to its first cause: "so Mr. Dimmesdale, conscious that the poison of 
one morbid spot was infecting his heart's entire substance, attributed 
all his presentiments to no other cause." 166 Indeed, the heart not only 
"colors" our perceptions, but also speaks its own language, a language 
whose meaning may often contradict the spoken word itself. Thus it is 
with Dimmesdale's final sermon before the "revelation:" 
But even when the minister's voice grew high and commanding 
still, if the auditor listened intently, and for the purpose, he 
could detect the same cry of pain. What was it? The complaint of 
a human heart, sorrow-laden, perchance guilty, telling its secret, 
whether of guilt or sorrow, to the great heart of mankind; beseech-
ing its sympathy or forgiveness,--at every moment,--in each 
accent,--and never in vain! It was this profound and continual 
undertone that gave the clergyman his most appropriate power.167 
In so far as it is ontologically prior, the heart always knows far in 
advance of the head--indeed, amasses its reasons while reason itself 
stumbles. Hence even in his sermon, Dimmesdale is already alongside what 
must inevitably follow by "reason" of a logic more swift and subtle than 
any intellectual exercise could devise. Articulating a context which 
both logically and psychologically completes the central scaffold scene, 
Dimmesdale approaches the pillory where Hester had encountered the world's 
ignominious stare some seven years before: "There stood Hester, holding 
little Pearl by the hand! And there was the scarlet letter on her 
breast!" 168 After an anxious delay, Dimmesdale at last consummates the 
165Ibid., p. 126. 166Ibid., p. 140. 
167Ibid., pp. 243-44. 168rbid., p. 251. 
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central image of the novel, and brings it full circle as he ascends the 
scaffold, supported on the one hand by Hester's arm which twines about 
him, while clasping the tiny hand of Pearl with the other. Having dis-
placed Pearl as the central figure of the triad, he reveals the final 
secret of a heart untrue to itself: imprinted on his flesh, the scarlet 
letter gleams. Those best able to appreciate the minister's sensibility, 
and the reciprocal operation of the heart upon the body, "whispered their 
belief, that the awful symbol was the effect of the ever active tooth of 
remorse, gnawing from the inmost heart outwardly." 169 In typically 
ambiguous fashion, however, Hawthorne leaves the psychosomatic supposition 
open to interpretation; for others, who professed never once to have 
removed their eyes from Dimmesdale, "denied that there was any mark what-
ever on his breast, more than on a new-born infant's."l70 And the 
narrator even more ambiguously concludes: "Without disrupting a truth so 
momentous, we must be allowed to consider this version of Mr. Dimmesdale's 
story as only an instance of that stubborn fidelity with which a man's 
friends--and especially a clergyman's--will sometimes uphold his 
character; when proofs, clear as the mid-day sunshine on the scarlet 
letter, establish him a false and sin-stained creature of the dust."l71 
As Alfred Marks has said of this uncertain resolution: "Clear as the 
mid-day sunshine on the scarlet letter," however, to the twentieth-century 
reader who notices what Hawthorne does with sunshine, on the one hand, and 
the scarlet letter, on the other, means something equivalent to "clear as 
mud."l72 
169rbid., p. 258. 170rbid., p. 259. 
17 1rbid. 172p. 284. 
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Nevertheless, Hawthorne's fascination with the psychosomatic 
problematic is nowhere more in evidence than in its meticulously detailed 
exploration and analysis in The Scarlet Letter. Yet, other tales examine 
a similar phenomenon from variously perceptive angles. In her complexion, 
for example, Beatrice betrays a marked similarity to the plants; she is 
the semblance of but another flower, "the human sister of those vegetable 
ones, as beautiful as they ... but still to be touched only with a 
glove, nor to be approached without a mask." 173 Even her voice betrays 
an all too vivid bloom, "a voice as rich as a tropical sunset, and which 
made Giovanni, though he knew not why, think of deep hues of purple or 
crimson, and of perfumes heavily delectable." 174 Herkimer remarks that 
Roderick's complexion "had a greenish tinge over its sickly white, remind-
ing him of a species of marble out of which he had once wrought a head of 
Envy, with her snaky locks." 175 And as with Dimmesdale, Roderick's 
symptoms produce an endless perplexity and speculation among the crowd: 
"They knew not whether ill health were robbing his spirits of elasticity; 
or whether a canker of the mind was gradually eating, as such cankers do, 
from his moral system into the physical frame, which is but the shadow 
of the former." 176 Similarly, among the guests at "The Christmas 
Banquet," there was a man whose misfortune it was "to cherish within his 
bosom a diseased heart, which had become so wretchedly sore, that the 
continual and unavoidable rubs with the world • . . made ulcers in 
173"Rappaccini's Daughter," X, p. 97. 
174rbid., pp. 96-97. 
175"Egotism; or, The Bosom-Serpent," X, p. 269. 
176Ibid., p. 271. 
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it •.•. he found his chief employment in exhibiting these miserable 
sores to any who would give themselves the pain of viewing them;" there 
was a man of "nice conscience" as well, "who bore a blood-stain in his 
heart;" then there was an aged lady, "who had lived from time immemorial 
with a constant tremor quivering through her frame;" and then again, a 
certain Mr. Smith, "afflicted with a physical disease of the heart, which 
threatened instant death on the slightest cachinnatory indulgence, or 
even that titillation of the bodily frame, produced by merry thoughts." 177 
That Hawthorne is so often concerned with the psychosomatic phenomenon 
reveals to what extent his fiction is grounded in the situation. In so 
far as the body equally links us to our "self" and the "world," it arti-
culates both the psychological and physiological context of intentionality 
which constitutes the single, unitary phenomenon, being-in~the-world. 
Hawthorne's understanding of this phenomenon has already put itself 
ahead of the subject-object dichotomy, and its concomitant conceptual 
schema: form-content. As a unitary structure, this phenomenon transpires 
alongside two simultaneous, spatial horizons, two horizons moreover which 
are neither parallel nor conjoined in infinity. Grounded in a space 
which is neither geometric-geographic (physical) nor affective 
(intentional), but both, the phenomenon itself thus undercuts the entire 
arsenal of machinery which representation has at its command. Further-
more, because its content is entirely formal, its truth is discovered 
solely in the appearance, in what remains hidden or concealed. And this 
essential ambiguity which remains hidden is its truth: the "subject" of 
this phenomenon is at once its own "object." Correspondingly, so long as 
177x, pp. 287-88, 294, and 295, respectively. 
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it can never be a fact or proposition, it can never be "correct." In 
other words, rational (mind) and irrational (body) diachronically 
constitute apparent manifestations of a single truth, the truth of 
simultaneous horizons--that is, the ek-static structure of being human. 
The psychosomatic phenomenon thus expresses man's existential facticity, 
the situated structure of Being. Hawthorne's treatment of this phenome-
non attests to what extent he implicitly understood its situated dynamic. 
In protest to a one-sided "rationalism," Hawthorne's oeuvre ironically 
asserts the very "irrationalism" of such a pro-position, for the heart 
must have its say as well. It can make its complaints "known," however, 
through the only intermediary both head and heart address in the same 
"language." The void which Hawthorne's villain experiences at the center 
of his being, and to which the body subsequently bears witness, is the 
very emptiness of his heart. The circle, moreover, is vicious. Without 
a heart, he lacks a common bond with the "other." At the same time, in 
severing his relation to the "other," he simultaneously severs his own 
relationship to "self" in so far as the "other" is a constitutive element 
of the "self"--that is, the unitary structure being-in-the-world. The 
self-assertive domination of the rational subjecturn and its objectifica-
tion of Being places Hawthorne's villain outside all care, but only from 
a theoretical point of view. The body can never escape its situation, 
and thus rebels against the reasonless pro-position of reason alone as 
the only redeeming link between the "selfishness" of the head and the 
"otherness" of the heart. Metaphysically, as a subjective mode of 
consciousness, the head can never have its "reason" without the heart; 
and conversely, the heart too becomes a blind and wilful pro-position or 
im-position, void of its own "reason," without the head. Each, without 
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the other, reduces itself to absurdity. 
From an existential point of view, this distinction takes the form: 
~ soi-pour soi. For the one, witness Ethan Brand; for the other, Owen 
Warland. In the end, they are the same. That is not to say they are 
identical, but rather constitute two aspects of a single phenomenon. 
Their dynamic is the same. Hawthorne's oeuvre discloses the Pascalian 
truth that we are always searching for what we have already found. Thus, 
Ethan Brand spends eighteen years in search of a truth he is at last to 
discover, beside the blaze of the lime-kiln, within his own heart alone. 
Against the deficiency disclosed in measuring the distance between himself 
and his ideal, Hawthorne's villain deserts the very ground of Being. By 
seeking to be the equal of his ideal, he thus reduces Being to the dull 
unity of mere uniformity.l78 That is to say, he has already measured 
this distance mathematically or, better, geometrically. Such is the 
supreme reductio ad absurdum which the scientific-technological attitude 
negotiates, the reduction of Being to quantitative measurement; and such 
is the imperfection which troubles Aylmer. As representative of the 
scientific posture of his age, his experiment on his own wife reveals his 
absolute faith in science and its ultimate ability to control nature: 
"The higher intellect, the imagination, the spirit, and even the heart, 
might all find their congenial aliment in pursuits which . . • would 
ascend from one step of powerful intelligence to another, until the 
philosopher should lay his hand on the secret of creative force, and 
perhaps make new worlds for himself.nl79 His wife becomes the probability 
178Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 219. 
179"The Birth-Mark," X, p. 36. 
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of this new "world," for he had devoted himself too unreservedly to 
scientific studies, "ever to be weaned from them by any second passion"--
which is to say, by any passion whatsoever; indeed, his "love for his 
young wife might prove the stronger of the two; but it could only be by 
intertwining itself with his love of science, and uniting the strength of 
the latter to his own."l80 Though Aylmer seeks to make Georgiana more 
than she is factually, he concurrently seeks to make himself more than he 
is factically; and it is in this sense that he deserts the ground of 
Being. Indeed, to Aylmer, this minor imperfection represents the very 
"visible mark of earthly imperfection."l8l In striving to come up to 
perfection, to become its equal as "creator," Aylmer has already measured 
this dimension quantitatively. The ideal of perfection is, by definition, 
infinitely removed from man's own factical being, for only number as 
quantity can negotiate the idea of infinity. As Max Scheler has 
expressed it: "Man takes his own emptiness of heart for the 'infinite 
emptiness' of space and time." 182 "Empty" means, to begin with, an 
expectation that is not satisifed; man's original emptiness is, then, the 
emptiness of his own heart.183 It is the emptiness or lack of what we 
desire. In order to take this emptiness to himself, man must measure 
this dimension with his own intentional metric; 184 only thus does man 
bring Being into its ground plan--that is, his own facticity. Aylmer, 
on the other hand, addresses an expectation which in itself is infinitely 
180Ibid., pp. 36-37. 18 1Ibid., p. 37. 
182Man's Place in Nature, p. 45. 
183Ibid., p. 44. 
184cf. Heidegger, Poetry, ~anguage, Thought, p. 221. 
346 
remote. As such, the original emptiness of his heart is inhuman from the 
start, for its desire is already outside its own possibility. 
Similarly, the void at the interior of Gervayse Hastings' being is 
without ground: "he is such a being as I could conceive you to carve out 
of marble, and some yet unrealized perfection of human science to endow 
with an exquisite mockery of intellect; but • • the demands that spirit 
makes upon spirit, are precisely those to which he cannot respond."l85 
As Gervayse says of himself: "It is a chillness--a want of. earnestness--
a feeling as if what should be my heart were a thing of vapor--a haunting 
perception of unreality! Thus, seeming to possess all that other men 
have--all that men aim at--1 have really possessed nothing, neither joys 
nor griefs." 186 Roderick's preface to the story of Gervayse hits on a 
further truth; such a man most probably is never "conscious of the 
deficiency." 187 Neither of course is Ethan Brand, whose marble heart 
reflects the utter desolation and solitude of daguerrean consciousness. 
Like all of Hawthorne's villains, Ethan "carelessly" expects to come up 
to the ideal, to identify at some point in the future with the infinitely 
remote. He thus becomes a fiend; in fact, began to be so from the moment 
that his heart had ceased to keep pace with his intellectual development, 
a development which in its progress, 
disturbed the counterpoise between his mind and heart. The Idea 
that possessed his life had operated as a means of education; it 
had gone on cultivating his powers to the highest point of which 
they were susceptible; it had raised him from the level of an 
unlettered laborer, to stand on a star-light eminence, whither the 
philosophers of the earth, laden with the lore of universities, 
might vainly strive to clamber with him. So much for the intellect! 
185"The Chr1.· stmas Ba t " X 284 nque , , p. . 
186rbid., p. 304. 187rbid., p. 285. 
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But where was the heart? That, indeed, had withered--had 
contracted--had hardened--had perished! It had ceased to partake 
of the universal throb. He had lost his hold of the magnetic chain 
of humanity. He was no longer a brother-man, opening the chambers 
or the dungeons of our common nature by the key of holy sympathy, 
which gave him a right to share in all its secrets; he was now a 
cold observer, looking on mankind as the subject of his experiment, 
and, at length, converting man and woman to be his puppets, and 
pulling the wires that moved them to such degrees of crime as were 
demanded for his study.188 
In this respect, Ethan is typical of the unfettered disregard for the 
being of others, which daguerrean consciousness merely posits as quanta 
of calculation.189 To put the world "in order," it subsequently forces 
the existent as a whole to conform to the uniformity of its own view; it 
thereby levels down every ordo to that of the manipulatively "objective." 
Because its end, in fact, is never in the view itself, but rather 
invisibly lingers at the end of an infinitely remote, single horizon, the 
daguerrean imposition reciprocally and unknowingly cuts off or prevents 
any experience of itself; and for this reason alone it is never conscious 
of its deficiency. Therein subsists its greatest danger to Being: it is 
unaware of itself. Hence, the objectification of Being consists in 
nothing less than man's blind, purposeful self-assertion in 
everything.190 Fittingly, Ethan's final recognition of the truth is 
involuntary: it comes in reverie, both out of the fire and back to his 
heart. His death is thus paradoxically possible only in so far as he has 
learned to identify with the finitude of his own facticity. In being 
brought back to himself, he is simultaneously restored to the solicitous 
sphere of Being. 
188"Ethan Brand," XI, pp. 98-99. 
189cf. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 129. 
190rbid., p. 116. 
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Neither at home with themselves nor with the world, Hawthorne's 
villains are therefore doomed to isolation. Like Goodman Brown, the 
deceit which they practice upon themselves and the world inevitably comes 
back to haunt them. Caught up in the sanctimonious omnipotence of their 
ideal, they have already turned their eyes away from the earth, the very 
ground on which they stand and which alone can bring the figure of the 
"self" into the fullness of Being--that is, make it "stand forth." 
Unable to accept their own finitude, the slightest disagreement or 
divergence from their rigid, systematic frame becomes intolerable. As 
Kierkegaard remarked of Hegel's own such inflexible system, there is no 
room in it for a sneeze.l91 So it is with the lady at the Christmas 
banquet, who had fallen short of absolute and perfect beauty "merely by 
the trifling defect of a slight cast in her left eye. But this blemish, 
minute as it was, so shocked the pure ideal of her soul, rather than her 
vanity, that she passed her life in solitude, and veiled her countenance 
even from her own gaze."l92 The void or emptiness of heart that 
initiates this general movement away from the world and into the solitude 
of the "self" is thus already determined by wilfully appropriating the 
19lcf. Martin C. D'Arcy, S. J., Dialogue With Myself (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, A Touchstone Book, 1966), p. 32. 
192"The Christmas Banquet," X, p. 289. At the other extreme, there 
are those who share an equal isolation with the egotist, having forfeited 
all ties to the world, although via a route somewhat circuitous to the 
most prominent of Hawthorne's villains. Such is the gentleman at the 
Christmas banquet who, ever since he was able to read a newspaper, "had 
prided himself on his consistent adherence to one political party, but, 
in the confusion of these latter days, had got bewildered, and knew not 
whereabouts his party was. This wretched condition, so morally desolate 
and disheartening to a man who has long accustomed himself to merge his 
individuality in the mass of a great body, can only be conceived by such 
as have experienced it."(Ibid., p.303) Nonetheless, Hawthorne's indict-
ment of those who refuse to take up their own responsibility cannot be 
taken too lightly. 
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daguerrean consciousness, that logic of the head which cuts the subject 
off from the world in its objectification of Being. An authentic subject, 
on the other hand, comes into the fullness of the existent by leaving the 
"self" unprotected and open to Being. An authentic subject is thus 
taken to the world, taken toward the world; he is taken by the world as 
its own. He is taken by the world in the same way as he is taken by that 
toward which he is enthralled--in wonder and awe. In moving outside or 
beyond himself, he enowns the world both concernfully and solicitously, 
and thereby expresses the unitary structure of his own existence. 
Though deceptively simple, Hawthorne's exquisite little piece 
entitled "Feathertop" poignantly explores this phenomenon, and the 
related question of authenticity. Mother Rigby sets the tone in her 
initial observation of the scarecrow: "Why, I've danced with a worse 
one, when partners happened to be scarce, at our witch meetings in the 
forest! What if I should let him take his chance among the other men of 
straw and empty fellows, who go bustling about the world?"l93 Once 
brought to life, however, Feathertop's existential situation becomes 
immediately apparent: "Why lurkest thou in the corner, lazy one? 
Step forth! Thou hast the world before thee!"194 With the world "before 
him," Feathertop must thence decide in what way he will negotiate it, how 
he will "enter it." The question of Being--that is, his existence 
(Existenz)--having thus been decided, there remains the twofold 
problematic regarding his own facticity: (being)-in-the-world and 
being-(with)-others. Feathertop resolutely accepts his factically limited 
situation, that "essential condition of his existence;" as Mother Rigby 
I 9 3x , p . 2 2 7 . I94Ibid., p. 229. 
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exhorts: "whatever may happen to thee, thou must stick to thy pipe. 
Thy life is in it; and that, at least, thou knowest well, if thou 
knowest naught besides."195 Thus the scarecrow enters the world, and in 
its resolute demeanor, "strode manfully towards the town" in order to 
play its part "in the great world," where "not one man in a hundred . 
was gifted with more real substance than itself."196 Ironically, amidst 
the general admiration which befalls the scarecrow, the only two who 
perceive a discrepancy beneath his appearance are a dog and a child. 
Unaware, however, Feathertop is soon to learn the truth of himself; and 
when at last he beholds his image in the mirror, "not the glittering 
mockery of his outside show, but a picture of the sordid patchwork of 
his real composition, stript of all witchcraft," Feathertop surrenders to 
the truth: "For perchance the only time, since this so often empty and 
deceptive life of mortals began its course, an Illusion had seen and 
fully recognized itself." 197 Having commenced the world in fear ("feeble 
and torpid natures, being incapable of better inspiration, must be 
stirred up by fear"), he terminates it in anxious responsibility to the 
truth of himself, and similarly takes upon himself his own "death:" 
"I've seen myself, mother!--I've seen myself for the wretched, ragged, 
empty thing I am! I'll exist no longer!"198 Snatching the pipe from 
his mouth, "he flung it with all his might against the chimney, and, at 
the same instant, sank upon the floor, a medly of straw and tattered 
garments, with some sticks protruding from the heap; and a shrivelled 
195Ibid., pp. 234 and 235, respectively. 
196rbid., pp. 236 and 232, respectively. 
197Ibid., p. 244. 198rbid., p. 245. 
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pumpkin in the midst"--the very image in which the child perceived him as 
he entered the town. 199 If it seems somewhat foolish to speak of the 
"life and death" of a scarecrow as we have in the above context, consider 
that Hawthorne's irony, throughout, continuously throws us back to what 
the tale itself presents as its most exclusive issue, an issue which 
addresses the conflict between the truth of oneself and the falsehood of 
the world in general. Mother Rigby summarily characterizes this world at 
the conclusion: "There are thousands upon thousands of coxcombs and 
charlatans in the world, made up of just such a jumble of worn-out, 
forgotten, and good-for-nothing trash, as he was! And why should my poor 
puppet be the only one to know himself, and perish for it?"200 Thus, the 
central problem is not, in fact, that Feathertop was an illusion, for the 
illusion turns out to be the only truth of the entire tale. Reality, on 
the other hand, or what is taken to be the reality in our average every-
day life, turns out to be a single and continuous lie. Indeed, Feather-
top "dies" precisely because he was true to himself. From the outset, 
Hawthorne had already rehearsed the logic of the conclusion in the ironic 
rejoinder Feathertop gives to Mother Rigby: "I will thrive, if an 
honest man and a gentleman may!"201 The conclusion: he may not. Mother 
Rigby sums it up: "Poor Feathertop ••. I could easily give him 
another chance, and send him forth again to-morrow. But, no! his feel-
ings are too tender; his sensibilities too deep. He seems to have too 
much heart to bustle for his own advantage, in such an empty and heart-
less world."202 Clearly, then, the central issue at stake is that of 
199rbid., pp. 245 and 239, respectively. 
200rbid., p. 245. 20lrbid., p. 235. 202rbid., p. 246. 
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authenticity. In his final moment of anticipatory resolution Feathertop 
forsakes the inauthenticity of the "they" (das Man), that condition of 
man's average everydayness whose essential tendency it is to level down 
the possibilities of Being, and in so doing he appropriates the fullness 
of Being as his own. In following the dictates of his heart, Feathertop 
effects the interior conversion of consciousness, that movement away from 
the self-assertion of daguerrean objectification which represents the 
constant negation of death.20J His "death," in turn, turns Being itself 
into the open, renouncing the negative reading of death that the 
daguerrean consciousness assigns to it. 
This interior transformation within the space of the heart 
constitutes the conversion of consciousness which Hawthorne's oeuvre 
transacts. When consciousness turns toward and thus proceeds from the 
interior of the heart's inner space, it thereby secures for itself a 
safety, a safety thereafter liberated from daguerrean manipulation and 
its objectification of Being.204 What we have called dioramic conscious-
ness, in reference to the explication of Hawthorne's world hitherto 
advanced, thus approximates the basic experience of being-open-to-Being. 
Accordingly, dioramic consciousness neither merely applies knowledge, 
nor decides beforehand.205 Furthermore, the resoluteness of those 
characters who turn the conversion of consciousness in Hawthorne's 
oeuvre does not constitute the deliberate action of a subject as such; 
otherwise, this movement would merely represent the subjectum of 
203cf. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 125. 
204cf. Ibid., PP· 120-21. 
205It is, in fact, the basic experience of "thinking" in 
Heidegger's Being and Jime; cf. also, Poetry, Language, Thought_, p. 67. 
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daguerrean consciousness itself. Rather, anticipatory resoluteness 
enables a subject to transcend the captivity of the actual by opening 
onto the possibility of Being. Through his resolute anticipation, for 
example, Dimmesdale articulates the phenomenal structure of care (Sorge) 
in so far as his comportment toward death reveals his ownmost possibility 
for Being; and to that extent his existence becomes authentic--if only in 
its dying. In the distinctive possibility of being his own, he has 
already wrenched himself away from the "they." This is made possible, in 
the end, when Dimmesdale's consciousness turns toward the interior of the 
heart: "It was a ghastly look with which he regarded them; but there was 
something at once tender and strangely triumphant in it."206 Appropri-
ately, he invites both woman and child to his side; "Yet he trembled, and 
turned to Hester with an expression of doubt and anxiety in his eyes, not 
the less evidently betrayed, that there was a feeble smile upon his 
lips."207 In delivering himself over from the quantitative uniformity of 
daguerrean logic in the "they," Dimmesdale triumphantly reveals the 
burning letter on his bosom, the very symbol "of what has seared his 
inmost heart." 208 By turning toward the truth of the caustic 
accusations of his heart, he qualitatively secures for himself a 
distinctive safety at the interior of Being, a safety made possible in 
the ineffable logic of the world's inner space. Dimmesdale has 
decisively come home to himself, and thus to Being as well. As Rilke 
expressed it in a letter of 11 August 1924, 
206The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 252. 
207Ibid., p. 254. 
208 Ibid. 
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However vast the "outer space" may be, yet with all its sidereal 
distances it hardly bears comparison with the dimensions, with the 
depth dimensions of our inner being, which does not even need the 
spaciousness of the universe to be within itself almost unfathom-
able. Thus, if the dead, if those who are to come, need an abode, 
what refuge could be more agreeable and appointed for them than 
this imaginary space?209 
In this "imaginary space," as Rilke calls it, Dimmesdale is delivered 
over to Being: "and there was a sweet and gentle smile over his face, as 
of a spirit sinking into deep repose."210 At the same time, Dimmesdale's 
single gesture secures the possibility of Being for the "other:" 
Pearl kissed his lips. A spell was broken. The great scene of 
grief, in which the wild infant bore a part, had developed all her 
sympathies; and as her tears fell upon her father's cheek, they 
were the pledge that she would grow up amid human joy and sorrow, 
nor forever do battle with the world, but be a woman in it. 
Towards her mother, too, Pearl's errand as a messenger of anguish 
was all fulfilled.211 
In coming up to the finitude of his own existence, then, Dimmesdale is 
touched from out of the widest orbit of Being: the will is shaken by the 
touch. 212 
In the same way, Ethan Brand dares the venture "to be" in his own-
most possibility toward death. Having once ventured a glance inward 
toward the knowledge of his own heart, Ethan "was making himself at home 
in his old place, after so long absence that the dead people, dead and 
buried for years, would have had more right to be at home, in any 
familiar spot, than he."213 In returning to the heartfelt sphere of 
Being he had so long neglected, Ethan now reclaims the precinct of Being 
209quoted in Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 128. 
210The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 256. 211Ibid. 
212cf. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 125. 
213"Ethan Brand," XI, pp. 88-89. 
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as his own. His quest for the Unpardonable Sin returns full circle to 
its beginning: "It is a sin that grew within my own breast . . . . A 
sin that grew nowhere else! The sin of an intellect that triumphed over 
the sense of brotherhood with man . . . and sacrificed everything to its 
own mighty claims."21 4 If, as Bartram remarks, "The man's head is 
turned .• he is a madman," 215 Ethan's final act at least restores 
him to the integrity of "self." In turning toward the interior of his 
own heart, he thus returns himself to earth and so redeems the whole of 
Being: "Oh, Mother Earth ..• who art no more my Mother, and into whose 
bosom this frame shall never be resolved! Oh, mankind, whose brotherhood 
I have cast off, and trampled thy great heart beneath my feet! Oh, stars 
of Heaven, that shone on me of old, as if to light me onward and 
upward!--farewell all, and forever!" 216 The sunrise which follows 
confirms that Ethan's death has transformed the calculating logic of the 
head back into the interior of the heart's inner space, where bot;h reside 
as one: "Earth was so mingled with sky that it was a daydream to look at 
it."217 The transmutation of Being thus comes back into the "stilled 
repose of the balanced oneness of the two realms within the world's 
inner space."218 In surpassing itself, the marble of Ethan's heart not 
only comes up to its own "self," but back into the finite nature of its 
truth as well: "At any rate, it is burnt into what looks like special 
good lime; and, taking all the bones together, my kiln is half a bushel 
214Ibid., p. 90. 215Ibid. 
216Ibid., p. 100. 
217 Ibid., p. 101. 
218Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 135. 
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the richer for him." 219 If Ethan takes upon himself the responsibility 
for his own death in anticipatory resoluteness, however, Beatrice's 
death, on the other hand, merely articulates to what extent the calcu-
lating and manipulative reason of daguerrean consciousness plunders the 
whole of Being without the conversion of its interior. By treating the 
"other" as an object, Rappaccini reveals the self-assertion of the 
scientific-technological objectification of Being at its most unbridled 
extreme. Yet, in his flagitious disregard for his daughter, he is not 
alone; even Giovanni, who professes to love her, carelessly imposes his 
own demands upon Beatrice out of the vacant selfishness of his own heart, 
and is therefore equally responsible for her death. Her final words, 
perforce, must fall upon ears long since deaf to the solicitous call of 
Being. 
I would fain have been loved, not feared •••• But now it matters 
not; I am going, father, where the evil, which thou hast striven to 
mingle with my being, will pass away like a dream--like the 
fragrance of these poisonous flowers, which will no longer taint my 
breath among the flowers of Eden. Farewell, Giovanni! Thy words 
of hatred are like lead within my heart--but they, too, will fall 
away as I ascend. Oh, was there not, from the first, more poison 
in thy nature than in mine?220 
Although the solicitous call to Being characteristic of the 
conversion of consciousness may sometimes end in death, it does not 
always; the lesson, however, is always learned at great expense. Thus, 
Roderick Elliston ironically re-enters the common bond of humanity to 
tell it a story, a story of a man very much like himself before 
dislodging the serpentine egotism gnawing at his heart. 22 1 Nonetheless, 
219"Ethan Brand," XI, p. 102. 
220"Rappaccini's Daughter," X, p. 127. 
221see, "The Christmas Banquet," X, pp. 284-85. 
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Hawthorne's irony is rarely so playful. The tale of Reuben Bourne 
bespeaks a sterner fate by far. "He regretted, deeply and bitterly, the 
moral cowardice that had restrained his words, when he was about to dis-
close the truth to Dorcas; but pride, the fear of losing her affection, 
the dread of universal scorn, forbade him to rectify this falsehood." 222 
Having once concealed the truth out of intellectual pride, Reuben's 
"one secret thought, became like a chain, binding down his spirit, and, 
like a serpent, gnawing into his heart; and he was transformed into a sad 
and downcast, yet irritable man."223 Like Dimmesdale, however, the logic 
of his heart unwittingly works itself out toward an irrevocable 
resolution. Indeed, the further Reuben strays from the deliberate 
course he had originally set upon, the more immanently his retribution is 
at hand: "Unable to penetrate to the secret place of his soul, where his 
motives lay hidden, he believed that a supernatural voice had called him 
onward, and that a supernatural power had obstructed his retreat."224 
And he accepts the call to Being, the call for a daring which surrenders 
to the dictates of the heart, hoping for an opportunity of expiating his 
selfish and deceitful past. Within the darkened interior at the "heart" 
of the forest, Reuben, like Ethan Brand, returns full circle. In opening 
up himself to what has been so hermetically closed off for years, he 
finally effects the transmutation of consciousness within the heart. 
Even so, this interior logical design is incomplete without the ironic 
killing of his son; for with the death of Cyrus, Reuben likewise negates 
his most indulgent claim to "self." The "self" enters onto the world: 
222"Roger Malvin's Burial," X, p. 349. 
223rbid., p. 350. 224Ibid., p. 356. 
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"His sin was expiated, the curse was gone from him; and, in the hour, 
when he had shed blood dearer to him than his own, a prayer, the first 
for years, went up to Heaven from the lips of Reuben Bourne."225 Those 
lips now speak from the heart. And in the saying of the inner recall, 
which converts the will to im-pose into the innermost region of the 
heart's space, all being "other" than the heart turns inward and toward 
it: "Here everything is inward: not only does it remain turned toward 
this true interior of consciousness, but inside this interior, one thing 
turns, free of all bounds, into the other. The interiority of the 
world's inner space unbars the Open for us."226 
Only when Being is ventured thus, does man create a safety; only 
thus is he secure; only then does man poetically dwell in the world with 
both himself and others. Being secure at the interior makes Being 
spacious. In opening onto the world, man opens the world for others; he 
thereby brings Being into its fullness. The conversion of consciousness 
in and toward the interior of the heart's inner space, which Hawthorne's 
oeuvre transacts, bespeaks the saying of the single-minded injunction, to 
thine own self be true. This simple axiom commences the world; it is the 
ground of all solicitous being-with-others; it is the truth of love. 
Through love, the truth of the heart sets itself to work in Hawthorne's 
world. Though it begins with "self," Being begins to be at home when it 
opens onto others, for Being is always situated. 
The word "heart" is for Hawthorne the supreme mirror-word, the 
word enclosing all others: it is sphere, house, temple, prison, 
cave, grave, lake, fountain, and furnace. The word "head," its 
225rbid., p. 360. 
226Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 130, 
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antithetical homologue, is, in comparison, lackluster, indigent, 
barren. And both the attic and the aerie, images of the observing 
and sovereign consciousness, refer us back yet again to the central 
organ that symbolizes better than any other all man's hidden 
inclinations. For Hawthorne, consciousness was not a brain but a 
heart . . . . And poetic language is not a language of the brain 
but of the heart.227 
Hawthorne's work is thus decidely onto-logical. Yet, both head and heart 
must come together in the conversion of consciousness which Hawthorne's 
world sets forth in so far as they metaphysically constitute subjective 
modes of consciousness. In this initial movement, the head remains 
directed outward while the heart turns inward toward itself. As Martin 
D'Arcy has expressed it, "Intellect and love work together ina recipro-
cal relationship, love being a blind beggar and intellect a cripple 
with good insight sitting 0 n the shoulders of love."228 In the tradition 
of Augustine and Pascal, Hawthorne's world therefore articulates a meta-
physic of consciousness wherein man abides in his wholeness and 
integrity, within the fullness of Being. As Pascal has said: "Nature 
has set us so well in the centre, that if we change one side of the 
balance, we change the other also."229 Ontologically, however, the 
conversion of consciousness most central to Hawthorne's oeuvre primordi-
ally transpires within the interior of the heart's own space, the inner 
space of the world--and there alone. In its ontological constitution, 
then, love inclusively expresses, within the single interior of its 
space, the dual metaphysical postures of head and heart. It does so, 
furthermore, at the level of situated Being, whereby man ek-statically 
227Normand, p. 341. 
228nialogue With Myself, p. 31. 
229Pensles, p. 21. 
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dwells within the double horizoned structure simultaneously constituted 
by his love of "self" as well as the "other." The world of Hawthorne's 
work thus dwells in love; it abides in its poetic saying of the inner 
recall. The heart must have its voice, for only in the heart does man 
transcend the metaphysical attitude itself, that referential surface of 
the world-view which Hawthorne's work internally disrupts: "And as for 
ripeness--and as for progress--let mankind always do the highest, 
kindest, noblest thing, that at any given period, it has attained to the 
perception of; and surely that thing cannot be wrong, nor wrongly 
timedt" 230 At the interior of Hawthorne's world, then, love brings 
about the future, whereas daguerrean consciousness in and of itself can 
only be within the delimited confines of the actual, its present moment. 
In the end, the onto-logic of the head represents nothing more than a 
photograph album with fixed instances--"never the future coming about 
before us, the step from yesterday to today, the first prick of forget-
fulness in the memory."231 Hawthorne's world initiates that first prick 
of forgetfulness in the memory; it displaces the inauthenticity of the 
actual in favor of an authenticity grounded in the possibility of Being 
itself, and simultaneously gives man back to the ek-static temporality 
of his own existence. 
Over and against the eternal present of daguerrean consciousness 
and its hypnotic gaze toward infinity, Hawthorne's world effects a 
present which holds a finite future in it, a present whose very 
temporality is grounded in that future. Reuben Bourne begins the possi-
230"Earth's Holocaust," X, p. 393. 
231Julio Cortazar, Hopscotch, trans. Gregory Rabassa (New York: 
New American Library, A Plume Book, 1966), p. 468. 
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bility of a future only when the burden of his synchronic past has been 
withdrawn;232 Roderick Elliston initiates a new life with Rosina only 
when the eternal moment of his morbid egotism has been discarded; 233 
Owen Warland inaugurates a new beginning for his art only when the super-
ficial motivation of his past endeavors has been nullified;234 Matthew 
and his bride embark upon a new life only when their impossible quest has 
been forsaken; 235 Peter Goldthwaite launches a realistic future only when 
the pretense of his "castle in the air" has been exposed;236 Robin dis-
covers he is his own man only when his immature dependence upon his 
kinsman has been displaced; 237 Pearl enters onto the world only when the 
truth of her birth has been laid bare;238 the two "owls" ironically 
disengage themselves from a stifling past only when the House has been 
abandoned. 239 Hawthorne's world attests the bankruptcy of all who would 
live a present either grounded in the sterile fixation of its past or the 
impossibility of its future. "In this world, we are the things of a 
moment, and are made to pursue momentary things, with here and there a 
thought that stretches mistily towards eternity, and perhaps may endure 
as long. All philosophy, that would abstract mankind from the present, is 
232"Roger Malvin's Burial," X, p. 360. 
233"Egotism; or, The Bosom-Serpent," X, p. 283. 
234"The Artist of the Beautiful," X, p. 475. 
235"The Great Carbuncle," IX, p. 165. 
236"Peter Goldthwaite's Treasure," IX, pp. 383 and 406, 
respectively. 
237"My Kinsman, Major Molineaux," XI, p. 231. 
238The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 256. 
239The House of the Seve~ Gables, II, p. 318. 
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no more than words."240 Pascal has said it another way: 
We do not rest satisfied with the present. We anticipate the future 
as too slow in coming, as if in order to hasten its course; or we 
recall the past, to stop its too rapid flight. So imprudent are we 
that we wander in the times which are not ours, and do not think of 
the only one which belongs to us; and so idle are we that we dream 
of those times which are no more, and thoughtlessly overlook that 
which alone exists. For the present ..•. is never our end. The 
past and the present are our means; the future alone is our end. 
So we never live, but we hope to live; and, as we are always pre-
paring to be happy, it is inevitable we should never be so.241 
Whereas the inauthentic existence of Hawthorne's villains appropriates an 
either infinitely remote past or future, authentic existence on the other 
hand appropriates the present as its own, a present which can be its own 
only in so far as its future is finite. "How sad a truth--if true it 
were--that Man's age-long endeavor for perfection had served only to 
render him the mockery of the Evil Principle, from the fatal circumstance 
of an error at the very root of the matter!"242 Only within the heart, 
that "little, yet boundless sphere,"243 does man hold both a past and a 
future within the present. "Purify that inner sphere; and the many 
shapes of evil that haunt the outward, and which now seem almost our only 
realities, will turn to shadowy phantoms, and vanish of their own accord. 
But, if we go no deeper than the Intellect, and strive, with merely that 
feeble instrument, to discern and rectify what is wrong, our whole 
accomplishment will be a dream."244 For Hawthorne, then, the present is 
authentic only when it contains the finite possibility of its future, a 
present moreover which has already taken up the possibility of its own 
240"01d News," XI, p. 133. 
241Pensles, pp. 60-61. 
242"Earth's Holocaust," X, p. 403. 
243Ibid. 244Ibid., p. 404. 
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death in anticipatory resolution. For death is man's final horizon, 
forever beyond his understanding, the plenary horizon of nothingness in 
which Being itself is grounded. As the skeleton at the Christmas banquet 
betokens: 
And if, in their bewildered conjectures as to the purpose of earthly 
existence, the banqueters should throw aside the veil, and cast an 
inquiring glance at this figure of death, as seeking thence the 
solution otherwise unattainable, the only reply would be a stare of 
the vacant eye-caverns, and a grin of the skeleton-jaws. Such was 
the response that the dead man had fancied himself to receive, when 
he asked of Death to solve the riddle of his life; and it was his 
desire to repeat it when the guests of his dismal hospitality should 
find themselves perplexed with the same question.245 
If Aylmer's life apparently contradicts the ek-static structure of 
man's existence in Hawthorne's work, it does so only paradoxically: "The 
momentary circumstance was too strong for him; he failed to look beyond 
the shadowy scope of Time, and living once for all in Eternity, to find 
the perfect Future in the present."246 In looking "beyond the shadowy 
scope of Time," authentic existence thus disrupts its synchronic, 
historical continuum, and thereby "stands out" from itself in an ek-
static present animated by its own finite future. Hawthorne's villains, 
on the other hand, maniacally attach themselves to the infinite omni~ 
potence of an idea, an idea grounded in the impossibility of a future in 
so far as it is unattainable. Forever closed off to possibility, 
Hawthorne's villains live an eternally repetitive present in which 
existence itself has already escaped their grasp. "Dr. Heidegger's 
Experiment" poignantly bears witness to this phenomenon, and .the 
absurdity of its four "melancholy old creatures, who had been unfortunate 
245"The Christmas Banquet," X, p. 287. 
246"The Birth-Mark," X, p. 56. 
in life, and whose greatest misfortune it was, that they were not long 
ago in their graves."247 Dr. Heidegger alone accepts the finitude of 
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Being: "But the doctor's four friends had taught no such lesson to them-
selves. They resolved forthwith to make a pilgrimage to Florida, and 
quaff at morning, noon, and night, from the Fountain of Youth."248 
Hawthorne knew better: "Death . is an idea that cannot easily be 
dispensed with, in any condition between the primal innocence and that 
other purity and perfection, which, perchance, we are destined to attain, 
after travelling round the·full circle."249 
Hawthorne's work is thus decidely existential. In contrast to the 
inauthentic lives of its villains, "which end like literary articles in 
newspapers and magazines, so pompous on page one and ending up in a 
skinny tail, back there on page thirty-two, among advertisements for 
second-hand sales and tubes of toothpaste,"250 Hawthorne's world exhorts 
the free and daring venture of Being. Against the fear and ultimate 
despair of its villains, indicative of "every human existence which 
supposedly has become or merely wills to become infinite,"251 Hawthorne's 
world sets forth a resolute anxiety characteristic of the conversion of 
consciousness, and ontologically grounded in the interior space of Being, 
Pascal's logic of the heart, Hegel's logic of quality. At this most 
inward interior, the space of the world becomes both the public and 
247rx, p. 227. 248rbid., p. 238. 
249"Earth's Holocaust," X, p. 393. 
250cortazar, p. 409. 
251Kierkegaard, "The Sickness Unto Death," in "Fear and Trembling" 
and "The Sickness Unto Death," trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, Princeton Paperback Edition, 1968), p. 163. 
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private expression of a single, unitary structure. As Diderot's famous 
dialogue makes clear: "I'm down here in this world, and I'm staying 
here."252 At home with both himself and the world, man thus creates a 
safety for Being wherein he dwells primordially secure. In his 
solicitous being with others, he articulates an authentic "public" life, 
a life hypothecated in openness and love. Hawthorne's treatment of the 
psychosomatic phenomenon illustrates, for example, the essential public-
ness of life, and prefigures its contemporary relation to the 
psychiatrist's couch. Accordingly, to make one's private "sins" public 
can sometimes cure the disease: witness Roderick Elliston. Similarly, 
Dimmesdale's interior conflict is finally assuaged when he reveals the 
truth of himself on the pillory. Even more persuasively, the entire 
novel is structured by an explicit alternation between public and private 
scenes, between the pillory and the pulpit on the one hand, and the 
interior drama of the heart on the other. In the same way, the avowe~ 
brotherhood at Blithedale reflects the morally untenable nature of those 
distinctions which separate man from man in society, just as the fact of 
the relation between Zenobia and Priscilla mirrors an implicit sisterhood 
decisively more significant than the playful masquerade Zenobia would 
make of it.253 In this respect, Westervelt epitomizes to what extent the 
daguerrean consciousness of the scientific-technological world-view 
manipulatively devastates the solicitous sphere of Being. As a phenom-
enon, Westervelt's control over both Zenobia and Priscilla constitutes 
252nenis Diderot, "Rameau's Nephew," Selected Writings, trans. 
Derek Coltman (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966), p. 140. 
253A. N. Kaul, "The Blithedale Romance," in Hawthorne: A 
Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. N. Kaul (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 158. 
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a peculiarly sinister variation of the technological im-position, which 
makes a delusive show of "spirituality" while really imbued throughout 
with a cold and dead materialism: "it suggests the exploitative power 
which technology was putting into the hands of men: the power to bring 
individuals into total bondage while leaving them outwardly free and 
untouched. against the brotherhood of voluntary love, which is 
based upon the magnetic chain of human sympathy, Westervelt's mesmeric 
union is enforced bondage, destructive of true individuality as well as 
true community."254 In its power of "remote control," the technological 
attitude thus typified by Westervelt reflects the equally remote infinity 
of its far-sighted vision as conclusively as it prefigures the techno-
logical ambition of the twentieth century itself: "Man puts the longest 
distances behind him in the shortest time. He puts the greatest distance 
behind himself and thus puts everything before himself at the shortest 
range."255 And yet, this frantic abolition of all distances brings no 
nearness. "What is least remote from us in point of distance •.. can 
remain far from us. What is incalculably far from us in point of 
distance can be near to us. Short distance is not in itself nearness. 
Nor is great distance remoteness." 256 Solicitously counterpoised 
against the remoteness of the daguerrean view, Hawthorne's work appro-
priates a circumambient milieu which affectively brings man back into the 
nearness of Being, the interior of the heart's inner space wherein 
existence sustains him with its touch. 
254rbid., p. 159. 
255Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 165. 
256rbid. 
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Yet, in its existential constitution, the world of Hawthorne's work 
not only negotiates man's being-with-others, but equiprimordially arti-
culates the unaccommodated "self" as well. Unlike the modern 
philanthropist at the Christmas banquet, "who had become so deeply 
sensible of the calamities of thousands and millions of his fellow 
creatures, and the impracticableness of any general measures for their 
relief, that he had no heart to do what little good lay immediately with-
in his power, but contented himself with being miserable for sympathy,"25J 
whosoever ventures the conversion of consciousness, like Dimmesdale, 
finds peace within himself, and in the resolute anticipation of death. 
Authentic existence enjoys its "self" within its ownmost factical mode as 
"thrown possibility."258 Hawthorne's own life bears the stamp of such an 
authenticity; although he loved to find himself among a circle of guests 
seated about a fire, and while he likewise enjoyed the physical intimacy 
of a crowd, he equally required life's most refreshing moments of 
solitude: "What would a man do, if he were compelled to live always in 
the sultry heat of society, and could never bathe himself in cool 
solitude?"259 This solitude, however, is decidedly not the solitary 
confinement Hawthorne's villains experience at the center of their Being, 
but rather constitutes a genuine enownment of the "self" in face of man's 
most existential problematic. Though unaccommodated in certain respects, 
man always comes up to himself and to the world whenever he obeys the 
saying of the inner recall, and its forward recollection of the single-
257"The Christmas Banquet," X, p. 303. 
258Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 243. 
259The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 26. 
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minded injunction: to thine own self be true. Nevertheless, existence 
is hard work, and brings with it its own demands. As Heidegger expressed 
it: "The hard thing is to accomplish existence."260 The difficulty is 
in the conversion, in going over from the self-assertive domination of 
the head to the work of the heart. And in this most existential of all 
man's acts, he is emphatically alone. Above all else, perhaps, 
Hawthorne's oeuvre expresses this radical solitude, man's indelible sense 
of apartness with which authentic existence must come to terms over and 
against the inauthentic, collective activity of the "they;" the world of 
Hawthorne's work is thus discovered beneath "the superficial, reassuring, 
consoling myths of an America on the road to prosperity and discount 
happiness."261 But neither America nor the world has ever thanked anyone 
for disrupting its comic and conventional myths of the easy life, as 
Apollinaire so thoroughly managed for the twentieth century, in favor of 
the kind of tragic myths which "involve man in a wholly different way, 
thus forcing him to look at himself, not as he appears from his conven-
tional gestures or in retouched and idealized photographs, but upon the 
screen of his own consciousness."262 And so for the most part, 
Hawthorne's age did the best it could; it ignored him. Yet, Hawthorne's 
work arrives out of the future; his world is present to us now, a world 
which discredits the noisy talk and idle chatter of the "they," supplant-
ing, in its stead, the solitude of silence wherein man abides uniquely 
hushed, and listens--to the resolute call of Being. 
260Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 138. 
261Normand, p. 332. 
262rbid., pp. 332-33. 
369 
III 
The tripartite structure of The Scarlet Letter not only conceals a 
deeper structure beneath it, but also reflects one which underpins the 
entire oeuvre, and which functions on a level closely approaching that of 
an obsession. For throughout Hawthorne's work, a single theme persis-
tently surfaces to the top: that of the journey and return. Dimmesdale 
returns to the spot from which he strayed seven years prior; Coverdale 
enters the experiment at Blithedale only to return once again to the 
"world;" Goodman Brown journeys forth from the clearing at dusk and 
returns again at sunrise; the narrator of "The Celestial Rail-Road" re-
enters the space of his dream only to dismiss it at the end with the 
"light" of reason fromwhence it originated; the narrator of "The 
Procession of Life" comes back to his own situation, it is not time for 
death; Feathertop commences the world only to return to the lifeless 
heap from which he began; Roderick finds salvation in being restored to 
the love of Rosina, the wife whom he had originally deserted so many years 
past; the Christmas banquet returns to itself each year, terminated only 
with the death of Gervayse Hastings; Drowne's art reverts to its dull 
mechanical style after his brief interlude with the lady of the wooden 
image; Roger Malvin's curse is lifted only by Reuben's return to the site 
from whence it was incurred; the narrator of "A Virtuoso's Collection" 
forsakes the illusive museum for the "real" world from whence he 
entered; the Gray Champion disappears as suddenly as he appeared; the 
revellers at the may-pole disperse once again to the gloomy world forced 
upon them when driven from their classic groves of fable; cast aside by 
his mother, the gentle boy is again reunited only to lose her in the end; 
Ethan Brand returns to the place from whence his quest for the 
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Unpardonable Sin began; Wakefield comes hom twenty years later to 
discover that the final joke is on him; David Swan interrupts his journey 
with a nap, only to return to the highway of life refreshed but unaware; 
Dr. Heidegger's guests become the shriveled victims of their age prior to 
the experiment; Robin returns from his labyrinthian sweep of the town to 
the ferryman who brought him hence; Nurse Toothaker returns to the bed-
side of the dying man who had originally disclaimed her; the wanderer of 
the "Night Sketches" returns to the fireside; the wives of the dead 
return to their beds; the haunted mind returns to its sleep. The list 
goes on. This obsession with circularity in Hawthorne, to. come round 
again to the beginning, at once attests to both the roundness of his 
oeuvre, and the inevitable end which it implies, for roundness ends 
wherever it begins. The circle is endless only to a geometrician 
grounded in the "viciousness" of his infinity. Life knows better. 
Being is round. Hawthorne's oeuvre was his life; and as his oeuvre, 
Hawthorne's life was round. Hawthorne's life came full circle, and by a 
most uncanny, symmetrical route. "My journey, as thou callest it, forth 
and back again, must needs be done 'twixt now and sunrise."263 It is a 
curious fact, then, that Hawthorne's European travels were thus circular, 
and nearly perfectly so. For from the States (Wayside), Hawthorne 
proceeded to England, France, and Italy; he returned from Italy, to France, 
then to England, and finally back to the States (Wayside). It is a more 
curious fact that the very same ship captain, a Captain Leitch, who took 
him over to England brought him back again. It is a most curious fact 
that Hawthorne's absence from home reflected the same amount of time that 
263"Young Goodman Brown," X, p. 74. 
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Dimmesdale avoided the pillory: seven years. Similarly, there is a 
corresponding relation between Hawthorne's life and the emphasis on time 
in his oeuvre; we discover thus: the early works emphasize the past; the 
ndddle period, the present; and his final period, especially the 
unfinished manuscripts, the future. Suffice it to say in general that 
throughout his life, until those final desparate years, Hawthorne's most 
pressing issue had been expressed most poignant.ly in his preface to the 
Twice-Told Tales: "They are not the talk of a secluded man with his own 
mind and heart, (had it been so, they could hardly have failed to be more 
deeply and permanently valuable,) but his attempts, and very imperfectly 
successful ones, to open an intercourse with the world."264 To open an 
intercourse with the world: Hawthorne's work was the very way out of his 
own personal tendencies toward introspection, what Melville called his 
"indoor cast of mind." 
Where openness, expansion, and a hankering after infinitude are 
characteristic of his contemporaries, Hawthorne sticks to his 
secretiveness, and to the atmosphere of enclosure, the awareness of 
things closing in. The journey ends in a house and within a locked 
room, with the rediscovery of another self for whom it has all been 
a dream; he has never left home. But this does not mean that he 
has never adventured; for there can be cosmic adventure in 
introspection, as much as in exploration.265 
Torn between the androgynous poles of Being, between the "self" and 
"other," Hawthorne's life affirms the deep-seated duality of his nature: 
he was at once both proud and humble, cold and sensuous, sluggish and 
active, conservative and liberal, realistic and romantic. 266 Corre-
spondingly, his life, like his work, reflects the struggle with the 
single-minded injunction: to thine own self be true. Hawthorne's 
struggle with himself articulates his resolutely anxious endeavor to come 
264rx, P. 6. 265Levin, p. 100. 266cowley, p. 551. 
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up to this imperative, an imperative he had imposed upon himself at a 
very tender age--since the time he emerged from the accidental injury to 
his foot--at the age of twelve. 
How difficult it must have been, for example, for Hawthorne to under-
play his gravitation toward Melville and the exotic world this nomad 
offered his profound sensibilities, at the expense of himself and in the 
interest of his wife, Sophia. Since he often confided to his journals 
those experiences which affected him most, the very absence of any 
detailed commentary on Melville speaks for itself. Hawthorne's silence, 
on this point alone, bespeaks a world of critical supposition. Yet, 
Sophia's insistence upon reading everything he committed to paper 
undoubtedly accounts, at least in part, for Hawthorne's reticence, and 
simultaneously points to his solicitous regard for her. He was forced to 
keep many such secrets. And so the journey ended for Hawthorne as it had 
begun, within his indoor cast of mind. His life-long struggle with time, 
and the journey and its return, came home to haunt him. As he expressed 
it at the Wayside, 1863, less than a year before his death: "The Present, 
the Immediate, the Actual, has proved too potent for me."267 In his 
final years, he could no longer sustain the immediacy of that resolutely 
forward recollection which grounded not only the world of his work, but 
his very life--the recollection of the single-minded injunction. As his 
final fragmentary pieces confirm, the issue most at stake had become the 
future. The fragmented consciousness of Dr. Grimshawe's Secret and the 
obsession with immortality, in both Septimius Felton and The Dolliver 
Romance, testify to the dream-like consciousness with which Hawthorne 
267"To a Friend," the dedication piece to Franklin Pierce, Our Old 
Home, V, p. 4. 
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quitted the earth. The concerns of the haunted mind had become his only 
ones; he grew especially weary of the feeling that he had been "here" 
before--the deja vu of going through the same emotions meaninglessly: 
as writers repeat their plots, thus man's life repeats itself, and at 
length grows stale.268 Like the dream-scape of Dr. Grimshawe's Secret, 
in the end everything was comparable to a dream for Hawthorne, an 
unforgotten reality.269 The "flight of time" in Fanshawe which 
characterizes Dr. Melmouth's study, that flight of time so "swift as the 
wind, and noiseless as the snow-flake ... a sure proof of real 
happiness,"270 now weighed heavy on Hawthorne's troubled mind. Death was 
close to him, and he knew it. Yet, it was no surprise; nor could he 
suddenly fear what had informed the most persistent theme of his entire 
oeuvre. Believing, or pretending to believe, that a change of air was 
his only hope for recovery, he determined upon a journey to the region of 
lakes and hills that had been his true native land all his life.271 
Having succumbed in those final barren years to the expectations and 
demands he had set upon himself throughout life, half-way between waking 
and dream, and unable to write, he summoned one last spurt of courage and 
set off, on 12 May 1864, with his dearest friend in life, to die alone--
far from the domestic complications of Sophia and his children to whom he 
had unselfishly devoted his ownmost being. 
Making their way up into the White Mountains, perhaps with the 
expectation of reaching Crawford Notch, the two friends stopped off 
at the little town of Plymouth. Hawthorne seemed to be having more 
and more difficulty in walking and using his hands. Was it 
paralysis or a heart attack? However, on the evening of May 18 he 
268Levin, pp. 97-98. 269rbid. , p. 98. 
270nr, p. 337. 271Normand, p. 77. 
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went off to sleep peacefully enough. Between three and four 
o'clock in the morning of the nineteenth, Pierce went into his 
friend's room, and upon touching him discovered that he was already 
cold. That was how Hawthorne died, at the age of sixty, in the 
completest solitude, his last thoughts, his torments, his doubts, 
and the mystery of his genius locked up forever in his heart.272 
He returned home only in death. At the gravesite, The Dolliver Romance 
was most fittingly placed upon his breast. His heart embraced in death 
what he could not complete in life. 
Being is round. The world is round around the round Being.273 
Being is around the world. We come from nothing and go to nothing; from 
the darkness of the womb, to the darkness of the grave. In between, 
there is only the void which waits to be filled. The conversion of 
consciousness, at the interior of the heart's inner space, takes the 
void as its own and embraces this void with its fullness, the fullness of 
temporality, the ripeness of its own time. The ontological movement in 
Hawthorne's oeuvre, both in and toward the heart's interior, creates a 
safety for Being itself, a security without care, a care-free center 
which turns toward the open draught of Being and into it. In Hawthorne, 
dioramic consciousness begins this movement, wherein man creates a safety 
at the interior of himself, a secure re-pose outside the daguerrean 
objectification of Being, and wherein man reposes in the logic of the 
heart. This unguardedness, outside the protective defenses of the head, 
intimately secures the wholeness of Being around man himself. Dimmesdale 
secures a safety in the daring venture to be himself; his gesture lights 
up the presence of Being and makes it present in its widest orbit, wider 
272rbid., pp. 77-78. 
273cf. Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, pp. 234 and 240, 
respectively. 
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by far than that of the comet, which illumines the night sky and yet 
conceals him. And yet, to Chillingworth, Dimmesdale is now hidden more 
than ever, for under rational analysis the gesture of the heart has 
already taken flight. It is gone. ("Thou hast escaped me!" he repeated 
more than once. "Thou hast escaped me!") 274 Being thus shatters every 
I 
attempt to penetrate it; it turns the calculating im-position backjoward 
its destruction. Even in his dying, Chillingworth turns his back to 
Being; his death becomes the altogether inconstant and null.275 
Reciprocally, Dimmesdale acknowledges where Being touches him most; his 
death becomes the constant and full. His death sets Being on the way of 
its orbit once again; the Letter goes abroad. It too will die--even 
Being. And yet, while Being is, it can be only in so far as man enowns 
it at the center of himself, the interior of his own heart. 
The inner and invisible domain of the heart is not only more inward 
than the interior that belongs to calculating representation, and 
therefore more invisible; it also extends further than does the 
realm of merely producible objects. Only in the invisible inner-
most of the heart is man inclined toward what there is for him to 
love • . • • the interior of uncustomary consciousness remains the 
inner space in which everything is for us beyond the arithmetic of 
calculation, and free of such boundaries, can overflow into the 
unbounded whole of the Open. This overflow beyond number arises, 
in its presence, in the inner and invisible region of the 
heart. • • • The widest orbit of beings becomes present in the 
heart's inner space.276 
Dimmesdale's conversion recalls the abjectness of objects back into the 
space of the heart. It rescues the thing from abjectness and rescues it 
for Being. Dimmesdale's conversion returns the Letter to the world. It 
makes things once again familiar, and man familiar to himself. 
274The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 256. 
275cf. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 125. 
276Ibid., pp. 127-28. 
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Dimmesdale's conversion gives both the thing and man back to Being, and 
does so in such a passionate way that the fullness of Being comes up and 
back to its own within the heart itself. In being returned to its own 
domain, Being, as "being-there" (Dasein), is secured. But how? 
In the saying of the inner recall, Dimmesdale dares Being. The 
round presence of Being is marked off in its being present in the word: 
"Language is the precinct (templum), that is, the house of Being."277 
Dimmesdale accomplishes the return from the realm of objects, and their 
representation, back to the innermost region of the heart's space only in 
this precinct, the temple of Being itself. The Letter flees from its 
abjectness to become language--that is, part of the world--only when 
Dimmesdale accepts the dare to speak. In the saying, the Letter becomes 
its own: 
People of New England! • • . I stand upon the spot where, seven 
years since, I should have stood • • • • Lo, the scarlet letter 
which Hester wears! Ye have all shuddered at it! Wherever her 
walk hath been • . • it hath cast a lurid gleam of awe and horrible 
repugnance roundabout her. But there stood one in the midst of 
you, at whose brand of sin and infamy ye have not shuddered! ••• 
But he hid it cunningly from men, and walked among you with the 
mien of a spirit, mournful, because so pure in a sinful world!--and 
sad, because he missed his heavenly kindred! Now, at the death-
hour, he stands up before you! He bids you look again at Hester's 
scarlet letter! He tells you, that, with all its mysterious horror, 
it is but the shadow of what he bears on his own breast, and that 
even this, his own red stigma, is no more than the type of what has 
seared his inmost heart!278 
Dimmesdale's saying punctuates the silence of the crowd more piercingly 
than even the meteor punctuates the dark fissure of the night; it rends 
the jagged edge of silence away from the void and back to the fullness of 
the world, the fullness of the existent, the fullness of Being. Language 
277Ibid., p. 132. 
278The Scarlet Letter, I, pp. 254-55. 
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makes Being full. "The multitude, silent t:Ul then, broke out in a 
strange, deep voice of awe and wonder, which could not as yet find 
utterance, save in this murmur that rolled so heavily after the departed 
spirit."279 In daring language, Dimmesdale restores Being to its full-
ness; he makes its presence present; and he does so in a saying which 
accomplishes the oneness of the two realms, both head and heart, because 
it has already been turned toward the interior of the heart's inner space. 
"That oneness, as the integral globe of Being, encircles all pure forces 
of what is, by circling through all beings, in-finitely unbounding 
them." 280 Because the saying in-finitely unbounds all beings, it thus 
finitely binds them to themselves, and to themselves alone. Secure within 
themselves, the Being of all beings has thereby been won over. 
Dimmesdale's saying is a saying that recalls the temple of Being to 
itself. Language thence encircles in and through the crowd, bringing 
every being immediately before its own facticity, and at the threshold of 
the temple as well, but only at the threshold; at best, it can but murmur. 
And yet, it is a beginning; it begins to form the work of language on its 
own, the final saying that goes over from the vision of the head to the 
saying of the heart. Dimmesdale's articulate utterance, on the other 
hand, has come round to the temple full circle, and back into it. It has 
already pronounced the round sound itself, and brought it to repose. 
Being is round. 28l Dimmesdale's pronunciation brings the Letter into its 
279rbid., p. 257. 
280Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 136. 
28l"What calm there is in the word round. How peacefully it makes 
one's mouth, lips and the being of breath become round."(Bachelard, The 
Poetics of Space, p. 239.) 
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own, into the fullness of words, into the saying of its discourse. Out 
of the silence comes the sound. The silence and the saying come together; 
together they articulate the spoken. For what is spoken is never, and in 
no language, what is said. 282 The "A" becomes Art, becomes alphabet, 
becomes alpha, becomes beginning; and yet it is itself the end as well. 
It is beginning and end. It has already come round the full circle to 
itself. Dimmesdale's conversion occurs in the poetry of language. It is 
therefore uncommon; it is exceptional. In turning toward the freedom and 
openness of its finitude, it denies the customary im-position of the 
"self" in its everyday, eternal imposture of the "they." Dimmesdale's 
saying makes Being safe, secure; it makes it sound. It is a saying that 
follows something to be said, a saying which is said solely in order to 
say it.283 And in its very saying, it turns away from itself; it turns 
itself toward man: "The more venturesome are those who say in a greater 
degree, in the manner of the singer. Their singing is turned away from 
all purposeful self-assertion. It is not a willing in the sense of 
desire. Their song does not solicit anything to be produced. In the 
song, the world's inner space concedes space within itself."284 As Rilke 
has expressed it in the third of his sonnets to Orpheus (1922): "Gesang 
ist Dasein." Song is existence.285 The more venturesome is thus the 
singer; the singer makes space. He makes the round space for Being. The 
282Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 11. 
283cf. Ibid., p. 137. 284Ibid., p. 138. 
285Rainer Maria Rilke, Sonnets to Orpheus, trans. M. D. Herter 
Norton (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., The Norton Library, 1962), 
p. 20: 
Gesang, wie du ibn lehrst, ist nicht Begehr, 
Nicht Werbung um ein endlich noch Erreichtes; 
Gesang ist Dasein. 
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singer takes the first breath that makes the round space of Being there, 
so that when Being is there, it is the singer (Da-sein). Being and the 
singer are one in the breath which dares to say; and "those who are more 
daring by a breath dare the venture with language."286 And who is this 
singer who ventures more than any other? 
He is the poet, but only the poet "whose song turns our unprotected 
being into the Open." 287 In the saying of the inner recall, Dimmesdale 
takes up the song of the singer and dares to venture forth from the 
everyday nature of man into the round realm of Being. "The converting 
inner recalling is the daring that dares to venture forth from the nature 
of man, because man has language and is he who says."288 Dimmesdale is 
thus the poet whose song sings the round Being itself. And yet, this 
round Being is in no sense thereby handed over to the geometrician, 
whose thinking is exterior to thinking. 289 For Being always comes into 
its completion within the finitude of its own time, and so can never 
enter onto the single, infinite horizon of the geometrician's eternally 
vacant stare. Rather, the simple song which Dimmesdale sings teaches a 
profound lesson in both finitude and solitude, but only to those who 
listen. It is outside the noisy chatter of the "they," and 'therefore 
"to the point." Dimmesdale's song is near and to the point because it 
echoes, amidst the interval of silence, the authentic interrogation, 
Song, as you teach it, is not desire, 
Not suing for something yet in the end attained, 
Song is existence. 
286Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 140. 
287Ibid. 288rbid. 
289cf. Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, p. 233. 
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"What does it mean to be!" It echoes, however, only with another 
question, for the answer is itself already contained in the question. 
Dimmesdale's saying sings the song: "What does it mean to die!" It 
sings the saying with such an immediate frankness that those who are 
talking cannot hear. The saying is therefore like the singer himself: 
"tout rond."290 The roundness of the poet is the roundness of his 
question. The poet Dimmesdale thus sings the saying of the inner recall 
long forgotten since Parmenides: What is the meaning of Being! The 
question, like its meaning, comes round full circle in the solitude of 
the poet who sings it. And the roundness of the question comes back to 
us in his death. Death makes poets of us all. 
Being is round. The time of Hawthorne's oeuvre is now; it is 
present to us in its future. Those with ears may hearken to the 
intimate silence of its void. The silent void of Hawthorne's world 
unnerves us with its strange and alien listening. It is the silence of 
the dark, the silence that echoes a saying, a saying out of a silence 
which is, as night is to darkness, the disembodied shade of silence 
itself. As with Montaigne's essays, Hawthorne's work informs a single 
question; it answers none. It is silent. The question is the saying 
which has long since been forgotten: what does it mean to be! This 
saying of the question has been forgotten because it is too near. For 
this reason, it has been forgotten on purpose. Hawthorne's work disrupts 
the talkative chit-chat of forgetfulness with a silence that remembers 
290In English, the expression betrays to what extent the 
hypocritical tendencies of the scientific-technological world-view 
reflect its manipulatively pre-dominant and psychotically insecure (care-
less) mode of consciousness; for such an earnest openness is never 
"round," but "square." (Cf. Ibid.) 
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what has become remote, and which is near to us now because there is 
nothing in the way. Hawthorne's work takes in a single breath the 
saying of the question what does it mean to be and, in an aspiration 
singly full of sound, creates a world. The world of Hawthorne's work is 
in the poetic saying of its language. The poetic saying of Hawthorne's 
work speaks to us today, and does so within the silence of its 
listening, a listening which echoes the saying of the inner recall to be. 
The poetic saying of Hawthorne's oeuvre "gathers the brightness and 
sound of the heavenly appearances into one with the darkness and silence 
of what is alien. By such sights the god surprises us. In this 
strangeness he proclaims his unfaltering nearness."291 The poetic saying 
of Hawthorne's work brings man back to earth and into the fullness of 
Being. Hawthorne's world is his work; it brings man into the fullness of 
dwelling. Poetically, Hawthorne's oeuvre abides. 
291Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 226. 
SUMMARY 
THE GROUND. The middle ages had conceived of a picture as an impene-
trable surface on which figures and things were depicted. It was not 
until about 1420 that Brunelleschi defined the painting as a plane cross 
section through the pencil of rays connecting the eye of the spectator 
with the objects seen, so that by around 1435 Alberti was able to formu-
late the picture as an imaginary windowpane through which we look out 
into a section of space. Because the Renaissance predicated its 
radically new approach to the visible world upon this neoteric definition 
of artistic construction and representation, the world itself became 
uniformly spatial in so far as it could be geometrically articulated. 
Indeed, this revolutionary technique for graphic representation created 
the very possibility of an objective science; and it is fair to say that 
the subsequent development of all the sciences during the Renaissance was 
directly contingent upon it. To the degree that the world had become 
geometrically spatial, man became an observer--the dis-interested 
spectator of his "view." Similarly, to the extent that the new 
representational technique of perspective delineated the space of an 
"objective" world and created the basis for an "objective" science during 
the Renaissance, it subsequently fostered the metaphysical world-picture 
whereby the subjectum negotiates the world from an un-situated and 
theoretically ubiquitous point of view--that is, outside of it. Once the 
world became transparent, it ceased to be that space where man comes up 
"against" things, and became instead the luminous reflection of 
consciousness. Cartesian metaphysics solidified this position when it 
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defined the existent as objectivity of representation, and truth as 
certainty of representation; as such, the existent is only so long as it 
is set before us as an object, as something calculable and manipulable. 
Similarly, the world became determinate only in so far as man had it in 
his view. This anthropological analysis of the world attained exclusive 
prominence at the end of the eighteenth century and is essentially 
characterized by having a world-view (Weltanschauung). For Newton the 
existent became known as correct or true to the extent that it was 
represented as a refractive condition of the eye; for Kant the existent 
became known as correct or true in so far as it was represented either as 
a determinate concept through the instrumentality of the ~ priori forms 
of the categories of the understanding, or as an indeterminate concept of 
an "aesthetic" object. Thus, both the "scientific" and "intellectual" 
attitudes came to be predicated on the analogous operation of 
re-presentation. 
Blake's disgust with the tradition of Newton and Cartesian dualism 
constitutes a radical break with the eighteenth-century aesthetic and 
metaphysical world-view. He continuously inveighed against the 
scientific-technological objectification of Being. Yet, for the most 
part, his age ignored him. Similarly, the romanticism and transcenden-
talism of the nineteenth century merely transferred the transparency of 
an isolated "cogito" onto the external world itself. Thus, the subject-
object dichotomy remained inherent in any investigation of "reality." 
Although romantic poets rhetorically rejected "rationalism" in favor of 
"feeling," they continued to employ its perceptual bias in so far as they 
appropriated perspective in order to isolate single, emotional states. 
In looking back toward an historical subjectivity, romanticism 
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synchronically framed a whole life in terms of sequential, emotional 
pictures placed in a theoretical perspective. In the same way, Emerson's 
"transparent eyeball" ignored the opaque carnality of existence. In his 
essay "Nature," he invariably relied upon the traditional epistemological 
metaphor of picture-thinking, and its correlative ground in perspective. 
Like the scientific consciousness, Emerson's "reason" defines its scope 
in terms of the infinite and eternal; because it fails to recognize the 
very situatedness of Being, it dis-locates itself from the world it seeks 
to perceive and, henceforth, ascribes to mind what was once the task of 
the body. Truth remains objective in the sense that it is there for all 
to see, it is the object of the mind; and man can know the truth only as 
a completed view already set before him. This attitude represents a 
logical extension of Cartesian metaphysics, wherein the existent as a 
whole forfeits its opacity and becomes visibly transparent--that is, 
invisible. Thus, man gets a view on it, a picture of the whole thing. 
In effect, Emerson no more wished to transact the truth of vision than 
did Descartes, for Emerson's vision, like Descartes' Dioptric, merely 
constructs the visible according to a model-in-thought. Indeed, that 
Emerson uses the word "picture" in his essay to such an excess suggests 
that he recognizes the moment of vision as a fixed, organized image, 
anticipating the daguerreotype by three years. 
If in the history of modern science the advent of perspective 
marked the beginning of a first period, the discovery of the photograph 
culminated the attitude of an age. More than any other invention of the 
nineteenth century, the daguerreotype became the metaphor for technology 
in the public consciousness. In general, the daguerrean view supported 
the publicly biased attachment to technology and its concomitant 
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perceptual prejudice to the extent that it helped "locate" man in the 
universe; it encouraged the fictive time and space which accompanies 
having a world-view, Once man had captured the existent scientifically, 
and done so in a purely "objective" fashion divorced from the partial 
subjectivity inherent in microscopic and telescopic instrumentation, the 
existent was assumed to be "there-before-him" once and for all--that is, 
in the sense we have defined as "rational. 11 In 1849, when Samuel Dwight 
Humphrey sent one of his plates of a multiple exposure of the moon to 
Jared Sparks, Sparks remarked that it revealed the actual motion of the 
earth on its axis, distinctly measured for half a minute's time within 
the space of one-tenth of an inch. Once time and space have been set 
before us as an entirely measurable function, as the kind of thing on 
which we can formulate a perspective, both time and space are 
demonstrated to be calculable and manipulable; they are, in fact, proven 
to be exclusively objective, and to be so "really." The daguerreotype's 
ability to record a direct image of man's "location" with respect to the 
moon and stars asserted man's presence in the universe, and pushed him 
further into the forefront of that frame of reference by which the 
existent as a whole would henceforth be envisioned, manipulated, and 
constituted. The daguerreotype terminated the emphasis which the age 
placed on visual representation and its correlative ability to arrive at 
the truth of nature, and reality in general. Moreover, the dauerreotype 
not only objectified the thing, but the subjectum as well; the 
daguerrean portrait transformed people into things in so far as it 
extended and multiplied the human image to the proportions of mass-
produced merchandise. Nevertheless, whatever "object" it captures, the 
photograph, like the world-view, sets its image before us as ~ view; the 
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spectator simultaneously sets himself apart from the view to the extent 
that it represents a privileged consciousness anterior to perception 
itself. In the sense that the photograph objectified the world, it 
further evidenced the "correctness" of Cartesian metaphysics whereby the 
subjectum knows the object as extended and separate from him in a 
continuous and uniform space according to an a priori rationality or 
fixed perspective. Scientifically, of course, the photograph culminated 
the age of mechanical industrialism. Thus, perspective created the very 
possibility of an objective science. Telescope and microscope had 
further magnified the scientific objectification of the world. But with 
the photograph, the scientific mission had entered a new era which would 
extend the ubiquitous deceit of the camera-eye far into the twentieth 
century itself. Since it was able to capture the interior gestures of 
both matter and mind, the photograph constituted the foundat.ion not only 
for sub-atomic physics, but for the new worlds of endocrinology and 
psychopathology as well. 
When Gertrude Stein said of Picasso that with him pictures 
commenced to want to leave their frames, she prefigured the most 
elementary posture of twentieth-century art in general •. Although the 
twentieth century divinizes the image of life framed by the world-view 
because it remakes technology into the new godhead, its artists have 
relentlessly declared that god is, once and for all, dead. Very simply, 
this means that we can no longer unquestioningly accept the all-embracing 
grace of the ubiquitous vision of science. Rather than envision the 
world as god would see it, twentieth-century art liberates the world for 
man and man for the world; it situates man within the limited point of 
view, the freedom of his own "perspective," and rids him of the 
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cystostic vision of a technology which would control him with the same 
disrespect by which its controls its entire object-world. And this is 
what cubism explicitly proclaimed. Because cubism appreciated the 
spectacle of the world as a certain kinaesthetic situation, it redefined 
the significance of correlative perspective in perception. It thus 
renounced the transparently ubiquitous point of view which always "sees" 
the thing from an ideal perspective, as a mental construct or 
idea--Leibniz's perspectiveless posture. Cubism reformulated the 
phenomenal space of the world, the non-geometrical space in which my 
relation to the thing is constituted by the situation. In so far as the 
"realism" of the photograph is derivative, it tells us' nothing of our 
primordial appropriation of a world. If art were to escape its utter 
subjection to the world-view, it had to rediscover that primary "reality," 
being-in-the-world. Cubism pictorially articulated the primordial 
situatedness of Being prior to its intussusception by a malignant 
theoretical optics. It reversed the traditional perspective of 
Euclidean space. Even before cubism, modern painting had definitively 
disclaimed Euclidean space as an ~ priori. The images of Seurat and 
Rousseau transact the "interior" space of the world; as formal or 
phenomenal spaces they are naive only to the extent that there is no 
"room" for an impersonal object. By manipulating its foreground as the 
embolic function of an expressive depth, modern painting apprehended the 
object in its phenomenal space, one which in-corporates the spectator, 
takes him in, envelops him. Because it does not set the perceiver apart, 
as a viewer, its expressive space emancipates it from the frame. Yet, 
in their insubordination to the emmetropic delineation of reality, modern 
painters were not alone. 
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Just as in painting the composition commenced to leave its frame, 
so it was with the musical composition as well; for with "atonality" or 
"antitonality," as Stravinsky preferred to call it, the tonal function 
of chords escaped the frame of the diatonic system. Similarly, with 
Apollinaire, Proust, and Ibsen, the poem, novel, and play abandoned the 
narrative and temporal continuity which had informed the basic structure 
of literary art since the Renaissance "rediscovered" Aristotle. Thus, 
by rejecting the lineality of a continuous and uniform perspective-
space, modern art exploded that most elemental bias which had plagued 
Western civilization for more than four centuries. In returning to the 
expressive composition of the work, modern art abrogated the subject-
object dichotomy constituted and sustained by the principles of 
resemblance, imitation, and representation. By virtue of a trans-
position, either juxtaposition or superimposition, modern art escaped 
the continuous and uniform perspective of "transition." We no longer 
observe the art work from a pre-determined distance, as a view, but touch 
it by entering onto its space. To the extent that modern art brings all 
of its "elements" equally into the foreground so that something is "in 
front" or "in back" of something else only in so far as the gaze of the 
"perceiver" distinguishes it as such, the art work enters onto the world 
as an incomplete "gestalt" which demands to be completed in order to be 
experienced at all. In its demand to be completed, modern art asserts 
an ontological priority in time, not space, and appropriates this 
significance in so far as the motion becomes identical with its 
completion. The transposition of modern art thus constitutes what today, 
in effect, we call "montage." For the twentieth century, as for the 
Renaissance, it was art which once again preceded science and technology, 
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and their most significant product since the daguerreotype--the "motion" 
picture. The motion in modern art prefigured cinematic montage and its 
purely transitional nature--temporal juxtaposition. Modern art not only 
opened onto the revolutionary form of the film and its subsequent techno-
logical development, but once again laid the ground for all of the 
seminal advances in the science and technology of the twentieth century. 
It created, in fact, the very possibility of a "post-modern" physics 
some fifty years ahead of its time. For what, after all, is the space 
of the electron, wherein it concurrently travels through two or more 
different routes without traversing the space between them at all, if not 
the pre-objective, "behavioral," situated space of being-in-the-world? 
It is nothing less than the expressive space of modern art. The post-
modern physicist is subsequently encouraged to talk about a theory in 
terms of its "elegance," rather than its "truth." And in so doing, he 
has at last returned to a world of beauty, the very world of art from 
whence he originally emerged during the Renaissance. As it did when 
Einstein introduced his theory of relativity and Heisenberg his 
principle of indeterminacy, the world henceforth runs the risk of 
continually being upset--indeed, reappropriates the very principle of 
chaos as part of its ground. The perceptually biased "defense 
mechanisms" of optical perspective are, at last, de trop. 
THE FIGURE. For the nineteenth century, the daguerreotype appreciably 
offset the temporal and spatial displacement caused by the latest 
technology; for it securely located man within the perspective 
co-ordinates of his world-view. Yet, violent technical innovation 
engenders alienation and the pain of isolation in any age. Hawthorne's 
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fiction definitively expresses the alienation and pain of isolation which 
his own age experienced. Hawthorne's fiction condemns the unconscious 
bias of perception of his own culture, and thus opens the possiblity of 
new perceptions with respect to the counter-environment or "world" of the 
fiction itself. Hawthorne's fiction speaks against the age. What he 
most generally disliked about his age was its attitude toward the visual 
sense, an attitude which overwhelmingly reflected the major concern of 
his day as it appeared vis-\-vis technology--specifically, the 
"daguerrean" or world-view. Grounded in finite temporality, Hawthorne's 
descriptive gaze never gives us the whole picture any more than the mind 
is able to grasp the meaning and value of Being within a single and 
systematic mental equivalent. Hawthorne's emphasis on feeling, 
sensibility, and interiority reflects his reaction to the prevalent 
"rationalism" of his day, and appropriates, in its place, the changing 
appearance of each object with respect to the temporality of perception 
itself. The scientific frame of reference provided Hawthorne with 
images which enabled him to interiorize the world afresh in order to 
communicate with it, to rediscover its primordial texture and consistency 
rather than describe its popularly accepted fixation in physical, 
chemical, and biological laws. Hawthorne's external objects 
consistently defy their abstracted theoretical frame: the Letter, the 
House, the Faun, the serpent, the ribbon, the maypole, the veil, the 
lime-kiln--all these objects signify, in fact, the interior enownment 
of a world, partial elements of a spatial configuration, the personal 
completion of a structural "gestalt" within a subject. For Hawthorne, 
an object is "objective" only to the extent that it perceptually informs 
the partial aspect of a "field." Indeed, in the most basic sense of the 
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term, all of Hawthorne's symbols are, in fact, emblems. They exist 
within a spatial configuration, and appear as "figures11 against an 
ambiguously indeterminate "ground. 11 Thus it is with Hawthorne's greatest 
symbol, the scarlet letter. Hawthorne's fiction abrades the traditional 
descriptive distance; we find ourselves in a revolutionarily unique 
landscape where the immediate encroaches so entirely upon our perceptual 
field that we can scarcely obtain a perspective at all. Like the cubists, 
Hawthorne's descriptive gaze transforms the object into a set of 
synecdochic oscillations whose visual orientation strives toward maximum 
determinateness. It obtains only in so far as the perceiver "completes" 
it himself. This technique is clearly cinematic, and prefigures the 
changing angle, variable perspective, and repertoire of variously focused 
"shots" indicative of the highly sophisticated "motion" picture of the 
twentieth century. 
Hawthorne's changing light manifests this perceptual "distance" as 
an expressive function of the gaze itself. Our proximity to any given 
figure in the field is solely predicated upon the descriptive intention 
to "take it up." Because description discloses the affective aspect of 
an object, its perceptual appropriation primordially reflects an 
intentional "motion" in the subject, and not the representational 
determination of an object as such. Thus, in Hawthorne, distance 
invariably constitutes the expressive completion of a figure against a 
background, and not the static and fixed pictorialism of photographic 
perspective. Hawthorne's variable lighting alters the discovery of its 
objects according to the changing situatedness of the perceiver. Unlike 
daguerrean representation, which seeks to bring into sharp focus the 
entire content of its frame, Hawthorne's emblematic field, grounded in 
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darkness itself, merely suggests the incomplete outlines of its figures 
as they are intermittently elucidated by the perceptual intention to take 
them up. For every object the gaze investigates, it simultaneously 
forfeits its hold upon the other objects in its field; they, in turn, 
slip away or fade back toward the obscure periphery from whence they 
originated. Like the modern art work, Hawthorne's descriptive gaze 
brings the object out of its predetermined location and to the surface. 
It explodes the predetermined objectification of a reality transparently 
and uniformly illuminated by the scientific vision, which would impose 
its own inflexibly rigid structure in order to manipulatively dominate 
the delimited content of its fixed and sterile view. The world of 
Hawthorne's fiction passionately defrays the inordinate cost of an 
objectively neutered universe and its bankrupt vision, in favor of a 
polar and metamorphic reality situated in the personal glance of a 
perceiver. Amidst this sexually ambiguous world, Hawthorne's gaze enowns 
the interiority of its objects as they in turn reconstruct the 
subjective consciousness perceiving them. Perceptually grounded in the 
mutability of time, the object refuses the absolute determination 
assigned to it by the formal and spatial priority of the world-view. The 
inter-play of light and shade, of reflected and refracted light against 
an obscure backdrop of black, allowed Hawthorne to populate his universe 
with objects interiorized by the opacity of human consciousness itself. 
Hawthorne's Faustian gaze dared to see reality differently than his age 
would have him view it; rather than intellectually codify the images of 
experience, he ventured into its primordial chaos in order to resurrect 
the very body of the world itself, a body whose physical and opaque 
carnality had long since been discarded by the disembodied image of 
daguerrean perspective, the flat projection of the scientific and 
technological world-view. 
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Yet, if Hawthorne's indirect lighting were to articulate the 
objects of an emblematic gaze so that they virtually protrude to touch 
us, he would have to project a personal and concrete field which inter-
penetrates every experience of his world, and concomitantly allows for 
the inter-sensory unity of every "thing" in that world. In other words, 
Hawthorne's emblematic gaze required a means at his disposal by which he 
could capture the reality of the world of his vision, and his 
appropriation of the emblem itself partially accomplished that task, for 
in the emblematic technique he discerned that indeterminate field whicQ 
insinuates the object and perceptually enables it to come to life. The 
depth of Hawthorne's vision, however, demanded something more; and he 
unearthed that key in the diorama. For Hawthorne, the diorama 
represented the most expressively intense perceptual model of how we 
primordially articulate the world. What best characterizes the dioramic 
experience is its ability to absorb a reflective identity via the 
circumambient darkness constitutive of the precondition for involvement. 
Just as silence constitutes the ground of all communication, darkness 
makes it possible. Darkness is immanence; it recreates the interior of 
Being, the way in which the world makes its first appearance. Dioramic 
darkness engages the spectator-reader by surrounding him, and thus 
establishes the specific situatedness by which a percipient makes the 
birth of Being possible in the first place. Reciprocally, because it 
encloses the spectator within the immediacy of its own perceptual 
re-enactment, this dioramie darkness concurrently generates the creation 
of a self-sufficient world. In fact, the spectator-reader has already 
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been put into the situation by virtue of the presencing temporality of 
those images which spontaneously appear amidst the ground of chaotic 
darkness, and are already on the way toward a determinate order. Thus, 
Hawthorne's images are essentially cinematic. Against the enclosing 
dark, the cinematic image "takes shape," and prematurely stands out 
against this indeterminate field. This perceptual, physical blackness 
which pervades Hawthorne thus yields the key that unlocks not only the 
perceptual habit of Hawthorne the man, but also discloses the interior, 
self-sufficient world of his oeuvre. If the reflective attitude sustains 
its space by thinking the illuminated relation of its parts, the pre-
reflective interior of dioramic darkness, on the other hand, unites me to 
an affective space precisely because it intimately merges with the 
surface of my body, and threatens to absorb the very reflective identity 
which can always disperse it by "turning on the lights." Because it 
constitutes a dimension in which I am entirely enveloped, darkness thus 
recreates the depth of an interior space wherein I am perceptually 
situated at all times. Without anchor in externally objective 
co-ordinates, Hawthorne's dioramic darkness grounds the world of his work 
in the ambiguous affectivity of a subject, that zone of not-being-in-front-
of whereby things are primordially able to come to light, and, on the 
descriptive level, provides the very darkness necessary in the cinema in 
order to show up the performance. 
However, if dioramic space can be distinguished from the daguerrean 
view in so far as it essentially envelops us rather than spreading its 
content out before us, and therefore outside of us, it also distinguishes 
itself on another equiprimordially meaningful level. If Hawthorne 
discovered, in the diorama, the cirumspective black in which the shape of 
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his images could make their first appearance, he also detected an 
interior "motion" by which they unfold before us and come to life. In 
the juxtaposition or, more properly speaking, the "transposition" of his 
images, we find Hawthorne's brilliant cinematic vision most pronounced. 
While the internal composition shapes the significant content of 
Hawthorne's image, it simultaneously determines those images which 
precede and succeed it, for the sequence of his imagery is predicated 
on the pre-reflective motion of perception, that motion in the visual 
field which "makes sense" of the objects it discovers. Hawthorne's 
cinematic "shots" constantly alter in proportion to the extent of their 
discovery, for they continuously suit or accommodate the transfigurative 
motion of perception, the discernment of variously changing figures 
against an indeterminate ground. In the diorama, Hawthorne had already 
discovered montage. Because it transcends or trans-forms the individually 
framed images which produce it, montage creates the illusion of motion. 
Hawthorne employed the literary equivalent of montage in order to create 
a similar kind of motion in the mind's eye. His images continually 
manipulate the affective distance between spectator and scene not only as 
a function of space, but also in time. Hawthorne's editorial technique 
of "cutting" and "splicing" directly regulates and modifies the tempo in 
which his images appear. Most often, his visual effects do not demand 
fast cutting. Indeed, in many instances, fast cutting would ruin the 
desired effect, for the movement is frequently located within the image 
and virtually demands a fixed, consistent camera-viewpoint. Thus, 
Hawthorne's strong, eloquent arrangements between successive images and 
within the single image (mise-en-sc~ne), invites stylistic comparison 
with Eisenstein, especially his later style in Ivan the Terrible, where 
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he had already evolved away from a rapid cutting style to a slow, 
elaborate pic torialism. Li.ke the later Eisenstein, Hawthorne's 
predominant tempo is slow; slow motion, delayed and deliberate cutting, 
these most suitably accommodate his preferred themes, especially that of 
the processional. If point of view determines the correlation between 
foreground and background, it is more readily understandable why 
Hawthorne prefers a slower movement between successive images, rather 
than a rapid cutting style, for it gives him more time to create an 
ambience, to animate the scene, to linger, to suggest--the speed, in 
short, which allows the most extensive interchange between foreground 
figures and background objects. Hawthorne's imagery is thus clearly 
cinematic; its interior motion reflects an intentional subjectivity 
beneath perception which not only accounts for the birth of a world, but 
also sustains the reality of that world. He anticipated the modern 
cinema by more than half a century, and in that process he prefigured the 
articulation of an affective spatial depth wherein perception primordially 
transpires. 
Moreover, if Hawthorne's dioramic gaze enabled him to reveal an 
indeterminate world no longer constituted by the daguerrean frame or 
world-view, it simultaneously structured a consciousness which was itself 
ambiguously circumvoluted. Because cinematic consciousness projects a 
space which comes and goes, it subsequently creates an iconology whose 
jagged edges split and tear the image rather than seal it off. At the 
interior of this disconnected, unenclosed consciousness, Hawthorne 
heuristically interrogates the meaning or significance of those 
apparitions which inhabit the world of his work. The world of Hawthorne's 
work previews the purely apparitional space of cinema and its irreverent 
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disregard for objectivity by re-incorporating appearance and reality. 
The cinematic vision expresses the immediacy of its apparitions. Grounded 
in facticity, Hawthorne's world is thus formal only in so far as it is 
phenomenal; because it has no framework fixed in a physical or pictorial 
space, but merely structures the mobile reticulation of intention, it 
thus asserts, as its primary formal characteristic, a virtual present. 
It is in the mode of dream. Hawthorne's fiction characteristically evokes 
a dream mode, a mode which like all of modern art brings its elements 
equally into the foreground. The dream provided Hawthorne with a 
diastolic counterbalance to the ponderous systole of rationalism and its 
synchronic historical perspective. Hawthorne explicitly reconstructed 
the logic of dream consciousness in order to undermine the arrogant and 
manipulative certitude of the daguerrean view, thus undercutting the 
subject-object dichotomy itself. Against the transparency of scientific 
certitude, Hawthorne's fiction asserts the ambiguous concealedness of 
truth and its corresponding epistemological appropriation by a factical 
subjectivity which must call it into Being. By re-establishing the 
primacy of the phenomenon, Hawthorne's dream-like vision returns to the 
immediate order of apparitions as they make their. first appearance in 
consciousness, and by which the world in turn originally announces 
itself. The dream enabled Hawthorne to structure a vision of the world 
primordially grounded in appearance, a vision indistinguishable from the 
"reality" it is presumed to re-present. Reality becomes the oblique 
transformation of appearances, a lived-through structure whereby man's 
facticity announces itself anew. For Hawthorne, the dream mode thus 
cancelled out the abstracted and theoretical logic of second-order 
consciousness; the truth of the world no longer obtains from its non-
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contradictory agreement within a fixed and sterile mental perspective of 
correct and true ideas. Indeed, dream even distorts the "probable," that 
quantitative security-blanket by which the masses live their lives 
mathematically. 
Hawthorne's interior world of dream translates the dioramic gaze 
into the subjective realm of metaphysics as an analogous model of logic. 
In contrast to the mediate, reflective consciousness of the rational 
attitude, this new interior consciousness reveals a logic immediately in 
touch with Being. Only outside Being does man objectify the object; 
within the concernfully solicitous sphere of his existence, the object is 
objective only in so far as it "objects." Hawthorne's ontological turn 
toward the interior of Being discloses a logic which converts the 
immanent objectness of consciousness into the heart's innermost region. 
Within this intimate space, the heart takes up the things of the world 
as they proximally express the nearness of Being. That the remoteness of 
Being, which the perspective of the scientific-technological world-view 
takes for granted, represents the most pressing dilemma of a visual 
culture is already indicated in the growing sense of division between 
appearance and reality; thus, in conjunction with its afo.rementioned 
evils, the perspective of a world-view also introduced an obsession with 
the problem of hypocrisy. Hawthorne's oeuvre, on the other hand, seeks 
to direct or turn consciousness away from itself, and back to a single-
minded injunction long forgotten since Socrates. And it is now 
remembered in the same way that we recall a friend who was once dear to 
us. At the same time, this injunction evokes a general image which 
initially hovers before the world of Hawthorne's work, and which 
completes the work itself. And though Hawthorne's metonymic iconology 
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manipulates its "space" so that it freely moves about, his interior 
consciousness and its corresponding logic of the heart's inner space 
nevertheless creates an intimate and unified bearing toward the world of 
his work, a bearing spiritedly at odds with the continuous and fixed 
attitude of the world-view. It is this intimate and unified bearing 
which recalls the single-minded injunction long since forgotten: "to 
thine own self be true!" This imperative so innnediately undercuts the 
hypocritical duality of the world-view that its recognition at once 
illuminates the deceitful disposition of the technological attitude and 
its attendant evils. By being true to himself, man can at last learn to 
accept the reciprocal "reality" of appearance and its formal relation to 
the structure of the world. Hawthorne's oeuvre attests this fact, and 
solicits the truth of Being within the ambiguous openness at the interior 
of the heart's inner space. Hawthorne's work accomplishes this venture 
by transforming the technological dominion of purposeful self-assertion 
in the objective into the saying of an inner recall; and it inaugurates 
this transformation with the single-minded injunction. Once Being has 
been dared this way, it now lies in the balance. The world of Hawthorne's 
work safely negotiates this balance once it executes the saying of the 
inner recall. In going over from the calculating will to the interior of 
the heart, the world's inner space, the conversion of consciousness is 
therein complete, whereby consciousness secures itself for Being. Thus, 
the conversion of consciousness at the interior of Hawthorne's world 
appropriates a "physics of the exception" rather than the rule; it 
care-fully takes man beyond the protective rule of uniformity toward 
that interior space which bears the personal and unique stamp of Being. 
Ultimately, Hawthorne's work accomplishes this conversion within the 
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precinct or temple of Being itself, within the solicitous sphere of 
language. In the saying of the inner recall, Being is at last liberated 
for man and for itself. Grounded in the single-minded injunction, 
Hawthorne's oeuvre speaks against the age. It was only the destitution 
of his own age which, unaware of what it was doing, prevented Hawthorne's 
work from becoming timely. Yet, Hawthorne's oeuvre arrives out of the 
future; the future is present in it. The world of Hawthorne's work is 
present to us now. It returns man to the solicitous sphere of Being in 
which he most primordially dwells, the temple of language. The world of 
Hawthorne's work reposes in the poetry of its saying. Poetically, 
Hawthorne's oeuvre abides. 
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